

THE NEW RESEARCH REGARDING COOPERATION BETWEEN S.O.E. - N.K.V.D. DURING WWII

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Abstract: *The memorandum concluded by S.O.E. (Special Operations Executive) and N.K.V.D., (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs-Народный комиссариат внутренних дел) in September 1941, obliged the two intelligence services to collaborate in a wide range of fields. The British wanted to take advantage of "the powerful communist N.K.V.D. during world war II network in Europe to destabilize the German-occupied countries by organizing sabotages and subversive actions. The Russians, on the other hand, did not want to organize sabotage operations in areas far from the front line, but were interested in contacting their Western European information network. The present article presents aspects of the co-operation between the two services in the light of the research we have undertaken in the London archives.*

Keywords: N.K.V.D., S.O.E., Colonel Chichaev, Brigadier Hill.

1. Introduction

Lieut. Col. D.R. Guinness [1] was sent out to Moscow in August 1941 to negotiate directly with N.K.V.D. about the possibilities of cooperation between the two organizations. He was put in touch with General B. Nikolaeff, by the British Embassy. After a fortnight in Russia was returned to London with the N. K. V. D. proposals which were discussed with the Foreign Office. After this discussion in London had been completed, Lieut.Col. Guinness returned to Moscow, and on the 30th September, "Agreed Record of Discussion" and a "Preliminary Survey of Joint Subversive Policy" were signed by Lieut. Col. Guinness for S.O.E., and by General Nikolaeff for the N. K. V. D. Lieut. Col. Guinness remained in Moscow, until the arrival of Major Hill in October, who was sent out with the rank of Lieut. Colonel to find the SAM Mission (the code-name

to be given to the S.O.E. Mission in Moscow). Lieutenant Colonel Hill's N.K.V.D. contact was General Cehov. With the rank of full Colonel, Hill left for Moscow to take charge of the Mission in place of Major McLaughlin because of heads of the n/p London Section. Captain Wild also returned to London in July.

To implement Part II, Para, 8 of the Agreement mentioned above, by the end of October 1941, arrangements had been made to receive Russian agents to be dropped on the continent. By this time, it was already obvious that the main role of the Russian Liaison Mission in London was to deal with these people. On no occasion were S.O.E. allowed to know their true directives which were dealt with by Col. Chichaev or Major Graur. In general, Pickaxes (the code-name by which Russian agents to be dropped on the Continent were known) caused a great deal of trouble, a waste of time and energy

on S.O.E.'s part - a fact which never seemed to be slowness and inefficiency. This complaint, though perhaps in some cases well-founded, seems nevertheless rather unfair, given stories which have reached on Russian organization and dropping of agents - all of which tend to prove that the Soviet methods were, to say the least of it, very tough.

Colonel Chiceaev, chief of the Russian Mission in London had travelled a great deal in Europe and Asia and appeared to know France well. He spoke good English with an American accent, which he learned from an American student girl in Moscow, and also good German and French. He also played the piano well. He worked extremely hard and often did not go to bed until six or eight in the morning and then started work again about 11 a.m. (Note: This was not an unusual wartime schedule for Soviet officials). He was fond of his food and drink and lived in a luxurious house with a staff of very well-trained servants. He had a charming Georgian wife who was the principal of one of Moscow's largest universities and speaks six languages well, including English with a good accent. They had two children, a boy of thirteen years old and a girl of twenty-four years old. He joined the Navy and in 1914 was condemned to 10 years imprisonment. This sentence was later commuted to labor service on the front where he finally joined the army as an Ulan. During the Revolution, commanded a band of irregulars [2].

In May 1942, Lieut R. F. Ilingloy left the organization to take up other employment, and it was agreed that major Milner Gaskell should join it as second-in-command to Lieut.Col.Hill, although he did not leave the U.K. until August to replace him and becoming deputy head of the Section, on the departure for Moscow of Captain Darton in October 1942.

O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Service) representative in London, expressed to A/DH(Keswick, David) the desire that S.O.E. should, if they consider it possible,

pass to his office, any London copies of Intelligence Reports, whether telegraphed or by mail, received by them from Moscow from N.K.V.D. sources.

