

Whitaker Prize Address, MACLAS 2023

Diáspora, exilio y retorno: Transformaciones e impactos culturales en Argentina, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay (2021), authored by Luis Roniger, Leonardo Senkman, Saúl Sosnowski, and Mario Sznajder, earned the 2022 Arthur P. Whitaker Prize awarded annually by the Middle Atlantic Council of Latin American Studies (MACLAS) for the best book published in the previous two years by a MACLAS member.

This text is based on the keynote address delivered by Dr. Luis Roniger on March 10, 2023, at the MACLAS Conference at Salisbury University, Salisbury, Maryland.

Exile, Transnational Life, Return, and Diasporas: The Southern Cone Experience

Luis Roniger

Wake Forest University and Hebrew University of Jerusalem
ronigerl@wfu.edu

This article analyzes the experience of massive exile during the last wave of dictatorships in Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and particularly the process of partial return to the home countries. Given the dramatic and unparalleled institutional breakdown that affected these societies, each in different ways and at varying degrees, the text addresses what limits, difficulties, or shortcomings the former exiles encountered upon their return; what the impact of returnees was on their respective national landscape; and how the transnational experience of those displaced individuals affected the home institutions, politics, and national culture upon their return to their home countries. Finally, it explores how the home countries have addressed and related to the persistent diasporas of co-nationals abroad, particularly those with academic and professional credentials.


Keywords: exile, transnational experiences, democratization, return, institutional and cultural impacts

Este artículo analiza la experiencia del exilio masivo durante la última ola de dictaduras en Argentina, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay, y en particular el proceso de retorno parcial a los países de origen. Ante el dramático quiebre institucional que afectó a estas sociedades bajo las dictaduras, cada una de ellas de diferente manera y en diversos grados, el texto aborda qué límites, dificultades y carencias encontraron los exexiliados a su regreso; cuál fue el impacto de los retornados en sus respectivos escenarios nacionales; y cómo la experiencia transnacional de las personas que sufrieron tal desplazamiento territorial modeló su impacto sobre las instituciones de origen, la política y la cultura nacional a su regreso a los países de origen. Finalmente, el artículo indica cómo los países de origen han abordado y se han relacionado con las persistentes diásporas de connacionales en el extranjero, en especial con la diáspora de académicos y profesionales.

Palabras clave: exilio, experiencias transnacionales, democratización, retorno, impactos institucionales y culturales

Este artigo analisa a experiência de exílio em massa durante a última onda de ditaduras na Argentina, Chile, Paraguai e Uruguai e, em particular, o processo de retorno parcial a seus países de origem. Diante da dramática ruptura institucional que atingiu essas sociedades durante as ditaduras, cada uma delas de forma diferente e em graus variados, o texto aborda os limites, dificuldades e deficiências os exilados encontraram em seu retorno; qual foi o impacto dos retornados em seus respectivos cenários nacionais; e como a experiência transnacional das pessoas que sofreram tal deslocamento territorial modelou seu impacto sobre as instituições de origem, a política e a cultura nacional em seu retorno aos países de origem. Por fim, o artigo indica como os países de origem têm se aproximado e se relacionado com as persistentes diásporas de compatriotas no exterior, principalmente com a diáspora de acadêmicos e profissionais.

Palavras chave: exílio, experiências transnacionais, democratização, retorno, impactos institucionais e culturais



(Photo courtesy Diane Johnson)

Interdisciplinary Research Team

For a decade, I was part of an interdisciplinary research team that explored the impact of exile, transnational life, and return on the societies in the Southern Cone of the Americas. The research team included Leonardo Senkman, a social historian and historian of ideas; Saúl Sosnowski, a cultural studies and literature scholar; and Mario Sznajder, a comparative political scientist. Through the analysis of the dynamics of exile, the policies of return enacted by Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay, and extensive interview materials with many of those individuals who had such experience, we traced the role of exiles, expatriates, migrants, returnees, and sojourners on institutions, politics, and culture in the transition from dictatorship to democracy, and in the long-term process of reconstituting the public spheres around democratic values.

The book is the product of that interdisciplinary work. At the center of our inquiry was the experience of those who had been displaced from the national territory in the 1970s–80s and who, while vowing to return, lived through varied transnational experiences that transformed their horizons, while impacting the home countries once return became viable and some of them opted to go back. For several years, we traveled repeatedly to Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay and conducted in-depth interviews with over 150 intellectuals, political and social activists, academics, artists, authors, and professionals who lived in exile and returned to the home countries or became sojourners traveling back and forth.

I would like to share part of the findings about those exilic experiences and the process of return in all its complexity, addressing the following questions: given the dramatic and unparalleled institutional breakdown that affected these societies, each in different ways and at varying degrees, what was the impact of returnees on their respective national landscape? How did their exile and transnational experience affect their return and home institutions, politics, and national culture? Those who left changed, and so did those who remained and lived under dictatorial rule. Fractures and scars pointed to the need for a healing process, however dramatic or challenging. Charges and countercharges on the trials of survival were part of the process, for no one, and certainly not the national societies themselves, emerged unscathed from the violence of military repression. Diasporic communities, moreover, did not cease to exist by virtue of an official end to dictatorship.

Accordingly, not exile, not diaspora, and certainly not return, could be seen as a homogeneous whole. A mixed scenario of exiles, expatriates, migrants, returnees, and sojourners emerged, carrying different dialogues and holding different commitments toward the home country. And as these societies implemented policies of economic neoliberalism to different degrees, how was the return process

conducted? What was the role of NGOs, international organizations, home governments, host countries, the market, and the exiles themselves? And what limits, difficulties, and shortcomings were encountered? Finally, how did the home countries address and relate to the persistent diasporas of co-nationals abroad? For reasons of space, the treatment of these issues here is necessarily partial; a fuller treatment can be found in the book awarded the Whitaker Prize as well as in several other essays that I have published on this topic in the last two decades (among others, Roniger 2009; Sznajder and Roniger 2009; Roniger 2010; Sánchez and Roniger 2010; Roniger 2011, 2014, 2016a, 2016b, 2017, 2021, 2023).

Exile: A Mechanism of Institutional Exclusion

Exile is a mechanism of institutional exclusion and a political practice used by authoritarian regimes and limited democracies. Many societies and political systems adopted it from time immemorial and into modernity (see, e.g., Tabori 1972; Simpson 1995; Queiroz 1998; Aguirre Moreno, Sánchez Cuervo, and Roniger 2014; Sánchez Cuervo, Pilatowsky, and Senkman 2021).

In the Americas, the roots of this phenomenon go far deep into colonial times, when territorial displacement and expulsion were widely used against social offenders, outcasts, rebels, and criminals, at first from Europe to the Americas, and soon replicated within the Americas, both in Brazil and Hispanic America. In colonial times, territorial displacement and expulsion were instrumental for dealing with social offenders (Scardaville 1977, 304–350) and for reinforcing defenses on the margins of the empire. Authorities tended to recommend caution in the use of this practice, yet by late colonial times territorial displacement was widely known and used throughout the Americas (Roniger and Sznajder 2008).

With the transition to political independence, exile developed a special profile as all Latin American states incorporated exile as a major political practice, along with other mechanisms of punishment. As such, it became used and abused in the realm of politics. In the collective imaginary and in the public spheres of Latin American countries exile became a central mode of “doing politics.” Those who defied power could expect the fate of *encierro*, *destierro* o *entierro*, that is, prison, exile, or death, as put colorfully by historian Félix Luna for those opposing Juan Manuel de Rosas (Luna 1995, 202). Throughout the two centuries of independent statehood, political actors and rank-and-file citizens were forced time and again to leave their country of residence to escape repression, suffering the loss of civil and political rights or, as they feared, persecution and even the loss of life.

