

ENVIRONMENTAL REFORMS IN BRAZILIAN AMAZONIA UNDER SARNEY AND COLLOR - EXPLAINING SOME CONTRASTS

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1. Introduction

Environmental policies in Brazil attracted considerable publicity in the run-up to the Rio summit especially because of the global effects of deforestation in the country's share of Amazonia. There have been intense debates both over the real content of reforms as well as over factors determining the pace and range of reforms.

In this paper, I examine differences between the Sarney (1985-1990) and Collor (1990-92) governments in three different policy areas relevant to environmental problems caused by deforestation and forest depletion in Brazilian Amazonia. These are policies related to the native populations of Amazonia, policies regarding international cooperation on Amazonia and environmental inspection policies; policy areas in which I argue that the Collor government implemented considerable changes. In section 2, a discussion of the contrasts between the environmental policies of the Sarney and Collor regimes follows. In section 3, five approaches suggesting variables for explanations of the contrasts between the two regimes are discussed. The main conclusion is that the difference between the environmental policies of the Sarney and Collor governments may not be explained by pointing to shifts in Brazil's debt-situation, international pressure or changes in the internal balance of political forces in bureaucracy and society. Rather, the change is explained by a fundamental difference in political strategy and the perception of Amazonia's relevance to this strategy. For Sarney, Amazonia was a non-negotiable question of territorial security which allowed only partial and slow reforms. For Collor, rapid environmental reform especially in Amazonia was a precondition for the achievement of increased growth through the opening of the Brazilian economy and collaboration with industrial countries. This conclusion is informed by

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theories that highlight executives as active strategists acting simultaneously at the domestic and international levels.

2. Sarney and Collor: Three contrasts in policies relevant to Amazonia

At least three sets of environmental reforms constitute a main difference in environmental policies between the Sarney and Collor governments: changes in *environmental surveillance and inspection*, changes in *policies to protect the indigenous populations of Amazonia* and changes in *Brazil's positions on international environmental cooperation* to address the problem of deforestation in Amazonia. Though it is difficult to estimate the environmental impacts of these policy changes on the Amazon region, several commentators (Hurrell 1992, Viola 1992) argue that they are important landmarks in the change to a more progressive environmental policy for the region under Collor.

Environmental surveillance of Amazonia to implement existing (since 1965) federal laws prohibiting deforestation of more than 50 percent of rural properties and requiring reforestation programmes by wood-consuming industries was introduced by president Sarney in 1989 in the so-called "Emergency Programme for Legal Amazonia" (PEAL). This policy implied an increase of federal presence in Amazonia through the deployment of patrols of federal policemen and staff from the newly (1989) created environmental executive body IBAMA². Under Collor, these efforts were substantially increased through what was marketed as "Operation Amazonia". Field personnel and journalists reported an increase of IBAMA inspection in Amazonia in the dry season of 1990 compared to the previous year (Margolis 1992:308)³. The amount of fines distributed increased and routines for their collection were considerably improved⁴. Politicians from Amazonia speaking on behalf of economic interests punished by IBAMA in 1990 and 1991 complained about the change⁵. According to IBAMA sources, the body was able to detect and punish trespassers of prohibitions of deforestation at an area of 96.305 hectares in the dry season before October 30, 1991⁶. This was just below 9 percent of estimated deforested area this year according to the Brazilian Space Agency (INPE), a number which strengthens the assumption that "Operation Amazonia" had a substantial demonstration effect in many areas. Heavy fines were distributed to several large companies⁷.

There was also a substantial difference between the willingness of the Sarney and Collor governments to support the native inhabitants of the forests. This is most pronounced in decisions regarding the huge Yanomani reservation in Roraima. Sarney's response to the influx of miners that poisoned the forest ecosystem and mistreated its native inhabitants in 1989 was to break the territory up in 19 pieces and encourage further immigration (Albert 1992, Allen 1992).

This decision was reversed under the Collor government. In November 1991, Collor recognized the entire reservation. Along with this, several other reservations were recognized and decided demarcated. Even though demarcation of the areas has proceeded slowly, the contrast between the two governments is substantial and clearly recognized by Brazilian NGOs supporting indigenous populations and other observers⁸.

The third important area of contrast is the change of Brazil's positions on international cooperation related to Amazonia's environmental problems. Sarney's position was widely known as defensive and nationalist (Albert 1992, Allen 1992)⁹. Collor's position in this field was a profound contrast from the outset. In his inaugural speech, only the economic liberalization programme received priority over environmental questions (Cleary 1991:117). The change of positions under Collor is demonstrated by the following statement by Ambassador Marcos Castrioto de Azambuja, secretary-general for foreign policy, in December 1990 (Brazil 1991:9):

"It is precisely because these are also concerns of the Brazilian society and of Brazil's Government that we understand that the international community has a right to be concerned by the violation of human rights and by the damage done to the environment wherever they may occur. In dealing with these and other issues, Brazil *no longer* [my Italic] resorts to allegations of sovereignty to deflect criticism. Instead, it shoulders its responsibilities, conscious that its actions have repercussions for the whole planet."

