

Mark D. Hamilton  
Marcio Adriano Anselmo

DOI: 10.2478/cmc-2025-0033

## KO IMAŠ LE KLADIVO: IZKUŠNJE IZ AMERIKE GLEDE SEKURITIZACIJE DRŽAVNIH ODZIVOV NA HIBRIDNE GROŽNJE

## WHEN ALL YOU HAVE IS A HAMMER: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAS ON SECURITIZING STATE RESPONSES TO HYBRID THREATS

**Povzetek** Članek analizira povezave med institucionalno šibkostjo, korupcijo in kriminalom v Latinski Ameriki ter naraščajočo odvisnostjo od vojaških akterjev pri vsakdanjem upravljanju v tej regiji. Izkušnje Latinske Amerike, kjer so v času pretresov varnostni ukrepi pogosto militarizirani in uporabljeni kot orodje hibridne vojne, aplicira na izzive EU. Obravnava koncept »večdimenzionalne varnosti« Organizacije ameriških držav, ki je nastal pred dvajsetimi leti zaradi regionalnega nasilja in šibkih institucij. Poudarja izzive civilnega nadzora nad oboroženimi silami, tveganja politizacije in izkoriščanja vojaških zmogljivosti za hitre »zmage«. Članek sklene s priporočili, kako lahko evropske države, predvsem manjše, ravnajo ob sodobnih hibridnih grožnjah.

**Ključne besede** *Latinska Amerika, hibridne grožnje, hibridna vojna, večdimenzionalna varnost, organizacija ameriških držav.*

**Abstract** This article engages linkages between institutional weakness, corruption, and criminality in the Americas, with a focus on an increasing dependence on military actors for everyday governance. It provides lessons learned from the Latin America region on how, in a time of upheaval, many things are being weaponized and militarized (hybrid warfare) to provide security. It examines the concept of ‘multidimensional security’, coined by the Organization of American States (OAS) just over twenty years ago, against a backdrop of significant regional violence and institutional weaknesses. It identifies issues with the norm of civilian control of armed forces – a healthy byproduct of democratization in the post-Cold War era – which has catalysed a largely unforeseen governance risk: political leaders’ temptation to leverage military capacities to score quick ‘wins’ often come at the cost of other state sectors’ maturation, the politicization of armed forces, and potentially even citizen confidence in democratic ideals. The article concludes with a series of recommendations and

lessons learned on Latin America's multidimensional security concept for European nations, particular smaller states, on how to deal with contemporary hybrid threats.

**Key words** *Latin America, hibrid threats, hibrid warfare, multidimensional security, Organization of American States*

*The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy of the Inter-American Defense College, the Inter-American Defense Board, the Organization of American States, the Brazilian Federal Police, or the authors' ministries/countries.*

**Introduction** At the dawn of the new millennium, regional leaders gathered in Mexico City to sign a shared *Declaration on Security in the Americas* (Organization of American States, 2003), broadening regional security analysis beyond a national security frame to include political, economic, social, and environmental factors. The Declaration envisioned a more cooperative framework to address transnational threats and challenges, respecting member states' sovereignty and prioritization of concerns while also seeking to strengthen regional commitments to human security and democratic governance.

Now almost twenty years later, the region is still in crisis. Various scandals and political fractures have eroded the legitimacy of the Organization of American States (OAS), and challenged faith in representative democracy in many regional stakeholders (Carothers, Feldmann, 2021; Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2021; Hamilton et al., 2022). The Americas are facing diverse threats and challenges to security and development, with the region referenced as the most violent in the world (Instituto Igarapé, 2025; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023), and among the most unequal (Bárcena, Byanyima, 2016), most corrupt (Pring, Coralie, 2019; Le Clercq, Rodriguez, 2020), and most deadly amid the Covid-19 pandemic (Our World in Data, 2025; Villar et al., 2025).

In practice, it appears that the 'multidimensional security' discourse of the OAS has failed to cultivate outcomes which approximate the vision of stability and cooperative security outlined by the member states in the 2003 Declaration (Hamilton, 2020b; Serbin, Serbin Pont, 2016; Thérien et al., 2012). In fact, we argue a flawed embrace of the 'multidimensional' concept by regional states has contributed to trends in securitization and militarization.

But what is the relevance of the OAS 'multidimensional security' concept for other parts of the world? Are there lessons learned in the Americas which can inform how countries in Europe could or should manage contemporary 'hybrid threats', particularly in smaller states? While Europe generally features stronger political institutions and recent history of cross-border collaboration and integration, many analysts see a growth in authoritarian and nationalist trends, often linked to the neighbouring

conflict in Ukraine and resultant socioeconomic dislocation (Alexandrescu, Stoica, 2024; Rathkolb, Steinbacher, 2025). Organized crime is invading the legal realm, with increasing corruption. Migration crises are increasingly framed in securitized or even militarized terms (Ciekanowski et al., 2025; Gabrielle and Garcés Mascareñas, 2025). Meanwhile, Ljungkvist (2024) worries about how the new ‘military-strategic rationality’ and ‘total defence’ framework in Sweden (and its neighbours) may serve to martialize domestic life.