Forced migration can assume multiple forms, in a range from expulsion and deportation to escape and expatriation. Once forced to escape or leave their home

society, individuals abroad faced daily obstacles stemming from precarious conditions of existence and in some cases a lack of documentation, facing informal work opportunities, low salaries, and even confronting social marginalization, xenophobia, and sometimes criticism, as in the case of Chilean leftists arriving in Cuba and criticized by Fidel Castro for not fighting to the death, hence their exile was “not productive enough” (Ortega 2019). In contrast, for those who overcame initial hardship, living abroad could open new educational and employment opportunities.

In parallel, on a phenomenological level, exile has often triggered existential dilemmas and called into question the territorially bound character of the idea of a nation-state by redefining national loyalties as disengaged from political obligations and citizen entitlements. Indeed, exiles in the diaspora tend to remain loyal to their sense of nation despite losing citizen entitlements and relinquishing their obligations to the government that forced them to take the path of exile. Thus, a constant redefinition of cultural and political premises is operated in exile that defies the intention of those willing to silence their political and cultural opponents.

Cold War Antinomies, Repression, and Massive Exile

In the 1960s, the Cuban Revolution became a model galvanizing people growing up in authoritarian and unequal environments throughout Latin America. Spearheading the ideas of anti-imperialism, anticapitalism, national liberation, and armed struggle, the concept of a socialist revolution resonated with many middle-class young people, often college students or dissidents from Communist parties, who in the post-Stalinist era disengaged from blind support of the USSR. Resenting the existing political and socioeconomic structures backed by the United States, revolutionary leftist groups emerged in Paraguay, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. These groups advocated the Cuban model of a revolutionary vanguard leading an assault on power structures that would mobilize massive support toward radical change.

Against the backdrop of the Cold War and the inability of ruling elites to lead their countries to peaceful coexistence and development geared to benefit all social classes, a growing sense of support for radical change dominated intellectual circles and the younger generations. Many supported the feeling that Latin American societies should be radically transformed, by force, if necessary. While the Communists traditionally supported establishing coalitions with bourgeois political organizations to create future conditions for change, the new groups proclaimed revolutionary violence as the strategy to reach social liberation on a continental and even global scale. Cubans offered support and training to insurgent groups throughout Latin America. International meetings such as the Tricontinental Conference in 1966 and that of the OLAS, the Latin American Solidarity Organization,

in 1967, lifted the banner of Third Worldism and fortified cross-continental ties as well, particularly with Africa, as seen in support for Algeria's Front de Libération Nationale in its struggle against France and for leftist groups in Guinea-Bissau, Congo Brazzaville, and Angola.

For its part, the United States placed increasing emphasis on ties with the Latin American military, police, and national guards. As the Cuban Revolution radicalized groups, concerns deepened and accelerated the process. By 1960, nearly seven thousand officers had been assigned to military assistance advisory groups in Latin America, and police forces were trained in counterinsurgency methods. In the early 1970s, military grants and credit sales more than tripled, while the Latin American armed forces grew exponentially, especially in those countries in which the military seized power (García 1995; Nunn 1995, 7–9).

In the context of the Cold War, safeguarding social unity and achieving development became an increasing concern for Latin American armed forces trained to protect national security. Gradually, the armed forces identified leftist groups as the enemy who, with their revolutionary discourse and activities, were destabilizing the political arena and colonizing public spaces and culture. They saw that impact as inimical to the values of their nations, as interpreted by them. Their professional training added corporate consciousness and alienated them from the civilian political class, seen as unable to deal with the challenges and vulnerable to agitators pushing Marxist and other "foreign" ideologies (Gill 2004, esp. 71–73).

As the reformist option of the Alliance for Progress lost momentum and the revolutionary option gained track, the strategy of counterinsurgency became the main mechanism for confronting the radical Left. Following Cuban efforts to export that revolution—creating "as many Vietnams as possible"—the United States moved to condone and support authoritarian rule in the name of national security. If Latin American countries were unfit to follow the US model and, in the context of the Cold War, were on the brink of political breakdown and the threat of revolution, perhaps it was time to make room for a renewed domestic model of "order and progress" resembling the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries' credo of Positivism.

The potential for violence was imbued in the ideological polarization that prevailed in the Cold War era. Cultural analyst Ana Pizarro observed that, for the Left, the 1960s and early 1970s were years of discussing dependency theory as opposed to developmental approaches, of criticism and countercriticism, of launching a dialogue with Africans who were emerging from decolonization processes, and of assessing the significance of the Cuban Revolution and the prospects of Caribbean and Latin American integration (Pizarro 1994, 173; see also Galeano 1987, 435–436). Influencing the political climate during this period were leftist anti-imperialist

feelings, the spread of liberation theology, and demands to protect the rights of minorities. The ideas of the Left were rejected by others who held diametrically opposed visions of their society yet were no less passionate in their views (Dinges 2005, 41–81; Calandra 2011). The very principled positions of these circles and the semi-sacredness with which they cognitively structured and evaluated the forces of society contributed to the clash that tore apart these societies in the period leading up to the military takeovers.

Formal democracy broke down and was replaced by military rule, in a domino effect that started in Brazil in 1964 and would involve all Southern Cone countries in a wave of authoritarianism. The impact of US hemispheric policy combined with domestic trends, primarily increasing socioeconomic mobilization and polarized political arenas. Latin American governments had the vision of being on the front line of the defense of Western civilization, as led by the United States and encoded in doctrines of national security. As a result, countries slipped into a renewed use of regimes of exception, military intervention in public life, and the suspension of constitutional freedoms and guarantees, with severe consequences in the realm of human rights across the region. To a large extent, the coups d'état signaled the defeat of the legacy of populist mobilization and leftist radicalization.

With the election of Juan Domingo Perón as president, Argentina became a haven for political exiles and revolutionary organizations from all over the region. Uruguayan Tupamaros, Bolivian ELN (National Liberation Army), Paraguayan groups within the Colorados party, and the Chilean MIR (Revolutionary Left Movement) joined the Argentinean Montoneros and ERP (Revolutionary Popular Army), convinced that they would trigger a regional process leading to socialism. With mass mobilizations at their peak, these groups thought they could galvanize public opinion and bring about a mass insurrection following their vanguard actions. They engaged in a partially successful series of kidnappings of corporate CEOs for ransoms and some military actions in remote areas, as well as terrorist attacks on military personnel. By August 1973 they had devised a plan to coordinate their actions transnationally and provide mutual logistical, financial, and military support across borders through a revolutionary coordinating junta (JCR). Knowledge of this augmented the concern in military circles and enabled them to taint the nonviolent opposition with the violent tactics of guerrilla groups (Kornbluh 2003, 16; 2005). Furthermore, Pinochet's September 1973 coup in Chile gave credence to the claim by the revolutionary Left that only violence would open the door to socialism in Latin America.

Soon, the revolutionary groups passed from an initial phase of euphoria to decimation by paramilitary networks and later by the military in power. The Southern Cone armed forces managed rather early to marginalize the radical Left after launching their own network of counterintelligence coordination and capturing some key

Southern Cone activists in Paraguay. They operated policies of harsh repression as well as a network of transnational repression of leftist groups and their sympathizers in the framework of Operation Condor. Moreover, they continued to use the actions of the radical revolutionary Left as central to their own narrative of redeeming their nations from the threat of international Communism.¹

Repression produced death and imprisonment and generated massive waves of escape and exile. The extent of forced migration can only be estimated, as many citizens were smuggled across borders, while others left with legal documentation yet without any wish or possibility of returning while the dictatorship retained its hold on power. Estimates put the number of Argentine exiles in the late 1970s in the range of 265,000–350,000 out of a population of about 27 million, which is in the range of 1.0–1.5 percent of the population, with an over-representation of young people and university students.