3. Approaches to the explanation of reforms

Four conventional approaches looking at changes in the international economic and political context of policy changes (a and b) and the domestic political context of policy change (c and d) as explanations of the mentioned changes are discussed below. It is argued that these explanations provide incomplete explanations of the policy changes in question; a more satisfactory explanation is to be found in explanations that link policy changes to fundamental differences in the political strategies of the two presidents (approach e).

a) The dependence approach

The dependence approach focuses on the economic constraints on Third World states emanating from a global economic order designed to the advantage of the industrialized countries. According to this approach, because of mechanisms like unfair terms of trade and unfair debt regimes the state has to abandon all environmental considerations and focus on the maximization of export income.

A popular hypothesis is that balance of payments constraints imply that products from forest areas must be extracted at maximum speed and without

considering the environmental consequences of activities (Altvater 1987, Wood 1990, Agarwal & Narain 1991). Guimarães formulates the logic of this situation (Guimarães 1991:124): "The financial resources needed for (...) development must be paid back, which in turn creates a need to earn dollars, which means more exports, which means intensified exploration of already overexploited resources".

If we take a look at the three mentioned political changes in question and start with the increase of environmental surveillance, this reform does not seem to have threatened exports in any decisive way. Most illegal deforestation punished was the burning of forest for the extension of pasture. However, the contribution of beef exports from Amazonia to exports has been negligible as the productivity of the huge investments in this business has been very low. Several fines were also distributed to companies doing illegal logging operations in the region. Though principally serving the domestic market, a sizeable part of log production in Amazonia was exported as plywood and sawn timber. But sawn timber and plywood prices remained about the same under both governments. Thus, changes in the value of natural resources may not be used as an explanation for the mentioned contrast.

For indigenous policies, the fact that the Yanomani reservation and other indigenous reservations contain vast mineral resources made decisions in this area relevant to the balance of payments constraint. Several large mining companies had initiated very promising prospecting operations in indigenous areas, and Brazilian gold exports from placer-mining in these areas increased substantially from the mid-1980s (Albert 1992, *Financial Times*, 8 February 1995). However, there were no decreases in estimates of the value of these resources that may explain Collor's more protective attitude.

The change of Brazil's positions on international cooperation in Amazonia does not seem to have any direct connection with the balance of payments constraint as this is principally a change of attitude.

Generally, there were no substantial changes in the balance of payments constraint between the Sarney and the Collor government¹⁰. Thus, the balance of payments constraint as a motive for unrestricted exploitation was constant for the two governments. Consequently, the change of policies under Collor seems to be more adequately explained as a change of priorities than by pointing to variations in this constraint.

However, at a deeper level, the increases of linkages between Brazil's environmental policies under Sarney and issues relevant to the external crisis like the debt regime, foreign investments and access to World Bank financing and northern markets may suggest a different relationship between reforms and balance of payments constraints than our initial hypothesis. Changes towards the end of the 1980s connected several export- and investment-related issues like the

debt regime and a resurgence of US investment to an improvement of environmental policies and a more cooperative position regarding Amazonia.

These potential restrictions on the balance of payments also had potentially alleviating effects as foreign financing of environmental reforms became available. After Collor's takeover in 1990, both the World Bank and the G-7 countries have funded environmental reform plans with special attention to Amazonia. After the government announced a less hostile attitude to "debt-for-environment-swaps" in June 1990, this debt-reducing opportunity has been included in the agreement on aid with the G-7 (*Gazeta Mercantil*, 11. June 1990:2).

These examples illustrate that the balance of payment constraint had contradictory effects on policies. Generally, the export losses produced by the mentioned political reforms seem much lower than the potential export losses caused by international sanctions against Brazil that could be triggered by a denial to implement reforms and change international positions. An essential point is that foreign funding for the Brazilian environmental sector may be seen as a positive sanction, opening the way both for reforms and alleviation of balance of payments constraints. However, also if the debt restriction is interpreted as more of a positive incentive for reforms, this restriction does not explain why Sarney avoided international financing of reforms while Collor accepted such financing.

b) The international political system approach

In this approach, policy change is seen as a response to incentives and threats produced by the international system against states. Brazil was exposed to both kinds of pressure related to environmental problems in Brazilian Amazonia. The external pressure on the Brazilian state regarding environmental reforms has come from two principal categories of actors in the international system, international organizations like the World Bank, the G-7, and individual countries, principally the US.

The decision to make tropical forests the top issue made by US NGOs in the early 1980s was decisive for the intensity and shape of external pressure. These NGOs focused their criticism on World Bank projects that caused large-scale deforestation like the POLONOROESTE migration project in Rondônia and the Carajás mining project (Arnt & Schwartzman 1992:93-137). Because of this pressure, the World Bank went a long way to force the Brazilian government to obey the "green clauses" in the loan agreements. A climax of NGO pressure on the World Bank came with the negotiations over an energy investment plan for Brazil comprising a series of large dams in Amazonia, the so-called PLANO 2010. The World Bank gave in to the pressure, and in March 1989 negotiations on a loan for the Power Sector Plan were suspended. Early

in 1989, World Bank statements that funding for Amazonian development was to be transferred to poorer countries were published alongside news on other external pressure on the Sarney government, clearly demonstrating the growth of linkages between the environment and issues essential for growth and investment in Brazil (*O Globo*, 31. March 1989:7).

The pressure from NGOs also provoked bilateral pressure from Brazil's main trading partners and investors. US politicians like senator Al Gore tried to link environmental reforms in Amazonia to a more liberal debt regime and the inflow of fresh investments in the Brazilian economy (*Correio Braziliense*, 18. January 1989:12).