Chief of the Russian Section has discussed this question with A/DP (Boyle, Archie) who agreed that S.O.E. should make available this information to O.S.S. in London on a clear understanding with them that they will not distribute it to any British or other allied departments. Resolution of the S.O.E. chief was: take steps to see that all N.K.V.D. reports containing intelligence or information, whether telegraphed or mailed, are passed by you to A/DU (Hazell, Ron) who will be responsible for handing them to O.S.S. Foreign Office was anxious that this material should not be distributed to O.S.S. except through A/DU and O.S.S.[3].

2. N.K.V.D. Mission for Jerusalem

On the 17th April, S.O.E. sent a telegram to SAM (3318/9) saying that the Foreign Office agreed to the dispatching of the mission in return for a representation in Persia. British were anxious to send representatives in Persia for post-occupation activities. The ambassador from Teheran said that these activities can be done only with the knowledge and cooperation of the Russians. The local Russians appeared to be cooperative. They received no encouragement from the Soviet Government. S.O.E. suggested that their final agreement for Jerusalem's plan must be dependent on closer cooperation in the Russians zone in Northern Persia. One other suggestion was that the Russian party for Jerusalem should accompany the Russian Military Mission which was going to Cairo, but Russians refused to mix up their military mission with N.K.V.D. party [4].

N.K.V.D. improved under these conditions, along with the general improvement, the Anglo-Russian relations to an extent that would justify expecting to get substantial favors from them eventually. S.O.E. need hardly say that will entry offer assistance to the N.K.V.D. of a kind which has already

been agreed to be by Foreign Office, or which they may agree to after being specifically appraised by S.O.E.

S.O.E. added that as a last resort their representative might inform N.K.V.D. that unless liaison arrangements could be placed on a basis of confidence and reciprocating service, he could recommend the recall of the Mission, to which Foreign Office would undoubtedly agree.

In a reply in a telegram which was not received until the 8th of May 1942, S.O.E. representative said that he had a frank-down but had not used the threat to withdraw the Mission as he thought this would have no effect whatever and they should be the only losers. He also said that he felt that S.O.E. was committed to allowing the N.K.V.D. Mission to proceed to Jerusalem, without seeking to impose conditions (i.e. that S.O.E. should be allowed to send representatives to Northern Persia).

The position now is therefore as stated in a memorandum that S.O.E. must reconsider their whole future policy and decide whether S.O.E. insisted upon reciprocity (which they feel was likely to bring their relations to an impasse) or go forwards on the basis outlined in the Memorandum [5].

In an S.O.E. –Foreign Office meeting on 22nd June 1942 was decided:

a) That because of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and the hope of a consequent improvement of relations there could be no question of putting an end to S.O.E.'s cooperation with the N.K.V.D;

b) That the basis of cooperation should, in theory, be mutual assistance;

c) That the basis regarding S.O.E. requests of the Russians 1) It was to S.O.E. advantage that the Mission should proceed to Jerusalem, for Turkish reasons Istanbul should not be the place where S.O.E. and N.K.V.D. cooperated, 2) there was no chance of getting a Mission to the Far East and 3) there was no great point in pressing for S.O.E. representatives at Resht and Tabriz, and 4) there was, therefore, nothing to be gained by pressing any of these

requests and S.O.E. had none others to make at present;

d) That it was unwise that Colonel Hill should be S.O.E. only representative in the Soviet Union, and that he should have an assistant to take his place in case of an accident, illness, etc., or in case he had an opportunity;

e) That the Foreign Office had no objection to Colonel Ossipov's being invited to United Kingdom if S.O.E. decided that this was advisable. As regards (d), S.O.E. did not mention at the meeting, that they thought of increasing the representation in Moscow to a total of five, but to put the proposal to send Milnes-Gaskell on the basis described above; and S.O.E. agreed, that there was, in fact, a little practical result at that moment from S.O.E. collaboration with the N.K.V.D. This being so, Foreign Office should rather doubt whether it is necessary to decide to increase S.O.E. representation in the Soviet Union to five and suggest that this should be left over for further consideration if the number of practical cooperation increases [6].

