

SOE, IASI-CHIȘINĂU OFFENSIVE AND COUP D'ETAT FROM AUGUST 23, 1944

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Abstract: Between 1941-1944, S.O.E. (Special Operation Executive) activity in Romania depended heavily on the collaboration with Maniu and P.N.T (National Peasant Party -Partidul National Țărănesc). In order to improve its activity, S.O.E. has taken steps to create a reliable communication channel between S.O.E. residents in Istanbul and Bucharest. The connections between the residence in Istanbul and the S.O.E. network in Romania were made through the connections of Switzerland and Turkey or through the transmitters sent to Istanbul, Ankara and Cairo, or through radio and radio transmissions launched by the parachute. Our study aims to find the connection between the S.O.E. activity in Romania, the Soviet Iasi-Chisinau offensive and the coup d'etat on August 23, 1944.

Keywords: S.O.E., Soviet offensive, Romania, coup d'etat

1. Introduction

In September 1940, Chastelain met the peasant leader in Rică Georgescu's house and agreed to work with the S.O.E., but asked Churchill personally to guarantee Romania's integrity and the restitution of northwestern Transylvania [1].

The list of Chastelain's agents published by Mr. Buzatu includes 39 names, from which the most famous are Iuliu Maniu, Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu, Alexandru Crețianu and Niculescu Buzzești [2].

Regarding Maniu's action, we found interesting to present an informative note from the Hungarian vice-consulate in Brasov from November 14, 1940. According to this document, at the beginning of November Maniu visited General Antonescu and told him that the victory of the Axis is not certain at all, and Romania had to prepare for the alternative of a British victory, so it was necessary to have a second political set which, if necessary, would determine Romania's transition to the sphere of British

influence. Antonescu said he would make sure that the authorities looked at Maniu's action kindly [3].

At a meeting, called the S.O.E. - Foreign Office, in February 1941, the representatives of the S.O.E. informed that after the departure of the members of the legation from Bucharest, their program in Romania depended on the cooperation with Maniu [4].

An S.S.I. (Romanian Secret Intelligence Service) note reported that on February 12, 1941, Corneliu Coposu visited the British Legation. According to the note, Coposu was a liaison between Iuliu Maniu and Reginald Hoare [5].

Upon departure, Hoare left the leader of the P.N.Ț. a transmission device. The British hoped that Maniu would take over the subversive actions in Romania. But the peasant leader, although pressured by the S.O.E. in 1941-1942 to stage sabotages, he responded to British insistence that they were useless because they would attract

German retaliation and tighten German control [6].

2. Contacts Tozan -Maniu

After the fall of Rică Georgescu network, the connection with Maniu became quite difficult. S.O.E., tried a collaboration with the N.K.V.D. Thus, in October 1941, the S.O.E. established contacts with a N.K.V.D. agent from Istanbul, Baklanov, who was acting as assistant secretary of trade at the Soviet Embassy in Ankara. The collaboration turned out to be one-sided, and the British interrupted it in February 1942, when Baklanov did not keep his promises on untrue grounds. S.O.E. resorted to the Turk Satvet Lufti Tozan, who was Finland's honorary consul in Istanbul who agreed to do courier services for the S.O.E. Tozan had several meetings with Maniu during which he received \$ 40,000 and informed Tozan that he had collaborated with strong military and civilian groups, and that the scene was ready for revolt. He conditioned the success of his revolt, however, by obtaining an Anglo-Russian guarantee that Romania would not be occupied by Soviet troops and asked S.O.E. if this could be achieved to make this known throughout Romania through brochures thrown from the plane [7].

The P.N.T. president sent Tozan information about the German General Headquarters, which included data on Generals Keitel, von Bock and von Brauchitsch. On his return to Istanbul, Tozan reported to Masterson that Mihai Popovici and Maniu estimated their financial needs to organize subversive actions in favor of the British, at about 800 to 900 million lei. Maniu received only a part of the amount until the end of the war [8].

Tozan returned to Romania on the morning of March 14, 1942. He took two cars with him, one containing a large quantity of tobacco as a gift for the Finnish troops on the Russian front. In the cigarette boxes were hidden some of the materials for Maniu, a quantity of precious stones and

foreign currency, questionnaires, signal plans and cipher.

He arrived in Bucharest at the end of March, where he managed to hand over to Maniu the W/T device, cash, precious stones, questionnaires, signal plan and cipher. From there he continued to Budapest, where he was arrested [9].

