



Regulating Temporary Agency Work Through Collective Bargaining: Insights From The Slovenian Experience

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Abstract

This article examines whether collective bargaining in Slovenia meaningfully supplements the statutory regulation of temporary agency work (TAW). Using a qualitative socio-legal case-study design, it combines targeted doctrinal analysis of the EU and Slovenian legal framework with qualitative content analysis of all 47 valid national-level sectoral collective agreements, supplemented by two illustrative company-level agreements and selected worker-organisation examples. The findings show that sectoral collective bargaining regulates TAW only selectively: most agreements contain no explicit TAW clauses, while most existing clauses mainly restate equal treatment guarantees or improve transparency. More robust protective supplementation appears only in a limited number of sectoral provisions and more clearly at company level, notably through quota rules, training access, and negotiated pathways to direct employment. The article concludes that collective bargaining in Slovenia functions not as an autonomous TAW regime but as an uneven supplement to a relatively developed statutory framework.

Keywords

Temporary Agency Work, Collective Bargaining, Collective Agreements, Labour Law, Slovenia

I. Introduction

Temporary agency work (TAW) occupies an ambivalent position in labour law. It offers employers numerical flexibility, but its triangular structure also raises recurring questions about equal treatment, temporariness, assignment limits, representation, and the risk of abuse (Spattini, 2012; Sartori, 2016; Alsos and Evans, 2018). Under the Directive on temporary agency work (TAW Directive) (European Union, 2008, Articles 1–3), agency workers are employed by a temporary work agency and assigned temporarily to work under the supervision and direction of a user undertaking (client organisation). Recent Court

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of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case law has clarified three issues particularly relevant to this article: misuse through successive assignments, illustrated by *JH v KG* (C-681/18) (Kullmann, 2024); the scope of equal-treatment guarantees, illustrated by *GD and ES v Luso Temp* (C-426/20) (Kártyás, 2023); and the conditions under which collective agreements may derogate from equal treatment while still ensuring the overall protection of agency workers, illustrated by *CM v TimePartner Personalmanagement GmbH* (C-311/21) (Munkholm, 2024).

TAW is not regulated only by legislation. In several EU countries, collective bargaining and related forms of social dialogue have also shaped its use, although the extent and level of regulation differ substantially across industrial-relations systems (Sartori, 2016; Alsos and Evans, 2018). Comparative research shows that collective agreements may regulate issues such as assignment limits, quantitative restrictions, equal treatment, and the use of agency labour in sensitive situations, but that these protections remain uneven and institutionally contingent (Eurofound, 2009; Spattini, 2012; Bruno, 2020). This variation is particularly important in newer EU Member States, where collective bargaining historically played a more limited role in TAW regulation and union presence among agency workers tended to be weak (Eurofound, 2009).

Against this background, this article examines whether collective bargaining in Slovenia meaningfully supplements the statutory regulation of TAW. Slovenia was selected as a case study because it combines relatively strict labour regulation (OECD, 2024a), multiemployer industrial relations (Eurofound, 2024), and weakly developed collective regulation of TAW. TAW has developed within this framework despite continuing legislative reform (Kresal Šoltes, 2020; Krapež, 2024; Kotnik et al., 2020).

II. Research Design, Corpus and Research Questions

The research adopts a qualitative socio-legal case-study design focused on Slovenia. It combines two analytical components: first, a targeted doctrinal analysis of those elements of the EU and Slovenian statutory framework that shape the room for collective bargaining on TAW; and second, a qualitative content analysis of collective agreements and selected related materials. The study examines how legal norms and collective bargaining interact in a specific regulatory setting and assesses how formal legal space for bargaining is used in practice (Webley, 2016; Korstjens and Moser, 2017; Yin, 2018). The article builds on two earlier studies on TAW in Slovenia. One examined the development of the Slovenian legal framework and identified social dialogue and soft-law regulation as areas requiring further research (Krapež, 2024). The other analysed the broader drivers and decent-work implications of TAW and found that social dialogue, worker voice, and collective bargaining play only a limited role in this field (Krapež, 2025).

