Representations of Resistance

"Safe Zone" by Sachi Stovall. Acrylic Paint and Black Paint Pen on Paper, 2015.

From the artist's statement: "This painting is, in many ways a reflection of myself. [...] As I continue my life journey in finding out who I am, I've realized that I am a true believer in purity and realness. This is the reason why I chose a nude painting. [...] I'm learning to love my soul and not the shell that I am in."

More context from the editor as well as a discussion of this image can be found on p.15.

SPECTRA: The Social, Political, Ethical, and Cultural Theory Archives
Volume 4, Issue 1, September 2015

Representations of Resistance
SPECTRA: The Social Political Ethical, and Cultural Theory Archives
Volume 4, Issue 1, February 2015

202 Major Williams (0192) * Blacksburg, VA 24061
Email: editor@spectrajournal.org * Phone: 540.231.0698 * Fax: 540.231.1134

2015

ISSN 2162-8793

Representations of Resistance
Vol. 4, No. 2, September 2015

4.2.1 – Editors' Introduction

Can resistance be represented? *Should* resistance be represented? Is it not rather the case that resistance – political, economic, cultural, ecological, social – is already represented: exposed and overexposed in the generalized architecture of a mediated warfare for informational value in the precise sense of the term: shock coefficients? As the attention economy's wetwares struggle to keep up with the flattened and DDOS'd traffic jams on the world's data highways, do Cecil the lion and #Shellno become one in the 24/7/365 reality of televised telestasis?

On the other hand, perhaps representation *is* resistance? Do not Sandra Bland and Eric Garner and Natasha McKenna and Trayvon Martin remind us that to resist is to represent oneself, to speak with one's voice, to transmit one's suffering? Yet, to assume so is to assume a very narrow view of representation, too: do body cameras and television cameras speak the neutral truth, or does not the Center for Medical Progress remind us that video footage is as much subject to manipulation as statistical data has always been? #Blacklivesmatter may be more or less close to the root of the problem than #Alllivesmatter, yet both are already apprised and expropriated by the categories in which resistance and suffering and resilience are transposed to the discrete elements the media transfers in various formats. Perhaps this is the price to be paid for breaking down telestasis, if ever so momentarily.

Perhaps, however, it is false to think of this in prices being paid. An uncritical media positivism in which representation engenders resistance may be as ill-advised as the opposite stance that resistance is futile in the age of mediated implosion. Far from retreating to the assumption, once again, that representation is a mere neutral arbiter of truth, one must perhaps nevertheless represent to resist and resist to represent, represent resistance and resist representation. If contemporary lifeworlds are mediated and mediation is the contemporary lifeworld, 24/7/365 representation is perhaps simply an irreducible reality. The notion of representing resistance, an active notion rather than one of passive consumption, may then allow the political to return without short-circuiting it to millenarian immediatism. What is at stake, then, is not so much the representation of resistance in a passive sense of reception, but an active politics of representing resistance.

The authors assembled in this issue of SPECTRA emphasize precisely this active, resilient role of representing resistance. In her title image *Safe Zone* as well as her reflections on her work, Sachi Stovall engages the duality of exposure: visibility as vulnerability goes hand in hand with visibility as empowerment. Representation is resistance; resistance is representation. In her reflection, in turn, Melissa Schwartz reminds us that resistance is always physical as well as emotional, and that mental and intellectual resistance tap into reservoirs they cannot control and whose resilience is beyond the power of words – represented, therefore, in an aesthetics whose resistant quality is at the core of its mode of representation.

SPECTRA is honored to feature in this issue an interview with Dr. Wendy Brown. This interview was conducted by Jordan Laney and Anthony Szczurek in March 2015, prior to Dr. Brown's lecture "Undoing Democracy: Neoliberalism and Political Life" in the Women's Forum at Roanoke College. As global neoliberalism seemingly remains triumphant, it is imperative to represent again and again that its ever-changing and seemingly insurmountable reality meets

equally ever-changing resistance. Within and against practices of neoliberal power, Dr. Brown's critical intervention uncovers "what's invisible or disavowed or unspoken or un-emancipatory in whatever practice or whatever set of powers [Dr. Brown is] looking at."

One such site of which Dr. Brown alerts us is the university itself in its North American as in its global incarnations. In many ways, the university occupies a peculiar place with regard to resistance: nominally devoted to enlightened or even emancipatory thought, it is also focal point of the economization, neoliberalization, and neutralization of knowledge. Moreover, it is a workplace – site of production, site of assessment, to be sure, but also site of cultural resistance. As such, it is perhaps particularly evident here what David Watkins' article *Republicanism at work: strategies for supporting resistance to domination in the workplace* diagnoses for neoliberal and late capitalist workplaces in general: an accelerated omnipresence of "the experience of uncertainty or 'precarity' amongst the workforce." Seen through a republican rather than a classically liberal lens, the inability of individualism to serve as a site of resistance to workplace domination becomes evident here (as in Amiel Bernal's article in this issue). Perhaps, Watkins concludes, more democratically constituted workplaces can serve as sites of resistance to hegemonic projects of accelerated neoliberal exploitation, human capital optimization, and not least the basic physical exhaustion of citizens subjected to increasingly precarious wage labor.

At the often underappreciated physical level, an ethos of exhaustion pervades capitalist society: labor power must be exerted; subjects must be formed and reformed; bodies must be (re)aligned and controlled. The order to which bodies are subjected when they are subjectified as a power laboring to capacity and non-laboring to incapacity is an order of sacrifice: a carnivorous order devouring what comes before it and what is subjected to it. Katherine Young's article *Beastly Politics: Derrida, Animals, and the Political Economy of Meat* reads Derrida and Hobbes, Plato and Machiavelli to show that the teeth devouring animals, animaux and animots are at the core of the body politic. Yet, Young asserts, if carnophallogocentrism is indeed the privileged site of the state administering itself against civil society, the political economy of meat, its workplaces of sacrifices, may become yet another site of resistance to neoliberal statehood.

Asserting, on the other hand, that civil society by itself and left to its own devices in a spectacular charade of libertarian pipe dreams can resist the state, perhaps even by its own means, is equally fallacious. Andrew Barber's *Bitcoin and the philosophy of money: evaluating the commodity status of digital currencies* shows that the hopes attached to Bitcoin and other manifestations of cyberpunk scrips may be premature. To be sure, Bitcoin has the potential to engender cultural solidarity based on the idea of subjecting the state to the Lulz of currency trolls – or, in a more positive light, based on the idea of Temporary Autonomous Zones hoping, one day, to become permanent. Yet, one may conjecture, the trolls in question are already here: the currency markets. Moreover, the state always reasserts itself; in this case, by subjecting Bitcoin to commodity status and tax laws.