Although Maniu was then ready to reorganize and restore communications with Istanbul, the W/T machine did not issue, the answers to the S.O.E. questionnaires were not received, to the exasperation of the Foreign Office. In 1942, through the questionnaires they sent to Iuliu Maniu, the British asked for information about the Romanian Army operating in a certain district. The British had no military base to fight the Romanians. The problem was that they transmitted such information to the Soviets. There was a S.O.E.-N.K.V.D. cooperation protocol, which presupposed the existence of S.O.E. representations in Moscow (led by Brigadier General George Alexander Hill and N.K.V.D. in London (led by Colonel Ivan Chichaev) [10]. This led to the activity of Iuliu Maniu's men in the area of betrayal. Arrested in Budapest, Tozan was initially sentenced to death, but following the S.O.E. intervention, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, but he was eventually released [11].

3. Ranji-Autonomous missions

Towards the end of 1942 and the beginning of 1943, the British secret services intensified their pressure on the leader of the P.N.Ț. to take action.

It was decided to send a mission called "Ranji", led by Major David Russel, to Yugoslavia, which was to arrive in Romania and contact Maniu [12].

On the night of June 15, Russel, accompanied by radio operator Nicolae Turcanu, was parachuted into Yugoslavia. They were ordered to enter Romania in order to "open a radio-telegraphy communication channel, to establish

contact with Maniu's organization and prepare a parachuting area in the Romanian Carpathians" [13].

On September 4, Russel was reportedly killed for gold coins that any British agent on a mission had on him. After Russel's death, Alecu Ionescu brought Țurcanu to Bucharest and installed him in an apartment on Protopopescu Street [14].

On November 9, 1943, Maniu notified to the British that he wished to send a special delegate out of Romania, in order to discuss arrangements for a political change in that country. After consultations with Moscow and Washington, London agreed, notifying to the leader of P.N.Ț. that the emissary's only function was to discuss the operational details for the overthrow of Antonescu's regime and its replacement with a government ready to accept unconditional surrender[15].

In order to accelerate the negotiations, the "Autonomous" mission formed by Gardyne de Chastelain, Ivor Porter and Silviu Mețianu was sent to Romania [16] This mission failed and was captured a few hours after the parachuting. By mutual agreement with Vasiliu, Cristescu and with the approval of Mihai Antonescu, a credible legend was arranged for the three to be told to the Germans in case they requested to participate in the investigation.

From the investigation of the three, Cristescu failed to find out the true purpose of the Autonomous mission that the British officers probably did not know either. Today, it is known that the British used contacts with the opposition and the Romanian government to confuse the German army. The operation was codenamed "Bodyguard" and managed to persuade the Germans to maintain troops in the Balkans to allow the Allies to land in Normandy [17] On April 2, Maniu met with Chastelain in the Andronache Forest. The meeting with Maniu lasted more than an hour and gave Chastelain the opportunity to pressure the peasant's leader to take action. Maniu replied that his plan is complete and in a few days a coup d'état will take place.

In his report about the mission in Romania, Chastelain claimed that he did not know how much truth was in Maniu's words but he considered that the Anglo-American air raid from April the 4th must have ruined any plan that Maniu might have had [18] The civilian losses were high causing such resentment to the population that the success of any coup d'état was excluded [19].

4. Colonel Black's scheme

In May 1943, Cătălin Vlădescu-Olt, the vice-consul of Romania in Istanbul, presented S.O.E. the document known as Colonel Black's Scheme.

This was a politico-military coup plan in which one of the leading figures was General Sănătescu, who had been dismissed from command by Antonescu, due to criticism of his government's policy of waging war on USSR territory. At this stage, Sănătescu had been introduced to the Palace according to Caranfil's plan to infiltrate trusted people into key positions.

The plan called for some air support from Allied aircraft, but was not given the attention it deserved by the Allies. According to "Black", the group consists of three generals - Nicolescu, Protopeanu and Sanatescu - but details about what forces could count was missing. These details were sent to Istanbul to Chastelain by the Romanian Vice-Consul, Victor Caranfil, and at the end of October.

In the early 1944, Vlădescu-Olt was able to provide additional S.O.E. details. The generals did not want to surrender directly to the Russians, but preferred to surrender to a British force by one or two thousand paratroopers, commanded by a senior British officer.

Vlădescu-Olt claimed that the group could count on half a million soldiers, who were only lightly armed and with a few armored vehicles.