These types of issues have long been at the heart of political and social life in the Americas, so it merits attention to consider its historical narrative, ongoing struggles with these issues, and attempts to date in seeking solutions.

## 1 UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL INSECURITY IN THE AMERICAS

The ‘multidimensional security’ concept of the OAS offered a broad and comprehensive framework to engage regional security issues. Still, the *Declaration on Security* can be critiqued for its fuzzy threat definitions, the overlap of civilian-military functions, and general lack of binding policy implementation (Covarrubias, 2019; Pereyra et al., 2020). Such challenges, though, are part of a much larger historical narrative: hemispheric security collaboration has long been undermined by divergent national and regional interests. According to Child (1980, 42 and 46), historical efforts to build strong regional security institutions have led to “elegant but emasculating” compromises and “unequal alliances”.

Since the 19th century, the Americas have struggled with competing interests of national sovereignty versus regional integration and accountability (Hamilton, 2016). Post-independence leaders in the Americas could never agree on a collective defence framework. Tensions pitted the isolationist tendencies of the US Monroe Doctrine against the Bolivarian/integrationist visions expressed in the Hispanic American Congresses of Panama (1826), Lima (1847-8), Santiago (1856), and once again in Lima (1865). Into the 20th century, the post-World War II architecture of the Inter-American system was designed without any standing military organ, due to discrepancies and power struggles surrounding nations’ security definitions (Connell-Smith, 1966; Einaudi, 2007; Hamilton, 2020b).

The Cold War era was dominated by ideological and political/military struggle between the competing discourses of capitalism versus communism or, for some, between imperialism and nationalism. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Americas began a slow transition from military governments to more democratic forms, and market-based coordination increasingly took the stage on the economic front. Multinational companies began to fill the institutional vacuum left by a shrinking and increasingly de-militarized state, this time alongside a multitude of new illicit actors, including street gangs, drug cartels, and retooled insurgent organizations (Muggah, 2019).

Socioeconomic dislocations were very common in this period, and questions surrounding security governance were deprioritized by civilian leaders. More recently, though, ‘new threats’ to citizen and public security forced regional leaders to make a critical reassessment of governance paradigms, amid still-tense civil-military relations. Figure 1 traces some key aspects of evolving regional security priorities and shifting military roles across time in the Americas.

In the early years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there was significant variance across countries in terms of their security priorities. After the surprising attacks on New York City and Washington DC in September 2001, the United States looked to highlight ‘terrorism’ in regional security discourse. Meanwhile, transnational gang issues were understood as imminent threats to Central American governance, and narco-centred criminal networks attracted increased attention in Colombia, parts of the Andes, and Mexico. Finally, a more individualized ‘human security’ lens was advocated by the Canadian government, alongside many proponents from civil society organizations.

The ‘multidimensional security’ concept agreed to by the member states of the OAS in 2003 blends traditional national sovereignty concerns with a rights-focused ‘human security’ discourse. According to Serbin and Serbin Pont (2016, 130), it “represents a doctrinal and practical advancement from the broad human security concept to a specific framework for addressing issues at a regional level”. It also represents a shift from a collective defence to more of a cooperative security paradigm, to the extent of its effective implementation.

**Figure 1:**  
Shifting State  
Priorities and  
Military Roles in  
the Americas  
**Source:**  
Figure adapted  
from Hamilton  
(2020a)

#### From Independence to the Cold War

- **State Priorities:**  
Political Independence
- **Military's Role:**  
Protectors of Sovereignty; From "Caudillismo"  
to Professionalization (External Orientation)

#### During the Cold War (1950s - 1980s)

- **State Priorities:**  
Modernization and Anti-Communism
- **Military's Role:**  
Guarantors of "National Security Doctrine";  
Military Governments (Internal Orientation)

#### The Post-Cold War Era (1980s-90s)

- **State Priorities:**  
Democratic Transition and Consolidation;  
Free Market and Private Sector Growth
- **Military's Role:**  
"Return to the Barracks"; Military Submission  
to Civilians and Diminished Forces/Budget  
(External Orientation: Only Defense)

#### The New Millennium (2000- )

- **State Priorities:**  
Integral Development within a Democratic  
Context; "Multidimensional Security" Focus
- **Military's Role:**  
Evolution in Tasks; Submission to Civilian  
Leaders and Filling the "Security Vacuum"  
(Internal Orientation in Many States)

‘Multidimensional security’, as outlined in the Declaration, lacks order or prioritization; however, at least four key thematic categories can be culled from the long list of nations’ ‘threats, challenges, and concerns’ (Anselmo et al., 2022; Hamilton, 2016; 2020a). The

first encompasses diverse *social and environmental vulnerabilities*, including inequality and institutional weakness, characterized by Griffiths (2009) as ‘structural risk’ factors.

A second umbrella category is *transnational organized crime and public insecurity*, a theme of significant interest for this publication, other global scholars (Albanese, Reichel, 2014; Allum, Gilmour, 2012; Miklaucic, Brewer, 2013) and supranational institutions, such as the Organization of American States (2011; 2012), the United Nations Development Program (2013), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2023), and the World Bank (2011). This category necessarily includes consideration of illicit trafficking, violence, corruption and impunity, all discussed earlier in this article.