The core empirical corpus of the study consists of all 47 valid national-level sectoral collective agreements identified in the official register of valid collective agreements maintained by the Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities (2024). The period examined was 2013–2023. First, all 47 agreements were screened for explicit TAW-related clauses. Second, agreements containing such clauses were subjected to closer qualitative content analysis. To contextualise the sectoral findings, the study also

included two purposively selected company-level collective agreements and three cases of newly established worker organisations relevant to TAW and precarious work. The company-level agreements were selected as information-rich illustrative cases because they were publicly presented by the Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia (ZSSS), the country's largest and most representative trade union confederation, as examples of good practice in regulating TAW. The three newly established worker organisations were included exhaustively and represent the full set of identified new union forms in Slovenia specifically relevant to precarious or agency-related work during the period examined. This selection strategy follows qualitative case-study guidance on transparent corpus delimitation, purposive selection of information-rich cases, and differentiation between exhaustive and illustrative components of the sample (Rashid et al., 2019; Moser and Korstjens, 2018). The documents were analysed according to the presence, content, and regulatory function of TAW-related provisions. Particular attention was paid to clauses concerning equal treatment, access to collective norms and workplace information, quantitative limits on agency work, restrictions on use in sensitive situations, training rights, union-related provisions, and mechanisms facilitating transition to direct employment. The analytical benchmark was whether such clauses merely restated the legal baseline or added meaningful protection in areas where legislation leaves room for supplementation. Because EU and Slovenian law already establish a compulsory baseline for equal treatment and lawful use of TAW, the relevant question is whether collective agreements add protection in areas where sector- or workplace-specific regulation may still matter (European Union, 2008; Kullmann, 2024; Kártyás, 2023; Munkholm, 2024). The content analysis was guided by a legally informed normative standard rather than by simple clause-counting alone (Aguinis and Solarino, 2019).

The research is guided by three questions:

- RQ1: To what extent do Slovenian collective agreements contain TAW-specific provisions that go beyond statutory minimum standards?
- RQ2: What types of TAW-related provisions are used in Slovenian collective agreements, and what regulatory functions do they perform?
- RQ3: What do selected company-level and worker-organisation examples reveal about the conditions under which stronger TAW-related collective regulation emerges in practice?

The qualitative design entails important limitations. While the sectoral corpus is exhaustive, the company-level and worker-representation material is illustrative and based on publicly documented examples, which may privilege visible or successful interventions. The article therefore cannot show how frequently similar practices occur beyond the selected cases, how negotiated clauses operate in day-to-day workplace relations, or whether silence in collective agreements reflects irrelevance, failed bargaining, or informal regulation. Its contribution lies instead in transparent case selection, structured contextual and interpretive analysis (Webley, 2016), and triangulation across legislation, collective agreements, official registers, trade-union materials, and related documentary sources (Korstjens and Moser, 2018).

III. Legal and industrial-relations context of TAW collective bargaining in Slovenia

The institutional framework for social dialogue in Slovenia is centred on the Economic and Social Council (ESS), a tripartite body that facilitates national-level intersectoral negotiations. In contrast to some countries where associations of temporary work agencies participate in collective bargaining and sectoral self-regulation (Eurofound, 2009, p. 17), Slovenia's Association of Temporary Work Agencies (Združenje agencij za zaposlovanje, ZAZ) does not exercise collective-bargaining authority. Nor is there a dedicated trade union or union section specifically representing agency workers. As a result, the ESS has remained the principal venue for negotiations on the legislative framework governing TAW, although tripartite dialogue within the ESS has been marked by recurrent instability (Stanojević and Poje, 2019; Eurofound, 2024).

The key feature of the Slovenian legal framework is that it does not leave TAW regulation exclusively to legislation, but reserves a supplementary role for sectoral collective bargaining (Vaníčková and Bílek, 2025). That role developed gradually and became more visible under the Employment Relationships Act (Zakon o delovnih razmerjih – ZDR-1) (Republic of Slovenia, 2013). Sectoral collective agreements may impose additional restrictions on the use of TAW and may regulate the proportion of fixed-term agency workers assigned to client organisations that are not small employers. ZDR-1 sets a default ceiling of 25% of the workforce, but sectoral collective agreements may modify this limit, whereas lower-level collective agreements may not (ZDR-1, Art. 59). Slovenian law therefore leaves relevant, but limited, regulatory space for sectoral social partners, although this flexibility has attracted criticism where weak worker protection may allow inconsistencies or exploitation (Kresal Šoltes, 2020).