It was not until February 12, 1944, that a memorandum about the planned coup d'état, from the British Embassy in Washington was sent to the State

Department for Admiral William Leahy, the US Chiefs of Staff coordinator.

The memorandum explained that the document described a proposal made to the S.O.E. by the Romanian vice-consul in Istanbul, on behalf of certain Romanian military elements which were ready to overthrow Antonescu by the help of a coup d'état in the name of the king.

The Memorandum indicated the desire of the British government to find out the views of the U.S. (United States) government on the proposal. The State Department tended to cast doubt regarding the probability of its possible maturity. The memorandum mentioned that the group's spokesman was a colonel in command of a regiment of 1,300 soldiers from Bucharest and it also added that two or three generals were connected to the plan. It was known, however, that several generals in leadership positions could not be considered for support. Officers supporting the coup d'état were ready to start a riot as soon as His Majesty's government agreed to send [a] high-ranking officer with a force of 1,000 to 2,000 paratroopers to the Eastern Front, where, together with the Russian Command, would receive the unconditional surrender of the Romanian army: 'the generals insisted on the presence of a British parachute force. S.O.E. hoped to get in touch with the group soon, but the memorandum appeared "embryonic".'

The British information was communicated on the same day - February 8 - to the Russians when the British ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr left a note about the plan in an audience with Molotov's deputy, Dekanozov. The ambassador explained that His Majesty's government doubted its chances of success.

Planning was in its infancy and the figure of half a million soldiers who could argue the coup d'état seemed an exaggeration.

However, his government would be grateful to have the Soviet government's opinion on the coup d'état. In the

meantime, the British would not take any action [20].

In S.O.E.'s final report about the operation in Romania it is shown that the coup d'état of August 23, 1944 was in fact Colonel Black's scheme as presented by Vladescu-Olt and Caranfil [21].

5. Cairo's negotiations. Moscow's position.

On April 30, 1944, Molotov sent a telegram to London in an aggressive tone accusing the British of plotting against the Soviets in Romania. Churchill retaliated harshly, dismissing all accusations, but at the end of his response, he reminded the Soviet prime minister: *"I also told you that we consider you the first violin in terms of Romanian policy, based on the conditions of capitulation on which we agreed, subject to my concern about compensation"* [22].

The British considered Molotov's protest unfounded because they had informed Novikov, the Soviet representative in Cairo, about this mission immediately after its capture by the Romanians in December 1943.

On May 5, 1944, Eden proposed a fair to Ambassador Gusev, as Greece was in the British control zone, the British were asking Moscow for support for their policy there, just as London was willing to help the Soviets with U.S.S.R. (Soviet Union) in Romania. Two weeks later, Gusev communicated Moscow's acceptance to Eden, on condition that the U.S. approve this agreement [25].

On June 1, Lord Moyne, Novikov, and MacVeagh met and agreed to hand over a statement to Romanian emissaries declaring that the extension of the negotiations was no longer a purpose and that the negotiations were considered closed. If Maniu wanted to take advantage of the armistice conditions offered, he had to send an officer to the front to contact the Red Army [23].

On June 3, 1944, Vișoianu sent a telegram to Crețianu informing him about the following existing situation in Cairo :

1. The solidarity between the allies is perfect and the terms of the armistice are agreed in their entirety by all; Vișoianu also states that the initiative was left to the Soviet delegate, because in fact the war is being waged with his country and he must negotiate with him if Romania changes its political orientation and wants to conclude peace. Maniu's remarks did not make a very bad impression in the first instance, except for the remarks about Bessarabia, which from the beginning were completely eliminated by all the allies. Bessarabia was seen not only as one of the major conditions of the armistice but also as the sole basis for a political agreement with the U.S.S.R. It is considered that the return of Transylvania to Romania is a great compensation for the loss of Bessarabia. Vișoianu remarked that for any responsible politician - even assuming that he would accept all the terms of the armistice - it would be difficult to declare that he accepts the loss of Bessarabia and if he did he would be so vulnerable to attacks by opposing propaganda that he would endanger the whole operation of political change. It was replied that since we already know the terms of the armistice we can go before the coup d'état and then adopt a proper attitude towards these terms and find a formula to follow a conduct related to territorial issues in the most appropriate way.