A third category, labelled *asymmetric challenges*, considers three security challenges often studied in isolation: terrorism, cyber threats, and weapons of mass destruction. The decision to analyse these together is based on shared characteristics: focus on an asymmetric ‘battlefield’, utilization of attacks against mass populations, and critical links to transnational organized crime. In addition, all fall under the purview of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE).

The fourth category involves *traditional threats* (focused on military and defence), with an emphasis on sovereignty. The four categories are shown in Figure 2, and discussion follows concerning the implications of linking ‘multidimensional’ challenges, in terms of blurring the lines of institutional responsibilities and the potential for fomenting militarization.

Figure 2:  
Multi-  
dimensional  
security  
themes in four  
categories  
Source:  
Adapted from  
Hamilton (2016)  
and Anselmo,  
Borges, and  
Hamilton (2022)




Critiques of the OAS multidimensional security agenda emerge from many sectors. Human rights activists have expressed concern with securitization and the potential militarization of everyday life, reversing the democratic reforms of recent decades.

Early critiques emerged from Chiller and Freeman (2005) and Barrachina and Rial (2006). More recently, Motta and Pimental (2016) have framed ‘securitization’ (and de-securitization) from an Arendtian conception of politics. Meanwhile, some defence analysts and military leaders scoff at the ‘mission creep’ of multidimensional definitions, and worry that these diffuse approaches water down states’ focus on ‘real’ national security threats such as inter-state conflict or more proximate state challenges related to terrorism and insurgency (Chandler 2008).

Even many advocates for a ‘multidimensional’ approach to security have voiced their concerns about difficulties in implementation, citing the inability for a regional body like the OAS to set a clear agenda, to leverage states’ political will, and to achieve measurable results beyond a simple ‘shopping list of threats’ or agreement to vague declarations (Covarrubias, 2019; Daly-Hayes, 2006; Hamilton, 2020b; and Pereyra et al., 2020).

There is inherent tension in a framing of multidimensional security which pairs ‘national’ and ‘human’ security lenses without explicit discussion of the resultant challenges. Figure 3 highlights a few key differences in their respective framings and priorities, as adapted from Schirch (2011).

**Figure 3:**  
Differentiating  
national vs.  
human security  
priorities  
**Source:**  
Adapted from  
Schirch (2011)



A ‘national security’ frame centres on defending the State (as a collective) from critical external threats. Meanwhile, a ‘human security’ lens broadens the aperture to include economic, health, environmental, personal, community, and political issues (United Nations Development Program, 1994). The purpose of ‘security’ shifts, from protecting state sovereignty to protecting the basic rights of individual citizens. This individual protection can be conceptualized as above (or sometimes even against) the interests of the State collective and its governing elite.

Framers of the Declaration (Organization of American States, 2003) tried to integrate both lenses into a holistic concept. On the one hand, ‘multidimensional security’ is grounded in ‘human security’, and overtures are made to include non-state groups. Nonetheless, citizens and local civil society groups were not the lead decision-makers in Mexico City. Rather, state leaders were the signatories of the agreement, and most multidimensional threats, challenges, and concerns were framed at national or supranational levels. This national versus human security dichotomy is at the heart of the multidimensional concept, and contributes to its lack of clarity, consensus, and political will (Covarrubias, 2019; Hamilton, 2020b; Realuyo, 2013).

## **2 THE TEMPTATION OF MILITARIZATION AND ITS DE-INSTITUTIONALIZATION EFFECTS**

The region has experienced major shifts in state governance priorities and military roles across the years, including major changes in this new millennium. Interstate armed conflict is now deemed increasingly unlikely in the region (Domínguez et al., 2003); however, internal conflict and civil violence (linked to transnational organized crime) is seen as a threat to governance, with de facto challenges to state sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity (Calderón, 2012; Costa, 2012). States are increasingly utilizing armed forces to address internal (public security) challenges from illicit actors. This trend raises concerns from both national and human security perspectives (Chillier, Freeman, 2005; Rodrigues, 2012; 2020).

From a national security frame, several critical questions arise: If most defence resources are being committed to non-traditional missions, how will this impact a country’s traditional defence priorities? How are military actors being prepared for new missions in terms of their doctrine, training, and legal guidance and protection? Finally, what will be the long-term impacts on military esteem and healthy civil-military relations? What are the impacts on other state institutions?

From a human security frame, what are the institutional impacts of continued dependence on the armed forces for non-defence missions? What does this ‘mission creep’ mean for the securitization of public space and restrictions on civil liberties and citizen privacy? Finally, what will be the impact on citizen freedoms and healthy civil-military relations?

A major concern which has risen to the forefront in recent years is the role of military utilization and its impact on the de-institutionalization of other civilian sectors, envisaged years ago by Barrachina and Rial (2006) and engaged empirically more recently (Bartolomé et al., 2023; Grabendorff, 2021; Isaacson, 2020; Medeiros, Acácio, 2021; Rodrigues, Labat, 2019; Tickner, 2022; and Verdes-Montenegro, 2019). Armed forces in the Americas comprise both their own interest group (with power and authority vested over centuries) as well as a political tool of their civilian commander-in-chief. What may be the implications of civilian leaders using military leaders to accomplish their political goals? The enhanced use of armed forces in

pandemic and disaster response in recent years has increased their popularity in many countries, and astute leaders seeking quick solutions to complex problems have recognized their value-added as a rapid-response tool.