In Paraguay, the population drain started earlier, with multiple waves during the long rule of General Alfredo Stroessner (1954–1989). A combination of political and economic pressures generated successive waves of territorial dislocation that by 1980 produced a diaspora of 263,000 out of a national population of circa 3 million, that is, about 8 percent of the population; the number of political exiles among them has been placed at 17,000 plus their families, according to the report of the 2008 Paraguayan Commission of Truth and Justice.

Uruguay lost to exile between 8 and 13 percent of its population of 3 million, that is 250,000–350,000 individuals, who engrossed a much larger diaspora that by 1985—the year of restoration of democracy—included 25 percent of Uruguay’s professionals and technicians, 15 percent of its architects, and 10 percent of its physicians and engineers.

Chile was traditionally a country witnessing economic migration across the Andes, probably numbering around 450,000 residents in Argentina by the early 1970s. Between 1973 and 1989, another mass of 175,000–248,000 citizens left for economic reasons, while 150,000–225,000 went into political exile, totaling a diaspora that estimates put in the range of 575,000–850,000 out of a population of 10.6 million inhabitants.

¹ The initiative was Chilean. See letter by Manuel Contreras, head of National Intelligence in Chile, inviting South American police and intelligence delegations to a secret meeting aimed at coordinating crossnational intelligence, to be held in Santiago on November 25–December 1, 1975. Manuel Contreras, *Document 00143F0011–0022*, 1975. Available online: www.pj.gov.py/cdya (accessed 26 September 2008). See also McSherry 2002.

The Vitality of Exile Communities and Their Collective Plight

Of more political weight than mere numbers of exiles and forced migrants was the ability of the various exile communities to organize abroad and become a voice claiming to represent the entire national diaspora, establish transnational ties with networks of solidarity and advocacy, and put pressure on the home dictatorships, demanding democratization and accountability for the massive human rights violations perpetrated by the dictatorships. All political diasporas formed in the 1960s–70s faced similar challenges derived from the policies of disinformation carried out by the dictatorships, and attempts to persecute and discredit them, as well as the exiles' disconnection from the home countries and societies, their will to continue organizing and fighting while abroad, and of course their need to survive under the circumstances of the different sites of exile.

They all participated to various degrees in the emerging human rights movement and established links with committees of solidarity and transnational networks of advocacy. Still, some exiled nationals had greater difficulties in impacting the international community due to the distinct circumstances of their institutional background and environment. First was the lack of a party system like that of the host countries, a hindrance that was evident particularly for Argentine exiles. The Argentinean case resembled the Chilean one in terms of the dispersal of exile communities and the drive to create their own organizations, geared on the one hand to the political domain and on the other to the social support of the exiles. Equally important, Argentine exiles seem to have been able to establish links with networks of solidarity in the host countries and the transnational arena.

Yet it was harder for outsiders to position themselves vis-à-vis Argentina than vis-à-vis Chile. The case of Chile stood out in its international clout, and the multiple ideological and institutional transformations begun after the September 1973 coup were brought to full circle in the late 1980s. The September 11 airstrikes on the Moneda presidential palace in Chile had left a profound mark on global consciousness, like the September 11 (2001) attack on the Twin Towers a generation later. The military takeover constituted a breakdown of the Chilean constitutional tradition, and it ended the first experiment of a Marxist-Socialist administration reaching power through the ballots. The brutality and magnitude of repression following the military takeover made Chile the cause célèbre of both Leftist and Liberal democratic forces.

Chilean exiles who fled into exile or were expelled became the pivotal core of a vibrant diaspora that further projected into global awareness the plight of their society undergoing massive human rights violations. They came from a country with an

articulated political system and political parties that found almost immediate resonance with sister-parties and intellectual circles both in the Western world and in communist states, in Latin America, Europe, and many distant lands. Chilean military rulers closed the political sphere, alienating many Christian Democrats and members of other nonrevolutionary and centrist parties, and created a constellation of forces that transcended the East-West divide of the Cold War. Chilean exiles proactively projected themselves through networks of solidarity and advocacy and international organizations.

Contrastingly, outsiders could not fully understand the situation of Argentina, a country where democracy broke down and massive repression started under a civilian government. The in-fighting within Peronism generated massive violence as its left and right wings were already trying to kill one another in the early 1970s, several years before the military coup of 1976. In addition, the propaganda of the Argentine military junta portrayed exiles as still spearheading violence and armed struggle, which led them to be suspect in world public opinion. It would take time and the emblematic case of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo and relatives of the victims, who demanded justice and the return alive of their abducted relatives and friends, for the international community to become sensitive to their plight.

In the case of Paraguayan exiles, the effectiveness of the exiled opposition was diminished by internal fragmentation and personal rivalries and the existence of thousands of spies and collaborators among Paraguayans abroad. Their concentration primarily in Argentina, with minor communities in Spain and the United States, further limited their impact on the international scene. Adding to the equation was the strategy of the Stroessner dictatorship that retained the formalities of electoral democracy in Paraguay and relied on the backing of a major political force, the Colorado Party, that enjoyed ancestral loyalties in the country and provided popular support to the regime. Stroessner thus managed to convince external audiences that most displaced individuals left the country searching for better economic prospects rather than being pushed out of the national territory by repression.

Another major factor in the ability of exiles to become the voice and image of a diaspora stemmed from the relative mix of political and economic motivations projected by the community of co-nationals. In the case of the Uruguayan diaspora, despite prominent exiles—Senator Zelmar Michelini, Speaker of the House Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz (both abducted and murdered in Argentina in 1976), and others who escaped such fate, including Senators Wilson Ferreira Aldunate and Enrique Erro—their impact on global public opinion was not based on the massive mobilization of their diaspora as it had been for the Chileans. The crucial discriminating factors in the case of Uruguay seem to be the different insertion of Uruguayan exiles among their co-nationals, their limited organizational structure abroad, and their origins in

a society with almost no tradition of political exile in the twentieth century. Nonetheless, toward the end of the dictatorship exiles managed to regain centrality in the process of democratization, both by spectacular campaigns like the organized return of the children of exiles to Uruguay, which sensitized all Uruguayans to their plight and demand for general amnesty, and by the principled position of Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, who disclosed and harshly criticized the terms of the Uruguayan transition. The transition was negotiated between the Colorado Party leadership and the generals and predicated on the approval of a law of immunity that prevented attaining wide accountability for human rights abuses committed by the civilian-military dictatorship for over 25 years (Haugaard 1997; Roniger 2016c).

Also important is the image that an exile community assumes in the framework of foreign policy considerations of the global community and host countries, especially if the latter have a pivotal place in the international system. While the case of Chile transcended the East-West divide, as both Christian Democrats and leftist forces raised their voice against Pinochet's rule, thus resonating in both Western and Communist camps, the other three cases demanded longer campaigns to shift public opinion against the home dictatorships. For example, it took years for Uruguayan and Paraguayan exiles to project their message into public opinion in their host countries. Much like Haitians attempting to enter the United States, they were largely considered economic migrants, unlike Cubans who fled the island under communism, and were viewed as an exile community escaping authoritarian rule, an image that was instrumental to the framework of US foreign policy in the context of the Cold War. As for Argentines, only the plight of the relatives of the *desaparecidos* convinced world public opinion of the brutal nature of the Argentine dictatorship, dismissing the alternative narrative spread by the military regime.