2. The delegate of Great Britain is in complete agreement with his Soviet colleague and did not in any case consider the possibility of any change in terms which even his boss declared in a speech given in the House of Commons as being "fair and equitable", Romanians must understand that the main goal of his country's policy is to win the war, and the alliance with the U.S.S.R.

is fulfilling this, as its leader pointed out. Moreover, their cooperation on the Peace Treaty will go beyond secondary issues, such as our observations given for their great common interest in other parts of the world. Bessarabia is the condition no. 1 of

the present and future understanding with them. However, the Romanians should not have had any illusions about this result.

3. Everywhere it is believed that large combined operations are imminent and change in Romania must take place without delay, so that we can benefit from this change since the whole world wants to make an Armistice. Vișoianu considered that the change in Romanian policy will be more effective if it is closely connected with Allied military operations, it is desirable that this coordination should be taken into account and for this reason it could be requested that the coup leaders send an officer to contact the Soviets. It is understandable that change in Romania will be easier and probably more useful if it were part of the allied operations plan in the Balkans. It is not the Romanians who change the allied military strategy. Air support by bombing several targets indicated by the coup d'état will probably be considered but also in agreement with the Soviets. The opposition must not confuse desires with reality.

Any request addressed separately to the Western allies not only has no chance of success, but not being known to the other would produce bad political and moral effects.

The Soviet delegate made the following statements during a conversation with Vișoianu. "I have noticed from the messages received from the messages of your government that when the government uses the word allies it refers only to those in the West. I hope your boss does not share this vision. " Any other idea is wishful thinking [24].

On June 10, Maniu telegraphed to the Allies that he accepted their terms [25]. As for the means of implementing the armistice, the peasant leader informed that they were being settled with the responsible factors and would be communicated to the allies [26].

7. The Iasi-Chisinau offensive and the coup d'etat of August 23, 1944

On June 20, the peasant leader had sent a message to Ankara containing detailed plans for the coup d'etat that would lead Romania to the United Nations camp. For the success of the action Maniu asked the U.S.S.R. to undertake a vigorous offensive on the Romanian front and to send to the Anglo-Americans three airborne brigades, in some vital points around Bucharest [27]. Maniu decided that General Aldea should cross the front line and treat the conditions of the armistice with the Russians. The crossing of the lines was to take place on the night of August 8-9, 1944. The operation did not take place due to the resumption of fighting [28].

In turn, the government was in advanced negotiations in Stockholm with the Soviet ambassador, Mrs. Kolontai [29].

On August 20, when Soviet pressure on the front rose, Maniu transmitted to Cairo that he had decided to act without waiting for a response from the Allies [30]. Mihai Antonescu also asked Turkey to act as an intermediary between Romania and allies for the conclusion of the armistice, with the consent of the king, the marshal and all members of the opposition. He wanted to know which of the three alternatives were convenient for the Anglo-Americans: sending a Romanian representative to Moscow to conclude the armistice; simultaneous contact with the Americans, the British and the Russians to establish the terms of an armistice; or discussing the terms of the armistice in Cairo with the Allies [31].

Eugen Cristescu, the head of the Special Intelligence Service (S.S.I.), informed the head of state in advance about the intentions of a group of generals, in combination with the Royal Palace and some political leaders of the "democratic opposition", to take power, but Marshal Antonescu did not want to believe that "it was something serious." However, as early as April 1943, Marshal Antonescu had

realized that Germany would lose the war and told Cristescu that "it is important that we do not lose ours," referring to possible negotiations for an exit from the alliance with Germany and joining the United Nations coalition. The events intensified rumors about Romania's failure and there are sources who say that Berlin was immediately informed about the gravity of the situation.

On August 21, 1944, Eugen Cristescu, (head of SSI - Special Intelligence Service) informed the German legation in Bucharest that King Mihai I had received Iuliu Maniu in audience and that, "expect serious events in the coming days." Colonel Fritz Baur immediately informed Berlin's authorities, but received no response.

Moreover, on the 22nd August 1944 Rudolf Brandsch head of the main department of the German ethnic group in Romania and head of the Bucharest press office, Otto Liess, informed that a "clique" led by General Nicolae Radescu is ready to carry out a coup d'etat in order to dismiss Marshal Antonescu

The leadership of the Third Reich ignored warnings on the eve of the coup d'etat and Berlin was unable to respond to the seriousness of the political and military situation [32].