Yet, communities of resistance do exist and do thrive in culturally mediated solidarity. What can they do to resist? How can they represent resistance and represent themselves as resistant? In Rachael Kennedy's *Spaces of Suppression, Resistance; Strategies of Cohesion, Momentum*, we encounter the sites and resources of resistance of which Dr. Brown had made us aware in yet another light. Between the burning barricades and shut-down intersections of

what is commonly seen as political activism on the one hand, and the weapons of the weak of everyday resistance on the other hand, this article explores case studies of social movements to show a middle ground. Finding cohesion and momentum, Kennedy maintains, requires as much deliberate strategy as what is commonly said to be resistance: building solidarity, identifying fault lines, and sustaining tactics of emotional allegiance.

This bottom-up labor is not limited to the offline existence of the 'real world.' On the contrary: it often transcends the binary of representation and resistance altogether. Nevertheless, the elements by which representation comes to be constituted as resistance – the platforms and nodes of hacktivist telecommunication – are themselves embedded in social relations which are as conducive to resistance as reproductive to the very fault lines to be resisted. In her article *We are all anonymous: beyond hacktivist stereotypes*, Emma Stamm analyses the two-faced reality of hacktivism. Who is hacking the peer2peer networks' interfaces? Are the interfaces of peers networking with peers all of the same kind? By whom and to what end is 'the hacker' represented? Why are mainstream media depictions exploited for the lulz, and who is laughing when nerd cultures and Gamergates perpetuate casual racism and sexism?

Online or offline, in cultural cohesion or social movement, as digital signature or fleshed-out wetware, as labor power or intellectual entrepreneur, the individual is project and subject, node and focus of representation and appropriation, of reductionism and resistance. Amiel Bernal intervenes in this discourse, arguing that one must see the *Individual as Ideology*: moral praise and blame, individual courage and acquiescence are equally problematic categories when representing the social, political, ethical, and cultural manifestations of resistance. Yet, Bernal also cautions against simply turning one's back to individualism: in the fiercest rejections of individualism, one finds the all too familiar face of individuality reappearing, refusing to vanish like faces drawn on shorelines.

Concluding with a reflection on *Philopoiesis, Resistance, and Resilience*, a version of his remarks made as keynote at the 2015 ASPECT Graduate Conference, Samson Opondo engages a multiplicity of philosophical and literary sources to show sites of resistance in colonial and ethnological representations. Philopoiesis, a zone of indistinction between philosophy and literature – modes of representation, modes of resistance against representation – shows what lurks in the shadows of the margins of Euro-American philosophy and literature: the monster, the hybrid, the arriving stranger, the resilient resistance of never-assimilated remainders in representation and against representation.

Yet, it is time to close this introduction; the authors assembled in this issue need no representation and will rightfully resist representation. The forum is theirs to represent resistance and resist representation.

Blacksburg, August 16th, 2015

Sascha Engel, editor sascha-engel@vt.edu
Jordan Laney, editor-elect jlaney@vt.edu
Anthony Szczurek, editor-elect anthos9@vt.edu
Christian Matheis, editor-emeritus matheisc@vt.edu

4.2.2 An Interview with Wendy Brown

Jordan Laney (jlaney@vt.edu)*, Anthony Szczurek* (anthos9@vt.edu)

*"Undoing Democracy: Neoliberalism and Political Life," was a lecture given by Dr. Wendy Brown, on March 10, 2015 at the Colket Center on the campus of Roanoke College as part of the Women's Forum. The event was sponsored by Phi Beta Kappa Chapter at Roanoke College. The interview was conducted a day prior to the event. Dr. Wendy Brown is the Class of 1936 First Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley.

SPECTRA: We're interested in the process of your book. What brought about this particular work? How did it change in your mind or how did the themes change from when you first started out?

WB: You probably know that I wrote a couple articles on neoliberalism back in the early 2000's and, at that time, what I was trying to do was to get at why neoliberalism wasn't simply a set of market policies, but was doing much more and having a much more dramatic effect socially, culturally and politically than simply producing inequality and opening season for capital. So I became really engaged at that time with Thomas Lemke's transcription of parts of Foucault's recorded *College* lectures on the subject, which hadn't yet been published even in French. Foucault's idea was that neoliberalism is a political rationality, and a form of governmentality, not just a set of economic policies. And even back then I was interested in what it seemed to me neoliberalism as a rationality was doing to democracy. That is, how it wasn't just flooding democracy with corporate money or submitting elections and democratic institutions to corporate power, but how it was actually changing the meanings of the terms. I guess the book came out of a desire to explore that at greater length. Around that time I had also been working on the demolition of public higher education in the US, and of course that's part of neoliberalization: all the ways in which students and faculty get increasingly cast as self-investing bits of human capital. This casting can't be comprised by a notion of a public good. So my work on neoliberalism was also focused on the dismantling of the University of California as a public good, the state's rapid disinvestment in it, and all the ways in which best practices and corporate practices were just—I'm sure you've experienced this Virginia Tech—invading from every portal to transform the institution. I'm sure you know this from the New School too.

SPECTRA: I was there when Bob Kerrey was there.

WB: So yes, you watched the neoliberalization of that institution even while it was imagined as the primary scene of critical theory in the US if not the world, and that contradiction must just have been flaming.

SPECTRA: Yes, and it's still going on.

WB: So I'd say, on the one hand, I came to the book wanting to develop more fully the Foucauldian idea of neoliberalism as a political rationality. On the other hand, I wanted to develop more fully what was happening to democracy—both practices of democracy and our imaginaries of it, radical democracy as well as actually existing liberal democracy. And on a third

hand, my interest really got concretized through the work on higher education. I have a chapter in the book on higher education, but I also look at a couple of other concrete cases neoliberal rationality is transforming what democracy means, not only corroding its institutions. I look closely at *Citizens United*. I look at the neoliberalization of Iraq right after Saddam and the installation of Paul Bremer, who knew nothing about Iraq but a lot about what neoliberalism. Apart from the civil conflict, violence and disaster of failed American state-building in Iraq, I look especially at what happened to agriculture there in the Bremer period.

So those are the three genesi. Books are always a little bit accidental to me. They start one place and end up another place. There's no book I've ever written that hasn't had that migration.

SPECTRA: May I ask when you started conceiving of the book or when you started working on it?

WB: Probably about five years ago.

SPECTRA: Five years is kind of a long time when it comes to something like neoliberalism because it evolves so quickly.

WB: Yes, I kept changing my mind.

SPECTRA: Could you speak more to that?

WB: Two things happened. One, more and more people are writing about neoliberalism all the time so I kept learning new things and shedding previous views. Two, I set out to write about neoliberalism and in the end I had to also write about financialization, and they are not the same thing. So the book's thesis hybridizes them. On the first, every time I turned around, when I thought I was finished with an argument—something new appeared. Right now I'm reading Wolfgang Streeck's work on democracy and neoliberalism and I'm glad I didn't read it right when I was finishing. It's a really good book and I would have happily taken it on board, but it also would have changed some of my arguments. There are two things you can do as the world changes or as you change your mind while you're writing a book. You can go back and rewrite everything or you can just keep kind of patching things in and hope that the cracks don't show too much. I did the latter.