3. The Romanian Problems

On the 3rd July 1942 the talk between S.O.E. with the N.K.V.D. took place in London regarding coup d'état and the Anglo-Russian guarantee asked for Iuliu Maniu.

A long discussion took place regarding Romania and the possibilities of a uprising that would pull Romania out of the war and on to the side of the Allies. The N. K. V. D. representative started by saying that they saw no difference between the policies of Antonescu and Maniu and that in fact what the Romanians want to be a guarantee from Russia that the latter would give to Romania a large slab of Russian territory in return for a vague promise that a successful coup d'état would be brought about. S.O.E. put forward the usual arguments but it was quite clear that the Russians' amour proper' was at stake. They started with the assumption that both Bessarabia and Bukovina are Russian territories and this feeling is increased by the fact that

Timoshenko was born in Bessarabia. The N. K. V. D. also made it quite clear that they did not think they were losing the war or had any prospect of doing so and that they would deal with Romania one day in a highly suitable manner. Why, therefore, should they guarantee to give to Romania a large slab of their territory in return for a very vague promise?

Also, S.O.E. appreciated that one cannot argue with the N. K. V. D. at present without the eternal question of the second front coming up. Just when one is about to make a point and they look like being cornered, they say in effect, "Romania is small fry and the main enemy is Germany. You, England, must get to grips with Germany and the best way to do that is to invade the Continent of Europe". It should also be remembered that even though the news of the fighting in the Caucasus is very critical the Russians believe that the loss of territory means nothing, so long as they keep their armies intact and it is part of their grand strategy to retreat and draw the Germans on and on until they exhaust themselves. S.O.E. representative gives all this ground because it was important to appreciate their mentality and although S.O.E. put forward as strongly as they could the obvious arguments that a successful revolt in Romania must be of most advantage to Russia at present, they are simply not prepared to consider guaranteeing anything. SOE replied that they must dangle a carrot in front of the donkey 's nose and their only reply to that was "what carrot?". The argument lasted for a considerable time and it became clear that the Russians thought that, the English, were trying to make the Russians give up what they called their territory but although SOE pointed out over and over again that they were merely trying, to put British lines of communication with Romania at their disposal so that Myron could get into direct touch with them, they would not be shaken [7]. After 2 weeks an S.O.E. representative lunched with the N. K. V. D. representative and it was pretty clear that they have

received an answer from Moscow and that the answer was definitely no. [8].

4. Common missions SOE-NKVD

In November 1942 S.O.E. received a demand made by N.K.V.D. through SAM and Chichaev for 300 ration cards.

S.O.E. had in stock, only a small quantity and therefore made application to MPS (Howarth, Patrick) for further copies. MPS stated that, as it involved a question of policy, the request must be considered on a higher level.

MX (Wilkinson, Peter) eventually told D/P (Barry, Richard) that authorization had been given for the issue of 50 sheets, which D/P (Established in 1942 and headed by major AD Seddon) D/P worked closely with Russian mission in London) duly received. These were disposed of to Chichaev and SAM, leaving a small reserve with D/P. This reserve has been forwarded to SAM.

MPB (Pickles Mike) started when he handed over the 50 sheets, that he had no more in stock and that it would be difficult to produce a large number within a reasonable time, owing to the time pressure of priority work.

On application being made for these cards, D/P conferred with x to ensure that security would not be imperiled and was informed that, to allow these cards to be forwarded to SAM, they would cancel another operation entailing the dissemination of large numbers of these cards over Germany.

D/P was naturally not informed as to the importance or otherwise of these documents to the Polish section and presumed the interest to them was mainly based on the fact that they control the printing press, but in this D/P may be wrong and there may be cogent reasons of which he is unaware. He is, therefore, unable to connect SAM's remarks about MX and M 's policy (M-colonel Colin Gubins) with this specific request. Russo-Polish relations would not seem to be affected by the N.K.V.D. demand, and, as far as the D/P section is concerned. there is good collaboration with the MX section, which is reflected in SAM'

s remarks about his relations with the Poles in Moscow.

However, the validity of these cards does expire in mid- January 1943, it would be well if the solution to this problem could be sought immediately.