The Soviet offensive (Operation Iasi-Chisinau) began on August 20, 1944 with the forces of the armies of the Ukrainian Fronts 2 and 3, under the command of General R. Malinovsky and General F. Tolbuhin. On August 21, Soviet troops captured the city of Iasi and began advancing on Bucharest. The front of the German-Romanian forces was collapsing. About 1,000,000 Soviet soldiers had managed to break the Romanian-German front, to cause great losses to Romanian troops (in some places of about 80-90% division level), to create two deep breaches (south of Iasi, with the depth of about 80 km, and east of Vaslui, 110 km deep), reaching in the evening of August 23, 1944, 50-60 km from the fortified alignment from

Focsani gate. The undeniable success of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts was due to the overwhelming superiority of forces in the rupture sectors, as well as the quantity and use of artillery and tanks, which facilitated the rapid penetration of infantry. The Soviets also benefited from the fact that the German High Command had recently withdrawn from the Romanian front about 12 divisions, most of them armored and motorized, which they moved to the Polish front, as well as some mistakes of command and execution of missions from the Romanians [33].

Those who challenge the opportunity for Romania to join the United Nations at that time invoke the strength of the fortified position of Focșani-Nămoloasa-Brăila, in front of Soviet troops. Theoretically, they are right, but in reality it had not been organized in time for a long defense, the Romanian units in the sector having a total strength of only 15,000 soldiers. Those who were to arrive from the interior had not yet arrived for various reasons, and those who were retreating from the front, under constant pressure from Soviet troops, had far too little combat capability to be considered for serious resistance. In this context, the crossing of the fortified line by the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts would have transformed the entire national territory into a devastating theater of war.

It is also undeniable that the ideal would have been to resist the fortified alignment in order to negotiate the conditions of the armistice with the Soviets and to obtain the most favorable conditions for the country, as Ion Antonescu wanted.

Although bold, the marshal's conception was unrealistic in that strategic context because, on August 23, 1944, the Soviets were no longer in a position to impose conditions on them, already benefiting from the unconditional support of Western powers interested in dealing with the Soviets.

All these lead us to consider that on August 23, 1944, Romania had no other solution than to side with the United Nations. Therefore, I appreciate that Romania's passage to the United Nations on August 23, 1944 saved, at the last moment, what could be saved [34].

On the afternoon of August 23, the marshal and his main collaborators were arrested. With or without August 23, 1944, Romania was still occupied by the Red Army, as a result of the Tehran agreements. Romania and the other states in this area were placed in the sphere of Soviet influence.

Consequently, Romania could not avoid the Soviet occupation. At that time, all politicians sought to save the country, the difference between them being the concrete way in which they believed that this goal could be achieved.

Political parties have been involved in the previous period, they created B.N.D. (The National Democratic Bloc - June 20, 1944), but did not act as a driving force on August 23. Brătianu (P.N.L.- National Liberal Party) was at Florica's, at his sister's funeral. Maniu (P.N.Ț.) avoided assuming the responsibility of the government leadership (even on the morning of August 23, 1944), still "negotiated" and did not even give the "letter of guarantee" requested by Antonescu to sign the armistice; the P.N.Ț. leader appeared on the morning of August 24, when the king had already left Bucharest, and the Palace had been bombed by German aircraft. Constantin Titel Petrescu (Social Democratic Party-P.S.D.) "passed on to" the Palace, but finding that Maniu was missing, he also left. Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu (P.C.R. - Romanian Communist Party) came with the folder in which he had prepared the documents that the king had to sign (political amnesty, the abolition of the concentration camps, etc). The four parties politically endorsed the act of August 23, 1944. The monarchy, after a period of inactivity (Sănătescu was amazed by the fact that in 1943 King Mihai did not even know the evolution of the front, being

preoccupied with his own cars), began to "plot," committing himself to finding a solution. Pushed by the circles around him (Stârcea, Ioannițiu), but also by some generals (Sănătescu, Aldea), most of them involved in Colonel Black's Scheme, the king accepted the idea of Antonescu's dismissal, not accepting any respite, because he (through Mihai Antonescu) wanted to conclude an armistice with the United Nations. His act of courage was overshadowed by the lack of political-diplomatic training, by the state of confusion created in the army. His departure from Bucharest, a few hours after Antonescu's arrest, increased the state of chaos, given that the Government was not formed (most did not even know that they had been appointed ministers) [35].

8. Some conclusions and personal considerations

During the period 1941-1944 S.O.E. activity in Romania has depended heavily on collaboration with Maniu and P. N. Ț.