SPECTRA: Going along with reading new texts, and new developments in neoliberalism that are constantly coming into play, what are the concerns, traces, threads that have followed you throughout your career that may not be as obvious?

WB: I just thought of one more thing I want to say that may have been more of what your other question was fishing for. I started this book right in the aftermath 2008, so my thought was really on the crisis, on the bailouts, and everyone I knew was saying: "oh, neoliberalism is dead because it's obviously gone belly up if it's really a bunch of economic practices that have added up to this." And the book was originally animated by a kind of "no, that's not what neoliberalism is." Neoliberalism's a whole rationality, a form of governance and a form of conduct; it's in all our institutions at the micro-tissue level, so it's not over. The book had that animating it at first, but it was also very focused on the austerity measures of 2008, and the

enormous human sacrifice they entailed…the irony of that sacrifice in the face of responsibilizing human capital to take care of itself. So the book was originally called something like "Neoliberalism's Sacrifice" or "Freedom Inverted into Sacrifice," which came to be just the tiniest last chapter, because as I got further away from 2008 and more people were writing about neoliberalization and financialization, it took a different turn. I think also with Thomas Piketty and even Robert Reich and Paul Krugman, the whole idea of austerity is pretty discredited. It may still live in the EU, with a kind of last gasp, but it's pretty discredited and it wasn't discredited when I started the book. Now on to your other question.

I would say the big themes that run through my work are these: I'm always concerned with the powers that are invisible in regimes of governing—whether it's the powers of capital, or the powers of gender, or the powers of identity, or the powers of the psyche, or the powers of neoliberalism, or the powers of de-democratization. I'm not a one-node thinker. When I'm done with a project I don't usually do another project on the same thing, which could seem eclectic but I think what binds together the work is a commitment to a kind of critique that's trying to get at what's invisible or disavowed or unspoken or un-emancipatory in whatever practice or whatever set of powers I'm looking at. So in *States of Injury*, for example, I was very concerned with identity, as were many in the nineties, and I was interested in the powers constituting identity that weren't being acknowledged by those of us who were very engaged in identity politics but also constrained by it. That's really different from neoliberalism, but I am still looking at disavowed powers, disavowed or invisible powers. In my understanding of critique, this is what a critical theorist is trying to bring to the surface so we know where we are, who we are, and what our possibilities are.

SPECTRA: That seems like a very Foucauldian kind of approach. Would you say critical theory in general has turned to this is the kind of approach in the past few decades?

WB: No, I think there are different approaches depending on what you mean by critical theory… you know, there are the Habermasians and I don't think that's how they're thinking. They're doing a different kind of work. I think that some but not all Marxist-inflected critical theory does what I described. About my Foucauldianism—it's there. But I am always thinking between Marx, Foucault, Freud, Nietzsche, and Weber. Those are my five guys. It's not that I don't consult others, it's not that I don't read others, but when I say they're my five guys it's because each one has something the others don't. I cannot think without Weber's theory of rationality since Foucault's is not deep and complex enough for me. I cannot think without Marx's critique of capitalism or his critique of liberalism, but it's insufficient. I can't even imagine being me without Foucault, but Foucault's Nietzsche is a weird Nietzsche, it's a Nietzsche that's almost completely divested of the psyche…which leaves a thin theory of the subject and subjectivity, despite how important Foucault is for all of our contemporary thinking about the subject. Foucault's Nietzsche is about forms of history and genealogy and critiques of progress and mono-logics and all that. And I love that and that's part of how I think, but there is also in Nietzsche—for example, in the *Genealogy of Morals*—so much about the psyche, about the shaping of desire and its reversals…and in turn the shaping of history through this plasticity. You cannot get a theory of bad conscience or self-beratement without this, but this part of Nietzsche does not exist in Foucault, it's gone. He's almost allergic to the whole question produced about the psyche from Nietzsche and of course from Freud. Anyway, I need them all for my work. I need them kind of crashing and bashing, not synthesized. I need them in a kind of drunken cocktail party.

SPECTRA: That would be a fun party.

WB: Well, kind of. Sometimes it's noisy. But about the critical theory question. The thing about critical theory now, at its best: if it's wrenched free from the Habermasian grip, it goes in a lot of directions. It's postcolonial, it's feminist, it's queer, it's Marxist, it's thinking about neoliberalism, settler colonialism, aesthetics, affect, and gender. Critical theory is not just an umbrella term for Left thought; it's the practice of a certain kind of critique. It's not helpful when Foucauldians or Habermasians or Marxists or post-Marxists try to claim it as exclusively belonging to them.

SPECTRA: Are you still interested in questions of the secular and the religious?

WB: Hmm. About five years ago, Saba Mahmood and I co-taught a seminar, which was really fun for us at least, and we are close and we think together about problems. The seminar was on secularism, democracy and violence, but it was really about secularism. Soon after, I wrote a piece about the veil debate in Quebec, where I really tried to bring together my thinking about what's wrong with the way secularism is bandied about today. So that was probably my most concentrated period with the problem. On the other hand, I've been working on and off on a book about Marx and religion for almost a decade—I'll finish it at some point but I keep setting it aside for other things. Secularism and theology make something of an appearance in *Walled States* and also, before that, in the *Regulating Aversion* book on tolerance. So there—I have this ongoing interest. However, I don't have the deep knowledge of religion that needed to be working on this problem and I wasn't that interested in what was being posted on the Immanent Frame,[i] where much of the academic debate about secularism was happening. So, I keep weaving in and out of this problematic, never quite moving into it squarely.

SPECTRA: So we did have a final few questions about something that I think is very exciting, that is, resistance to neoliberalism and the possibilities there. So these turn in that direction. Which ruptures between democratic citizenship and neoliberalism stand out for you today? As neoliberalism becomes the new common sense, what is the danger in us simply acclimating to these ruptures and conflicts?

WB: I need you to clarify something for me. What do you have in mind regarding rifts and conflicts?

SPECTRA: So for example I think you could make the argument that what is happening in Ukraine, the people there are being given one of two choices: join the EU and become a neoliberalized citizen, on one hand, or a citizen of a neo-Tsarist state on the other.

WB: Right, impoverished...

SPECTRA: Greece too...

WB: Okay, yes. And yes we do have these kinds of things happening here too. Have you read Wolfgang Streeck's book?[ii] That's the way he's thinking about, I think, democracy and neoliberalism. Let me give you his thesis, which is more interesting to me at the moment than

my own. Then I'll give you mine. His thesis is that capital couldn't afford democracy anymore, and by democracy he means the welfare state and egalitarian, redistributive-oriented democracy. And for him, neoliberalism was from the beginning a kind of attack on democracy, and a de-democratization that took the form of dismantling the state, responsibilizing individuals, financialization, handing a ton of power to the banks, deregulating finance so that individuals had less and less power but also fewer expectations that there might be equality or that they would be represented, that they are able to be politically represented.