Following extract of a telegram from Moscow and dated 4.10.42 was forwarded for C information:

Please inform C (Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service) that 12 W/T Set has been taken over by N.K.V.D. and believe have reached Moscow.

Have made it a clear gift from C, not repeat S.O.E. for initiation. As requested, to thank donors on behalf of N.K.V.D.”

S.O.E. knew that the N.K.V.D. received a letter from C referring to the gift and making other suggestions. This appeared unfortunate, given Colonel Hill’s advice to at their meeting in London and his stated view that to couple the gift at this, juncture with possible future requests on S.O.E. part would be very inadvisable.

S.O.E. was anxious to avoid any suggestion that the gift was in any way attached to conditions and wished to convey the impression that the gesture came as a result of their desire to show admiration for the work of the Partisans.

They were afraid the manifestation is not great but is chiefly noticeable in SAM ‘s reports of the Prime Minister’s visit. He states. Relations with our colleagues seem friendlier“, “Col.X called in person to-day, was very friendly and stated that he hopes to settle all outstanding matters before D/P. 101’s return”- (this must be examined in conjunction with the report that immediately after D/P. 101 ‘(George Hill) departs from U.S.S.R., Col. X appointed a subaltern to liaise with D./P. 103) –“S.O.E. impression was that N.K.V.D.’s cooperation with S.O.E. may improve”.

There has so far been no concrete result of this reported improvement, but S.O.E. has noticed with their local colleagues a lessening of restraint - a greater freeness of speech - particularly on the part of major Graur (who was born suspicious and

endowed with unattractive personal qualities almost amounting to repellent hostility). But the period immediately after the Prime Minister’s visit in Moscow most definitely produced in them the same outward effect as a successful investment in the Derby or Grand National does for S.O.E. They felt that Moscow had instructed them to relax a bit and treat us them not entirely hostile [9].

At the end of 1942, it was transmitted from S.I.S. to N.K.V.D. a gift of 12 W/T Acta, and also handed over two special field sets from S.O.E., all these acts were for the use of the Russian partisans operating in enemy-occupied territory. In August 1943, Captain J H. Darton returned from Moscow and soon afterward left the Section to link up to other S.O.E. work in Italy, in November 1942.

Until the end of 1942, S.O.E. had infiltrated Soviet agents into enemy occupied countries without reference to the exiled governments concerned, but on 2.12.42, C.D.(Nelson, Frank) ruled that no N.K.V.D. agent should be introduced into Allied countries whose governments were in London. This ruling, added to unavoidable delays in producing documents and obtaining air priorities, nearly brought about a rupture of S.O.E./N.K.V.D. relations at the end of 1943. On 15.9.1944, Colonel Chichayev informed SOE that no further agents would be sent; without any reasons [10].

Infiltration of Russian Agents to Enemy Occupied Territory. In the Middle of 1943 S.O.E. was advised by its Moscow Mission that 5 agents for infiltration into Northern Italy were awaiting dispatch. Owing to the surrender of Italy and the necessity of co-ordinating S.O.E. activities with AFHQ (Allied Forces Headquarter) some delay was unavoidable, but elaborate arrangements were made for the party’s transport direct to Southern Italy from where the operations were to be mounted. Major Mandelstam personally visited the S.O.E. base in Southern Italy to arrange for accommodation and all operational facilities. The services of the conduction

Officer were obtained, who proceeded to Italy early in April.

Result. N.K.V.D. informed S.O.E. that they decided to abandon the operation in May 1943. And colonel Chichaev informed brigadier Hill that there will be no further similar operation in the foreseeable future.

S.O.E./N.K.V.D. mission in Istanbul. S.O.E. Middle East proposed in May 1944 the resumption of liaison between S.O.E. and N.K.V.D. in Istanbul which had been broken off for security reasons after the von Papen incident in 1941. The suggestion was favorably received by N.K.V.D. and Foreign Office approved in June 1944. In July 1944 N.K.V.D. informed brigadier Hill that they decided not to appoint a representative in Istanbul.

S.O.E./N.K.V.D. liaison in Yugoslavia. In March 1944 NKVD requested S.O.E. to facilitate the journey of Major K.K. Krassowski, a member of the Russian Liaison Mission in London, to Marshal Tito. Major Krassowski was given full instructions to collaborate with the S.O.E. Mission at Partisan GHQ (General Headquarter). Every facility was afforded to Major Krassowski who arrived at Partisan GHQ on 14 April having been provided with W/T, pistol and ammunition, etc.