The Collor government was exposed to the same international climate. However, as already indicated in his electionary campaign, Collor responded more in a different way to pressure than there was a change in the international climate itself¹¹. Thus, the international pressure approach is strong in that it focuses on the emergence on a set of very important international sanctions that put the environment and Amazonia on the Brazilian government's agenda. But the approach does not explain the transition from a defensive and cautious environmental programme related to Brazilian Amazonia under Sarney to the offensive and rather progressive programme under Collor.

c) **The bureaucracy-centered approach: the military against IBAMA and SEMAM**

There is an extensive literature addressing the role of the Brazilian bureaucracy in recent development efforts in Amazonia (Allen 1992, Hecht & Cockburn 1989). The thoughts of the "grey eminence" behind the military governments, general Golbery do Couto e Silva, provide a set of basic geopolitically inspired arguments and plans for the settlement of Amazonia (Allen 1992). This ideological commitment inspired the creation of SUDAM¹² in 1966, a body responsible for the economic development of Amazonia mainly through its administration of fiscal incentives for ranching, agriculture and industry. During the 1980s, the capacity and legitimacy of SUDAM was undermined as funding for subsidies distributed by this body dried out and criticism against a very liberal policy of subsidy approval soared (Yokomizo & Gasquez 1986). This implied that demands for reforms increased in a period marked by great difficulties for SUDAM.

A more important bureaucratic organization influencing environmental policies during the Sarney government was the inheritor of the National Security Council, the Secretariat for the Assessment of National Defense (SADEN/PR). General Rubens Bayma Denys was leader of SADEN/PR as well as Secretary of State under the Sarney government. Denys and SADEN/PR were responsible for the Calha Norte programme which was implemented to increase the presence

of military and civilian authorities in Brazil's northern border regions (Allen 1992). Denys was also the top coordinator of "Nossa Natureza". As we have seen, one of the weaknesses of this programme was the failure to address the indigenous problem adequately. The Yanomani territory was perceived as a security risk and consequently the military supported the placer-miners that invaded the reservation¹³. Also for Brazil's international position, the military expressed much resistance to the idea of including Amazonia in international agreements in fear of giving away sovereignty over the region. In the Collor government, the military ministers were main opponents of reforming policies in Amazonia¹⁴. ADESG, a diplomatic affiliation of the war college ESG joined in the campaign against environmental reforms with their support to the campaign against the "internationalization of Amazonia" in 1991 (*Folha de São Paulo*, 25. July 1991:A-12). So did also the military institutions *Escola de Comando e Estado Maior do Exército* (ECEME) and *Centro Brasileiro de Estudos Estratégicos* (CEBRES) by hosting a seminar on the external threat to Amazonia in October 1991 in which high-ranking officers as well as regional politicians as Gilberto Mestrinho and Atila Lins participated (*O Globo*, 14. October 1991:7).

Equally important, Couto e Silva's geopolitical vision of Amazonia may have penetrated the Brazilian bureaucracy in a more general way as lots of technocrats and government advisers have participated in ESG's courses in "politics and strategy" (*Folha de São Paulo*, 25. July 1991: A-12).

The military's political influence on environmental policy-making decreased considerably under Collor. In the first place, the centrality of SADEN/PR (under Collor: SAE/PR) in the coordination of policies decreased. Environmental policies were instead taken more directly into governmental discussions, where proponents of reforms as Lutzenberger (secretary of the environment) and Goldemberg (Secretary for Science and Technology, later Minister of Science and Education, and after March 1992 also Secretary for the Environment) were able to influence Collor often at the expense of the military ministers¹⁵. The waning influence of the military on government decisions is also indicated by the military's participation in media campaigns against reforms of international positions and indigenous policies in this period. Several statements by military leaders were shaped as protests against the government, indicating the alienation of these interests in the Collor government.

Among segments of the bureaucracy resisting the strong and development-minded coalition of military and technocratic bodies, before 1989 only the small federal environmental agency SEMA played any role as an environmental opposition. According to Guimarães (1991), it seems very difficult to trace any direct influence on the use of a natural resource like forests as SEMA seems to have worked mostly with narrow issues like urban pollution. Viola (1992)

stresses that SEMA increased its efficiency under the dynamic leadership of Messias Franco 1986-88. In this period, SEMA raised the environmental issue internally in the state apparatus and promoted both internal cooperation and cooperation with the scientific community. However, this impulse should not be overestimated. Though acting more dynamically, SEMA was still quite inefficient due to its peripheral position inside the state apparatus, organizational deficiencies and the Sarney administration's ambiguous attitude to environmental questions (Viola 1992:9)¹⁶.

When it came to the definition of the Brazilian positions in environmental negotiations, the Ministry of External Relations (Itamaraty) seems to have been an important barrier to reforms. In the Brazilian bureaucracy, this ministry is associated with a general outlook quite similar to the geopolitical outlook of the military¹⁷. Though Brazil's positions were defined in groups including NGO representatives, Itamaraty's interpretation of the mandate given by these groups seems to have been in favor of more defensive positions¹⁸. Goldemberg, who participated in the groups that defined Brazil's international positions in the preparations for the UNCED conference and was actively involved in the shaping of Brazil's official positions, describes the ministry's role in the negotiations like this: "(...) Itamaraty was always defensive and at one point they were ordered to follow instructions on the Climate Convention and take less confrontational attitudes to the industrialized countries¹⁹."

