

TWO MONTHS, TWO PROCESSES, TWO OUTCOMES: EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES IN ELECTIONS IN EL SALVADOR AND PANAMA*

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I. INTRODUCTION

Two recent Central American elections – presidential elections in El Salvador on March 7 and general elections in Panama on May 2 – featured dissimilar electoral processes and produced strikingly distinct outcomes. While in El Salvador the incumbent party Alianza Republicana Nacional (ARENA) retained its hold of the presidency through the resounding first-round victory of Francisco Flores over the opposition, Facundo Guardado of the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional (FMLN), the Panamanian elections catapulted the main opposition leader, Mireya Moscoso of the Partido Arnulfista (PA), to power over Martín Torrijos of the governing Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD).² Secondly, while voter turnout in El Salvador plunged to 38.6 percent, the lowest registered in the past two decades, in Panama the turnout rose to a record high of 76.2 percent. And thirdly, the results imply that while a single party continues to dominate both the executive and the legislature in El Salvador, Panama's new government, unlike its predecessor, holds only a minority in the legislature.³

Although the two outcomes are similar to the 1994 presidential race in the two countries in the sense that the Salvadorans opted for continuity while Panamanians embraced change, the two outcomes and turnouts are different from each other – now as well as in 1994. The purpose of this paper is to explain the factors producing these differences, and to analyze the implications of the latest round of elections to the two isthmus democracies. The differences in the two electoral products and processes are all the more intriguing considering that El Salvador and Panama share many institutional and historical characteristics, such as presidential systems, unicameral legislatures, authoritarian pasts and only recently initiated free

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and fair elections. The comparative framework seeks to add context and dimensions that a single country study cannot grasp. The following questions are explored: Why did the governing party win in El Salvador while the opposition captured the presidency in Panama? Why did proportionally twice as many Panamanian as Salvadoran registered voters come to the polling booths; and why did the turnout increase in Panama while declining in El Salvador as compared to previous elections in the two countries? And what do the latest elections entail to the consolidation of democracy in the two cases?⁴

This paper argues that three factors, namely party dynamics, candidates' personalities and relation to their parties, and the duration of the election campaigns, created differing perceptions of the existence of a credible option to the incumbent party candidate in El Salvador and Panama, and produced the difference in the two election outcomes. Five factors, meanwhile, caused the turnouts to differ in the two cases: electoral organization, attitudes toward voting, polarization of the electoral scene, historical backdrop, and the candidates' mobilization capabilities. The latter two, I argue, are the keys to understanding the difference in the 'direction' of the turnouts in the two countries. While democracy is routinized – in terms of regular, free and fair elections accepted by all the political players as the legitimate and only form of ascending to power – in both cases, the election outcome as well as the electoral process inspire more confidence in democratic consolidation in Panama than in El Salvador.

II. EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCE IN OUTCOMES

The difference in the election outcomes in El Salvador and Panama was not determined by campaign spending: while ARENA undoubtedly spent the most of the seven parties or coalitions that posed candidates in El Salvador, Moscoso spent the least out of the three coalition contestants in Panama. The incumbent PRD, meanwhile, spent the most, yet Torrijos lost to Moscoso by a 7 percent margin. The role of external actors – still in the 1980s a significant factor in isthmus elections – also fails to explain the difference in the outcomes as the key outside players in both El Salvador and Panama confined themselves to observing and supporting the electoral process, rather than buttressing a specific party line. The media and civil society in both countries include effective opposition voices. Moreover, of the two, El Salvador featured a stronger opposition in the legislature able to launch criticism at the government from a visible podium throughout the election campaign. The differences in the two electoral processes, most vividly illustrated by the divergent turnouts, are also insufficient to explain

the different outcomes. The preferences of the abstainers are difficult to gauge, particularly as large proportions of voters in both countries rejected all parties *per se*.⁵ One can only speculate on the results in the event of lower turnouts. Differences in the range of policy proposals in the two campaigns do not offer credible explanations either. While the platforms were largely interchangeable in Panama, they were by and far crystallized in El Salvador.⁶ Variance in the voters' pre-campaign preferences was also negligible, and in fact appeared to favor the incumbent more in Panama than in El Salvador.⁷ The electorate's perceptions of government performance are not unlike in the two cases. Polls established similar trends in El Salvador and Panama, be it either the government's or the president's work or the economic situation of the surveyed.⁸ Finally, and perceptions aside, macroeconomic situations in the two cases were also alike, and again, more favorable to the Panamanian government.⁹

Many factors often considered key to understanding election outcomes – campaign spending, the role of external actors, media and civil society, voter turnout, party platforms, pre-campaign perceptions, views on government performance, and the state of the economy – all fail to offer explanations for the difference in outcomes in the Salvadoran and Panamanian elections. The difference in the two electoral products was rather a factor of inter- and intra-party dynamics, the candidates' personalities and candidate-party relations, and the duration of the campaigns.

Party Dynamics

Much like in the 1989 and 1994 presidential elections, this year also the ARENA benefited from disunity within and between the Salvadoran opposition parties. The opposition ticket was split over six candidates supported by their respective parties or coalitions. In the absence of a large opposition alliance, the main force, the FMLN, had to battle not only ARENA's potent machinery, but also the dispersion of the opposition vote. The most important challenge came from the solid support building behind the Centro Democrático Unido (CDU) coalition candidate Rubén Zamora, the runner-up in the 1994 presidential elections on the FMLN-backed Convergencia Democrática (CD) coalition ticket.¹⁰ Furthermore, the FMLN was debilitated by internal splits. Rooted in the five leftist groups of differing ideologies embraced by the Frente during its years as a guerrilla movement, the intra-party divisions dissipated prior to the 16 March 1997 municipal and legislative elections, permitting the FMLN to score important gains.¹¹ However, divisions reemerged shortly afterwards due to

disagreements over policy collaboration with ARENA and moves toward a more moderate policy line in the December 7 1997 convention that elected Guardado as the FMLN's coordinator general and alienated the party's orthodox wing. Moreover, the FMLN's efforts at internal democratization backfired, allowing the intra-party splits to flourish, and costing the party two failed primaries – as well as stronger candidates, San Salvador Mayor Héctor Silva and former Human Rights Ombudsman, Victoria de Avilés. In the third convention on September 27 1998, the divisions were widened by the election of the compromise candidate Guardado, whose moderate credentials provoked strong dissent and even interpreted it as outright opposition by the party hard-liners led by Schafik Handal. The Unidad Social Cristiana's (USC) throwing its support behind Guardado in October did little to mend the intra-FMLN divisions which, along with the disappointingly ineffective use of the wider mandate received in the 1997 elections, eroded the party's credibility. The FMLN descended into internal criticism at the time it should have risen to build societal alliances and criticize ARENA. The party appeared unable to govern itself when it should have been prepared to govern the nation. Similar self-defeating factionalism consumed El Salvador's fourth largest party and the country's main political force still in the early and mid-1980s, the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC), which crumbled into three factions with widely divergent loyalties.¹²