Result. While Major Krassowski was en route the S.O.E. Mission, Bari reported:- "Krassowski completely unappreciative of efforts made on his behalf" On 29 June Colonel Chichaev, Head of the N.K.V.D. Mission in London, informed S.O.E. that Major Krassowski had been recalled by Moscow "as efforts to establish liaison with SOE with a view to collaboration had failed". Brigadier Maclean commented that he thought relations with Major Krassowski had been most cordial, but General Ossipov observed: "Perhaps Krassowski was the wrong type to send" which Brigadier Hill concurred.

Operations Designed to Suborn Russian Prisoners of War Impressed by Germans into service with the Wehrmacht. In April 1944 the S.O.E. Mission in Moscow was informed of a scheme for suborning

Russian prisoners-of-war serving in the Wehrmacht and complementary propaganda scheme designed to suggest that loyalty of Russians serving in the Wehrmacht was bit unquestioned. Further explanations, had been made N.K.V.D. reacted favorably to these proposals but demanded further information that was supplied. The propaganda operations were carried out to a limited extent whilst awaiting N.K.V.D.'s decision.

Result. In June 1944 Colonel Chichaev informed the S.O.E. Russian Section in London that he had been instructed by Moscow, that N.K.V.D. declined to associate themselves with S.O.E. in these operations and strongly deprecated S.O.E. proceeding with any such schemes.

Visit of General Ossipov to London. In May 1944 Brigadier Hill was asked for his reactions regarding a suggestion that General Ossipov should visit London to which he replied that the idea was excellent, but he thought General Ossipov would have difficulty in getting away. General Ossipov himself suggested a visit to France early in June; General Ossipov was officially invited to visit London by Brigadier Hill.

S.O.E./O.S.S./N.K.V.D. mission in Romania. At the request of S.O.E. Mideast brigadier Hill was asked in April 1944 to consider the likelihood of the Soviet authorities agreeing to a Romanian S.O.E./O.S.S. Mission proceeding to Russian occupied Romania. Brigadier Hill replied that it was unlikely that the Russians would agree unless invited to the mission. SOE Mideast was anxious to collaborate with the Russians but felt that the inclusion of Russians in the first party would make the task difficult on account of the feeling in Romania concerning the Russians. They were, however willing that N.K.V.D. should participate after the initial contacts have been made. Results. Although this information was passed to N.K.V.D. they informed brigadier Hill that they did not wish to attach Russian personnel to this mission.

Russian Activities inside Germany. In May 1944 Brigadier Hill was requested to obtain from N.K.V.D. information on Russian clandestine activities inside Germany.

Result. In June 1944 Colonel Chichayev informed the S.O.E. Russian Section in London that he had been instructed by Moscow, that N.K.V.D. declined to associate themselves with S.O.E. in these operations and strongly deprecated S.O.E. proceeding with any such schemes. Brigadier Hill has been unable to get any information other than that Ossipov "stressed desirability of our works closely in Germany."

Poland. In April 1944 Brigadier Hill was asked to obtain an appreciation of N.K.V.D. policy and program in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Result. Brigadier Hill was unable to elicit any information. In July 1944 Brigadier Hill approached N.K.V.D. to ask whether they would consider supplying the Polish Underground Army, fighting in support of Russian operations in certain areas, as S.O.E. could not reach Central and Southern Poland from their base in Italy.

Result. Brigadier Hill informed S.O.E. that he had mentioned the matter to Ossipov stressing the advantages, but Ossipov had replied that the Soviet Authorities were not interested. In August 1944 a message was passed to Brigadier Hill from Warsaw giving the text of a message to Marshal Stalin from Captain Kalugin, Soviet Army, who reported that he was in touch with the Commander of the Warsaw garrison; the message requested the supply of arms and ammunition, etc. and gave the locating for dropping these stores.