The institutional newcomers IBAMA (1989) and SEMAM²⁰ (1990) undoubtedly increased the influence of pro-environmental forces in the bureaucracy. For Amazonia, a presidential decree on SUDAM fiscal incentives in 1991 implied that IBAMA and SEMAM had to approve projects supported by SUDAM before implementation. The establishment of SEMAM also implied that environmental questions for the first time were raised to the level of government. This involved for example the participation of SEMAM as a voice of environmental concerns on line with other secretariats and ministries in the working group on the agro-ecological zoning of Amazonia established by Collor in 1990. Also the federal Indian authority FUNAI became important as a voice for reform when the career Indianist Sidney Possuelo was appointed as president of the body in 1991. Possuelo was well connected to the segment of the NGO movement that campaigned for increased protection of the Indians. He launched a much more aggressive policy of definition and demarcation of areas for indigenous populations, backed up by president Collor and the Minister of Justice, Jarbas Passarinho²¹. Possuelo's cooperation with Collor was remarkably intensive, given the peripheral position of FUNAI in the bureaucracy²².

On the other hand, reforms seem to have rested very much on the personal initiative of government members and the president, and not on the environmental bureaucracy. It is difficult to see any signs of SEMAM or

IBAMA becoming bureaucratic segments of high importance for general coordination and the introduction of new issues into environmental policies in this period. The federal deputy Fabio Feldman points to the failure to construct a strong and adequate environmental bureaucracy making these questions less vulnerable to political conjunctures as one of the most far-reaching failures of the Collor government²³.

To summarize, the influence of the military segment over environmental policies seems to be quite important in the explanation of differences in environmental policies between Sarney and Collor. The influence of the military on environmental policies decreased under Collor, facilitating less defensive international positions and a more reform-minded stance in indigenous policies. On the other hand, reforms do not seem to have been a consequence of a major increase of the strength of the environmental bureaucracy or weakening of the military bureaucracy. Rather, the change of indigenous policies and international positions seems to have been a consequence of initiatives from persons within the government, and especially the president himself.

d) Societal impacts: Professional NGOs against regional interests

While environmental protests were perceived as subversive by the military governments and confined to scattered protests in urban polluted areas, the democratization of Brazil seems to have facilitated a rapid increase of new and professional NGOs critical to the government's policies. Important NGOs created after the democratization were the São Paulo based *SOS Mata Atlantica* and the Brasília based *FUNATURA*.

Also the business community has responded, most importantly through a new organization called the *Brazilian Foundation for Sustainable Development* established in 1991. This new business NGO organizes large companies like Petrobrás, Aracruz, Jari, Shell and Varig, trying to change their policies in a green direction and differ significantly in outlook from business interests in ranching and logging in Amazonia which seem to resist reforms at any cost.

A third source of civil society drives for reforms has been the "green congressional block" established by the *paulista* deputy Fabio Feldman (PSDB) in 1987. This block managed to include several environmental clauses in the 1988 constitution.

There is, however, scant evidence that these civil society organizations had any major impact on the *initiation* of reforms under Collor. With Collor's austerity program, the financial basis of NGOs was undermined as they were partially dependent on various kinds of government funding and tax incentives. Such funding was more generous under Sarney²⁴. Lutzenberger's eccentric style in the government of SEMAM seems to have contributed to the lack of NGO influence²⁵. Some of the IBAMA presidents, most notably Edouardo de Souza

Martins (1991-92), who was also adjunct secretary of SEMAM, had an extensive informal dialogue with the NGO movement²⁶. Of course, also the choice of Maria Tereza Jorge Padua, leader of FUNATURA, as president of IBAMA during a few months in 1992 demonstrated a willingness to involve NGO representatives in decision-making. But none of these NGO representatives were involved in Collor's initial decision to change Brazilian policies related to Amazonia. Rather, they were appointed as leaders of the environmental bureaucracy as *instruments* of change. Neither were Brazilian environmental NGOs powerful as a political force that had to be taken into account by the Brazilian government. Environmental issues ranked quite low on the political agenda during the run-up to the presidential elections in 1989, and most of the Brazilian environmental NGOs focused on Amazonian environmental affairs are elite organizations with a rather small number of members and weak ties to political parties (Hurrell 1992, Arnt & Schwartzman 1992).

When it comes to societal actors *resisting* environmental reforms, there was a difference not so much in the organizational strength and political basis of these actors as a difference in *access* to the Sarney and Collor governments. Most prominent among societal actors resisting reforms were networks of regional economic and political interests based in forest-rich states both inside and outside Amazonia. These interests considered increased enforcement of environmental rules and increases of protection areas as threats to existing and planned investments in logging, ranching and mining.

These interests were well integrated in environmental decision-making under Sarney as politicians of the North were consulted in the shaping of the overall direction of Sarney's "Nossa Natureza" environmental plan for Amazonia²⁷, while NGOs seem to have been excluded. This influence was very clear in the case of the miner invasion into the Yanomani territory in 1989. Together with military interests, the miners and other business interests enjoyed easy access to decision-making; contributing to the government's denial to obey the federal court that judged the invasion illegal (Monbiot 1991:97).

This pattern of elite influence was broken under Collor. Progressive ministers like Goldemberg and Lutzenberger seem to have enjoyed relatively good access to Collor at the expense of military ministers and representatives from the Amazon region²⁸. This increase of government independence of vested interests provoked a political counteroffensive based among deputies, senators and governors from states with a large forest estate, mainly the Amazonian states, but also to some extent from the forest-rich state of Santa Catarina in the South.