In order to improve its activity, S.O.E. has taken steps to create reliable communication channel between S.O.E. residents in Istanbul and Bucharest.

The connections between Istanbul residency and S.O.E. network in Romania was made through Switzerland and Turkey legations or through emissaries sent to Istanbul, Ankara and Cairo, or by radio broadcast and by agents launched with parachute.

- It is estimated that these channels were functioning benefiting the help of the Romanian secret services which have tolerated their activity.

The insistence with which S.O.E. asked Maniu to launch a coup d'état in Romania in the autumn of 1943 and the spring of 1944, even if the chances of success were slim, leads us to believe that Britain was not necessarily interested in its success.

We think the British were interested in two things:

-the success of the Bodiguard operation, which is also highlighted by other works;

-the success of Churchill's Balkan version.

This could only be achieved by maintaining a large number of German troops in Romania, which would have delayed the Soviet advance into the Balkans, until the British occupied Greece and/or concluded a gentlemen's agreement with the Soviets to divide the spheres of influence, in Eastern Europe (which in fact has been achieved). From this point of view, the tactic adopted by Maniu until August 1944 was that of negotiation proved to be beneficial. The failure of the coup d'état, predictable between August 1943 and July 1944, would have had disastrous consequences for the old Romanian political class and for the country. The Germans would have implemented the Margarete 2 plan, the country would have been occupied and it would have become a theater of war between the U.S.S.R. and Germany. Disastrous, however, would have been the continuation of the tactics of the atrocities beyond August 1944, leading to the occupation of the country by battle by the Soviet army, the loss of Transylvania and the rapid communization of Romania

When Romania's situation worsened after the defeats at Stalingrad and Kursk Orel, the politicians did not join forces, they worked separately and even in opposition to each other (resentments prevailed in the 1930s).

This aggravated the country's negotiating position, especially in relation to the USSR. We believe that the Soviets did not seriously negotiate with the Romanians after May 1944, being rather interested in occupying the country militarily. In fact, this explains the reproaches addressed by Ana Pauker to Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej and the other national communist leaders who were asked why they did not consult with Moscow on August 23, 1944.

Regarding the role played by political parties, we believe that this was an important one in the preparation of the act of August 23, 1944, instead the contribution of the political parties to the effective

implementation of the act of August 23, 1944 was insignificant. On the contrary, P.C.R. proved to be active precisely in the decisive moments, our statement being supported by the activity carried out by Lucrețiu Pătrășcanu or Emil Bodnăraș.

The king staged the coup d'état of August 23, 1944, from his position as head of state, having the main role in the arrest of Marshal Ion Antonescu and his collaborators.

But after reading the Proclamation to the country on the radio, the monarch practically left the scene, retiring from the capital, to Dobrița in Oltenia. We appreciate, in these conditions, that the main role in the conception and execution

of the coup d'état belonged to the military and senior officials from the royal palace coordinated by General Constantin Sănătescu.

He coordinated the coup d'état plans, the execution and kept the situation under the control of the new authorities until the arrival of the Red Army in the capital.

The regime change of August 23, 1944 was a severe blow to Germany, which was forced to abandon much of the Balkans and withdraw its armies to Hungary. At the end of August, the Soviets crossed Romania, entering Bucharest liberated by the Romanian army on August 31. Romania was thus at the discretion of the U.S.S.R.

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- [32] Ottmar Trașcă, *Die Deutsche Volksgruppe in Rumänien und die Ereignisse vom 23. August 1944* im Spiegel eines unveröffentlichten Manuskripts. In: „Zeitschrift für Siebenbürgische Landeskunde“, Köln-Weimar-Wien, 34 (105) Jahrgang, Heft 2, S., pp. 190-193.
- [33] Prof. dr. O.A. Rjeșevsky: „*Lovitura de stat de la 23 august 1944 a redus din sacrificiile și distrugerile ce afectau România și a apropiat sfârșitul războiului în Europa*” (RIM NR 3-4/2009 P.28).
- [34] Prof. univ. dr. Alesandru Duțu: „*România nu avea, la 23 august 1944, altă soluție decât trecerea de partea Națiunilor Unite*” (RIM NR 3-4/2009 p.8).
- [35] Prof. univ. dr. Ioan Scurtu: „*...un act necesar, dar insuficient pregătit, țara fiind lăsată la discreția Armatei Roșii*” (RIM NR 3-4/2009 p.13).