I think that's a really interesting critique. Mine is much different. I'm arguing that the very terms of democracy have themselves been neoliberalized so that liberty comes to have a completely market meaning: equality inverts into the inequality of competition, universality only means that we're all in the market; it doesn't mean anything like Kantian universals or moral justice, and popular sovereignty just vanishes. There's just no coherent concept of popular sovereignty in a neoliberalized democracy because the idea of the demos, the idea of the people having sovereignty together, is beyond the ken of neoliberal reason where everyone is nothing more than a market actor. So my argument is not that neoliberalism attacks representative institutions of democracy, but that it attacks its very semiotics, its meanings and its values. And it also literally disintegrates a demos, a people who would rule for themselves, into so many bits of capital.

So in laying both of those out, I think that we see instances of rebellion against both in Ukraine, in Greece, in Occupy. You know those are three good examples of, "no, we will not simply be reduced to human capital," "no, we will not simply become sovereign debt collateral." In Greece, "we are the cradle of democracy and we insist on having control over our lives, and to have control over our lives means not just endless bailouts; it means debt forgiveness and getting rid of austerity." Not because it's austere, but because it's destroying the ability of a people to run their own lives. In Streeck's perspective, he would see the Ukraine really as the only place where you see this battle, the one you mentioned, where your entry into democracy is going to be neoliberalized from the get-go and hence not be democratic. But you know, I think there are lots of sites of resistance. I think they're often articulated as something other than resistance to neoliberalism. Greece is really the place where you see directly, you really see what EU neoliberal democracy has done in Europe: it makes the rich richer, it makes the poor poorer, and it's going to turn Spain, Italy and Greece into vacation lands for the rich Europeans—they will become its cheap, exploitable Third World, all the while maligned for not being proper First World nations. It's not as explicit with something like Occupy, where you get the language of the 1%, the language of equality. But those moments of "this is what democracy looks like," or moments of protests against things like Citizens United or other ways that corporations and financialization have eviscerated democratic institutions and expectations--I think that was present in Occupy. But Occupy was so concentrated on a discourse of fairness, the 99% vs. the 1% was all about fairness--this is our share, this is what we deserve a piece of. But what you see in Ukraine is more than this. I am not dissing Occupy. I really think it changed the national discourse—it literally transformed what was sayable and doable in national political life—in addition to whatever it did locally. The $15/hour movement is unthinkable without Occupy. Still, there are a number of examples from across the emerging or developing world--examples of battles, skirmishes where the reach for popular control, popular sovereignty, is incited by the IMF hammer of austerity and demands for monocrop economies, things like that. Is that what you were talking about?

SPECTRA: Yes, exactly.

WB: I think resistance has to be something you look for with generosity. By that I mean it may not come out in the form a theorist wants or expects. We have to take what we can get.

SPECTRA: You've written on the university as well. Do you think the university is a space of resistance?

WB: Yes.

SPECTRA: Is it currently?

WB: Yes. We're losing. But maybe we won't always. I mean, look, it's been the battle-ground in England, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, in California and Michigan, Wisconsin, and some really unexpected spaces and places, Germany and Bulgaria, South Africa and Greece. As long as universities don't become completely vocationalized and technicalized, as long as they don't simply become sites producing human capital on the one hand, or the preserve of the elite on the other, they're fraught with the contradiction of being subject to neoliberalism while still being spaces of thought. As long as they're spaces of thought, resistance is possible.

Faculty have been a huge disappointment. When you look at all of these resistance movements in universities, they're mainly student movements, very rarely participated in, let alone led by faculty. Faculty don't need to lead them, but not even participating in them? I think the professoriate was neoliberalized so early that it has largely ceased to be a community within institutions. Instead, it's all about your own career, your own trajectory, your reach for ranking and visibility. I mean, even at the University of California, there have been some fantastic faculty activists, just fantastic, but it's probably a tiny percent of the whole. Most, even if they are miserable about what's happening, they're saying—"students are so hard to teach when they are like this (neoliberalized)" and "I used to be able to get this (staff support)" and "this used to be a place where thinking and learning mattered, now we're just a business." Lament but very little resistance. I don't think that makes it hopeless, I just think that means the students shouldn't count on us.

SPECTRA: So that turns us to the question of—if it's not going to come from the faculty, I don't know how you'd term it—the inspiration or stimulus, whether it has to come then from the students, if it is going to continue. And the question is, will it?

WB: I mean, students in your generation have never been so precarious, you know that. On one hand, that produces a kind of risk aversion and, on the other, maybe a "What the hell? What do we have to lose?" Both responses are prevalent. I'm sure you're struggling with this one all the time. I've seen many students say they have no chances, so why not try and change the world, and there are others who scramble to their conservative careerist corners. I think both responses are to be expected. But, yeah I think it remains with students.

Another problem I think is that students and staff—In the American understanding of "staff," clerical staff—interests are not aligned. Staff is being hit very hard in universities: de-union-

ized, downsized, flexiblized, outsourced, and so forth. And I think students are tempted, understandably, to link these struggles, but I don't think the struggles always link easily. The worker struggle is rather different from the quality of education struggle and the affordability and access struggle. I'm not saying they shouldn't support each other, but worker struggles aren't always aligned with the struggle to maintain the university as a place of creative thinking and learning. I thought I'd just mention this because it's something the anti-privatization movement struggles with all the time at the University of California.

SPECTRA: You saw this with Moral Mondays in North Carolina, where it began with elementary school teachers in the face of massive state cuts, but it grew in interesting ways to include women's rights and other groups. But the struggles are all so different, so it's hard to articulate together.

WB: That makes sense. I think it's really important for lefties to figure out how to have solidarity without identity, how you can support something without saying it's all the same. If it turns out not to be the same, it can be really crushingly disappointing for some people. But it's time for us to get beyond theological politics where all the good is analytically and programatically linked and so is all the bad.

SPECTRA: So a final concern regarding resistance in general, in the world, is resistance primarily today in the face of neoliberalism. Are there differences, would you say, between political resistance versus cultural, social, even economic resistance, for example? The different levels at which you can resist?

WB: We live in an increasingly neoliberal world, but neoliberalism is certainly not the only regime or discourse of power organizing the world today. I'm very suspicious of analyses that try to become total like that. Again, when you try to fit every aspect of gender, sexuality, disability, settler colonialism, and everything else into one analysis, it's a sort of theological thinking, where you replace God with oppression—instead of one Creator and one system, there is one system of oppression. I don't believe in that. That's my secularism. And I think it's bad for the Left to think in this way because it leads to the kind of problem we talked about a minute ago where we are all and only good and they are all evil. So I don't think that all progressive resistance is resistance to neoliberalism. Sure, resistance to settler colonialism in Palestine will encounter neoliberal discourse—right, their security framework is suffused with neoliberal rationality—but I don't think neoliberalism is not at the center of what that resistance looks like. I would say, if we just pick another example, what's happening with the current campaign against sexual assault on campuses, we could find a neoliberal dimension in that but I don't think it's the most important thing. Instead, it's a kind of change in culture on campuses along with a feminist backlash that built up over years in response to the plethora of its contradictions. So I think neoliberalism is a part of the problem, but it's not at the heart of it.