The offensive was especially motivated by the increases of ecological inspection in forest areas by IBAMA and the establishment of new indigenous

reserves. Several politicians and their clients had their interests threatened by these reforms.

Politically, arguments against reforms in Amazonia tended to concentrate on security issues rather than the environment. The proponents of environmental reform were accused of deception and willingness to internationalize Amazonia²⁹. These accusations were promoted both by regional politicians like Gilberto Mestrinho, the governor of Amazonas, and military bureaucrats like the commander of the general staff of Amazonia, Thaumaturgo Sotero Vaz.

The political elite of Amazonia was also active in attempts to influence IBAMA decisions in environmental regulation and inspection. In interviews, two of the IBAMA presidents in the Collor period, Munhoz and Martins, and one very high-ranking official serving at IBAMA in 1992, identified a regional political elite very active in asking for political favors to themselves and their political clients. This was favors like the cancellation of fines, licenses for environmentally dubious projects and the appointment of easily controlled political clients in positions as IBAMA state superintendents. The most active among these seem to have been the governor of Amazonas, Gilberto Mestrinho³⁰, senator Jorge Bornhausen from Santa Catarina³¹, and senator Carlos de Carli³² from the state of Amazonas. The activity of other politicians like Jader Barbalho³³, Aluizio Bezerra³⁴ and João Maia³⁵, seems to support the view that this pressure was a common phenomenon among politicians from Amazonia and Santa Catarina³⁶.

Especially Martins and the other high-standing IBAMA source stressed that this pressure was a big problem as it occupied much time. On the whole, they seem to have been able to resist it. Newspapers brought reports on Munhoz' stubborn resistance to cancel fines for deputies and their clients and Bornhausen's attacks on José Goldemberg for Maria Tereza Jorge Padua's appointments at IBAMA³⁷.

Amazonian politicians were involved in the dismissal of Tania Munhoz from the position as president of IBAMA in 1991³⁸. Bornhausen used his position as Secretary of State to push for the firing of Lutzenberger³⁹.

Politicians from Amazonia involved in the pressure against IBAMA and SEMAM also participated in a major media campaign against environmental reforms as well as against the most important proponents of reforms at IBAMA and in government. Gilberto Mestrinho, the governor of Amazonas, was very active against the reforms of the Collor government. He was also central in the campaign against the "internationalization" of Amazonia as well as in efforts to establish a separate, liberal law for commercial activity in Amazonia (*Folha de São Paulo*, 25. July 1991:A-12, *Jornal do Brasil*, 17. July 1991:13). Senator Carlos de Carli attacked Lutzenberger on several occasions and blamed him for corruption⁴⁰. Aluizio Bezerra attacked Lutzenberger heavily for resisting the

construction of a road from Acre to Peru, linking Western Amazonia to Pacific ports (*Jornal do Brasil*, 3. May 1990). A special congressional investigation (CPI) on the "internationalization" of Amazonia in 1991 was led by Atila Lins, deputy from Amazonas. The CPI was widely supported among Amazonian politicians. Among the proposals of the CPI were the reduction of indigenous territories, limitations on IBAMA's surveillance and inspection activities in the region, the creation of new investment funds and the revitalization of the Calha Norte military border protection project (*Jornal do Brasil*, 29. November 1991:4). During the investigation, the special committee also demanded the dismissal of Munhoz and Lutzenberger (*Folha de São Paulo*, 10. September 1991:A-14).

Decisions like the firing of Lutzenberger and Munhoz, were consequences of the increasing impact of this coalition of Amazonian politicians as Collor's political programme lost congressional support⁴¹. However, this coalition was not able to influence the Collor government to the same extent as they had influenced the Sarney government. A clear indication of this was the fact that Collor resisted their pressure when giving the final recognition of the Yanomani-territory as exclusively belonging to the Yanomami tribe in November 1991, at a time when the pressure of regional politicians was at an all-time high⁴². Neither should the dismissal of Lutzenberger and Munhoz be seen as full victories for these interests as they were replaced by competent and dedicated persons like Goldemberg, Martins and Padua.

To summarize, the access of NGOs to government, which is a variable in the societal approach on which a high score should be expected to increased the pace and range of environmental reforms, was not high neither under Sarney nor under Collor. On the other hand, there are clear differences on the other societal variable in focus, the degree of access of regional interests to decision-making. High scores on this variable should be expected to impede reforms. Under Sarney, regional politicians were included in decision-making on environmental reforms to a degree that made them able to shape indigenous policies and become a strong supporter of the government's resistance to change its international positions. Under Collor, these interests were excluded along with military interests. The outcome was political fights in the media, in Congress, and attempts by Amazonian political interests to obstruct the operations of IBAMA and the federal Indian authority FUNAI.