The inability of the main opposition parties to reconcile their internal differences, much less present broad coalition slates, fuelled the perception of ARENA's coherence and determination. Still during the 1997 elections, ARENA had suffered from divisions that contributed to its weaker than expected showing.¹³ Its subsequent internal overhaul and strong party discipline helped, however, to overcome the feuding, bringing about an efficient, purposeful electoral vehicle during the March 29 1998 primaries. The fruits of the party's regrouping, effective strategy, campaign spending, and aura of credibility lent by the decade-long experience in government were evident. In a February 1999 poll, 62 percent of Salvadorans thought ARENA had fought the best campaign, compared to only 3.4 percent who viewed the FMLN-USC campaign as the most effective.¹⁴ This perception, reaffirmed by ARENA's consistently overwhelming lead in the polls, arguably converted into a self-fulfilling prophecy, helping to guarantee Flores a whopping first-round victory. A unified, determined opposition could at least have forced Flores to a second round.

In Panama, meanwhile, it was the opposition that benefited from inter-party dynamics, and to a lesser degree, intra-party grievances. In May 1994, the comeback of the PRD, Panama's largest party previously closely

affiliated with the country's military regimes, was made possible by the electoral scene's splitting into seven minority parties or alliances. Receiving only a minority mandate of 33.3 percent in Panama's single-round elections, the PRD's Pueblo Unido alliance won – not unlike ARENA both in 1994 and 1999 – by virtue of being the most cohesive and numerous of the atomized political forces (Scranton, 1995: 74-79).

Its foremost challenger, Moscoso's Alianza Democrática coalition, suffered from divisions and her party mate Guillermo Endara's hugely unpopular presidency.¹⁵ In contrast, in 1999, the Panamanian opposition split into only two, rather coherent coalitions of which only one, Moscoso's Unión por Panamá, stood a chance of beating the PRD's Nueva Nación alliance. The less divided electoral scene increased the proportion of votes obtained both by the PRD and by the PA as compared to 1994, but it benefited Moscoso more in the light of the PRD's stagnant support base and its coalition partners' inability to muster much additional support.¹⁶ Also helping Moscoso was the PRD's lack of unity in comparison to the 1994 race. In the national referendum on August 30 1998, the Panamanian electorate resoundingly rejected the government's proposal to reform the constitution to permit presidential re-election.¹⁷ This not only dashed President Ernesto Pérez Balladares's hopes of running for a second term, but threw the PRD off balance, leading to uncertainty, internal repositioning, and divisions within – and departures from – the party cupola that continued beyond the October primaries, debilitating Torrijos's campaign.¹⁸

The intra-party dynamics favoring both Flores and Moscoso were grounded on the distinct party systems of El Salvador and Panama. Panama's traditionally transient, fragmented system of numerous small appearing and disappearing parties and electoral alliances – often serving as non-programmatic, personalistic vehicles – perpetuated during the country's democratic transition, and has been fed by electoral rules allowing for pluralism.¹⁹ Although Panama's two traditional political trends, Torrijismo and Arnulfismo,²⁰ continued to dominate the electoral scene in 1999 – in terms of ideas, parties, and candidates alike – the fates of both the PRD and the PA depended, as in 1994, on the constellations of the smaller parties. Bringing additional elements of volatility to the Panamanian electoral scene is that the country's parties tend to have less well-defined ideologies than, for example, the Salvadoran parties, and that the Panamanian voters have not necessarily responded to well-financed, "winning" campaigns. Meanwhile in El Salvador, by the time the FMLN entered the electoral scene in 1994, thereby completing the Salvadoran political spectrum for the first time since 1931, the right embodied by ARENA had entrenched its

power in the absence of the left and in the face of weak and divided center.²¹ ARENA's well-oiled party machinery has perpetuated the party's dominance, while the opposition has remained poorly financed and quite incoherent. The Salvadoran electoral rules, meanwhile, have taken a turn to discourage the entry of new parties to the political scene.²² In short, the Panamanian party system features a higher propensity for alteration in power than the Salvadoran one. As evidenced in the 1999 elections, this benefited the opposition candidate in Panama and the hopeful incumbent party in El Salvador.

Personalities and Party-Candidate Relations

The candidates' personalities and relation to their respective parties acquired significant importance in both electoral campaigns due to the similarity of platforms in the two cases, and was the second factor producing the difference in the two outcomes.

Facundo Guardado failed to make a match with both the left and the right. His centrist ideas were rejected by the FMLN hard-liners, while his leftist credentials, combined with his uneducated background and momentary flirtation with a tax reform, did little to assure the Salvadoran private sector. As former guerrilla commanders, Guardado and his running mate María Marta Valladares (also known by her *nom de guerre* Nidia Díaz) evoked in the voters unpleasant memories of the Salvadoran civil war (1980-1992), and possibly also stirred old fears of polarization so effectively used by ARENA's campaign in 1994. By virtue of being the FMLN's compromise hopeful who emerged only after two failed party conventions, Guardado came to symbolize, and exacerbate, the intra-party divisions. And although the colorless styles of the Salvadoran front-runners rendered some observers to dub the campaign the duller in a generation, Guardado's weak image devoid of charisma, pro-active stance, and backing by his own party allowed Flores to emerge markedly stronger. Young, well-educated and enjoying a reputation as a moderate and pragmatic consensus builder established during his tenure, in 1997, as the President of the Legislative Assembly, Flores appeared an opposite to an ideologically charged Cold War figure who would provoke controversy either within ARENA or on the national level. Unlike Guardado, Flores received the largely unquestioned support of his party – and that of the incumbent president Armando Calderón Sol.