Diaspora communities became political spaces where antidictatorial groups and fronts emerged, combining local support and transnational networks of solidarity with the input of a wide array of exile organizations leading campaigns and the struggle against repressive dictatorships in their home countries. Exile organizations provided much-needed information and political content, galvanizing international public opinion and reaching global audiences through wide-ranging activities. Exiles documented the situation in their home countries through lectures, cultural events, publications, and filmmaking, as in the case of Chilean film director Miguel Littin, Argentine historian/filmmaker Osvaldo Bayer, Uruguayan composer/singer Daniel Viglietti, and Paraguayan writer Augusto Roa Bastos, among others. They and many other performers such as the Chilean Quillapayún and Inti Illimani or Argentine Mercedes Sosa were crucial in bolstering the banner of resistance of the exile communities, reaching out beyond their nationals to all the Latin American communities of the diaspora.

Creators were also able to register the angst of exile, as in Fernando Pino Solanas' film *Tangos, el exilio de Gardel* (1985), and contribute to retaining and reconstructing collective memory, as in Patricio Guzmán's documentary *La batalla de Chile* (1976–79) and its follow-up after democratization, *La memoria obstinada* (1997). Similarly, the sport and social organizations of the Paraguayan diaspora in Argentina, albeit infiltrated by *pyragües* (informers), enabled maintaining communal sociability while in exile. A minority of Argentine and Chilean exiles also organized clandestinely to return and continue their armed struggle.

Along with this impressive organizational impetus, exiles replicated their traditional political rivalries while abroad, although they were able to combine efforts and collaborate for the sake of their common goal, which was the key to the Chilean exiles' effectiveness in keeping the plight of their homeland as a top priority on the international agenda. Exiled leaders of the Popular Unity party (UP), who lived on subsidies from host governments, political organizations, or well-paying jobs, traveled among exile populations and worked with world political and government leaders to garner support for their cause. Some of them turned into figures with international clout. Anselmo Sule, president of the Radical Party, was elected vice president of the Socialist International in 1976, a reflection of the high priority of the Chilean case for this organization. The Socialist International lobbied governments and the United Nations. It also supported think tanks and publishing houses active in the 1988 plebiscite campaign (Pedrosa 2012). Similarly, the crossparty organization, Chile Democrático, which received financial support from governments in Western Europe, lobbied at the highest levels, published a very influential periodical (*Chile América*), and monitored the human rights situation in Chile, while it also financially supported the human rights movement linked to the Vicaría de la Solidaridad.

The socioeconomic profile of political exiles included rank-and-file activists from political parties, student and professional organizations, and labor unions. In exile, political solidarity and activism erased, to a large extent, class and rank differences that were salient in Chile. Activism and political solidarity went together, especially between members of the same political party both at home and in host countries. Even in countries with greater structural constraints for the Chileans, the political activism of the exiles kept the cause alive.

The Chilean Left underwent a profound transformation, especially under the impact of the European Left's debates on Euro-Communism, the Solidarity movement in Poland, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In many cases, the contact with "real Communism" in the Socialist countries brought about early disenchantment and the will to go back to the West, provoking some to break away from the Communist Party. While the 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua could still be interpreted within the Cold War framework, events in Europe—the transformation of Euro-Communism

into a new kind of Social Democracy and the process of parallel rigidity, weakening, and disintegration of the Eastern Bloc and the USSR—went far beyond.

All these collective and personal transformations contributed to the reconfiguration of the Chilean Left, especially as it followed a critical self-analysis and reassessment among its ranks and established a series of think tanks to study ways to modernize the nation. These trends were also part of a process to redefine the political positions and horizons of other exiles. The Chilean Communists, which had been a moderating force in the UP government, did not find any support for their idea of leading a broad antifascist front of the UP parties and the Christian Democracy. By 1980, they decided to support all forms of struggle, including armed struggle and popular insurrection. In 1983, they supported the creation of the guerrilla group known as the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez. The exile experience changed the Socialists, leading them progressively to embrace political democracy in a principled way. At first, the Socialists split in 1979 into a radical and a more moderate wing, and while the latter became closer to Christian Democracy, the hard-liners attempted to join the Communists and use the mass protests of 1982–86 to topple the regime. With the return of exiles, the shifts also influenced the domestic front.

The Prospects of Return. The Policies Implemented and Their Constraints

Authoritarian rule lasted much longer than initially expected in Paraguay, Uruguay, and Chile, and even in Argentina the dictatorship lasted seven years. While each diaspora envisioned the transformation of its home country, interactions between the various communities abroad existed, joint actions were adopted, and the experience of the host environment had an impact on all of them. According to varying circumstances, across the communities of co-nationals, the experience of exile produced moderation and reformulation of ideological premises on those who fled repression or had been expelled, especially when exile was prolonged. Overall, the defeat of the armed-struggle strategy, along with the exposure to new practices and ideas (e.g., human rights), facilitated changes in the horizons of many militants that progressively opted to leave behind ideologies of comprehensive revolution and began to support reformist political transitions to democracy, along with the political forces at home (Markarian 2005; Jensen 2010).

Nonetheless, democratic transitions across the Southern Cone differed, and a series of variable factors shaped distinctive policies of return in each country. Crucial among these factors was first, the weight that exiles and expatriates carried among those affected by dictatorships in each case; that is, how significant was the population drain for the home country, both qualitatively and in terms of the composition of

those leaving; namely, what was the weight of professionals and academics, political and cultural elites, rank-and-file activists. Second were the images of exiles and expatriates as affected by the dictatorships' narrative and propaganda. Unless contested effectively by the exiles themselves, sectors of civil society, and the advocacy networks, the images shaped by the dictatorships, which were geared to foster suspicion toward those who fled the home country, retained their hold in the minds of citizens, even as authoritarianism receded, and a postdictatorship era started.

Third were the difficulties inherent in return as derived from the existence of legal barriers, the length of time in exile, and its resulting impact on life transitions and prospects. Related to this was the timing of the return, whether it started under the dictatorship, the transition, or only following democratization, and whether it coincided with an economic downturn or a cycle of prosperity. The policies adopted could facilitate or hamper the prospects for massive or individual return. These policies emerged out of complex interactions between political actors, including NGOs, networks of civil society, political parties, and a series of international and transnational agents, shaping various outcomes and leading to the adoption of policies geared to facilitate or regulate the arrival of the exiles and expatriates back in the home countries.

In Argentina, the military government collapsed, and president-elect Raul Alfonsín envisioned a new founding of the Republic, adopting a policy of truth and accountability, almost without global precedents. Suspicion toward exiled radical activists, primarily of the Montoneros and ERP, who were portrayed together as one of "two demons" that spread violence—the other being the military repressors—prevented the lifting of judicial proceedings opened against the exiles and thus implanted legal barriers that made return even more difficult (Lastra 2016). Wide social reluctance to compensate exiles was further reinforced due to the timing of democratization, which coincided with an economic downturn. Sociologist Jorge Graciarena resigned shortly after being nominated to head the Comisión Nacional para el Retorno, while state programs focused mainly on bringing back prominent academics and professionals like César Milstein, 1984 Noble Prize winner in Medicine. All these were managed through the Ministry of Culture and Technology, which was headed by Manuel Sadosky, a returnee himself. Under such a set of circumstances, it took years for former exiles to receive legal compensation and reparations after the courts ruled in their favor in legal suits filed against the state.

Contrastingly and notwithstanding similar timing, an even longer dictatorship (1973–1985), and a negotiated democratic transition, Uruguay stands out in terms of the country's willingness to welcome back exiles and political prisoners and to reconstruct the body politic and social fabric. The huge population drain, comprising between 10

and 13 percent of the population, strongly impacted the country's consciousness. As in Argentina, exiles were only part of a wider spectrum of individuals affected by the civilian-military dictatorship; Uruguay had the largest per capita number of political prisoners, some of them—including leading political figures—spending many years behind bars. As Liber Seregni was imprisoned, a Frente Amplio Abroad was established to denounce repression. Exiles established organizations abroad to demand the possibility of returning, among them Convergencia Democrática in the US and Mexico, and the CIPREU (Comité Internacional Pro-Retorno) in Madrid (Dutrénit-Bielous 2006).