SPECTRA: So resistance has to be able to speak to...

WB: I think it has to identify—you asked me earlier to describe my work and what it has in common with itself—I think it has to identify the particular powers that it's addressing. I also want to say I think there's a difference between resistance and work to transform or appropri-

ate those powers. Resistance is just one political response, not a bad one, but it doesn't always know where it's going. I'm very aware of that in our struggles at the University of California, where we're resisting neoliberalism sometimes without a clue of what needs to go in its place, besides where we were in the past. We say, "we want that back." That's like wanting your childhood back, not a vision for what we do next. I mean sometimes resistance has a vision of what it wants in place of what it is resisting, but sometimes it is just resistance.

4.2.3 – Reimagining Representations and Resistance

Editor's note: The editors of this issue of SPECTRA are pleased to include Sachi Stovall's work **Safe Zone** as its title image. We have long admired Sachi's work and are excited to have an opportunity to share it along with the artist's own reflection on the meaning it expresses for her, as well as a reflection by ASPECT doctoral student Melissa Schwartz on its meaning for the wider theme of this issue of SPECTRA: representing resistance, resisting representation.

1. Title Image
Safe Zone



Acrylic Paint and Black Paint Pen on Paper, 2015.

This painting is, in many ways a reflection of myself. The reason I chose this name is because when I'm surrounded by the moon and the stars I am happiest.. The glow from the moon gives me a feeling that no other physical being could. I feel vulnerable but at the same time empowered.. Looking out at the universe reminds me of how great my creator is. Gazing at the stars reminds me over and over how unique I am because every star is different.. Every star shines in its own light and every star is a different size and is located in its own spot in this universe.. As I continue my life journey in finding out who I am, I've realized that I am a true believer in purity and realness. This is the reason why I chose a nude painting. No, we are not always comfortable with our physical body or what clothes we are wearing but when our journey in this lifetime is up, the soul is what matters the most. I'm learning to love my soul and not the shell that I am in. I used acrylic paint for this painting as well as a black paint pen to create sharper lines. --- Sachi Sovall.

2. How Creative Works Like "Safe Zone" Might 'Redescribe Reality'[i]

Melissa Schwartz, Virginia Tech (meliss1@vt.edu)

"***Since the artist cares in a peculiar way for the phase of experience in which union is achieved, he does not shun moments of resistance and tension. He rather cultivates them, not for their own sake but because of their potentialities, bringing to living consciousness an experience that is unified and total."*** [ii]

When I view "Safe Zone," I see a body filling a dark and shallow compositional plane. The nearly nude female figure flows outward strikingly toward the surface, almost pressing up against the threshold that separates the painted space from the place of the viewer. The moon creates a halo that surrounds the face of the portrait's subject. Her eyes are closed, at first glance seeming to indicate self-contemplation. Ultimately, however, the young woman strikes one as at once suspended in isolation from the cosmos surrounding her—due to partitioning teal curves of color—yet strangely in conversation with it—because of the angle of her head and the moon-glow toward which she turns.

Against this *spiritual* body language of contemplation certain details stand out in contrast: the figure's lips are perfectly painted, her body smooth and shiny, her nails done long and red, her lingerie worn skin-tight. These minutiae suggest possible relationships between the subject and her culture. Does she acquiesce to standards of beauty? Make strained and conscious choices regarding self expression? Or perhaps she feels the necessity to present her body in a certain way in order to exist *comfortably* within her social universe. Considering these possibilities engages some of the intellectual and humanistic questions regarding representation and resistance that the creation and viewing of "Safe Zone" engender. Most pressing is the overarching question of how the function of aesthetic representation exists as an act of resistance.

In refining a perspective on resistance in relation to representation, consider pragmatist philosopher John Dewey's statement regarding art and aesthetics.

> ***With respect to the physical materials that enter into the formation of a work of***

> ***art, every one knows that they must undergo change. Marble must be chipped; pigments must be laid on canvas; words must be put together. It is not so generally recognized that a similar transformation takes place on the side of "inner" materials, images, observations, memories and emotions. They are also progressively re-formed; they, too, must be administered. This modification is the building up of a truly expressive act.***[iii]

This passage reveals a primary element from his perspective that art is a process based on 'objects of concrete experience': material, bodily, mental, and emotional. This mutual process of transformation between the artist's 'inner' materials of experience and the "raw materials" forming works of art (what he calls, "valuable products") corresponds productively to the idea of representation as being related to resistance.[iv] For the individual embodying the process, creating art is a way of finding and refining one's place in the world and one's lived presence. Often this occurs through a type of spontaneity that breaks into the conscious after ripening through time and experience. [v]

Like the artistic process, resistance includes forming new relationships with one's environment and communicating them to another. Inherent to this perspective on art and resistance is the idea that 'opposition and conflict' with one's surroundings, both biological and socio-cultural, invoke a human necessity for "a transformation of them [conflicts] into differentiated aspects of a higher powered and more significant life."[vi] Again quoting Dewey:

> ***Emotion is the conscious sign of a break, actual or impending. The discord is the occasion that induces reflection. Desire for restoration of the union converts mere emotion into interest in objects as conditions of realization of harmony. With the realization, material of reflection is incorporated into objects as their meaning.***[vii]

'Opposition and conflict' suggest resistance, a concept that often seems appealing as providing an intrinsic defense of human dignity through the exercise of a person's (seemingly) autonomous actions. Yet intrinsic to resistance, there is generally some legitimation of whatever the resistor is refusing to accept. Due to the function of complex bio-powers and internalized influences in constituting one's identity, rather than pure agency, the forces at work in artistic processes and relationships are not always direct instances of resistance. Rather, the relationship between representations and resistance is more subtle and mysterious. As Vladimir Nabokov states regarding the art of writing, for instance, "literature is not a dog carrying a message in its teeth."[viii] The significance of artistic processes is that they form a means of making decisions about one's relationship to the world and, possibly, of transforming it by creating moments of openness for both artist and viewer, or audience.

Ultimately, whether or not artist and work react to or even incorporate power-based reality, the mere presence of the working artist and the attempt to foster moments of openness hold the possibility for 'redescribing' and for resisting what is taken for granted as reality through a change in perspective.

Consider philosopher Paul Ricoeur's concept of 'potent metaphor'. The ancient Greek view of metaphor was roughly that it provided a unique means of expressing a comparison through the reductive, nearly exact one-to-one correspondence between the thing-to-be represented

by metaphor and the metaphorical expression itself.[ix] Ricoeur's view surpasses this conception by viewing metaphor "as having a cognitive import of its own" beyond its use as comparative representation. For him, there exists a figurative space, or place of potential to "redescribe reality."[x]

Although metaphor is most often associated with writing, one can apply the idea of 'potent metaphor' to artistic and creative acts through the embodiment of imagination in artistic processes and artifacts. This sense of potency does more than beautify the world or express a prefigured understanding of a chosen motif. It actually reveals new perspectives and associations, some intentional, some subconscious.