Personality perhaps mattered even more in Panama's elections: Martín Torrijos is the son of General Omar Torrijos, the founder of the PRD and populist *de facto* leader of Panama from 1969 to 1981, who in 1977 signed

the Panama Canal Treaties with US President Jimmy Carter. Moscoso, for her part, was the second wife of Panama's late enigmatic three-time president Arnulfo Arias, whom Omar Torrijos helped to overthrow in 1968. With both presidential front-runners' carrying a heavy political baggage of the past, Moscoso won the personality game. A savvy and experienced political organizer with a consistent message, an inspiring presence, and an upgraded image since the 1994 race, she enjoyed an edge over the somewhat cautious and occasionally nervous Torrijos. Although the sincerity of Torrijos's pledges to reverse some of the PRD government's unpopular policies – primarily the privatization drive – was seldom disputed, his youth and short-lived political experience²³ undermined the credibility of his efforts to assert independence from the PRD leadership, much less emerge as the party's bellwether. Unlike Torrijos, hostage to his party's cupola, or Guardado, victim to his own past, Moscoso appeared as the paramount leader of her coalition, able to rise above the internal squabbles. Indeed, while both Moscoso and Flores helped to unite the Unión por Panamá and ARENA, respectively, the candidacies of Torrijos and Guardado served to divide the PRD and the FMLN.²⁴

Duration of Campaigns

Although it can be argued that a long campaign harms the contestant by expanding the time of his or her exposure to public scrutiny and the media, it appears that both in El Salvador and Panama the long campaigns run by Flores and Moscoso created an image of seriousness and initiative.

Both Flores and Moscoso got an earlier start for their campaign vis-à-vis the other candidates. Curiously, they won their respective party primaries on the same day, March 29 1998. ARENA, whose leadership started to prepare for the elections already in 1997 – following the electoral failure in the municipal and legislative elections – chose Flores to lead the race when the FMLN still faced another five months of frustrating search for a candidate. ARENA immediately mounted an impressive campaign that sent Flores to tour the countryside, networking with the leaders of the Salvadoran communities in New York and Washington, and earn the backing of the private sector with a promptly prepared government plan. Guardado, meanwhile, launched his campaign in October, presenting a more detailed platform only in February, a month before the elections. In Panama, Moscoso had virtually been on a campaign trail since her defeat in the 1994 elections. She won her presidential candidacy seven months before Torrijos would win his, and built momentum for the electoral race by spearheading the opposition's vigorous campaign against the PRD's constitutional reform

proposals in the August 30 referendum. Torrijos ran a well-financed but hurried campaign of six months. Moscoso walked to victory for 60 months. Moreover, in both cases, the positive effect of long campaigns was compounded by propitious timing: not only did Flores and Moscoso maintain their momentum, but their campaigns peaked in the eve of the elections.²⁵

Perception of Option

While the electorate's perception of the incumbent government's overall performance does not explain the difference in election outcomes in El Salvador and Panama, the perception of the existence of a credible option to the incumbent party candidate does. This perception derived from the three key factors discussed above – party dynamics, candidates' personalities, and duration of campaigns.

In El Salvador, Guardado was not well known coupled with his poor image, inconsistent message, and delayed campaign; while the FMLN (and the opposition) appeared weak and largely in disarray. In October 1998, ARENA was the most frequently mentioned as the most apt party to govern – by 36.6 percent of Salvadorans. In February 1999, with the elections only three weeks away, 54.5 percent of Salvadorans agreed with the statement that the FMLN was “not prepared to govern.”²⁶ Even if the Salvadoran opposition had managed to distinguish its platform from that of ARENA, lack of governing experience, weak candidate, and legacy of intra-party splits would have tainted its credibility. The opposition did not provide a credible option, much less a winning option, thus helping to produce another ARENA victory.

In Panama, meanwhile, those hoping to unseat the PRD had an option in Moscoso. She had presented a credible option already in 1994, losing to Pérez Balladares by only four percentage points, but was then, unlike in 1999, hurt by the numerous splits in the electoral scene as well as by her debilitating affiliation with the Endara administration. In polls carried out in 1997 and 1998, Moscoso figured consistently among the top three figures Panamanians would have preferred for the next presidency.²⁷ In the same polls – listing a dozen possibilities – Torrijos did not once appear as an option, not even in surveys asking the voter's preference for the PRD's next presidential candidate. As a veteran politician and renowned long-time opposition leader backed by a solid message, broad-based coalition and her husband's legacy, Moscoso presented a credible option, despite never having been hugely popular in Panama.²⁸ Panamanians simply knew who she was and where she stood. In short, even if both Panamanians and

Salvadorans cherished change, it was only in Panama that the voters had a credible alternative for effecting it.²⁹

III. TURNOUTS: RECORD HIGH AND LOW

The Salvadoran and Panamanian political systems feature similar institutional and historical characteristics. Yet, the countries' party systems as well as voter turnout rates differ. Turnout in Panama has consistently outpaced that of El Salvador. In 1999, the Salvadoran turnout plunged to a historical low of 38.6 percent, well below the 53 percent in the 1994 general elections (legislative and presidential elections coincide every 15 years in El Salvador) and above the levels recorded only in Guatemala and Haiti in the recent Latin American elections. ARENA's ostensibly impressive sweep was thus made possible by less than 20 percent of the registered voters. Panama, meanwhile, recorded a turnout of 76.2 percent on May 2, slightly up from the 73.6 percent in the 1994 race and the highest in the country's democratic history.

The difference in the two turnouts cannot be attributed to such standard structural indicators as the size of the middle class, the sophistication of the civil society, levels of education or poverty, rural-urban composition, or access to transportation. First, the differences in any of these aspects between Panamanian and Salvadoran voters are not dramatically distinct. Second, voters in Nicaragua are overall worse off than the Salvadoran voters in each of the six respects, yet have produced turnouts of 75 percent and above in the presidential races of 1984, 1990 and 1996.³⁰ The similarity of platforms, often seen as a demobilizing factor, also fails to offer an explanation, since the ideological distance between the Panamanian parties was narrower than that in El Salvador, yet voter turnout was much lower in the latter case. The role of political parties as mobilization agents also appears unable to explain the differences in turnout, as the institutionalization and mass mobilization of parties is low in both cases when compared to the other Latin American countries.³¹ The role of external actors in the two electoral processes was not markedly different in the two cases either. That the Panamanians came to the booths while Salvadorans stayed at home was, rather, the product of three factors: electoral organization, attitudes toward voting, and the polarization of the electoral scene. Compounding these factors, and representing the main determinants for the difference in the directions taken by the two turnouts this year from previous levels, were two factors, the historical backdrop and the candidates' mobilization capacities:

First, the persistent administrative weaknesses and lack of credibility of the Salvadoran Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) undermined the voters' incentives and ease to vote. According to international observers and Salvadoran voters alike, the 1999 elections exhibited many of the problems detected also in the 1989, 1991, 1994 and 1997 elections: incompleteness of electoral lists, delays in the opening of booths, and excessively centralized voting sites.³² Initiatives to reform the Salvadoran electoral law to guarantee the TSE greater independence and bring about a decentralized voting system have remained pending in Congress, with a push for them emerging only after the elections.