Starting in 1983, these organizations placed return at the center of their agenda and of the national conversation. Increasingly, the political forces pushing for democracy demanded a comprehensive amnesty that would cover both prisoners and exiles. In contrast to Argentina, the groups pushing for democratization were not afraid of returning political forces. In December 1983, CIPREU sponsored the return of 154 children of exiled families to Uruguay. The children had been living in exile with their parents in Spain, Belgium, Italy, France, Sweden, Austria, and Holland. In open defiance of governmental actions, the organization had the children board a flight from Madrid to Montevideo accompanied by a group of Spanish senators, deputies, and representatives of organizations involved in the initiative (the initiative also received backing from the PSOE, the Asociación Española de Ayuda al Refugiado, and the Spanish Red Cross). With the eyes of the world on them, and with that distinguished entourage, state authorities did not arrest or detain the children, so they were able to visit their families and country. Upon landing at Carrasco International Airport in Montevideo, the children were greeted by some five hundred family members and a crowd of thousands of supporters. Following the caravan of twenty buses to the city center, the crowds chanted antimilitary slogans, which included a vow to have their parents back in Uruguay.

The Comisión Nacional del Reencuentro was another forum created in December 1983 by representatives of all Uruguay's major political parties, which functioned largely through voluntary work by former exiles. It was founded to help exiles readapt to their country, provide them with legal aid, recover jobs, assist in the transfer of educational credits obtained abroad, and help young children returning to the Uruguayan educational system (Mallinder 2009). Consequently, during the long and protracted transition to democracy in Uruguay, which started in 1981 and lasted for years, the issue of return from exile figured prominently along with the liberation of political prisoners in the agenda of political parties and civil society organizations.

Unsurprisingly, all political parties agreed on return and liberation in the framework of their joint understanding, something that was known as the CONAPRO or Concertación Nacional Programática. Likewise, they incorporated the commitment to

removing legal impediments to returning to the homeland in platforms leading to the November 1984 elections (Notaro et al. 1990). Immediately following the end of the dictatorship on March 11, 1985, the Uruguayan legislature passed a Law of National Peace-Making (No. 15,737). The law created a repatriation agency, Comisión Nacional de Repatriación (CNR), under the oversight of the Ministry of Education and Culture to coordinate the return of nationals. Article VII.25 recognized the right of public officials who had been dismissed between February 1973 and February 1985 to be reinstated in their workplaces. Despite limited resources and capacities (like in Argentina), the CNR assisted 16,000 returning exiles and expatriates, though about half of all returnees were assisted in finding employment by networks of family and friends. NGOs such as the Servicio Ecuménico de Reintegración were also instrumental in aiding returnees.

In Uruguay, a country with a high percentage of public employees, the reinsertion of exonerated personnel into their former positions was one of the crucial keys to success. Exoneration was at the center of return and enjoyed wide public support, so academics and public officials were allowed to resume their former positions. With all the difficulties that this process implied, it enabled former exiles and “insiles” to learn to live and work together, in a spirit of mutual accommodation. Reflecting the self-image and civic traditions of the country, this process led to many successful initiatives and institutional innovations, including transnational projects.

Thus, Uruguay was able to promote a very broad reinsertion of exiled citizens, particularly those with academic credentials. The impact of returnees was strongly felt particularly in higher education. As part of the public sector, legislation entitled people to resume the positions they had before going into exile. No similar clause was contemplated for those in the private sector, where workers and employees did not even have the possibility of receiving recognition for years of work abroad (Coraza de los Santos 2007, 213). This was a major hindrance in the return of middle-aged individuals in the private sector, whose chances of receiving a good pension were affected.²

Like in Uruguay and on a much broader scale, in Chile exile affected leading politicians as well as activists, intellectuals, academics, and professionals, whom the authoritarian rulers found hard to delegitimize. As exiles galvanized the Chilean diaspora, the issue of return became entangled with the discussion of how to lead the struggle for democratization. A dense network of national, transnational, and international organizations soon addressed the issue of return among other paths of resistance, advocacy, and solidarity. Prominent among those organizations stood the Vicaría de la Solidaridad (1976-1992); the United Nations High Commissioner for

² This situation was corrected by law only in January 2002.

Refugees (ACNUR), supporting repatriation until August 1995; the International Office of Migrations (OIM); the International Red Cross; FASIC (Fundación de Ayuda Social de las Iglesias Cristianas); the Universidad Academia de Humanismo Cristiano; Fundación Salvador Allende; FTDA-France Terre d'Asile; DIAKONIA-Suecia; WUS-World University Service; CLACSO; Comité Pro Retorno de Exiliados-COPROREX; CODEPU-Comité de Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo; FARET-Fundación de Asistencia al Retornado; the Departamento de Migraciones; PRAL-Programa de Retorno y Apoyo Laboral; PIDEE-Programa para la Infancia Dañada en Estados de Emergencia, and a series of agencies dealing with mental health, such as Comisión Chilena de Derechos Humanos, and PRAIS, a health agency. Also instrumental were individuals such as bishop Helmut Frenz of the Lutheran Evangelical Church in Chile and a founder of the Chilean National Committee for Aid to Refugees.

Starting in the early 1980s, the lists of people that the Pinochet regime banned from returning to Chile were reduced, at a time when the UK's WUS-Chile (World University Service-Chile) and the political opposition attempted to bring back educated cadres that could contribute to the struggle against military rule. Indeed, many exiles made a huge contribution to defeating Pinochet in the 1988 referendum, opening the path toward the end of the dictatorship, albeit under the conditionalities and authoritarian enclaves of the 1980 Constitution.

The first postauthoritarian administration of President Patricio Aylwin (1990–94) adopted an institutional framework of reparations and compensations, but the financial and human resources allocated for reinsertion were insufficient. Returnees faced a state that had been seriously reduced by neoliberal policies and no longer had its former capacity to carry out social programs. Some programs of reinsertion were thus financed jointly by Chile and European agencies such as the Deutsche Bank or NORDIK, an NGO financed by the Norwegian government. The timing of return in the 1990s was overall beneficial as it coincided with an economic upturn, yet the wave of relative prosperity soon reduced the prospects of obtaining external support for a sustained program of return.


The state agency created to monitor the return, the Oficina Nacional del Retorno (ONR), had a mandate limited in time that was geared to prevent awarding privileges that could be resented by other social sectors. This was even more pronounced as fiscal discipline and austerity became a central characteristic of the Chilean economic model. Nonetheless, the ONR assisted 56,000 returnees, helping to solve pending judicial problems and finding labor and psychosocial solutions. NGOs and social networks were even more instrumental. In parallel, the private entrepreneurial sector was unsympathetic to the returnees. Legal initiatives established pensions for victims of political violence and human rights violations, including those dismissed from the public administration who could claim pension benefits.

The magnitude of Paraguayan political exile and migration, and the size of the communities of economic migrants in the diaspora, many of whom professed their desire to return, also created a strong goodwill basis toward returnees. Starting in the early 1980s, Stroessner started easing the process of return, fearing that otherwise the Paraguayans staying in the restored democracy of Argentina would mobilize to hamper the prospects of the mega-hydroelectric Yacyretá project. Still, until the 2000s, returnees from the Left had little official support, and a strong financial commitment was not forthcoming. The rejection of those who returned from exile was not limited to official circles. The country also faced inherent difficulties due to its limited resources.

Finally, in 1989, Stroessner's rule over Paraguay broke down through a split within the ruling political class, yet without a major transformation. The 2001 Argentine economic debacle produced a considerable flow of Paraguayans back home, including children of those who had left the country. Cognizant of the significant contribution that professional returnees would have on the country, the government addressed it in the 1992 constitutional convention and in the legislative process, and by 1993 established an agency currently known as the *Secretaría de Desarrollo para Repatriados y Refugiados Connacionales*. Interviews with returnees indicated that, while aware of the existence of this office, they did not avail themselves of such services or found them wanting, opting instead for direct contacts with professional and family circles. Established formalities did not address the needs of returning professionals, though they helped in securing legal documentation.