That supplementary legal role must be assessed against the broader industrial-relations context. In Slovenia, collective bargaining remains predominantly sectoral in the private sector, whereas more centralised bargaining is more characteristic of the public sector. Available comparative data consistently suggest relatively broad bargaining coverage alongside more modest union density (Stanojević and Poje, 2019; Eurofound, 2024; OECD, 2025). More directly relevant for TAW, union presence among agency workers appears weak and has been estimated at no more than 10%, while many agency workers do not regard union representation as an effective means of advancing their interests (Kresal Šoltes et al., 2020, p. 274). This helps explain why Slovenian collective agreements often remain silent on TAW despite the legal space for sectoral supplementation.

Recent Slovenian case law further shows why statutory regulation alone may be insufficient in practice. In the Port of Koper (Luka Koper) line of cases, the Supreme Court held that arrangements formally presented as service or subcontracting relationships could in substance amount to unlawful labour supply where the intermediary did not genuinely perform an independent service but effectively supplied labour to the client organisation, which organised, supervised, and economically controlled the work (VSRS VIII Ips 9/2022; VSRS VIII Ips 10/2022; VSRS VIII Ips 17/2023). Given that formal legal categories do not by themselves eliminate abuse, circumvention, or prolonged dependency in triangular labour-supply arrangements, collective agreements may provide additional preventive safeguards in practice.

IV. Findings

Screening of all 47 valid national-level sectoral collective agreements shows that TAW remains weakly and unevenly regulated through collective bargaining in Slovenia. Thirty-four agreements (72.3%) contain no explicit TAW-related provisions, while 13 address TAW to some degree. Where TAW is addressed, collective agreements most often restate equal treatment, improve transparency, or, more exceptionally, introduce quota rules, training rights, or pathways to direct employment (see Table 1).

Sectoral collective agreements: limited and uneven regulation of TAW

Of the 47 valid national-level sectoral collective agreements screened, 34 contained no explicit TAW-related provisions at all. This silence extended even to some sectors with relatively high documented TAW incidence, including trade, agriculture and food processing, and the paper industry (Redek et al., 2017; Ministry of Labour, Family, Social Affairs, and Equal Opportunities, 2024). At sectoral level, TAW is therefore rarely treated as an autonomous regulatory subject.

Where sectoral agreements do mention TAW, the most common approach is minimalist incorporation of equal treatment or non-discrimination. This pattern is visible, for example, in the collective agreements for the metal sector, hospitality and tourism, construction, public utility services, and the metal products and foundry industry, which expressly extend equal-treatment principles to agency workers. Similar, more concise clauses appear in the insurance and land transport sectors, while the banking sector prohibits discrimination against agency workers assigned to a client organisation. In these cases, collective bargaining does not substantially reconstruct the legal model of TAW; rather, it reaffirms the statutory baseline and makes its workplace application more explicit.

Some agreements go further by introducing operational or procedural safeguards. The collective agreement for the electrical industry provides that wage and cost-reimbursement rules apply equally to agency workers and requires that the collective agreement and general acts be accessible to them. The textile, clothing and leather agreement extends equal access to training and education. Several agreements in manufacturing sectors also require management to inform unions about employment policy, including the use of agency workers. These clauses move beyond abstract equal-treatment language and address information asymmetries and practical enforcement within the client organisation.

Only a few sectoral agreements address the quantitative use of TAW. The textile, clothing and leather agreement sets a ceiling of 50% of the workforce, while the electrical industry agreement permits the share of agency workers to rise to 35% for up to three months per calendar year under specified conditions, including a lower annual average and the absence of economically motivated dismissals in comparable jobs. These provisions do not all operate in the same direction: some make the use of TAW more visible and rule-bound, but may also increase employer flexibility rather than tighten worker protection. Sectoral bargaining thus appears more willing to regulate the management of TAW than to limit it consistently in a worker-protective direction.