While the Salvadoran electoral system has stagnated, the Panamanian one has progressed; Panama's Electoral Tribunal (TE) -like Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council (CSE)- has outperformed its Salvadoran counterpart. The TE has made strides to regain voters' trust since the 1984 rigged and 1989 annulled elections held under the Manuel Noriega regime (1983-1989). It performed in an increasingly professional, independent and impartial manner in the 1992 referendum, 1994 general elections and the 1998 referendum, winning praise also in 1999 from voters and international observers alike.³³ In June 1998, 62.4 percent of Panamanians thought the TE's performance in the 1999 race would be characterized by "great deal of honesty" or "some honesty", as opposed to 22.5 percent who responded "little honesty" and 9.6 percent who said "no honesty" (Dichter & Neira, 1998b). A week before the elections, these figures were even more favorable – 80, 10 and 6 percent, respectively (CID Gallup, 1999). Meanwhile, in October 1998, 42.2 percent of Salvadoran voters thought there would be fraud in the March elections, against 36.7 percent who said the contest would be clean.³⁴

The Panamanian case is by no means the optimum for which the Salvadoran TSE should strive: (i) Panama's turnout is still no match to many turnouts recorded in the latest South American elections; (ii) about a quarter of Panamanian voters generally still appear more or less skeptical of the TE's honesty; (iii) even after the 1999 race, criticism emerged of insufficient organization and preparation by the Panamanian electoral authorities particularly in the rural areas of the country. However, Panamanians could trust their Electoral Tribunal more and vote with greater ease than the Salvadorans.

Second, besides institutional differences, the attitudes toward voting created the difference in turnouts in El Salvador and Panama.

Most Salvadorans held negative feelings about their country's situation before the elections, and thought voting would not change it. In

October 1998, 58.7 percent of Salvadorans stated that voting was a waste of time because things would never change, while 37.5 percent (nearly the same percentage of the registered voters that voted), thought the opposite.³⁵ 47.7 percent argued that the country's situation would be similar or worse after the elections, while only 24.2 percent thought it would improve. The pessimism appears to have translated into abstention: of those who actually voted, 42.9 percent were optimistic, believing that the country's situation would improve after the elections, against only 3.6 percent who thought it would worsen (IUDOP, 1999).

In sharp contrast, 91 percent of the Panamanians thought their vote would make a difference in the elections (CID Gallup, 1999). Meanwhile, those viewing the country's future with optimism outnumbered the pessimists by a two-to-one margin. The Panamanians' positive attitudes toward voting can be traced not only to their confidence in the electoral authorities and the existence of credible opposition candidates, but also the fact that in the 1992 and 1998 referendums; and the 1989 – albeit belatedly³⁶ – and 1994 elections, Panamanian voters had rejected the incumbent government's quests for both constitutional reforms and power, establishing precedence where voting made a difference, to the point of guaranteeing alteration in power. Voting in Panama could be seen not only as allowing for the electorate to exercise its power and as offering a means to a change, but equivalent to change.

Third, while the similarity of platforms cannot be seen as a demobilizing factor in the sense that the Panamanian candidates presented even more similar platforms than the contestants in El Salvador, the degree of polarization in the two electoral scenes does help explain the difference in the two turnouts.³⁷

Polls consistently attest that about 50 percent of the Salvadoran electorate do not associate with any of the country's political parties. Out of the half that do, more than 90 percent relate to either ARENA or the FMLN. As Barnes argues, the Salvadoran electorate, like the Nicaraguan one, is not as polarized as the country's political scene, nor have the persistent socioeconomic polarization translated into political polarization. Whereas in Nicaragua, those in the middle (i.e. half of the voters having ambivalent views of both left and right and do not identify with either) chose to "align temporarily with one or the other of the two poles of the political spectrum" during elections. The middle stratum in El Salvador does not respond to election campaigns nor does it vote.³⁸ Furthermore, while the Salvadoran political poles followed their Nicaraguan counterparts in moving closer to the center during the election season in 1999, the polarizing rhetoric so vivid

in 1994 and still present in 1999 may nonetheless have undermined the centrist, moderate credentials of the two Salvadoran front-runners.

In contrast, such polarization is largely absent in Panama, where the political spectrum is dominated by centrist parties. These parties are the most credible electoral vehicles as well as the ones the Panamanian voters lean toward – as many voters in El Salvador and Nicaragua arguably would do. The two largest parties, the PRD and the PA, are favored by some 55 percent of the voters, while the smaller parties muster proportionally some four times more support than their Salvadoran counterparts. In short, while the middle stratum in Panama has an abundance of credible options corresponding to its political leanings and votes, the Salvadoran middle, in the absence of such options, prefers to abstain.

Differences in the Direction of Turnouts

Two aspects, namely the respective historical backdrops of Panama and El Salvador and the mobilization capacities of the candidates in the two elections, not only helped create the difference in the turnouts, but represented the key elements in the divergent directions of turnouts in the two countries.³⁹

First, neither case featured a defined, founding elections as the first post-Noriega race in Panama or El Salvador's first post-peace contest, referred to at the time as the "elections of the century". However, the 1999 race in Panama took place against the backdrop of an even more momentous occasion than the 1994 election. On December 31 1999, Panama for the first time in its 96 years independence gained full sovereignty over its national territory, as the Panama Canal and its adjoining areas reverted from the United States to Panamanian control. The Panamanians, whose nationalistic sentiments can never be underestimated, voted well aware of the fact that their next government would face the historical tasks of receiving and administering the Canal and steering a fully independent Panama. Whereas the historical occasion at hand arguably helped to draw the Panamanian voters to the booths in record numbers, the Salvadoran voters were far from harboring such sentiments of a change of an era. Rather, both the overwhelming ARENA victories presaged by the polls and the negative attitudes toward voting generated a mood of "more of the same" that the elections would be in no position to change.