We should keep in mind that, notwithstanding all Southern Cone exiles' initial determination to go back to their home country once the conditions preventing such a move vanished, after democratization return became just one option among multiple post-exilic paths [see Diagram 1]. In real life, return was a personal decision that forced individuals to reconsider the nostalgic dream of resuming life as before, forcing them to navigate the changed environment in their home country. For many, return became a lasting process of new challenges, and sometimes new traumatic experiences, in a socioeconomic, cultural, and political setting that differed much from the ones that returnees had known before and still dreamt about. Unsurprisingly, only a portion of the displaced individuals opted to return.

Diagram 1: Post-Exilic Paths



The Impact of Returnees

Among the countries in our inquiry, Chile stood out in terms of the degree of exiles' involvement in the national political system during democratization. Chilean exiles figured prominently in the leadership establishing the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia, the multiparty coalition of seventeen organizations launched in January 1988 to defeat Pinochet's move to retain power for another decade, an outcome that enabled the transition to democracy. Two Chilean presidents, Ricardo Lagos and Michelle Bachelet, had experienced exile. The leadership of the PPD (Partido por la Democracia), the party founded by Ricardo Lagos in 1987 that had attracted many members of the Socialist Party when it was deemed illegal under Pinochet, is paradigmatic of the salience of exiles' participation in politics: seven out of its nine leaders during 1987–2011 had experienced exile.

Returnees also figured prominently in the Concertación administrations governing Chile from 1990 to 2010. An analysis of government cabinets indicates that six out of thirteen ministerial posts were filled by former exiles in President Aylwin's administration; seven out of twenty-seven in Frei's administration; seven out of twenty-four in Lagos' administration; and eight out of twenty-two in Bachelet's administration. Contrastingly, in President Piñera's initial 2010 cabinet only one minister, Jaime Ravinet de la Fuente, had been exiled. According to the testimony of Jaime Esponda, the human-rights activist who served as head of the ONR, "perhaps up to 90% of the political class of the Concertación was made up by exiles. . . . [In the past] Chile was very disorderly. . . . There was enough demagoguery and a lack

of professionalism. . . . I believe that the group that returned from exile implanted a different culture, one of discipline and greater precision in the public administration” (Esponda 2015).

Returnees also contributed to policies of truth and accountability that addressed the legacy of massive human rights violations of the Pinochet period. Among them was Jaime Castillo Velasco, a Christian Democratic lawyer who experienced exile, participated in the National Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (the Rettig Commission), and became president of the Chilean Committee of Human Rights. José Zalaquett Daher, a prominent human rights activist, later adviser to President Aylwin and to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, who headed the Legal Department of the Pro-Peace Committee (Comité Pro Paz) and defended detainees of the military regime, was arrested and sent to a concentration camp in November 1975 and deported in April 1976. In London, he chaired the executive committee of Amnesty International from 1978 to 1982. Upon returning to Chile, he had a fundamental role in the Rettig Commission and in the Peace Roundtable, a “dialogue table” between the military and the civilian left that operated between August 1999 and June 2000. As director of the Center for Human Rights of the University of Chile’s Faculty of Law, Zalaquett continued to have a great impact on the recognition and institutionalization of the normative of human rights.

In Argentine politics, returnees operated mainly behind the scenes. Very few prominent politicians went into exile, among them Rodolfo Terragno and Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen. Moreover, with democratization, exiles and insiles found it hard to reconstruct common ground (Sosnowski 1984). Clear attention given to the *desaparecidos* as the typical victims of the dictatorship obscured the plight of the exiles. The demand for full accountability for past violence implied maintaining legal barriers for many displaced individuals who wished to return (Lastra 2016).

With democratization, returnees functioned mainly as political advisers, speechwriters, and members of the professional staff of President Raúl Alfonsín’s administration, particularly in higher education administration. Prominent in that respect was the advisory team of the Grupo Esmeralda established by Meyer Goodbar and Eduardo Issaharof. Carlos Nino elaborated analyses aimed at curtailing corruption and promoting a culture of human rights. Other returnees formed a Club de Cultura Socialista, conceived to invigorate political discourse and possibly generate alternative projects for Argentina. When Carlos (Chacho) Álvarez, one of the Club’s members, entered the political fray and was elected vice president on the Fernando de la Rúa ticket and later resigned, the Club was weakened as the country suffered disastrous management of the economy. Likewise, with democratization think tanks became dismembered, and international foundations’ financing dried.

Other exiles opted to make an impact on democratizing popular culture. For example, after gaining recognition as a writer during his Mexican exile, returnee Mempo Giardinelli launched a magazine in his hometown of Resistencia as a forum where cultural voices stemming from Argentina's hinterland provinces could be heard: "We decided not to fight anyone for cultural power . . . [but rather to] try to move beyond Buenos Aires in literature, with an eye not on the fad of Latin-Americanism but rather striving to embrace a universalism supported by the demand for quality" (Giardinelli 1988). The economic crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s led Giardinelli to create a foundation geared to both academic and massive cultural dissemination, organizing activities promoting reading and education with a humanistic orientation, conducting workshops, courses, conferences, and exhibitions, and supporting an exchange program with academics and students from US universities and colleges. In 2001 the foundation started enrichment courses for teachers and the public at large aimed at widening reading practices and skills in the outer provinces such as Chaco, Corrientes, Santa Fe, and Misiones. It conducted an innovative project in which grandmothers read stories to children, thus creating a transgenerational emotional motivation among the young to engage in reading. Following the 2001 economic crisis, it also provided basic nutrition for children in poor neighborhoods.

The impact of Uruguayan returnees has been fully felt both in politics and in higher education. In politics, the most significant impact was that of Wilson Ferreira Aldunate, who narrowly escaped being assassinated in 1976 in a joint Argentine-Uruguayan operation in Buenos Aires and, once in exile in the United States, led a high-profile relentless campaign against Uruguay's civilian-military dictatorship. Years later, he disclosed the terms of the secret Naval Club Pact between the armed forces and the Colorado Party leadership that enabled Uruguay's transition back to electoral democracy in return for blanket impunity, a mechanism implemented by the December 1986 *Ley de caducidad de la pretension punitiva del Estado* preventing a full-fledged policy of accountability for a span of twenty-five years.

Beyond politics, the major impact of returnees was on higher education. As Uruguay legal framework allowed reinstating discharged public employees (*exonerados*) in their positions before dismissal, academics who had been fired from the Universidad de la República (UDELAR), the only institution of higher education from 1849 to 1985, could resume activities. Some of those *exonerados* became leading figures in the reconstruction of academic life. Three of the first four provosts of UDELAR were returnees who raised their academic profiles while in exile: economist Samuel Lichtensztejn, provost during 1972–73 and back for the 1985–89 period, was a candidate for mayor of Montevideo in 1989, minister of Education during 1995–98 and ambassador to Mexico in 2000–2004; engineer Rafael Guarga, exiled in Mexico, was elected provost for 1998–2006; mathematician Rodrigo Arocena, who spent years in Argentine and Venezuelan exile, became provost from 2006 to 2014.