However, as NGOs remained weak and regional interests remained strong, the societal approach does not provide a good explanation of the contrast between Sarney and Collor. Rather, our findings about the force of the anti-environmentalist opposition compels us to ask the question: Why was Collor willing to pay the considerable political costs involved in keeping reforms on the track?

e) Explanations focusing on domestic-international interactions

A common problem linked to all the four explanations a-d is that they focus exclusively on the government and the executive as respondents to external or internal economic or political constraints and pressure. This is exactly what Moravcsik (1993:15) points to as a major deficiency connected both to international and domestic political theories. Both sets of theories "remove real initiative and discretion from the chief executive" (Moravcsik 1993:15). A second problem is that all the examined explanations seem to treat the national and international levels as separate dimensions. In highly "internationalized" issue areas like domestic environmental policies in Amazonia, executives and governments act simultaneously in an international and a national context. The general proposition that the strategies of governments and executives may be analysed as simultaneously being played out at the national and international level was put forward by Putnam (1988) through his "two-level metaphor". Later, Putnam's thesis has been applied to several case studies (Evans et. al. 1993).

Now, if we accept this two-dimensional criticism of international and domestic theories, how may this help us to reach a more adequate understanding of the Sarney-Collor contrast? First, the criticism is an invitation to focus on the general political strategies of the two executives in question. Sarney, a close associate to the military regime, inherited many of its chief considerations and was strongly influenced by his military collaborator Rubens Bayma Denys in questions related to Amazonia. This included a strong concern for national security that involved both economic self-sufficiency and territorial integrity. For Amazonia, Allen (1992) has demonstrated convincingly how the ideas of the *eminence gris* of the military regime general Golbery do Couto e Silva guided Sarney's perceptions of the issue of environmental problems. International worries over Amazonia's importance for global environmental problems were understood as challenges to Brazilian sovereignty over the region. This interpretation of the targets of international pressure was especially visible in the debate over international cooperation and indigenous reservations. Cooperation was understood as territorial claims in disguise. At the same time, in military strategy, Amazonia's vast natural resources was seen as one of the assets that could make Brazil an economic "world power". Consequently, the intensive international pressure on Brazil in the late 1980s was perceived as an international plot against the country's economic development, as stated by Paulo Tarso, Secretary General of the Ministry of External Affairs in 1989 (Hurrell 1992:405). This is a main explanation for the fact that Brazil refused attempts by European and US politicians to link environmental reforms to economic sanctions like improvements of the debt regime or increased foreign investment. Such issue-linking, as Evans (1993) points out, is less likely to

succeed as a strategy over issues related to security. And this was exactly what happened in relation to Amazonia under Sarney. As stated by Sarney, there was not enough money in the world to buy even a square meter of Amazonia.

Under Collor, the perception of Amazonia was changed. The core of Collor's economic programme was a drive for privatization and trade liberalization. Privatization and opening of the Brazilian economy was to be complemented by increases in foreign investment and an improved relationship to the industrialized world. An improved relationship to the industrialized world implied the improvement of environmental policies in Amazonia and a more positive attitude to international cooperation. This is clearly expressed in the document on environmental problems that was published by Collor between the first and second round of the 1989 elections (Collor 1989:4, my translation from Portuguese):

"I am conscious that if Brazil does not confront the environmental question internally and externally, this will make our programmes for economic development and international financing difficult."

The policy changes under Collor was a strong success in international terms. At the Ministry of External Affairs, one could feel external pressure "almost cease to exist".⁴³ The new secretary of the environment, José Lutzenberger, taught his eco-ideology to US politicians (*Jornal do Brasil*, 1. May 1990). The G-7 and the World Bank demonstrated a new willingness to fund environmental projects.

However, Collor's linking of policies in Amazonia to economic benefits soon confronted economic and political barriers. Economically, Collor's draconic austerity measures and reductions of the federal bureaucracy undermined funding and implementation capacity for all state institutions, also IBAMA (Carvalho 1991). Thus, to a certain extent, the economic programme, also impeded reforms. As the austerity programme was partially addressed to deal with the external debt, this barrier to reforms was also to some extent connected to Brazil's status as a dependent economy. Politically, as we have seen, there was a strong counter-offensive from the military and the economic and political elites in the Amazon region against reforms. The increases of environmental monitoring and surveillance and the more protective attitude to the Indian population implied threats to the profits of ranchers, miners and the region's nascent logging industry. The indigenous issue and the foreign policy reforms especially provoked the military bureaucracy, and to some extent also the Ministry of External Affairs itself. Together, this coalition contributed to the isolation of Collor in the Brazilian polity and to the partial crippling of reforms. The dismissal of Lutzenberger as secretary for the environment in early 1992 and the dismissal of Tania Munhoz as IBAMA president late in 1991 were, as

we have seen, concessions to this coalition. In addition, business interests in the region did major attempts to obstruct the activity of IBAMA and FUNAI, and made the positions as IBAMA and FUNAI presidents very uncomfortable. The Ministry of External Affairs managed to "moderate" the progressive attitude of the Collor government to international cooperation considerably during the UNCED negotiations. The environmental bureaucracy and environmental NGOs were not strong enough to launch a counter-offensive against this coalition and bolster Collor's position.

4. Summary and conclusion

On a general theoretical level, our comparison of the environmental policies of Sarney and Collor teaches us that the differences we have analysed are difficult to understand without taking into account the differences in political strategies between the two presidents. Both theories focusing on international and domestic constraints tend to neglect the executive as a strategic actor. Environmental reform in Amazonia was treated in a defensive and cautious way by Sarney as his political strategy was strongly inspired by the military regime's considerations for national security. This strategy was pursued in spite of its considerable international economic costs. This confirms assumptions made by Evans (1993) that national political reforms are less likely to take place through international bargaining if reforms are linked to considerations for national security. Conversely, as Collor perceived reforms in Amazonia as preconditions for his economic programme, Collor was much more positive to international bargaining. By perceiving reforms as economic assets, and not as risks for national security, Collor was open to exchange reforms against better connections with industrial countries and access to fresh international funds.