Second, although the mobilization capacities of political parties were similarly weak in the two cases, the fact that the Panamanian candidates were closely affiliated with the country's political giants with significant mass appeal, Omar Torrijos and Arnulfo Arias, arguably also caused the

turnout to soar in Panama. Indeed, Martín Torrijos received a greater number of votes than Pérez Balladares in 1994, yet lost the race. In contrast, in El Salvador, the main contestants were even more bland and devoid of symbolism than the main candidates in 1994, Armando Calderón Sol and Rubén Zamora.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

Election outcomes both in El Salvador and in Panama defy the notions that a simultaneous presidential and legislative elections would allow a single party to control both the executive and the legislative branch, and that the two elections held separately would encourage opposition-dominated legislatures. ARENA's sweep of the presidential race guaranteed the party continuing control of the executive and the legislature, a situation favorable to the Flores government which took office on June 1 – particularly in the face of the FMLN's persistent internal problems and ARENA's working majority in the Legislative Assembly with the third and fourth largest parties, the Partido Conciliación Nacional (PCN) and the PDC. The FMLN has little time for internal renovation and regrouping prior to the March 12 2000 legislative and municipal elections. The opposition's hopes may become increasingly pinned to the CDU instead. Meanwhile, pitting the legislature (with numerous seasoned PRD deputies) against the executive, the Panamanian outcome appears more conducive to democratic practice by requiring dialogue and accommodation rather than allowing for imposition. This is the case even as Moscoso managed to forge a one-seat working majority (36 seats to 35) in the Assembly only days prior to assuming office on September 1 since this coalition is fragile and Moscoso, much like Pérez Balladares with Pueblo Unido, may face a loyalty deficit by her coalition partners in the wake of the accomplished common task of unseating the PRD.

Nonetheless, and somewhat counter-intuitively, the Moscoso government has thus far enjoyed better circumstances for governance than the Flores administration. Moscoso's legislative majority has held in its first two months of existence, allowing the new president to deliver on her campaign promises to bring down many of the PRD government's measures. Meanwhile, Flores's ability to govern has been complicated by developments external to the executive-legislative relation, such as a number of negative legacies of the past ARENA administration, and a string of massive (and even violent) protests by former paramilitaries and public sector employees. The latter situation, indeed, suggests the Salvadoran voters find political

expression to be more effective when channeled through mechanisms other than voting or parties.

It could be argued that if the low turnout in El Salvador bears signs of a crisis of representation, the defeat of Panama's incumbent party, both now and in 1994, can similarly be equaled with such a crisis.⁴⁰ However, the record turnout and convergence of four parties behind Moscoso's candidacy in Panama accords much greater representativeness and legitimacy to the Moscoso government and to Panama's political, party and electoral systems – than the voter abstention does to the Flores government in El Salvador. This in spite of the fact that the Panamanian outcome and voter turnout do not necessarily imply that Panama's political parties are any more legitimate or representative than parties in El Salvador. Moscoso also enjoys a broader mandate than the Pérez Balladares government, which won in 1994 with only a third of the vote cast and in the context of a slightly lower turnout compared to 1999.

The analysis of the two turnouts also implies that while in Panama the bases conducive to solid turnouts are set (i.e. relatively well functioning electoral administration, optimistic attitudes toward voting, and credible centrist options), in El Salvador such factors continue to be absent. Even if the subsequent elections in Panama did not represent a similar historic occasion and were not contested by candidates with such celebrity credentials, as was the case in 1999, the turnout rates are unlikely to plunge heavily. The Salvadoran situation, meanwhile, seems gloomier, particularly if the electoral scene remains polarized. In sum, although this year's slight increase in turnout in Panama may have been temporary, factors of permanent quality for maintaining turnout rates at current levels are present. In El Salvador, it is precisely the permanent factors that will discourage substantial increases in voter turnout.

V. CONCLUSION

The effectiveness of electoral organization, the attitudes toward voting, and, perhaps most importantly, the polarization of the electoral scene produced the drastic difference in voter turnouts in the latest presidential elections in Panama and El Salvador. Compounding this trend, and generating the difference in the directions of the two turnouts were the two countries' respective historical stages and the mobilization capacities of their candidates. Producing different perceptions of the existence of a credible option to the incumbent party candidate, and creating the difference in outcomes in the two races were time, party dynamics, and personalities. In both races, messengers meant more than messages, campaign preparation

more than past performance and alignments within and between parties more than the size and grasp of each party individually. Indeed, party dynamics appear to be the most decisive factor in producing the difference in the outcomes. Even with stronger candidates and more time, Panama's incumbent party and the Salvadoran opposition would have been injured with the party dynamics remaining equal; while greater unity in the Salvadoran electoral scene and a larger number of splits in the Panamanian one could well have boosted the prospects of Guardado and Torrijos, respectively.

Certainly, an electoral event or elections alone cannot establish the degree of democratic consolidation, much less the quality of democracy.⁴¹ Neither can the consolidation of democracy be fully assessed in two cases by using them as each other's yardsticks. Thus, it cannot be argued here that democracy is consolidating in Panama and vice versa in El Salvador, even though the present study would suggest so. For example, in both countries, political parties have a long way to go to become more representative and effectively aggregate the society's demands. However, it can be established that the Panamanian elections – given the increasingly professional process, alteration of parties in power, solid turnout, and all for the second time around – inspires more confidence in the consolidation of democracy than the Salvadoran race. The opposition's plurality in the Panamanian Legislative Assembly promises to check the executive's powers and raise the role of the smaller parties and the legislature in the Panamanian political scene, which, in turn, begs incessant consensus-building and bargaining necessary for internalizing of democracy in political practices. In El Salvador, meanwhile, bringing about an effective and trusted electoral system, albeit a political issue seems easier than for the opposition to converge and pose a credible challenge to ARENA.