What happens, though, when the military becomes the tool of choice for resolving everyday community problems, or perhaps worse, political controversies within the state? When the military are empowered as development actors in remote areas, as seen in Brazil and Mexico, crowding out other civilian institutional actors? When the executive leverages other branches of government – such as the Courts or Legislature – by showing up flanked by armed actors, as seen in recent years in El Salvador (Rosen et al., 2022), not to mention in countries like Venezuela, Cuba, and Nicaragua (Diamint, 2015; Farah, 2012)? What happens when the military are the overseers of elections?

What we have seen in the Americas is that an expansion in the role of the military – even in the short term – tends to contribute to longer-term dependence on military capabilities. Post-Cold War democratization contributes to this effect, as the military offers civilian leaders not only logistical capacity, but also a greater sense of loyalty than many other actors, due to their “democratic obligation to submit to civilian power” (Hamilton, 2020a, 125).

Civilian leaders with populist and authoritarian tendencies may seek to use military power to carry out their political projects, and any perceived acts of resistance may adversely influence military budgets or be framed as coup threats. On the contrary, the acceptance of new roles may offer the armed forces greater access to resources (political and economic). The tendency to depend on armed forces to resolve the multidimensional gamut of challenges faced in the Americas foment a long-term risk of never developing other institutional sectors. Ultimately, when all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail!

### 3 THE VALUE OF ‘SEEING THE ELEPHANT’

Kacowicz and Mares (2016, 26–7) offer the historical backdrop of regional governance challenges that cut to the heart of state institutions in the Americas: “Looking back over the first 200 years of Latin American security we can agree that intrastate issues have always dominated the security agenda /and/ the Latin American state remains both the problem and solution to cope with many of the challenges”.

As a concluding reflection, consider the ancient Asian fable of the blind men and the elephant, chronicled by Saxe (Richardson, 2005; Holton, Curry, 1914). Each man tries to describe the ‘reality’ that he encounters: the first describes a snake (the trunk), the second, a wall (a leg), the third, a spear (the tusk), and so on. Each man accesses only a small part of a complex reality, with erroneous understanding if taken in isolation. Extrapolated to the contemporary security context of the Americas, policymakers would likely be in serious trouble if they were to diagnose the enemy as a snake, prepare a careful response strategy, and then end up engaging an elephant.

The breadth of the multidimensional concept – crossing disciplines, embracing the fuzziness of definitions, and engaging diverse actors and ideas to help tell ‘superior stories’ (Tilly, 2002) – offers the chance to at least ‘see’ this elephant. Academics investigating insecurity would be wise to draw on the multidimensional concept. Of course, critical questions of response and implementation remain, but the first step should be a better understanding of the scenario.

In the Americas, the rule of law does not work for much of the population. Justice is undermined by the diverse faces of corruption: elite capture of state resources (Acemoglu, Robinson, 2012); the criminal intimidation of government officials (Costa, 2012); impunity and citizens’ fear of speaking out (Alda, Rodriguez, 2021; LeClerq, Rodriguez, 2020); and a pervasive ‘culture of transgression’, with deep roots in colonial inequities (Sorj, Martucelli, 2008).

Anselmo and Pontes (2019; 2022) highlight the evolution and expansion of criminality in the Americas over the last fifty years, from CRIME.ORG (organized crime) and CRIME.COM (‘white collar’ crime) to increasing manifestations of CRIME.GOV (institutionalized crime and corruption). Corruption, especially when perpetrated at a high level by the political class, not only harms democracy; it also directly affects the people who lose resources which could be used for public health, education, security, and so on. It attacks the State in such a way as to prevent it from meeting the basic needs of the population, increasing the levels of inequality and, consequently, also of violence. Its cross-cutting effects allow us to consider it as one of the great current threats in the hemisphere, which directly influences the other categories.

Only through substantive advances in the levels of development and culture of integrity can the picture be reversed. As Rotberg (2020) points out, there are means to transform the dominant political culture through processes of good governance. However, such changes require profound changes in regional sociopolitical structures, which are often difficult to implement. Engaging the military as a tool of executive power offers quicker solutions and helps with the next election, but it also masks underlying problems.

Iron Fist (*Mano Dura*) policies which focus on harsh penalties are popular in opinion polls; however, their effectiveness leaves much to be desired (Muggah, 2019). According to the United Nations Development Program (2013, 13), such policies have “negative repercussions” such as “an increase in levels of lethal violence, the strengthening of criminal networks, congestion in already overcrowded prisons, human rights violations – particularly against youths and minors – and abuse of authority”.

Meanwhile, reliance on the military does not necessarily increase trust and collaboration in civil-military relations. According to Alves Soares and Vitelli (2016), Bruneau (2005), and Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas (2007), many countries struggle to develop civilian communities to effectively manage defence issues. This complicates public security coordination and a shared collective vision.