Philosopher Jacques Rancière, in fact, views the relationship of artistic endeavors to resistance as a paradoxical (even contradictory), two-fold endeavor: "it [art] resists as a thing that persists in its being; and, second, as people who refuse to remain in their situation." [xi] The art of resistance, therefore, is "a power of autonomy, of self-maintaining," and at the same time "a power of departure and of self-transformation . . . which intervenes to change the very same order that defines its consistency."[xii]

Under Rancière's conception, external pressures, similar to Foucaultian bio-powers , undeniably constitute aspects of an individual's experience. Yet the very nature of producing art undermines the intransigence of these conditions, if only for a moment. To imagine how "forms of 'resistance'" can become dynamic, Rancière looks to Gilles Deleuze on the 'task of art'. Deleuze states: ". . . from colours and sounds, both music and painting similarly extract new harmonies, new plastic or melodic landscapes, and new rhythmic characters that raise them up into earth's song and the cry of men and women: that which constitutes tone, health, becoming, a visual and sonorous bloc . . . a monument . . . it confides . . . the constantly renewed suffering of men and women, their re-created protestations, their constantly resumed struggle." [xiii]

In considering the artist's statement and viewing "Safe Zone," I read its process and very presence as performing artistic functions that reflect on relationships with one's place in the world in a way that corresponds to the conceptualizations of Dewey, of Ricoeur, of Rancière, and of Deleuze regarding the 'task of art'. The artist states: "This painting is, in many ways a reflection of myself." In her relationship to the surroundings, she further states, "I feel vulnerable but at the same time empowered" and also suggests that one cannot choose aspects of one's identity and existence. This lack of full agency forms a basis for the type of tension between artist and environment that Dewey sees as fueling artistic work while mutually transforming the artist and his/her materials.

The reflections on internal nature and outward connection to the greater world in "Safe Zone" correspond to the artist's rationale for painting herself naked. "No, we are not always comfortable with our physical body or what clothes we are wearing but when our journey in this lifetime is up, the soul is what matters the most." These thoughts brought to mind one of various expressions of the body in Indian art, coinciding with historian Naman Ahuja's perspective regarding views of transcendentalism in the art of India. Discussing a predominant perspective on the body in this tradition, Ahuja states that "[t]he self that inheres within the body has a much longer presence than its outer shell." [xiv]

While differences obviously exist between “Safe Zone” and Indian art, they may share some similarity in intention. For example, one motif of Jain imagery, ‘ākāśa-puruṣa’, “the image of the empty cut-out or silhouette of a man encapsulating nothingness” is relatable to “Safe Zone.”[xv] This expression of “bodily ‘absence’,” represents “the ideal liberated being, taking the body itself beyond corporeal form.”[xvi] While the individual/body in “Safe Zone” is not a literally cut out silhouette as in ‘ākāśa-puruṣa’, the teal curves surrounding it and the artist’s emphasis on exceeding the life of the body resonate with transcendence.

> ***The rhythm of loss of integration with environment and recovery of union not only persists in man but becomes conscious with him; its conditions are material out of which he forms purposes.[xvii] Because the actual world, that in which we live, is a combination of movement and culmination, of breaks and re-unions, the experience of a living creature is capable of esthetic quality.[xviii]***

For Dewey, unique experiences and environments provide a ground for artistic production.[xix] Ricoeur sees the space provided by the creativity of metaphor as “potentially giv[ing] rise to a new conception of reality.”[xx] Rancière and Deleuze view the self-maintaining and transformation of artistic production as a means of renewing and expressing human struggles. Whether quotidian, or critical, artistic processes, therefore, are performances of survival that form the core and the inspiration for aesthetic expression, and often, for the most productive sense of resistance.

Perhaps the juxtaposition of transcendence to the particular characteristics that mark the subject’s body (the long nails, lingerie, etc.) in “Safe Zone,” form an intersection that highlights the possibilities of art and resistance. The work appears to embody Rancière’s sense of ‘persisting in its being’ (albeit a transcendent one) more than an outright ‘refusal’ of the artist to remain in her situation. One thing of which I am certain, successive works by the creator of “Safe Zone” will embody new expressions of presence, of resistance, and of transformation.

Works Cited

Ahuja, Naman P. 2013. *The Body in Indian Art and Thought*. Edited by Belinder Dhanoa. Europalia International: Brussels. Ludion: Antwerp.

Balina, Marina; Goscilo, Helena; and Lipovetsky, Mark, Editors. 2005. *Politicizing Magic: An Anthology of Russian and Soviet Fairy Tales.* Northwestern University Press: Evanston, Illinois.

Dewey, John. 1934. *Art as Experience.* Penguin Group: New York.

Englund, Axel. 2012. *Still Songs: Music In and Around the Poetry of Paul Celan.* Ashgate: England and USA.

Rancière, Jacques. 2010. “The Monument and Its Confidences; or Deleuze and Art’s Capacity of ‘Resistance’” in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics.* Edited and Translated by Steven Corcoran. Continuum International Publishing Group: London and New York.

Notes

---

i The phrase ‘redescribe reality’ comes from a discussion on music and the poetry of Paul Celan in which author, Axel Englund, asserts that Celan strove for a “poetics of a new reality created in writing,” which was actually “a radical version of that which [Paul] Ricoeur ascribes to any potent metaphor, namely the power to redescribe reality.” Axel Englund, *Still Songs:*

Music In and Around the Poetry of Paul Celan, 14-15. England and USA: Ashgate. 2012.
ii John Dewey, *Art as Experience,* 14. New York: Penguin Group. 1934.
iii Id., 77-78.
iv Id., 10.
v Id., 74-75.
vi Id., 13.
vii Id., 16.
viii Marina Balina et al, *Politicizing Magic: An Anthology of Russian and Soviet Fairy Tales, x.* Illinois: Northwestern University Press. 2005.
ix Englund, *Still Song,* 13.
x Id., 15.
xi Jacques Rancière, "The Monument and Its Confidences; or Deleuze and Art's Capacity of 'Resistance'" in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics,* 170. London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group. 2010.
xii Ibid.
xiii Id., 170-171.
xiv Naman P. Ahuja, *The Body in Indian Art and Thought*, 13. 2013.
xv Id., 67.
xvi Id.
xviiDewey, *Art as Experience,* 14.
xviii Id., 16.
xix Dewey, *Art as Experience,* 13.
xx Englund, *Still Songs,* 15.

4.2.4 Republicanism at Work: Strategies for Supporting Resistance to Domination in the Workplace

David Watkins, University of Dayton (djw172@gmail.com)

Abstract: Work, as organized in contemporary workplaces and situated in social and political structures, poses a threat to freedom that has been under-appreciated in political theory, especially liberal political theory. The recent revival of republicanism offers an intriguing alternative-can republicanism do any better, with respect to work and freedom? An examination of the workplace through a republican lens does a better job of helping us make sense of the way work threatens freedom–by exposing us to the threat of domination--and it can generate at least three plausible proposals that might render resistance to domination in the workplace more successful: enhanced exit, workplace constitutionalism, and workplace democracy. But this is here where republican political theory leaves us. In order adjudicate between these strategies, as well as identify positive goals to accompany the avoidance of domination, we must turn to democratic theory, and pay closer attention to how workers, as a distinct subset of the population, pursue the project of enhancing and protecting freedom in the workplace. This examination makes clear that a missing concept in neorepublican theory is resistance--workers seeking non- domination through their own initiatives. Once this modification is made, the relative importance of workplace democracy for securing non-domination becomes clearer.