Table 1: Main findings on TAW-related regulation in Slovenian collective bargaining and worker representation

Level / source	Scope / cases	Main TAW-related content	Assessment relative to the statutory baseline
Sectoral corpus overall	47 valid national-level sectoral collective agreements	34 contain no explicit TAW clauses; 13 mention TAW to some degree	Sectoral regulation of TAW is limited and uneven; most agreements do not treat TAW as a distinct bargaining subject
Minimal sectoral supplementation	Metal sector; Hospitality and tourism; Construction; Public utility services; Metal products and foundry; Insurance; Land transport; Banking	Equal-treatment or non-discrimination clauses; applicability of agreement to agency workers; in some sectors information duties towards unions	Mostly restates or operationalises statutory equal treatment rather than going materially beyond it
More developed sectoral clauses	Electrical industry; Textile, clothing and leather	Equal pay/cost-reimbursement clauses; access to collective agreements and general acts; information duties; equal access to training; quota clauses	Mixed effect: some clauses add transparency and training rights; quota clauses partly expand employer flexibility rather than tighten protection
Company-level good practice	Tuš	Direct employment after five months of continuous work, or after six months where the worker changes agency but continues working for the same client organisation	Strong protective supplementation; creates a negotiated pathway from TAW to direct employment
	ETI	Equal bonuses; quota of 10% (15% exceptionally); review of agency-worker status; transition to permanent employment; inclusion of agency workers in union structures	Stronger supplementation than at sectoral level; combines quantitative control, equal treatment in practice, and representation
New worker organisations	VIR Prodnik; Syndicate of Youth Plus; Syndicate of Precarious Workers	Parallel or cross-sectoral representation where traditional unions were ineffective or absent; campaigns and litigation linked to precarious or disguised employment	Indicates persistent representation gaps and shows that organisational innovation may precede or substitute for formal collective-agreement regulation

Source: Author's analysis of sectoral and company-level collective agreements and related worker-representation materials

Company-level agreements: selective but stronger supplementation

The company-level material shows a different pattern. The two purposively selected agreements highlighted by ZSSS indicate that company-level bargaining may go further than sectoral bargaining in addressing TAW vulnerabilities.

The collective agreement concluded in Tuš in 2024 is significant because it creates a negotiated pathway to direct employment. The employer committed to offering a permanent employment contract to any agency worker after five months of continuous work with the company. The same right also applies where a worker changes agency but continues working at Tuš, once six months of cumulative service has been reached (ZSSS, 2024a; ZSSS, 2024b).

The ETI example shows a broader use of company-level bargaining. According to ZSSS, union intervention secured equal treatment for agency workers in relation to holiday bonuses and other benefits, introduced a quota limiting agency workers to 10% of the workforce (15% exceptionally), and established a practice of transitioning agency workers to permanent employment with the company. Agency workers were not only represented but actively integrated into workplace union structures, including through representation on the union executive board (ZSSS, 2019).

New worker organisations: representation where traditional channels are weak

The organisational material further illuminates the conditions under which TAW-related issues become visible in collective labour regulation. In Prodnik, a new parallel union was established after existing representation structures proved ineffective in addressing alleged unequal treatment of agency workers. Although it did not create a collective agreement, it helped trigger concrete improvements, including retrospective payment of certain allowances and bonuses (RTV SLO, 2020; Prodnik, 2020). This case is relevant since it shows that, where existing unions do not effectively represent agency workers, new organisational forms may emerge even at company level.

Two broader cross-sectoral examples point in a similar direction. Within ZSSS, two trade unions address precarious work that includes TAW and other non-standard arrangements. The Syndicate of Youth Plus organised protests to improve working conditions for kiosk shop employees (RTV SLO, 2017) and played a role in establishing the Trade Union of Food Delivery Couriers, which represents couriers working for the two food delivery platforms (N1, 2023), after the platforms changed the pay system and reduced couriers' income by 20 to 30 per cent (Eurofound, 2024, p. 9). Meanwhile, the Syndicate of Precarious Workers has initiated lawsuits against disguised employment relationships (Socialna družba, 2018).

V. Discussion

The findings show that collective bargaining in Slovenia functions not as a parallel regime of TAW regulation, but as a selective supplement to a relatively developed statutory framework (Kresal Šoltes, 2020; Krapež, 2024). On RQ1, Slovenian collective agreements go beyond statutory minimum standards only to a limited extent: most sectoral agreements remain silent, while most of those that regulate TAW largely confirm equal treatment or

non-discrimination rather than reconstructing the legal model of TAW. Stronger forms of protective supplementation appear mainly at company level, which is consistent with comparative research showing that collective bargaining in the TAW field often supplements statutory regulation unevenly rather than comprehensively (Eurofound, 2009; Sartori, 2016; Alsos and Evans, 2018).