**Conclusion** Drawing on the ‘smart security’ framework of Blackwell (2015), the lessons learned and recommendations stemming from the Americas experience of implementation of Multidimensional security are also quite relevant outside the region.

The first recommendation is to carry out a multidimensional analysis of the problem of criminality in the region in order to ‘see the whole elephant’ instead of just some of its parts. This approach encourages the development of nuanced and more flexible responses (Hamilton, 2020b).

The second recommendation is the prioritization of cross-sector, interagency and transnational collaboration. Cooperation between various actors minimizes the danger of ‘groupthink’ and offers creative and mutually beneficial solutions. Realuyo (2013, 244) highlights “critical elements for effective collaborative models”, including political will, capable institutions, functional mechanisms, resources, and results indicators.<sup>1</sup>

The third recommendation is the value-added of developing ‘state’ vs. ‘government’ policies (Bernazza, 2011). This encourages governance with a long-term vision and security responses beyond the particular interest of the current government/executive leader in office. It also allows greater predictability in international relations and common ground in policymaking.

The fourth recommendation is improving the relationship between the security sector and civil society, with particular emphasis on engaging across sectors and groups with a legacy of mistrust: “There is hope of finding ‘points in common’ between the sectors through listening sessions active, thematic round tables and joint task forces (Hamilton, 2018, 106).”

The fifth and last recommendation is the prioritization of capacity development in different sectors, both civil and military. ‘Inclusive institutions’ (Acemoglu, 2003) should be prioritized to ensure better governance. This requires a new approach to problem-solving in the realm of security, and probably one that does not see every problem as a nail to be hammered.

In terms of the implications of these recommendations for other contexts, especially Europe, a disclaimer is in order: there are key differences in regional geopolitical environments. Whereas security concerns in the Americas are focused primarily on non-state criminal actors, the hybrid threat frame in much of Europe is focused on the actions of Russia and its proxies. That said, these lessons still provide critical insight for European policymakers.

---

<sup>1</sup> See Muggah and Aguirre (2018) and Muggah et al., (2016) on mapping successful citizen security interventions involving diverse actors.

With regard to the first recommendation, a multidimensional diagnostic – privileging multiple perspectives – is valuable to understand the cross-cutting effects of institutional weakness and entry points for state-based and criminal threats. The second and third recommendations – focused on collaborative, multi-sector coordination and longer-term ‘state’ policy agreements – are a relative strength of the European Union vis-à-vis the OAS member states; nevertheless, amid continued Russian provocations, US isolationism, home-grown populism, and a sluggish economy, it is critical to not take collaboration for granted. In terms of the fourth recommendation, the security sector in Europe should prioritize bridge-building with civil society actors (especially ethnic minority and migrant groups), as trust networks are essential to navigate amid complex and multi-vector crises. Finally, ‘inclusive’ institutions are just as crucial to development and democratic governance in Europe as in the Americas. The short-term gains of militarizing responses to migration (and other ‘hot button’ issues) need to be considered in terms of their potential long-term effects. Europe can learn a lot from the governance challenges experienced in the Americas over the last twenty years. Among the lessons: successful states are not built by a hammer alone.

## References

1. Acemoglu, D., 2003. *Root causes: A historical approach to assessing the role of institutions in economic development*. *Finance & Development*, 40(2): pp 27–30.
2. Acemoglu, D., Robinson, J. A., 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty*. New York: Random House.
3. Albanese, J., Reichel, P. (Eds.), 2014. *Transnational Organized Crime: An Overview from Six Continents*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
4. Alda Mejías, S., Rodríguez Sánchez-Lara, G., 2021. *Seguridad, corrupción e impunidad en América Latina*. Madrid: Real Instituto el Cano.
5. Allum, F., Gilmour, S. (Eds.), 2012. *Routledge Handbook of Transnational Organized Crime*. Abingdon: Routledge.
6. Alexandrescu, M., Stoica, M., 2024. *Authoritarian Demand in East-Central Europe Post-Pandemic and Amid Neighbouring War*. *Politics and Governance*, 12: pp 1–16.
7. Alves Soares, S., Vitelli, M., 2016. *Comunidades epistêmicas e de prática em defesa na Argentina e no Brasil*. *Revista Carta Internacional*, 11(3): pp 99–123.
8. Anselmo, M., Pontes, J., 2019. *Crime.gov: Quando corrupção e governo se misturam*. Rio de Janeiro: Objetiva.
9. Anselmo, M., Pontes, J., 2022. *Operation Car Wash: Brazil's Institutionalized Crime and the Inside Story of the Biggest Corruption Scandal in History*. Dublin: Bloomsbury.
10. Anselmo, M., Borges, M., Hamilton, M., 2022. *Covid-19 e implicações à segurança multidimensional*. *Revista dos Tribunais*, 111(1044): pp 191–209.
11. Bárcena, A., Byanyima, W., 2016. *América Latina y el Caribe es la región más desigual del mundo. ¿Cómo solucionarlo?* Comisión Económica para América Latina. <https://www.cepal.org/es/articulos/2016-america-latina-caribe-es-la-region-mas-desigual-mundo-como-solucionarlo> (Accessed 14 September 2025).
12. Barrachina, C., Rial, J., 2006. *Los ministerios de defensa en América Latina y las consecuencias de la multidimensionalidad de las amenazas*. *América Latina Hoy*, 42: pp 1–21.