Danilo Astori became Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences during 1985–89 and Frente Amplio's candidate for vice president of Uruguay twice, being elected on José Pepe Mujica's ticket in 2009, after serving as a senator in 1990–95 and as minister of Economy in 2000–2005. Returning from exile, physician Ricardo Ehrlich started cooperation with Omar Trujillo, an insile, to consolidate the Faculty of Sciences. From five life scientists they managed to reach one hundred; they created new careers like biochemistry and molecular biology and established a program for the development of basic science, PEDECIBA. Later, as elected major of Montevideo in 2005 and as minister of Education under President Mujica (2010–15), Ehrlich democratized access to higher education by decentralizing UDELAR and creating three additional branches in the East, Northeast, and Northwest of the country, and a series of programs to foster universal education such as scholarship funds for underprivileged students.

In Paraguay, returnees made huge contributions by promoting greater democratic awareness. Bernardino Cano Radil and Rubén Bareiro Saguier were involved in drafting a new constitution; sociologist José Carlos Rodríguez was the leading force in Paraguay's Commission of Truth and Reconciliation and resumed work at an NGO that had been closed down by the dictatorship and reopened under the name of Centro de Documentación y Estudios (CDE), working with indigenous communities, and particularly with women, and succeeded in advancing their causes in the constitution.

Attorney Martín Almada used the new legal figure of *habeas data* and uncovered the Archives of Terror, a discovery that had a transnational impact since it substantiated knowledge about Operation Cóndor. Poet Félix de Guaranía published in Guaraní, Paraguay's autochthonous and second official language, to promote the country's collective identity. Physician Juan Félix Bogado Gondra, who was persecuted, arrested, and tortured while still a student in the School of Medicine, spent years of exile in Germany, disappointed with Paraguayan politics, and returned in 2008 when then-President Lugo asked for his help in the Ministry of Health. In addition to his work as a physician, Alfredo Boccia Paz published widely read books on the ethical conduct of medical doctors under Stroessner, on Operation Cóndor and the OPM guerrilla, on torture, and on regime collaborators, as well as on the police's secret archives.

Renowned author Augusto Roa Bastos fought Stroessner while abroad. In spite of his international recognition and standing, he was never offered a formal position after his return. The Colorado Party, which also controlled the National University, viewed him with suspicion, and the Catholic University feared his leftist positions and considered him inappropriate because he was divorced. Settling back definitely in 1996, Roa Bastos focused all his energies on trying to promote a change of mind by Paraguayans who were emerging from what he defined as "a century of destruction,"

driven both externally by foreign powers and internally by elites that stifled any sign of autonomy and critical thinking. Toward the end of his life he was appointed advisor to a governmental agency and appeared at educational presentations, yet he despaired of the established political parties and threw his support behind the young and women, whom he considered an uncontaminated reservoir, by promoting a feminist party from 1999 to 2004.

Diasporas as a Persistent and Invigorating Presence

The processes of territorial displacement during the dictatorships opened the gates for the existence of transnational connections and of permanent diasporas, including a diaspora of knowledge that would be engrossed by new waves of migration due to economic downturns or the increased connections of these countries to the global arena. Despite partial return, massive exile and migration have turned diasporas into a persistent trend that countries have recognized and tried to capitalize on. Policies and agencies of reconnection with the diasporas of co-nationals and in particular the diasporas of knowledge were adopted in all four countries.

Already in 2002, President Lagos introduced the idea of a Chilean Fourteenth Region as an administrative entity that should represent Chileans living abroad. In Uruguay, a similar idea was floated in 2009. In both cases, the idea did not advance, since it failed to gather significant support. Contrastingly, in Paraguay and Argentina, similar initiatives succeeded. Argentina instituted a *Provincia 25*, administered by the Ministry of the Interior and Transportation, specifically created to assess the total number of nationals living abroad. Argentines living in Spain, Italy, the US, and Germany led the list of associations of nationals that emerged as an extensive network that operates professional, cultural, and sports initiatives. Beginning in 1991, Argentine citizens residing abroad who registered in their local consulates were allowed to vote; and in 1993, a register of Argentineans residing abroad was created for this purpose. While in the country voting is mandatory, for those living abroad it remains voluntary.

For Paraguay, exiles and émigré associations, primarily in Buenos Aires, took the lead in securing in both legislative chambers in 2010–11 an amendment to Article 120 that excluded Paraguayans in the diaspora from exercising electoral rights. On September 2011, Buenos Aires witnessed representatives of the Paraguayan diaspora coming together to officially launch the *Coordinadora 7845.2 por el SI*, a forum in favor of attaining the vote for Paraguayans residing abroad. The crucial role of multiple NGOs of Paraguayans living in the diaspora in this process was the result of many years of political activism, buttressed by the legal mechanisms of democratic integration and transnational migratory dynamic recognized in the Mercosur. In

October 2011 a popular referendum in Paraguay amended the 1992 Constitution and approved the vote of Paraguayans abroad.

Another major path of reconnection is that of the diaspora of knowledge, especially with those trained in areas needed for the home country's development and for organizing programs of graduate training abroad. For scientists and researchers unwilling to return, RAICES created the "Encuentro de Cooperación Diáspora Argentina" (ECODAR) as a network to exchange ideas, capitalizing on nationals living abroad, even when they are unwilling or unable to return to Argentina. The program also established an award granted to Argentine researchers recognized for having promoted linkages strengthening the scientific and technological assets of the country. The program also encouraged short academic visits, workshops, and meetings; involving academics overseas in evaluating projects; creating in 1987 a system of "external" members at CONICET; transferring knowledge supported by external funding, e.g., the Tokten Program at the University of Mar del Plata; creating an agency for the transfer of technology and involving researchers in the private sector; establishing associations of Argentines abroad, and earmarking loans for up to 500 repatriated academics to facilitate home purchases. Cooperation treaties were also signed with scientific centers where many of the repatriated academics had been working (Germany, Colombia, Chile, Spain, Venezuela, Mexico, France, Italy, and Sweden).

Likewise, in Chile, returnee Jorge Arrate was behind the initiative to create a worldwide network of scientists and professionals that could cooperate with the country's development. In the 1990s, as minister of Education, Arrate attempted to establish the Chilean Network (Red Chile) in cooperation with the University of Chile. Led by Carlos Vignolo, then-director of the Department of Industrial Engineering of the University of Chile, the idea, first conceived by expatriates, was to connect Chilean professionals and scientists dispersed around the globe. The initiative did not prosper in the 1990s but resurfaced when Ricardo Lagos, a returnee himself, assumed the presidency in 2000. In 2001, the Dirección para la Comunidad de Chilenos en el Exterior, or DICOEX (Directory for the Community of Chileans Abroad), was established. Together with the National Statistics Institute, it carried out a census of Chileans abroad in 2003–2004 and identified over 857,000 citizens. Another project that took off in the 2000s, this one stemming from civil society, was Chile Global. Conceived within the framework of Fundación Chile, economist and labor mobility expert Molly Pollack launched a project geared to establish a network of Chilean professionals, researchers, academics, and entrepreneurs living abroad and willing to cooperate in critical areas such as food production, mining, education, sustainability and entrepreneurship, greater awareness of the potential of the diaspora to contribute and enrich the home country's perspectives on global insertion, innovation, and development.

The process of democratization and the strengthening of civil societies along with communication development coalesced to facilitate a growing basis of international links with communities abroad. An almost natural result of these developments has been initiatives to develop networks between home country agencies and NGOs—some with government participation or support—and communities abroad or sectors thereof. The old vision according to which there was a basic contradiction between the particularity of the nation-state and the transnational character of networks has increasingly been set aside.

Luis Roniger is a comparative political sociologist, Reynolds Professor Emeritus of Latin American Studies, Politics, and International Affairs at Wake Forest University, and Associate Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Latin American Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has written pioneering studies on clientelism, political exile, human rights, and transnational politics. Roniger has published 24 books and over 200 academic journal articles and book chapters. Among his most recent books are *Historia mínima de los derechos humanos en América Latina* (published by Colegio de México, 2018), *Conspiracy Theories and Latin American History* (coauthored with historian Leonardo Senkman, Routledge, 2021), and *Transnational Perspectives on Latin America: The Entwined Histories of a Multi-State Region* (Oxford University Press, 2022).