Assistance in Czechoslovakia. At the end of July 1944 the Foreign Office telegraphed to Moscow that S.O.E. was prepared to drop supplies of arms to two Czech divisions who would fight with Soviet forces against the Germans and requested the ambassador after consultation with brigadier Hill, the Czech ambassador, and general Pika, to approach the Soviet Government and to inform them that unless he heard from them

before 7 August, it was proposed that S.O.E. should proceed with these operations.[11]

In June of 1944, General Osipov was invited by S.O.E. to visit London to discuss the possibility of redrafting the S.O.E./N.K.V. D. Charter to provide a basis for fuller cooperation than had hitherto been possible. This offer was never accepted, and in January 1945, S.O.E. suggested that a senior officer of this organization (with Col. D. Keswick in mind) would visit Moscow with the object of consolidating the work done by Brigadier Hill, given his then imminent departure, and to negotiate a new agreement between S.O.E. and N.K.V.D. by which they could work together in countries surrounding Germany, and later in Germany itself. This invitation has never been specifically accepted or refused.

The opposite numbers in Moscow showed interest in the proposal but expressed a wish first to see a full agenda of what it was planned to discuss. Various drafts of this agenda were written during Brigadier Hill's visit to London in February 1945, and, after vetting by the Foreign Office, it was finally produced in Moscow in March. The Soviet reaction was that the whole matter concerned only the present and had no bearing on the future.

It was understood that matter of redrafting the charter was to have been raised again in Moscow by Colonel Bentham, but a suitable opportunity never occurred.

On 12 September 1945, a letter was circulated by V/CD, (Sporborg, Harry) stating that C.D. (Colin Gubins) had ruled, in agreement with the Foreign Office that the Mission should be withdrawn, the date of closing to coincide with the winding up of the Military Mission, October 1945.[12]

5. The end of cooperation. S.O.E. evaluate the damage

At the end of the war, S.O.E. was disappointed with the cooperation with N.K.V.D. A document from 22nd August 1944 said: „The actual results have been that whilst we have carried out certain

services for N.K.V.D. in the way of infiltrating agents for them into various countries of Eastern Europe to the number of 25, they have done nothing for us." So, these activities were canceled in late 1945. Also, suspicions arose about the activity of the Soviet mission in London. These suspicions increased especially after Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean fled to Moscow. Some suspicion rose about the activity of general brigadier Hill.

S.O.E. Archives contain a minute of 24.2.44. in which Brigadier Hill reported as follows: Ref: Red Army Day Reception at the Soviet Embassy:

"When most of the foreign guests had left the Embassy yesterday, 23rd February, I had a chance to talk to Mr. Gusev. He is a Leningrad-ite and, in consequence, was very interested in my recent visit to his native city. The conversation lasted just over 35 minutes, and during the latter part of it, we were joined by DPR.1. (Chichaev).

On my leaving, the Ambassador gave me a very cordial invitation to visit him on my return back and stressed that he would like me to make an opportunity of meeting him. If it is approved that I should make this contact, I think it is possible that the Foreign Office would like to brief me on certain specific lines, and therefore I venture to suggest that the Foreign Office should be told about M. Gusev's invitation."

MI5 provided with information through document Y.3270 of 10.9.1951 on Brigadier G. A. Hill, including a reference to his having arrived in Prague as Regional Controller of B.E.A (Bureau of Economic Agency) on last August 1946, when Chichaev had shown himself interested. It is not clear at what date Chichaev had arrived in Prague, but at that time he was Charge affairs as well as the local head of the N.K.V.D.

(I) According to information supplied by Petrov [13] in Australia Chichaev and Gorski was the Deputy Heads of the Anglo-American Section of the Komitet

Informatsii (K.I.) (Russian Intelligence Service-R.I.S.) in 1942. The Head of the Sixth Directorate was Graur.

(II) Petrov also said that Maclean and Burgess were among a group of students who were recruited by the R. I. S. and that their escape (in May 1951) was organized by Kislytsin [14].

(III) Not only was Kislytsin a member of the K.I. the action of which Chichaev was deputy head K.I. in 1952, but Kislytsin joined the staff of the Soviet Embassy in London in March 1945, in which same month Chichaev left for Moscow.