13. Bartolomé, M., Hamilton, M., Bordón, R. P., 2023. *¿La crónica de una militarización anunciada? El rol militar y las relaciones cívico-militares en los tiempos de pandemia. Perspectivas: revista de ciencias sociales*, 8(15): pp 1–26.
14. Bernazza, C., 2011. *¿Proyectos nacionales o políticas de Estado? Aportes al lenguaje de la política. Revista Reseñas y Debates*, 7(65): pp 1–4.
15. Blackwell, A., 2015. *If the War on Drugs is Over ... Now What? Security Without Easy Answers*. Victoria: Friesen Press.
16. Bruneau, T., 2005. *Civil-military relations in Latin America: The hedgehog and the fox revisited. Revista Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad*, 19(1): pp 111–131.
17. Calderón, F., 2012. *Ten Theses Concerning Social Conflict in Latin America. CEPAL Review*, 107: pp 7–30.
18. Carothers, T., Feldmann, A. (Eds.), 2021. *Divisionismo político y riesgos democráticos en América Latina*. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
19. Chandler, D., 2008. Review Essay: *Human Security: The Dog That Didn't Bark. Security Dialogue*, 39(4): pp 427–438.
20. Child, J., 1980. *Unequal Alliance: The Inter-American Military System, 1938-1978*. Boulder: Westview Press.
21. Chillier, G., Freeman, L., 2005. *El nuevo concepto de seguridad hemisférica de la OEA: Una amenaza en potencia*. Washington: Washington Office on Latin America.
22. Ciekanowski, H., Żurawski, S., Oskierko, M., 2025. *The migration crisis as a tool of hybrid warfare: Analysis of selected cases at the borders of the European Union. L'europe/United Europe*, 22(1): pp 20–29.
23. Connell-Smith, G., 1966. *The Inter-American System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
24. Corporación Latinobarómetro, 2021. *Informe 2021: Adiós a Macondo*. Santiago: Corporación Latinobarómetro.
25. Costa, G., 2012. *Citizen security and transnational organized crime in the Americas: Current situation and challenges in the inter-American arena. Sur: International Journal on Human Rights*, 9(16): pp 126–46.
26. Covarrubias, A., 2019. *Integración latinoamericana: un regionalismo coyuntural. In Shifter, M., Binetti, B. (eds.), Promesas incumplidas: América latina hoy*, pp 129–146. Washington: Inter-American Dialogue.
27. Daly-Hayes, M., 2006. *Partners of choice? Prospects for cooperation on the multidimensional security agenda. Presented at the Western Hemisphere Security Cooperation Symposium. Washington: National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies*.
28. Diamint, R., 2015. *A New Militarism in Latin America. Journal of Democracy*, 26(4): pp 155–168.
29. Domínguez, J., Mares, D., Orozco, M., Palmer, D., Rojas Aravena, F., Serbin, A., 2003. *Boundary Disputes in Latin America*. Washington: United States Institute of Peace.
30. Einaudi, L., 2007. *Trans-American Security: What's Missing? Strategic Forum*, 228: pp 1–8.
31. Farah, D., 2012. *Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National Security Priority*. Carlisle: US Army War College.
32. Gabrielli, L., Garcés Mascareñas, B., 2025. *The framing of migration as a hybrid military threat. Insights from the Ceuta's 2021 'crisis'. Migration Studies*, 13(1): pp 1–24.
33. Grabendorff, W. (Ed.), 2021. *Militares y gobernabilidad. Cómo están cambiando las relaciones cívico-militares en América Latina*. Bogotá: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
34. Griffiths Spielman, J., 2009. *An analysis of the conceptualization of security in Latin America and its impact in the regional scenario. In Armed Forces and Society: New Challenges and Environments*, pp 397–403. Santiago: Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares.