References

Aguirre Moreno, Arturo, Antolín Sánchez Cuervo, and Luis Roniger

2014 *Tres estudios sobre el exilio: condición humana, experiencia histórica y significación política*. Puebla, México: Editorial EDAF and Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla.

Calandra, Benedetta, ed.

2011 *La Guerra Fredda culturale*. Verona: Ombre Corte.

Coraza de los Santos, Enrique

2007 "Quien hablará de nosotros cuando ya no estemos? Memoria e historia del Uruguay a partir de un análisis bibliográfico." *Studia historica. Historia contemporánea*, 25: 191–222.

Dinges, John

2005 *The Condor Years*. New York: The New Press.

Dutrénit-Bielous, Silvia, ed.

2006 *El Uruguay del exilio. Gente, circunstancias, escenarios*. Montevideo: Trilce.

Esponda, Jaime

2015 Interview in Santiago de Chile, 18 August.

Galeano, Eduardo

1987 *Las venas abiertas de América Latina*. 1971. Montevideo: Ediciones del Chanchito.

García, Prudencio

1995 *El drama de la autonomía militar*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Giardinelli, Mempo

1988 *Puro Cuento*, 12: 1–2, quoted in Aixa Valentina Natalini, "La minificción en *Puro cuento* (1986–1992)." *Badebec Revista del Centro de Estudios de Teoría y Crítica Literaria*, vol. 1, núm. 1, septiembre 2011, <https://rephip.unr.edu.ar/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2133/15708/La%20minificción%20en%20Puro%20cuento%20%281986-1992%29.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y>

Gill, Leslie

2004 *The School of the Americas*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Haugaard, Lisa

1997 "Declassified army and CIA manuals used in Latin America: An analysis of their content", Latin American Working Group, February 18, 1997, www.lawg.org/misc/Publications-manuals.htm.

Jensen, Silvina

2010 *Los exiliados. La lucha por los derechos humanos durante la dictadura*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.

Kornbluh, Peter

2003 *The Pinochet File*. New York: The New Press.

2005 "Finding the Pinochet file: Pursuing truth, justice, and historical memory through declassified US documents." *Democracy in Chile*, edited by Silvia Nagy-Zekmi and Fernando Leiva, 14–23. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Lastra, María Soledad

2016 *Volver del exilio: Historia comparada de las políticas de recepción y asistencia en las posdictaduras de la Argentina y Uruguay (1983-1989)*. La Plata: Editorial de la Universidad Nacional de La Plata.

Luna, Félix

1995 *Historia general de la Argentina*. Buenos Aires: Planeta.

Mallinder, Louise

2009 "Uruguay's Evolving Experience of Amnesty and Civil Society's Response." *SSRN Electronic Journal* (Belfast), 60–64.

Markarian, Vania

2005 *Left in Transformation Uruguayan Exiles and the Latin American Human Rights Network, 1967–1984*. New York: Routledge.

McSherry, J. Patrice. 2002. "Tracking the Origins of a State Terror Network: Operation Condor." *Latin American Perspectives* 29 (1): 38-60.

Notaro, Jorge, Agustín Canzani, Augusto Longhi y Estela Méndez

1990 "El retorno y las respuestas de la sociedad uruguaya." *La migración de retorno*. Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria and Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo (CIEDUR).

Nunn, Frederick

1995 'The South American military and (re)democratization: Professional thought and self-perception.' *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 37 (2): 7–9.

Ortega, Javier

2019 "El 'test de los cojones'," pp. 210–214, in the dossier "La historia inédita de los años verdeolivo," "Historia de la intervención cubana en Chile," *Revista Encuentro* 212: 208–242.
<https://www.cubaencuentro.com/var/cubaencuentro.com/storage/original/application/3d667555d5b24397ff3f16c46afc77b5.pdf>, accessed 26 November 2019.

Pedrosa, Fernando

2012 *La otra izquierda. La socialdemocracia en América Latina*. Buenos Aires: Capital Intelectual.

Pizarro, Ana

1994 *De ostras y caníbales: reflexiones sobre la cultura latinoamericana*. Santiago: Editorial Universidad de Santiago.

Queiroz, María José

1998 *Os males da ausencia*. Rio de Janeiro: Topbooks.

Roniger, Luis

2009 "El exilio y su impacto en la reformulación de perspectivas identitarias, políticas e institucionales (Exile and its Impact on Shifting Perspectives on Politics, Institutions and Collective Identities)." *Revista de Ciencias Sociales* (Costa Rica) 125: 83–101.

2010 "Exilio massivo, inclusão e exclusão política no século XX." *DADOS - Revista de Ciências Sociais* (Brazil) 53 (1): 35–65.

2011 "Destierro y exilio político en América Latina: Un campo de estudio transnacional e histórico en expansión." *Pacarina del Sur* 9: 1–18.
<http://www.pacarinadelsur.com/home/abordajes-y-contiendas/318-destierro-y-exilio-en-america-latina-un-campo-de-estudio-transnacional-e-historico-en-expansion>

2014 *Destierro y exilio en América Latina. Nuevos estudios y avances teóricos*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (EUDEBA).

2016a "Displacement and Testimony: Recent History and the Study of Exile and Post-Exile." *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 29 (2): 111–133.

2016b "Exilio, teoría sociopolítica y enfoques transnacionales." *Migraciones y exilios* (Spain) 16: 33–56

2016c "How a Shattered Civil Religion is rebuilt through Contestation: Uruguay in Comparative Perspective." *Revista de Ciencia Política* (Chile) 36 (2, August): 411–432.

2017 "Citizen-Victims and Masters of their Destiny: Political Exiles and their National and Transnational Impact." *Middle Atlantic Review of Latin American Studies* 1 (1): 30–52.

2021 "La cristalización de diásporas y la capitalización de redes posexiliares en el Cono Sur." *Historia Regional* 34 (45): 1–11.
<http://historiaregional.org/ojs/index.php/historiaregional/index>

2023 "Forced Migration and Exile: Analytical and Historical Perspectives." *The Routledge History of Modern Latin American Migration*, edited by Andreas E. Feldmann, Xóchitl Bada, Jorge Durand, and Stephanie Schütze, 172–185. New York: Routledge.

Roniger, Luis, Leonardo Senkman, Saúl Sosnowski, and Mario Sznajder

2021 *Diáspora, exilio y retorno: Transformaciones e impactos culturales en Argentina, Chile, Paraguay y Uruguay*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires (EUDEBA).

Roniger, Luis, and Mario Sznajder

2008 "Los antecedentes coloniales del exilio político y su proyección en el siglo XIX." *Estudios Interdisciplinarios de América Latina y el Caribe* 18 (2): 31–51.

Sánchez, María Antonia, and Luis Roniger

2010 "El destierro paraguayo. Aspectos transnacionales y generacionales." *Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales* (México) 52: 135–158.

Sánchez Cuervo, Antolín, Mauricio Pilatowsky, and Leonardo Senkman, eds.

2021 *Exilio, ciudadanía y deber de memoria: Perspectivas iberoamericanas*. Barcelona: Anthropos and Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.

Scardaville, Michael C.

1977 *Crime and the Urban Poor. Mexico City in the Late Colonial Period*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International.

Simpson, John, ed.

1995 *The Oxford Book of Exile*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Sosnowski, Saúl

1984 *Represión y reconstrucción de una cultura. El caso argentino*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (EUDEBA).

Sznajder, Mario, and Luis Roniger

2009 *The Politics of Exile in Latin America*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tabori, Paul

1972 *The Anatomy of Exile. A Semantic and Historical Study*. London: Harrap.