The relative rarity of TAW clauses, despite a legal framework that expressly reserves a supplementary role for sectoral social partners, is best explained not only by legal design but also by the social organisation of bargaining in this field. First, Slovenian law already provides a comparatively strong statutory framework for TAW, which reduces the perceived need to negotiate additional sectoral rules in areas that appear legally settled (OECD, 2024a; Krapež, 2024). Second, weak organisation among agency workers and limited confidence in union representation reduce bottom-up pressure for TAW-specific bargaining (Eurofound, 2009; Kresal Šoltes et al., 2020). Third, bargaining incentives are uneven across sectors and often become salient only where agency work generates visible workplace conflict or sustained union mobilisation. This helps explain why more substantive regulation appears mainly in selected company-level settings. The Slovenian case therefore shows that the limited collective regulation of TAW reflects not only the statutory baseline, but also representation deficits and uneven bargaining salience across sectors.

On RQ2, TAW-related clauses in Slovenian collective agreements perform four main regulatory functions: they operationalise equal treatment, improve transparency and enforceability, regulate the extent and management of TAW, and create pathways out of prolonged agency dependence. Their importance lies less in creating entirely new rights than in addressing concrete vulnerabilities associated with agency work, especially weaker access to workplace information, training, representation, and stable employment trajectories. At the same time, some quota clauses regulate flexibility more than they restrict it, which shows that sectoral bargaining may also serve employer interests in managing TAW rather than systematically curbing its use (Sartori, 2016; Spattini, 2012).

On RQ3, the company-level and worker-organisation material shows that stronger TAW-related regulation is most likely to emerge where there is active workplace organisation, visible conflict, and sustained union pressure. Read together with the Luka Koper line of cases and the relevant CJEU case law, these findings reinforce a law-in-action point: formal legal categories do not by themselves eliminate abuse, circumvention, or prolonged dependency in triangular labour-supply arrangements. They also show that where traditional unions are weak or unresponsive, TAW-related conflicts may instead be articulated through alternative organisational forms, revealing the representation gaps that make effective bargaining difficult in the first place.

In comparative terms, the Slovenian case appears closer to the pattern historically associated with many newer EU Member States than to the more developed TAW bargaining structures found in parts of the EU15. Collective bargaining is no longer absent from TAW regulation, but it has not developed into a dense autonomous regime. The broader contribution of the article is therefore that, in a newer EU Member State with a relatively developed statutory framework, collective bargaining in the TAW field operates less as an independent source of comprehensive regulation than as a selective supplement, activated

mainly where organisational capacity and bargaining incentives are strong enough to move beyond legislative default rules (Eurofound, 2009; Sartori, 2016; Alsos and Evans, 2018).

VI. Conclusion

This article examined whether collective bargaining in Slovenia meaningfully supplements the statutory regulation of TAW. The answer is qualified but clear: it has not developed into an autonomous regime of TAW regulation but operates as a selective supplement within a legal environment already structured by legislation and case law.

The article's central contribution lies in identifying the conditions under which collective bargaining moves from formal acknowledgement of TAW to meaningful regulation. The Slovenian case shows that the key divide is not simply between regulation and deregulation, but between nominal incorporation of agency workers into existing legal norms and substantive supplementation through enforceable clauses on information, training, quantitative limits, and transition to direct employment. In this respect, the study contributes to wider debates on precarious work, labour-market dualisation, and the uneven regulatory capacity of collective bargaining in non-standard employment.

These findings also have practical implications. For policymakers, they suggest that a relatively strong statutory framework is necessary but not self-executing: without representational capacity and workplace-level enforcement channels, equal-treatment guarantees risk remaining formal rather than effective. For social partners, the evidence points to a focused bargaining agenda built around clauses that improve visibility, enforceability, and exit from prolonged agency dependence. For unions, the emergence of parallel and cross-sectoral worker organisations indicates that organisational renewal may in some settings be a precondition for stronger collective regulation.

The conclusions should nevertheless be read with caution. The study captures the formal content of valid sectoral collective agreements well, but the company-level and work-organisation material is illustrative and drawn mainly from publicly documented, union-visible examples; it may therefore overstate the visibility of successful interventions and undercapture quieter or unsuccessful bargaining efforts. Nor can the analysis show how often negotiated clauses are invoked, monitored, or enforced in day-to-day practice. The article's contribution is therefore analytical rather than causal or statistically generalisable: it offers a transparent framework for distinguishing between symbolic repetition of the legislative baseline and meaningful supplementary protection. Future research should test that framework comparatively across Member States and through implementation-focused workplace studies.