Keywords: Domination, Freedom, Resistance, Work, Workplace Democracy

Introduction: Freedom, Work and Resistance

How can freedom in the realm of work and the workplace be secured? This question is an important one, given the central and dominant role work plays in the lives of so many people. It has not attracted a great deal of sustained focus in liberal political theory. When liberals have turned to economic matters, they have tended to focus primarily on questions of distribution, rather than the workplace itself. But the workplace today is a place any practical philosophy of freedom must address. This is particularly true in light of the shift toward greater 'flexibility', which has done more to benefit employers than employees and has eroded the potential for collective power to be exercised by employees, thus increasing the experience of uncertainty or 'precarity' amongst the workforce.[iii] In short, there are ample reasons to focus our attention on the problem of freedom at work—what it concretely demands, how it can best be secured, and how threats to it can best be kept at bay. The liberal political tradition is most often associated with robust defenses of freedom, but has little to say about freedom at work. Liberalism, broadly conceived, remains committed to the separation of public and private realms, with the latter being treated as a realm beyond politics. Substantive issues regarding the nature and character of work are largely treated as a question of the private, not public realm; concerns regarding work's meaning and structure are but another "preference in the market."[iv]

While liberalism seems to offer little help to guide us here, the republican tradition provides a promising alternative. The ongoing republican revival in political theory, particularly as formulated by Philip Pettit, is premised on an alternative conception of freedom—freedom as non-domination, as opposed to the more traditional freedom as non-interference.[v] Domination is defined as a capacity to interfere arbitrarily—a power over another that isn't designed to

track their interests. This means that sometimes freedom is threatened without any actual interference at all, but also that some acts of interference—those made to track the interests of the interferee—are no threat to freedom. Domination takes a variety of forms, but the two primary types are important for us here. Freedom can be threatened both by *imperium* (state domination) or *dominium* (domination at the hands of non-state actors, including employers). A republican theory of freedom in the workplace, then, would need to first identify what kinds of configurations of power and authority would constitute domination in the workplace, and then devise a strategy for how to prevent it. This paper will work within the republican tradition on both of these fronts, and at the same time consider the limits of the focus on freedom as non-domination for promoting freedom in the workplace. Drawing on recent republican work on freedom and the workplace, I identify three plausible avenues to pursue non-domination at work, and contemplate what they might offer—alone and together—and how republican theory might direct us to think about choosing between them. I conclude that attention to that last question requires us to move beyond non-domination as the sole value to promote freedom in the workplace. When we pay attention to what workers want, it becomes clear the pursuit of freedom requires admitting other values. A strong candidate for an additional important value for workplace freedom, in light of an empirical examination of what workers want, is non-alienation. While republicanism does more to help us make sense of freedom in the workplace than liberalism, it must transcend its monistic focus on non-domination to realize its full potential in that regard.

The Workplace as a Problem for Republican Freedom

Pettit hopes to show that recasting freedom as non-domination is a conceptually radical move that advances our understanding of freedom in a direction liberals, committed to a conception of freedom as non-interference, are unable or unwilling to go.[vi] As noted above, Pettit's democratic theory is motivated above all by a desire to construct a system in which domination—understood as potential or actual arbitrary interference—is prevented or at least minimized. Pettit is aware that domination can come from the state (*imperium*) but it can also come from a variety of other private or semi-private sources (*dominium*). The harm caused by domination isn't determined by the source—domination by other private actors can inhibit our freedom just as much as domination by the state.[vii] It's important to note here that these two forms of domination look somewhat different, as they rely on slightly different conceptions of arbitrariness.[viii] When an individual, or non-state actor, dominates another, it is because they are in a position of power over another person (or persons), and their capacity to exercise that power is arbitrary with respect to that person's interests. The state's role in protecting us from private domination primarily revolves around the equal protection of the 'basic liberties' and access to the necessary resources to resist domination.[ix] The marker of a person free of private domination, Pettit tells us, is someone who can pass what he has recently called the 'eyeball test': "They can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire."[x] Securing freedom in the workplace would enable employees to be able to pass the eyeball test with respect to their employers and supervisors. Public domination, on the other hand, is secured by correct democratic procedure: we are said to be protected from it when the structure of the state forces it to track the avowable interests of the citizenry. This is said to be the case when the people have an equal say in the authorial function of the state (generating laws) and the editorial, contestatory function of challenging them when they fail to track their interests properly. This ensures that the manner in which the state might choose to limit the threat of domination in the workplace is not itself an arbitrary act of domination over the citizenry as a whole. Whether domination's source is

the state or non-state actors is important in assessing the impact of domination or determining what to do about it. However, as a threat to freedom, the distinction is secondary to the concern that it is, as a matter of fact, dominating toward some person or group of people, which is always a threat to produce an unnecessary and illegitimate reduction in freedom. Pettit's democratic theory is constructed around the goal of balancing the twin threats of *imperium* and *dominium* by creating a state that is likely and capable of crafting policies and strategies that limit the likelihood of conditions of *dominium*, but with power checked (by contestatory procedures) so that it will not devolve into *imperium*.

But how does such a theory help us prevent domination in the workplace? Work's relationship to freedom is a tricky one, and manifests itself in different kinds of potential threats. On the one hand, having the opportunity and capacity to exchange one's labor for wages is an important exercise of freedom, one that has the potential to expand one's options in life considerably, and is in generally understood, at least in American political culture, as a central marker of a free person.[xi] For all but a select wealthy few, if you don't work, you'll probably be dependent on others, and therefore potentially exposed to their arbitrary will to a significantly greater degree than otherwise. Work is the primary source of the provision of resources necessary to not be at the mercy of others, and to have no need to kowtow to them. On the other hand: work itself is a major source of unfreedom. Most workplaces allow very little freedom in a practical sense: very few people are fortunate enough to have much choice in or control over how they spend their working days. In a typical workplace, workers are interfered with regularly at work by people and rules not of their own design, and they have little or no say in the selection of those people and development of those rules. Furthermore, the contribution work makes to freedom also has the potential to make it a source of unfreedom since employees generally need jobs far more than their employer needs them. The lack of a robust exit option for many, if not most, employees is broadly understood by employers and management and increases the possible exposure to the arbitrary will of employers. This has led some to explore the possibility that work and freedom are irreconcilable, and freedom can be found only by moving beyond work, or at least that the requirement that virtually all people must work to obtain a subsistence level of material wealth is unjust.[xii] I will set radical critiques of work of these types aside for now and focus on the prospects for non-domination in a world where work remains, for better or for worse, a central and generally necessary feature of our society. In such a world, work presents a conundrum: it has the potential to contribute significantly to both our freedom and our unfreedom, "simultaneously valued for providing the means for self-realisation and disvalued for being burdensome and compulsory."[xiii] Is it possible to retain work's freedom-enhancing qualities, while downplaying, diminishing, or restricting its freedom-diminishing qualities? And is it possible to develop strategies that maximize the former and minimize the latter?