35. Hamilton, M., 2016. *Juggling defense and security in the Americas: Academic, diplomatic, and professional engagement at the Inter-American Defense College*. *Hemisferio: Revista del Colegio Interamericano de Defensa*, 2: pp 114–148.
36. Hamilton, M., 2018. Youth and the security sector: VE as a function of Y. In Schirch, L. (Ed.), *The Ecology of Violent Extremism: Perspectives on Peacebuilding and Human Security*, 103–109. London: Rowman and Littlefield.
37. Hamilton, M., 2020a. Relaciones cívico-militares: relaciones críticas y multidimensionales para el hemisferio. *Seguridad, Ciencia y Defensa*, 6: pp 118–130.
38. Hamilton, M., 2020b. Sistema interamericano de seguridad. In Lozano, A., Rodríguez, A. (eds.), *Seguridad y asuntos internacionales*. Mexico City: Asociación Mexicana de Estudios Internacionales.
39. Hamilton, M., Plancarte, M., Rodríguez Ceballos, O., 2022. La piedra angular de instituciones: reflexiones hemisféricas en el contexto de crisis multidimensionales. In Bartolomé, M., Borges, M. (eds.), *Corruption and Institutionalization*. Washington: Inter-American Defense College.
40. Holton, M., Curry, C. M., 1914. *Holton-Curry Readers*. Chicago: Rand McNally and Co.
41. Instituto Igarapé, 2025. Homicide Monitor. <https://homicide.igarape.org.br/> (Accessed 12 October 2025).
42. Isaacson, A., 2020. En América Latina, a causa del COVID-19 se está poniendo en riesgo alterar permanentemente las relaciones cívico-militares. *Análisis WOLA*. <https://www.wola.org/es/analisis/america-latina-covid-19-relaciones-civico-militares-policia/> (Accessed 7 October 2025).
43. Kacowicz, A., Mares, D., 2016. Security studies and security in Latin America: The first 200 years. In Mares, D., Kacowicz, A. (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security*, pp 11–29. London: Routledge.
44. Le Clercq Ortega, J., Rodríguez, G., 2020. Índice global de impunidad 2020: Escalas de impunidad en el mundo. Puebla: Universidad de las Américas Puebla y Centro de Estudios sobre la Impunidad y Justicia.
45. Ljungkvist, K., 2024. The military-strategic rationality of hybrid warfare: Everyday total defence under strategic non-peace in the case of Sweden. *European Journal of International Security*, 9(4): pp 533–552.
46. Medeiros Passos, A., Acácio, L., 2021. A militarização das respostas à COVID-19 nas democracias Latino-americanas. *Revista de Administração Pública*, 55(1): pp 261–271.
47. Miklaucic, M., Brewer, J., (Eds.), 2013. *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization*. Washington: NDU Press.
48. Motta, B., Pimental, C., 2016. Securitization and the Political: Contributions from Hannah Arendt. *Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Estratégia de Defesa*, 3(1): pp 23–51.
49. Muggah, R., 2019. El combate a la delincuencia organizada en América Latina: Entre mano dura y seguridad ciudadana. In Shifter, M., Binetti, B., (Eds.), *Promesas incumplidas: América latina hoy*, pp 31–52. Washington: Inter-American Dialogue.
50. Muggah, R., Aguirre, K., 2018. *Citizen Security in Latin America: Facts and Figures*. Strategic paper 33. Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute.
51. Muggah, R., Szabó de Carvalho, I., Alvarado, A., Marmolejo, L., and Wang, R., 2016. *Making Cities Safer: Citizen Security Innovations from Latin America*. Strategic paper 20. Rio de Janeiro: Igarapé Institute.
52. Organization of American States, 2003. *Declaration on Security in the Americas*. OEA/Ser.K/XXXVIII. Mexico City: OAS.
53. Organization of American States, 2011. *Declaration of San Salvador on Citizen Security in the Americas*. AG/DEC. 66 (XLI-O/11). San Salvador: OAS.
54. Organization of American States, 2012. *The Drug Problem in the Americas*. Washington: OAS.

55. *Our World in Data*, 2025. Coronavirus Pandemic (COVID-19), Data from Johns Hopkins University. <https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus> (Accessed 1 October 2025).
56. Pion-Berlin, D., Trinkunas, H., 2007. Attention deficits: Why politicians ignore defense policy in Latin America. *Latin American Research Review*, 42(3): pp 76–100.
57. Pereyra Bordón, R., Hamilton, M., Garma, S., 2020. ¿Fuera de alineación? Arquitectura, discursos y realidades de la seguridad hemisférica. In Chanona, A. (ed.), *Los regionalismos frente a los retos y la complejidad de las amenazas a la seguridad y defensa contemporáneas*. Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.
58. Pring, C., Vrush, J., 2019. *Global Corruption Index: Latin America and the Caribbean 2019: Citizens' Views and Experiences of Corruption*. Berlin: Transparency International.
59. Rathkolb, O., Steinbacher, S. (Eds.), 2025. *Authoritarian Trends and Parliamentary Democracy in Europe*. Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag.
60. Realuyo, C., 2013. Collaborating to combat illicit networks through interagency and international efforts. In Miklaucic, M., Brewer, J. (Eds.), *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization*, pp 243–265. Washington: NDU Press.
61. Richardson, J. M., 2005. *Paradise Poisoned: What We Can Learn About Development, Conflict, and Terrorism from Sri Lanka's Civil Wars*. Kandy: International Centre for Ethnic Studies.
62. Rodrigues, T., 2012. Drug-trafficking and militarization in the Americas: the addiction to war. *Contexto Internacional*, 34(1): pp 9–41.
63. Rodrigues, T., 2020. Narcotráfico, militarización y democracia en el Brasil contemporáneo. *Análisis Carolina*, 8, pp 1–13.
64. Rodrigues, T., Labate, B., 2019. México y el narcoanálisis: una genealogía de las políticas de drogas en los gobiernos Calderón y Peña Nieto. *Colombia Internacional*, 100, pp 15–38.
65. Rosen, J. D., Cutrona, S., Lindquist, K., 2022. Gangs, violence, and fear: punitive Darwinism in El Salvador. *Crime, law and social change*, 79(2): pp 1–20.
66. Rotberg, R., 2020. *Anticorruption*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
67. Schirch, L., 2011. Civil society-military roadmap on human security. [chrome-https://lisaschirch.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/civil\\_society\\_military\\_roadmap\\_on\\_human\\_security.pdf](https://lisaschirch.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/civil_society_military_roadmap_on_human_security.pdf) (Accessed 10 October 2025).
68. Serbin, A., Serbin Pont, A., 2016. Cooperative security and regional governance. In Mares, D., Kacowicz, A. (Eds.), *Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security*, pp 127–137. London: Routledge.
69. Sorj, B., Martuccelli, D., 2008. *The Latin American Challenge: Social Cohesion and Democracy*. São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Edelstein Center for Social Research.
70. Thérien, J. P., Mace, G., Gagné, S., 2012. The changing dynamics of inter-American security. *Latin American Policy*, 3(2): pp 147–163.
71. Tickner, A., 2022. Politización, militarización y democracia. *El Espectador*. <https://www.elespectador.com/opinion/columnistas/arlene-b-tickner/politizacion-militarizacion-y-democracia/> (Accessed 10 October 2025).
72. Tilly, C., 2002. *Stories, Identities and Political Change*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
73. United Nations Development Program, 1994. *Human Development Report 1994*. New York: United Nations Development Program.
74. United Nations Development Program, 2013. *Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014: Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America*. New York: United Nations Development Program.
75. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2023. *Global Study on Homicide 2023: Homicide and Organized Crime in Latin America*. Vienna: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