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Appendix 1

The sectoral collective agreements (CA) included in the analysis, which contain at least minimal provisions related to TAW:

1. Collective Agreement for the Slovenian Metal Sector (*Kolektivna pogodba za kovinsko industrijo Slovenije*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 6/15, 80/15, 6/17, 66/17, 82/18, 24/19, 15/22, 79/22, 100/23, 36/24) (private sector, extended applicability) (CA Metal Sector);
2. Collective Agreement for the Metal Products and Foundry Industry (*Kolektivna pogodba za dejavnost kovinskih materialov in livarn Slovenije*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 78/14, 43/19 – corrig., 39/15, 22/17, 84/18, 82/19, 105/21, 26/22, 74/23, 24/24) (private sector, extended applicability) (CA Metal Products and Foundry Industry);
3. Collective Agreement for the Hospitality and Tourism Industries (*Kolektivna pogodba dejavnosti gostinstva in turizma Slovenije*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 56/18, 16/19, 12/20, 93/20, 87/22, 161/22, 63/23) (private sector, partially extended applicability) (CA Hospitality and Tourism Industries);
4. Collective Agreement for the Construction Industry (*Kolektivna pogodba gradbenih dejavnosti*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 101/15, 15/17, 80/17, 30/18, 5/19, 81/19, 132/20, 67/21, 6/22, 87/22, 159/22, 67/23, 2/24, 30/24) (private sector, partially extended applicability) (CA Construction Industry);
5. Collective Agreement for the Textile, Clothing, Leather, and Leather-Processing Industry (*Kolektivna pogodba za tekstilne, oblačilne, usnjarske in usnjarsko-predelovalne dejavnosti Slovenije*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 18/14, 24/14, 25/14, 45/17, 148/22) (private sector, extended applicability) (CA Textile, Clothing and Leather);
6. Collective Agreement for Public Utility Services (*Kolektivna pogodba komunalnih dejavnosti*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 105/21, 94/22, 137/22, 106/23, 109/23) (private sector, without extended applicability) (CA Public Utility Services).
7. Collective Agreement for Slovenia's Electrical Industry (*Kolektivna pogodba za dejavnost elektroindustrije Slovenije*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 108/05, 43/06 – ZKoliP, 95/06, 114/06 – ZUE, 82/07, 71/07, 32/08, 70/08, 75/09, 47/09, 10/10, 84/11, 104/11, 32/13, 26/15, 58/17, 84/18, 24/19, 58/20, 49/22, 4/23, 4/24) (private sector, extended applicability) (CA Electrical Industry);
8. Collective Agreement Between Workers And Companies In The Small Business Sector (*Kolektivna pogodba med delavci in družbami drobnega gospodarstva*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 94/10, 58/11, 4/18, 23/23) (private sector, partially extended applicability) (CA Small Business Sector);
9. Collective Agreement for the Insurance Sector (*Kolektivna pogodba za zavarovalstvo Slovenije*) (Official Gazette RS, No. 192/21) (private sector, without extended applicability) (CA Insurance Sector);
10. Collective Agreement for Postal and Courier Services (*Kolektivna pogodba za poštne in kurirske dejavnosti*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 202/21, 26/22, 58/23, 22/24) (private sector, extended applicability) (CA Postal and Courier Services);

11. Collective Agreement on the Slovenian Banking Sector (*Kolektivna pogodba dejavnosti bančništva Slovenije*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 5/11, 14/13, 4/14, 95/14, 46/16, 24/18, 46/20, 17/22, 27/24) (private sector, without extended applicability) (CA Banking Sector);
12. Collective Agreement for the Real Estate Business (*Kolektivna pogodba za dejavnost poslovanja z nepremičninami*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 67/16, 38/17, 33/18, 46/19, 99/22, 7/23, 2/24) (private sector, partially extended applicability) (CA Real Estate Business);
13. Collective Agreement for Land Transport Services (*Kolektivna pogodba za storitvene dejavnosti v kopenskem prometu*) (Official Gazette RS, Nos. 200/20, 33/21) (private sector, extended applicability) (CA Land Transport Services).