However, our comparison also indicates that executives pursue their strategies under considerable domestic and international strain. Sarney's political strategy led to the international alienation of Brazil in the international community. Conversely, the change to a more progressive environmental policy related to Amazonia under Collor was politically costly as it provoked strong resistance from a coalition of vested interests consisting of branches of the military and regional economic elites, as well as the Ministry of External Affairs. These survivors of the military regime were strong enough to outbalance the pro-environmental segments of the Brazilian bureaucracy and civil society, and to impede reforms by threatening to isolate Collor politically. The frequent attempts of business groups and politicians to curb the capacity of IBAMA and FUNAI through illegal, clientelist measures also reminds us that Third World leaders face special problems when trying to implement domestic reforms. And

it reminds us, as pointed out by Hagopian (1994), that clientelism is still a commonly used strategy for influencing the Brazilian bureaucracy.

Notes

1. Thanks to Bent Tranøy, Eduardo Viola, Andrew Hurrell as well as Ibero-Americana's anonymous referee for comments to earlier versions of this article. Thanks to Luiz Pedone and Donald Sawyer for field work assistance, and to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs for field work financing.
2. IBAMA is the Brazilian Institute for the Environment and Renewable Resources. It was established by President José Sarney in 1989 as a regulatory and consultative body under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Under Collor, it was institutionally redefined as the executive arm of the Secretariat of the Environment (SEMAM).
3. According to Dr. Luis Alberto Vieira Dias at the Brazilian Space Agency INPE, "Operation Amazonia" used an improved methodology. In PEAL, weather satellites (NOAA) for fire detection were used, while "Operation Amazonia used much better images from the land monitoring satellite LANDSAT. Personal communication March 1995.
4. Interview with former IBAMA leader Tania Munhoz November 1990. On the improvement of the collection of fines, see *Jornal do Brasil*, 11. October 1990:12.
5. Jarbas Passarinho, senator from Pará, concluded in interview that there had been a change and that the implementation of rules became stiffer from 1990. See also the discussion later on in this paper regarding the opposition against "Operation Amazonia". Dr. Luis Alberto Vieira Dias at INPE emphasizes that even though funding for "Operation Amazonia" was far from sufficient, the programme represented a strong improvement compared to previous years: " - to put ten helicopters available to this program was an unheard effort in Brazil. Previously we had none!"
6. Sources at IBAMA.
7. Examples of this are the company Mineração Taboca, a subsidiary of the Brazilian mining giant Parapanema, and the Jerdau logging company. Mineração Taboca was fined with about USD 1,1 million for its operations in the cassiterite mine at Pitinga in the state of Amazonas (*Jornal do Brasil*, 11 October 1990:12). The company had been infamous for years because of its unpunished ecological disturbances of the Waimiri Atroara Indian reserve close to the mine (Fearnside 1990:210). One should have in mind that financial obstacles in 1992 became a serious threat to Operation Amazonia as funding for air surveillance dried out. See *Correio Braziliense* 24. May 1992:18. The state superintendent of IBAMA in Pará, Reginaldo Anaisse, complained that funding for air surveillance had decreased to a very low level in 1992 (own interview November this year).
8. Interview with Márcio Santilli, NDI (Núcleo de Direitos Indígenas) November 1993. Interview with Sidney Possuelo, head of the federal Indian authority FUNAI 1991-93 in July 1994.

9. The following statement from the Minister of the Interior, João Alves and IBAMA's first president, Fernando Mesquita, during a visit to Amazonia in February 1989 is typical for the Sarney government's position (my translation from Portuguese): "(-) the Brazilians do not permit the improper interference of strangers in the preservation of the ecology of Amazonia and consider this as an offense to our sovereignty. "Exército não permita ingerência na Amazônia", *Correio Braziliense* 10. February 1989:9.
10. In fact, the current account balance deteriorated from a surplus of about 4 billions USD in 1988 to a deficit of about 3 billions USD in 1990 and 1991, see World Bank 1993:42.
11. Between the first and second rounds of the 1989 presidential election, Collor issued a planning document (Collor 1989) written by the Brazilian environmentalist Helio Setti. The document includes most of the policy changes implemented by the Collor government. Collor's motivation for change was undoubtedly enhanced during his pre-inauguration visit to the US, Europe and Japan in 1990, when he was confronted with demonstrations from western environmentalists.
12. Superintendencia de Valorização da Amazonia.
13. See the articles: "Forças Armadas rejeitam Estado Ianomami", *Correio Braziliense*, 14. July 1991:8, "Mestrinho diz que faria guerra pela região", *Folha de São Paulo*, 25. July 1991:A-12.
14. Own interview with former Secretary of the Environment, José Goldemberg November 1992.
15. Own interview with Goldemberg, November 1992.
16. Messias Franco quitted in 1988 because the Minister for Social Questions, Prisco Viana, refused to sign a CONAMA decision prohibiting the use of mercury in mining in Amazonia, see the article "Secretário do Meio Ambiente pede demissão e faz crítica a ministro", *Folha de São Paulo*, 20. September 1988:2. More generally, Franco justified his quest for dismissal by pointing to the lack of political will to deal with the environment in a serious way (Guimarães 1991:200), even though Franco had managed to increase activity in CONAMA substantially from his position as executive secretary for the body. Two years before, the former leader of SEMA, Paulo Nogueira Neto, had quitted as head of SEMA for the same reasons as Franco (Guimarães 1991:200).
17. Itamaraty has since the 1970s increasingly perceived global relations in terms of North-South confrontations. In addition, the ministry has interacted intimately with the military over Amazonian issues, see Miyamoto 1989.
18. Own interviews with top-level staff of the NGOs FUNATURA and FBCN in November 1993.
19. Personal communication with Goldemberg January 1993. Confirmed by interviews with the staff of the Brazilian environmental NGOs FUNATURA and FBCN.
20. Secretaria do Meio Ambiente. Closed down and recreated as the Ministry of Environment under Itamar Franco.