76. Verdes-Montenegro, F., 2019. *La (re)militarización de la política latinoamericana. Origen y consecuencias para las democracias de la región*. Fundación Carolina, Documento de Trabajo 14.
77. Villar, J., Maçaira, P., Baião, F. A., 2025. *Lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic in Latin America: A Data Science standpoint*. PLoS One, 20(5). <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0324171>.
78. World Bank, 2011. *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development*. Washington: World Bank.

**E-mail: [mark.hamilton@iadc.edu](mailto:mark.hamilton@iadc.edu)**

**ORCID: 0000-0002-2332-8442**

**E-mail: [marcio.anselmo@iadc.edu](mailto:marcio.anselmo@iadc.edu)**

**Prof. dr. Mark D. Hamilton** je profesor na Interameriškem obrambnem kolidžu, na katerem poučuje mednarodno varnost, analizo konfliktov in multidimenzionalno varnost v Ameriki. Doktorat iz mednarodnih odnosov je pridobil na Ameriški univerzi. Njegovo raziskovalno delo se osredotoča na hemisfersko varnost, obrambne strategije, transnacionalne grožnje in reševanje konfliktov. Hamilton aktivno sodeluje v akademskih in strokovnih varnostnih mrežah ter prispeva k razvoju politik, ki povezujejo teorijo mednarodnih odnosov s praktičnimi varnostnimi izzivi v regiji.

**Prof. Mark D. Hamilton, PhD**, is a professor at the Inter-American Defense College, where he teaches international security, conflict analysis, and multidimensional security in the Americas. He earned his doctorate in international relations from American University. His research focuses on hemispheric security, defense strategies, transnational threats, and conflict resolution. Hamilton is actively involved in academic and professional security networks and contributes to the development of policies that link international relations theory with practical security challenges in the region.

**E-mail:** [mark.hamilton@iadc.edu](mailto:mark.hamilton@iadc.edu)

**ORCID:** 0000-0002-2332-8442

---

\* Prispevki, objavljeni v Sodobnih vojaških izzivih, niso uradno stališče Slovenske vojske niti organov, iz katerih so avtorji prispevkov.

\* Articles published in the Contemporary Military Challenges do not reflect the official viewpoint of the Slovenian Armed Forces nor the bodies in which the authors of articles are employed.

**Dr. Marcio Adriano Anselmo** je delegat Federalne policije Brazilije, kjer vodi preiskave kompleksnih finančnih in transnacionalnih kriminalnih zadev ter raziskuje vprašanja pravnega in policijskega mednarodnega sodelovanja. Je strokovnjak za preiskovanje finančnega kriminala, korupcije in mednarodno policijsko sodelovanje. Doktoriral je na Univerzi v Sao Paulu. Njegovo raziskovanje vključuje mednarodno gospodarsko pravo in preprečevanje pranja denarja.

**Marcio Adriano Anselmo, PhD**, is a delegate of the Brazilian Federal Police, where he leads investigations into complex financial and transnational criminal cases and researches issues of legal and police international cooperation. He is an expert in financial crime investigation, corruption, and international police cooperation. He holds a PhD from the University of Sao Paulo. His field of research is international economic law and money laundering prevention.

**E-mail:** [marcio.anselmo@iadc.edu](mailto:marcio.anselmo@iadc.edu)

---

\* Prispevki, objavljeni v Sodobnih vojaških izzivih, niso uradno stališče Slovenske vojske niti organov, iz katerih so avtorji prispevkov.

\* Articles published in the Contemporary Military Challenges do not reflect the official viewpoint of the Slovenian Armed Forces nor the bodies in which the authors of articles are employed.