Notes

- 1 Researcher at the Institute for European-Latin American Relations (IRELA) in Madrid. The arguments expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the views of IRELA.
- 2 In El Salvador, the results gave Flores 51.96% of the vote and Guardado 29.05%, thus obviating the need for a second-round run-off. Rubén Zamora of the *Centro Democrático Unido* (CDU) coalition -composed of the *Movimiento de Unificación Demócrata Cristiano* (MUDC), *Partido Demócrata* (PD), *Partido Popular Laborista*, (PPL), *Convergencia Democrática* (CD), and *Fe y Esperanza* (FE)- came third with 7.50%, followed by Rodolfo Parker of the *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC), who obtained

5.68% of the vote. The candidates of the *Partido Conciliación Nacional* (PCN), *Liga Democrática Republicana* (LIDER) and *Partido Pueblo Unido Nuevo Trato* (PUNTO) received a combined total of 5.81%. Another minor force, *Partido Liberal Democrático* (PLD) lent its support to ARENA. See Tribunal Supremo Electoral (1999).

In Panama, Moscoso of the *Unión por Panamá* coalition -composed of the PA, *Movimiento de Renovación Nacional* (MORENA), *Movimiento Liberal Republicano Nacionalista* (MOLIRENA) and *Cambio Democrático* (CD)- won 44.8% of the vote, while Torrijos of the *Nueva Nación* coalition -made up of the PRD, *Partido Liberal Nacional* (PLN), *Partido Solidaridad* (PS), *Movimiento Papa Egoró* (MPE) and *Movimiento Nuevo Amanecer*- received 37.8%, and Alberto Vallarino Clement of the *Acción Opositora* coalition -consisting of *Partido Demócrata Cristiano* (PDC), *Partido Liberal* (PL), *Partido Renovación Civilista* (PRC), *Partido Nacionalista Popular* (PNP)- obtained 17.4%. See Tribunal Electoral (1999c).

- 3 The legislature's political composition remained largely unchanged. The results gave the PRD 34 seats, PA 18, PDC 5, PS 4, MOLIRENA 3, PLN 3, CD 2, and MORENA and PRC 1 each. See Tribunal Electoral (1999b). Three parties -MPE, PL, PNP- lost their official status, owing to their failure to reach the 5% threshold required for continuing party registration.
- 4 Scholarly literature, of course, is rife with debate and disagreements over the definition, applicability, and even the validity of the concept of consolidation of democracy. Those who do use the concept put forth a great number of procedural and institutional factors necessary for it, such as institutionalization of political parties, effective judicial system, accountability and citizen capacity for scrutiny, political culture and practices underpinned by democratic values, and the military's subordination to civilian rule. Here, democratic consolidation does not imply definitiveness, but a dynamic process marking even the mature democracies, and is applied in a broad sense as produced by attitudinal, behavioral, and institutional dimensions alike. My concern here, nonetheless, is mainly with four factors: the alteration of parties in power, the participation of the electorate in the political game, the development of strong checks and balances, and representativeness and responsiveness of the political system.
- 5 Only days prior to their respective elections, 28% of Panamanians and 32.7% of Salvadorans did not prefer any party or know for whom to vote. For Panama, see CID/Gallup de Panamá S.A. (1999); for El Salvador, see 6-11 February poll by Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública (IUDOP) de Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA) cited in UCA (1999b).
- 6 Slight differences notwithstanding, all three presidential candidates in Panama centered their campaigns on pledges to create jobs, halt the incumbent government's privatization drive, guarantee effective operations of the Panama Canal, combat corruption and poverty, and reform the country's Constitution to foster the independence of state institutions. In El Salvador, where the ideological distance between the front-runners was arguably wider than in Panama, both the FMLN and ARENA presented moderate, centrist platforms geared to creating jobs, attracting foreign investment, boosting agricultural and industrial production, fostering education, and reducing crime. ARENA, moreover, incorporated two traditionally leftist campaign themes -income equality and eradication of poverty- into Flores's rhetoric.
- 7 In May 1998, the FMLN and ARENA ran neck-and-neck (23.4% to 23.6%, respectively) in voter preferences. In Panama in August 1998, the incumbent President Ernesto Pérez

Balladares was the voters' most favored candidate to capture the next presidency; he would have beaten the poll runner-up Moscoso by 23.3% to 17.7%. For El Salvador, see IUDOP (1998a); for Panama, see Dichter & Neira (1998d).

- 8 Although there are differences in how the survey questions are posed in the two cases, and although the reliability of polls in indicating the electorate's ultimate choices can be questioned, the broad trends are similar in El Salvador and Panama. Some concurrent polls even indicate again, that the Pérez Balladares government was relatively more popular than the Armando Calderón Sol administration. In May 1998, 52.8% of the Salvadorans said there had been no positive changes in the country since the Calderón Sol government took office, as against 42.6% who thought the opposite. Meanwhile, in June 1998, 55% of Panamanians viewed the performance of the Pérez Balladares government as "excellent" or "good", as opposed to 45.1% who viewed it as "bad" or "very bad". Similar trends characterized presidential performance: in El Salvador, 37.9% viewed Calderón Sol's performance as "very good" or "good", 31.3% as "regular", and 30.3% as "bad" or "very bad". In Panama, 53.8% thought Pérez Balladares's performance was either "excellent" or "good", while 46% viewed it as "bad" or "very bad". For El Salvador, see IUDOP (1998a); for Panama, Dichter & Neira (1999b). Calderón Sol's popularity was seen as improving the closer the elections drew, but this trend fails to offer a clear distinction with Panama. While favorable views on Pérez Balladares sank to 27% in January 1999 from the average 42% recorded in 1998 and 43% in 1997, they rebounded to 38% by the end of April 1999. Moreover, Pérez Balladares's popularity did not affect Torrijos's popularity, which remained at a steady 55-56% in 1998 and 1999, rising to 64% in March 1999. See CID/Gallup de Panamá S.A. (1999). Although in March 1998 (five months before the referendum that would uphold the constitutional ban on presidential re-election), 53.7% of surveyed Panamanians said they were opposed to the re-election of Pérez Balladares, he was, nevertheless, the poll front-runner to win the next presidency. See Dichter & Neira (1998a).