(IV) It is thus a reasonable supposition that Kislytsin might have taken over certain contacts of Chichaev's at that time in the U.K. (If it is true that Kislytsin had a big part in organizing the flight of Burgess and Maclean, it might be that Kislytsin was Coordinator: on for the task because he had been in contact with one or other of them in London previously, i.e. after March 1945.

(V) If Kislytsin did control Maclean and/or Burgess after March 1945, it seems quite probable that Chichaev may have done so before that.

There were, of course, some indirect links; for example: -

(a) The officers of S.O.E.: Russian Section, who were in contact with Chichaev and his staff, were trained at Station 17, where Philby was an instructor, and Philby was, of course, in touch with Burgess, the originator of the S.O.E. Training School idea.

(b) H. A. R. Philby has stated that at the time that Guy Burgess was getting the Training School underway, Burgess closest associates were Tomas Harris [15] and John Hackett. Report Y.2773/A of 13.11.53, which gave details of the Training School, R. S. Int mentioned that in October 1941 Captain Hackett (presumably identical) was transferred from Group B (in which Philby worked) to because of Commandment of advanced training, which was set up near the P.W.E. (Political Warfare Executive) Headquarters at Wosurn. (This unit was to train propaganda specialists for

P.W.S. (Psychological War Staff) and the instructors kept in touch with the day-to-day policy of P.W.E.). By that time Burgess had left Section D and rejoined the B.B.C. (British Broadcasting Corporation). He appears to have been in touch with P.W.E. affairs through Soften Delmer.

6. Conclusions

The memorandum concluded by SOE and N.K.V.D., in September 1941, obliged the two intelligence services to collaborate in a wide range of fields. The British wanted to take advantage of "the powerful communist N.K.V.D. network during world war II in Europe to destabilize the German-occupied countries by organizing sabotages and subversive actions. The Russians, on the

other hand, did not want to organize sabotage operations in areas far from the front line but were interested in contacting their Western European information network. At the end of the war, S.O.E. was disappointed with the cooperation with N.K.V.D. So, these activities were canceled in late 1945.

Besides, suspicions arose about the activity of the Soviet mission in London. These suspicions increased especially after Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean fled to Moscow. Finally, the Security check confirmed that the N.K.V.D. mission activity in London during the Second World War also included espionage activities against the United Kingdom.

References

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- [2] PRO Kew Gardens, HS4/334, *Notes on the Russian section of S. O. E.*
- [3] Idem, SOE, *Report 5th September 1942 from A/D.*
- [4] Idem, SOE, *Report from April 1942, „NKVD mission from Jerusalem"*
- [5] Idem, HS4 333, *SOE Report on June 13th, 1942.*
- [6] Idem, *Telegram from 1st of July 1942 Lord Glenconner to Warner,*
- [7] Idem, *Meeting 3rd July 1942 took place talk between SOE with the NKVD.*
- [8] Ibidem.
- [9] Idem, *Christopher Warner (Foreign Office) to SOE, Telegram from 06. 09 1942.*
- [10] Idem, *Glencore to Warner, Telegram from 15.9.1944.*
- [11] Idem, HS4/ 335, *Report from 21st December 1944, Principal heads of Soe contacts with NKVD and the results thereof.*
- [12] In June of 1944.
- [13] Vladimir Mikhaylovich Petrov (15 February 1907 – 14 June 1991, born Afanasy Mikhaylovich Shorokhov) was a member of the Soviet Union's clandestine services who became famous in 1954 for his defection to Australia. <https://mimirbook.com/id/308d3141e77>.
- [14] Nigel West, *Historical Dictionary of Cold War Counterintelligence*, Rowman Littlefield, 2007, 178,, Filip Kislitsin A member of the NKVD rezidentura in London since 1952,,. He had previously served in London where he participated in the management of Guy Burgess and Donald MacLean the two spies who defected from London in May 1951.
- [15] https://spartacus-educational.com/Tomas_Harris.htm (10 April 1908 – 27 January 1964) was a Spanish-speaking MI6 officer who worked with Juan Pujol García, an important double agent for the British during World War II, in what became known as the Garbo deception.
- [16] PRO Kew Gardens, HS4/335, *document Y.2/73/B of 23.7. 1945.*