21. Own interview with Sidney Possuelo July 1994. The inclusion of the old military politician and colonel Jarbas Passarinho as a supporter of the Brazilian Indians is highly interesting. Passarinho participated in a special congressional investigation regarding the definition of Indian rights in the Constituent Assembly. The investigation was arranged by politicians from the Amazon region who accused the supporters of the Indians of threatening national security. The representatives of the Amazon region acted on behalf of the military and mining interests. The Brazilian mining company ParanaPanema is said to have orchestrated the media campaign in the conservative newspaper "O Estado do São Paulo" that blamed pro-Indian deputies for being strawmen for foreign mining companies. Allegedly, this was to avoid the prohibition of mining on the land of indigenous populations. During this investigation, Passarinho turned from skepticism to sympathy for the cause of the indigenous populations on the background of this investigation, in which he rejected all accusations against the pro-Indian deputies. After this, Passarinho became a driving force behind the recognition of the rights of the Indians in the constitutional assembly. As a highly respected conservative politician from Amazonia, he was indispensable as a partner for the supporters of Indian rights. The source of this information is Marcio Santilli, leader of the pro-Indian NGO NDI, in own interview, November 1993. Possuelo stated in my interview with him in August 1994 the following: "Jarbas Passarinho was always in favour of the indigenous peoples".
22. Possuelo had personal meetings with Collor more often than once a month where questions related to FUNAI and indigenous populations were discussed. Own interview with Possuelo July 1994.
23. Interview with Fabio Feldman, federal deputy from São Paulo for PSDB, November 1992.
24. Interview with Maria Tereza Jorge Padua, president of FUNATURA and former president of IBAMA, November 1992.
25. According to Fabio Feldman, the Secretary of Science and Technology and later Minister of Science and Education José Goldemberg was a much more useful channel of NGO influence regarding environmental policies than Lutzenberger.
26. Staff at the environmental NGO FBCN told how various environmental activists were invited to the home of Martins to discuss environmental matters in an informal atmosphere. One of the matters addressed by these discussions was the selection of geographical priority areas for environmental monitoring. Own interviews with Edouardo de Souza Martins November 1993 and Ana Maria Fonseca (FBCN) November/December 1993.
27. *Estado de São Paulo*, 30. March 1989:A-17. The governors of the states of Amazonas and Pará, Gilberto Mestrinho and Jader Barbalho, participated in such meetings. Mestrinho has shares in mining enterprises in Amazonas, while Barbalho owns large ranches in Pará. Personal communication with former federal deputy Marcio Santilli in February 1995, see also Fleischer 1991.
28. Interview with Goldemberg in November 1992.
29. A good example is the article "Militares temem internacionalização", *O Globo*, 14. October 1991:7.
30. Mentioned by Munhoz and Martins.

31. Mentioned by a very high-standing IBAMA source, an anonymous SEMAM adviser as well as Goldemberg.
32. Mentioned by Padua and Martins.
33. Governor of Pará, mentioned by Martins.
34. Senator from Acre, mentioned by Martins.
35. Federal deputy from Acre, mentioned by Martins.
36. Goldemberg indicated in personal communication in January 1993 that also federal deputies from Santa Catarina were active.
37. Maria Tereza Jorge Padua was president of IBAMA for a short period when Goldemberg was Secretary of the Environment in 1992. For Munhoz' resistance, see *Folha de São Paulo*, 3. October 1991:A-10, for Goldemberg, see *Jornal do Brasil*, 4. May 1992:2. Bornhausen's motive for his attack was according to Goldemberg:
" (...) to force Padua to appoint political nominees, which were involved in illegal activities in the past. Some of them were linked to local politicians that favoured deforestation and other commercial interests." Personal communication with Goldemberg, January 1993.
38. *Folha de São Paulo*, 3. October 1991:A-10, own interview with Goldemberg November 1992.
39. *Correio Braziliense*, 23. March 1992:5, interviews with Feldman and an anonymous SEMAM adviser.
40. See for example *Correio Braziliense*, 24. March 1992:5.
41. See for example *Folha de São Paulo*, 3. October 1991:A-10.
42. President of the Brazilian Indian Administration FUNAI 1991-93, Sidney Possuelo, pointed out that all the politicians mentioned by the IBAMA staff above as politicians exerting pressure also were active in attacking him for his involvement in the extension of indigenous reserves. Gilberto Mestrinho and Jader Barbalho demonstrated the highest levels of activity. Own interview with Possuelo in July 1994.
43. Own interview with Ambassador Macedo Soares at the Ministry of External Affairs November 1992.

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