Differences in voters' perceptions of their economic situation are also alike in both countries--and could be seen as more favorable to the Panamanian government. In May 1998, 57.1% of Salvadorans thought their personal economic situation had remained the same or improved during the Calderón Sol administration, while in June 1998, 71.1% of Panamanians thought their economic situation had remained the same or improved during the Pérez Balladares government. For El Salvador, see IUDOP (1998a) and for Panama, Dichter & Neira (1998b). In Panama, 29% of the voters saw Pérez Balladares's performance as "very good" or "good" and 36% as "neither good nor bad" for the economic situation of their families. See CID/Gallup de Panamá S.A. (1999). And although the Panamanian opposition could capitalize on the discontent over Pérez Balladares's privatization spree and labor code reform that became associated with the stubbornly high 13% unemployment rates, the PRD's economic policies do not explain the differences in the Panamanian election outcome vis-à-vis El Salvador, where voters were by and large disenchanted with the state of the economy. In May 1998, 84.1% of surveyed Salvadorans opined that the Calderón Sol government was not resolving the country's economic troubles, as opposed to only 14.9% who thought the opposite. Furthermore, Salvadorans most frequently mentioned (in 20.8% of the cases) economic policy as the main failure of the Calderón Sol government, followed by high crime rates (15.1%). See IUDOP (1998a). The government's economic policies were also of greatest concern a year earlier, when 28.1% of Salvadorans viewed the high cost of living as the government's main policy failure, followed by unemployment (11.6%). See IUDOP (1997b).

- 9 While growth in El Salvador reached 4% in 1997 and 3.5% in 1998, Panama registered growth rates of 4.7% in 1997 and 3.9% in 1998. Inflation was modest in both cases: 1.9% in 1997 and 4.2% in 1998 in El Salvador, and 0.6%, the lowest in five years, in 1998 in Panama. On El Salvador, see Brachowicz et al. (1999); on Panama, Chona (1999).
- 10 At times, Zamora even slightly surpassed Guardado. By the end of 1998, he defeated Guardado 11.5% to 11.3% in voters' preferences for the next president, while in February 1999, he received 5.57 points against Guardado's 5.22, when the surveyed were asked to evaluate the candidates on a scale from 0 to 10. Flores, meanwhile, obtained 6.84 points. For the former, see IUDOP poll of 12-15 December cited in UCA (1999a). For the latter, see UCA (1999b).
- 11 In 1997, the FMLN received 33% of the vote in the legislative race, up from 21% in 1994; and 33% in the municipal elections, up from 20%. It gained mayoral seats in six of the 14 departmental capitals. See FMLN (1999).
- 12 While one wing of the party endorsed the FMLN-USC coalition, another, led by Ronal Umaña, presented Rodolfo Parker as its presidential candidate. A third spin-off group created the MUDC, which entered the CDU coalition backing Rubén Zamora.
- 13 Although remaining as the largest congressional party, ARENA lost 11 of its 39 seats in the legislature. In the municipal race, the party received 35% of the vote, down from 45% in 1994. See FMLN (1999).
- 14 8-14 February 1999 poll by APEX-BBDO y Saimer/GCA cited in *El Diario de Hoy* (1999).
- 15 Despite winning the May 1989 elections, which was subsequently nullified by the Manuel Noriega regime (1983-1989), the Endara government's legitimacy since its inception was tainted by virtue of its having been brought to power by an external force, the December 1989 US invasion. The government subsequently suffered from internal divisions and immense economic problems, while proving unable to fight corruption and having (and opting) to work through the inappropriate political institutions and constitution inherited from the military regime. Its constitutional reform proposal failed miserably in November 1992, and its popularity nose-dived consistently. For the institutional constraints and significance of the 1992 referendum, see Scranton (1993). For the Endara government's difficulties, see Furlong (1993).
- 16 Although the PRD obtained more votes than the PA, the PA's main coalition partner MOLIRENA attracted nearly twice as many votes as the PRD's *Nueva Nación* coalition partners combined. See Tribunal Electoral (1999d). The MPE - the third force in the 1994 race - performed particularly poorly in 1999; the PRD may have overestimated its coalition partners' appeal.
- 17 The No vote carried the day with 63.8%.
- 18 20 some losers in the PRD primaries -most notably presidential pre-candidates and renowned, long-standing party members Alfredo Oranges and Edith de Bethancourt- turned to support opposition candidates, becoming under threat of expulsion from the party after the elections.
- 19 Under Panama's 1988 electoral law, the petition to receive authorization for forming a party requires 1,000 signatures and the registration of followers numbering at least 3% of the votes cast in the latest elections. A US mission to Panama's May 1989 elections characterized the requirements for party registration as "minimal." See *The May 7, 1989 Panamanian Elections* (1989: 23).

- 20 Supporters of General Omar Torrijos, founder of the PRD, and those loyal to Arnulfo Arias, founder of the *Partido Panameñista Auténtico* (PPA), the main opposition to the PRD. The PAA crumbled after Arias's death in 1988, with most of his followers joining the PA, officially established in 1990.
- 21 ARENA's 1999 victory marks the first time that any one party wins the third consecutive term in government in El Salvador. Benefiting from the weakening performance of and internal struggles in the ruling PDC after the 1984 presidential and 1985 legislative races, ARENA won both the 1988 legislative and 1989 presidential elections. The FMLN, meanwhile, failed to run in 1989; and although the center-left *Covergencia Democrática* (CD) posed candidates in the race, it was poorly financed and attracted only 3.8% of the vote. Well established in the Salvadoran political scene by the 1990s, ARENA entered the peace talks and the 1994 elections from a position of strength; both the talks and the elections helped to nurture ARENA's interests, fostering its hegemony. The FMLN, for its part, entered the electoral scene from a position of weakness. First, it faced the difficult conversions from a violent insurgent into a political player, from embracing socialism into accepting the market. Second, the incomplete peace accord implementation created disenchantment among FMLN supporters with the party -and democracy itself- prior to the 1994 elections. The FMLN, nevertheless, sought to "convince its supporters to trust the government in its role as interlocutor in the negotiated peace accords." Stahler-Sholk (1994: 32). On the eve of the elections, the FMLN appeared incredible, unassertive, uncritical, and in a flux.
- 22 In November 1996, ARENA forced through electoral reforms which "vastly increased the number of signatures needed to form a party from 3,000 to 2% of the valid vote; required parties to gain 3% of the vote maintain their legal status; and limited government campaign fund support to post election disbursements to parties which gain the minimum number of votes (...). The Salvadoran electoral system has not been burdened by too many parties and a requirement of signatures amounting to 2% of the vote seems prohibitive. The central campaign finance problems were not addressed: one party dominates public and private financial resources; there is little accountability of private financing; and incumbents make excessive use of state propaganda through TV ads..." See Spencer et al. (1997: 11).
- 23 Torrijos served as Vice-minister of Government and Justice in the Pérez Balladares government.
- 24 Flores and especially Moscoso could qualify for what Jorge Domínguez categorizes as 'technopols', or leaders: "(a) at or near the top of their country's government and political life (including opposition political parties) who (b) go beyond their specialized expertise to draw on various different streams of knowledge and who (c) vigorously participate in the nation's political life (d) for the purpose of affecting politics well beyond the economic realm and who may, at times, be associated with an effort to 'remake' their country's politics, economics, and society." Like technopols and unlike Guardado or Torrijos, Flores and particularly Moscoso have advanced their ideas and political platforms from visible podiums for a substantial amount of time, built alliances to advance their cause, and generated independent energy while deriving support from their parties. See Domínguez (1998: 104).
- 25 Unlike suggested by the pre-election polls, Flores swept the race in the first round, whereas Moscoso passed Torrijos -who had held a consistent 6%-13% lead in the polls throughout the race- narrowly only ten days before the elections. The peaking of Moscoso's campaign appears to be attributed to developments: the apparent flattening of Torrijos' campaign

- during the final weeks of the race, interpreted by some analysts as the PRD's mistaken strategy to secure victory by "playing it safe", and the 11% polled drop in Vallarino's popularity in the course of April. See CID Gallup (1999). The first poll presaging a Moscoso victory received a great deal of publicity after some PRD members were seen purchasing *en masse* copies of the opposition paper that published the survey. See Jordán V. (1999).
- 26 IUDOP (1998b) and UCA (1999b). In the latter, Flores was preferred by 45.4%, Guardado by 12.5% and Zamora by 11.9% of the surveyed voters. Flores enjoyed rather consistent 40% popularity rates throughout the race, while Guardado's popularity never rose above 23%.
 - 27 Moscoso was the second most preferred candidate (with 15.7%) after Pérez Balladares in a March 1998 poll gauging 13 prospective candidates, second again in June 1998 (18.3%), in July (20.4%) and August (17.7%). In March, she was mentioned as a candidate with the best prospects for creating a unified opposition alliance. See Dichter & Neira (1998a, 1998b, 1998c and 1998d).
 - 28 In polls spanning from 1992 through April 1999, Moscoso's popularity rose from 24% in 1992 to 41% in 1994 and 44% in 1995, remaining thereafter below 45% until April 1999. On 10 April and 24 April, in the eve of the elections, she pulled 50% and 52% approval rates, respectively, beating Pérez Balladares but lagging behind both Torrijos and the Panama City Mayor Mayín Correa. See CID/Gallup de Panamá S.A. (1999).
 - 29 Prospects for a change in the *status quo* was the first or second most important motivation cited by those Salvadorans who did vote and voted for the opposition: 46.6% of the FMLN-USC supporters cited the prospects for a change as their reason for voting for the coalition, while the figure was 17.2% among the CDU voters and 17.1% among the PDC voters. See IUDOP (1999).
 - 30 For a comparative study on elections in El Salvador and Nicaragua, see Barnes (1998). It is true that the Panamanian voters are somewhat more urban and concentrated than their Salvadoran counterparts, as more than 50% of Panamanians reside in the urban corridor between Panama City and Colón. Whereas, some 49% of Salvadorans live in rural areas and only about a quarter in the San Salvador area. However, compared again to Nicaragua, a country with a very similar rural-urban composition as El Salvador, El Salvador is much smaller, less mountainous, and features a more extensive road network and concentrated population.
 - 31 See Peeler (1998:178-182). In fact, Peeler argues that institutionalization and mobilization capacities of Salvadoran parties and party systems are higher than in Panama.
 - 32 In a March 1999 exit poll, 24.6% of Salvadoran voters reported at least one difficulty in the voting process. See IUDOP (1999). According to an exit poll taken during the 16 March legislative elections in San Salvador, 21.3% of the surveyed had trouble locating their voting site, 18.1% lacked information on their voting site, 6.5% argued their voting booths opened too late, 7.1% did not find their name on the electoral lists. See IUDOP (1997a). Unlike in El Salvador, in Panama voters are assigned to the booths nearest to their residences.
 - 33 An indicator of the TE's growing professionalism is the decline in the number of impugnations in the wake of elections, from the thousands presented in 1984 and 1989 to 93 in 1994, and further to 40 in this year's race, with none of them coming in the presidential race. See Tribunal Electoral (1999c).

- 34 In IUDOP (1998b). The trend continued to the eve of elections, when 37.8% of Salvadoran thought there would be fraud in the elections, while 34.4% said the elections would be clean. See UCA (1999b).
- 35 See IUDOP (1998b). Similarly, in December 1996, three months prior to the legislative elections whereby the turnout plunged to 40%, half of Salvadoran voters thought that independently of whether they voted or not, the election result would always be the same. See IUDOP (1996). In February 1999, 69.6% of the Salvadoran surveyed predicted high abstention in the upcoming elections. 36.3% of them argued so on the grounds of the electorate's lack of confidence in politicians, 19.1% due to a sense of the elections being useless, and 11.1% due to a lack of candidates with appeal. See UCA (1999b).
- 36 Noriega annulled the May 1989 elections in Panama after it became clear that the opposition coalition, the *Alianza Democrática de Oposición-Civilista* (ADO-C) headed by Endara had gained an overwhelming victory. The Endara government was installed to power during the US invasion launched on 20 December 1989.
- 37 While producing the difference in turnout, polarization cannot be argued to have produced the difference in outcomes, which was rather the product of the different perceptions of the existence of credible options -be it center, right or left- to the governing party in the two cases. Even if a credible option in center could have increased turnout in El Salvador, it would not necessarily have defeated ARENA.
- 38 See Barnes 79-80. According to Barnes argues that in Nicaragua, "those who do vote are more polarized during election season than outside election season."
- 39 While the distinct historical backdrops in El Salvador and Panama help explain the difference in the two turnouts as well as in the directions taken by the turnouts, they cannot be claimed to have produced the difference in the election outcomes. Even in the absence of a defining moment in their nation's history, Panamanians could well have opted for change, while Salvadorans could well have chosen continuity even if the race had taken place in a more momentous context – as they did in 1994.
- 40 For defeat of parties during transition from authoritarian rule, see Domínguez (1998: 66).
- 41 As Alfred Montero notes, "it is possible to have consolidated democracy in a socially unjust and corrupt state and democracy." See Montero (1998: 121).

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