We might start by thinking negatively about avoiding the threat of domination—that is, having the necessary tools and capabilities to resist it. The concept of resistance gets very little attention in republican political thought, even as it lurks in the background.[xiv] When theorizing how we avoid domination, Pettit's preferred concept is 'insulation.'[xv] We are insulated from domination by laws and norms that protect us from exposure to the wills of others. In the cases of social relationships of unequal power, a category in which Pettit explicitly includes employer/employee, effective insulation requires active enforcement and monitoring of the more powerful actor, to avoid the problem that the law must be "triggered by the weaker party, and the act of triggering them can have costs of its own."[xvi] Insulation from domination is not

an agency concept; it's something society provides for us, rather than something we do. It functions well when designed and administered well. This is markedly different than the concept of resistance. Insulation mechanisms don't so much promote resistance as they remove the need for it in the first place. Particularly given republicanism's historic focus on the active citizen, as well the history of resistance as an important strategy for securing greater freedom in the workplace, republican theory should make room for an account of resistance as an important part of its theory of how non-domination is secured—not as a replacement for insulation but as a supplement to it. One way to describe the difference between freedom and slavery is the capacity to resist the dominating efforts of others. For a slave, who personifies unfreedom, the capacity to effectively resist is virtually non-existent.[xvii] Conditions of freedom promote a relative ease of resistance to domination; indeed, a truly free person's status will deter most would-be resistors such that the available tools of resistance will rarely be necessary. Most of us, however, live somewhere in the middle: we have capacity and tools to resist efforts at domination, however imperfect, and we have some insulation, but not enough to protect us all of the time. In non-ideal conditions, with people freer than slaves but not fully free, both insulation and resistance are necessary. Since it is rare indeed for people to be so free as to have little need for the tools of resistance, the relative quality and quantity of such tools are an important topic for republican political thought.

Moreover, in a world full of hierarchical relationships, the workplace stands out as harboring some particular dangers that highlight the need for resistance and insulation. For many types of hierarchical relationships, domination is a threat when properly functioning, non-dominating hierarchical relationships go astray and become corrupted. A corrupted just hierarchical relationship is one in which the powerful party is abusing her power; extending it beyond the bounds of its recognized and legitimate purpose. Teachers and parents, for example, exercise power over students and children in the service of a particular goal, or goals that are not arbitrary with respect to the interests of the subject. The student may not want to write this particular assigned paper, but the very identity of student suggests the purpose of the hierarchical relationship is learning and skill-building, which Pettit recognizes as non-dominating when functioning more or less as it should. But to what extent is the employer-employee relationship different than those discussed above? Many hierarchical relationships, such as parent-child, doctor-patient, teacher-student, priest-penitent, and so on, are at root developmental in character; the idea that the interests of the subject are central to the relationship is broadly accepted. Should the power be exercised in ways that advance the interests of the powerful actor at the expense of the subject of power, in most cases we would define that as corruption and potential domination. The employer-employee relationship is fundamentally different in this respect. While some employers take a developmental approach to some employees or otherwise concern themselves with their employees' well-being, this is a secondary concern; the employee is only hired because it is deemed to be in the interests of the employer to do so. Insofar as the employer-employee relationship has a core purpose, it is extractive rather than developmental, placing it closer to domination from the start.

This appears to make the employer-employee relationship uniquely worrisome from an anti-domination perspective, and an empirical examination of the ways in which employees are vulnerable to domination would lend further support to this concern. Consider, for example, the right to not be overworked. This is an important right, as even under normal circumstances work takes up a significant portion of one's time. But laws designed to protect this right for many low wage employees are insufficient to prevent massive wage theft by

employers, largely stolen by illegal demands for unpaid extra work from employees.[xviii] For salaried workers, the pressure to work more hours often comes in more subtle forms, but can be just as effective, even as it violates no specific identifiable rule—the widespread assumption that their future career success depends on being perceived as a hard worker.[xix] The psychological dimensions of differences in workplace status can open the door to a variety of forms of abuse and domination, with inadequate insulation and limited available avenues of effective resistance.[xx]

What gives employers such power over employees, often above and beyond what is officially authorized and sanctioned? Economic reasons, of course, are central here: most people need their job a great deal, as losing it courts economic catastrophe. But it's more than that—because jobs are so central to our identity and life, they become central to our identity and routine, making the threat of a loss a significant one, for both economic and social/psychological reasons. Reciprocal need for a specific employee is rare indeed; in virtually all cases a change to the status quo employment arrangement is a greater threat to the well-being of a the employee than employer, given the ubiquity of involuntary unemployment in capitalist economies—even in perfectly competitive markets.[xxi] The development of firm-specific human capital in employees is rational and efficient in economic terms, but it also raises the costs associated with exit, even for employees with generally marketable skills, thus rendering them vulnerable to potential domination.[xxii] Furthermore, because jobs tend to become central to people's lives, taking up a considerable proportion of their available time and energy, they become attached to them for a variety of reasons, above and beyond economic necessity. The psychological and economic dimensions of power in the workplace make the threat of domination particularly acute. Workplace domination should almost certainly be a central worry of republicans. Recently it has been, and three strategies have been suggested by republican theorists to address this threat. The next section introduces these strategies, and the final section offers an assessment of their capacity to do the job, and how they might be supplemented and evaluated.

Pursuing Freedom at Work: Three Republican Strategies

The first of these strategies is workplace constitutionalism (WC). Just as a constitutional order limits and empowers actors in a variety of ways, so too does workplace constitutionalism. Examples of workplace constitutional rules include minimum wage regulation, protection from various forms of discriminatory practices, rules regarding internships and overtime pay, and health and safety regulations, are all clear examples of workplace constitutionalism. The core idea, that a set of rules which have the force of law and are not locally alterable, even by employer-employee agreement, are capable of ordering and restraining power in workplaces such that a number of possible avenues for domination are stifled. Part of the logic of workplace constitutionalism is that a straightforward freedom of contract doesn't recognize the potential danger of domination in a negotiation between two parties of dramatically unequal power.[xxiii] Rules that establish floors—of wages, conditions, safety, and the like—presumably prevent the exploitation of desperate job-seekers, as well as establishing a general habit of non-dominating relations through attendant norms. This is the approach most obviously consistent with Pettit's conception of state power and its role in reducing domination: the state, through law, orders and limits the potential for *dominium* by constraining power relations.

That some version of WC is the primary way republicans should seek non-domination in the

workplace is advocated by a number of republican theorists, including Richard Dagger and Nien-He Hsieh.[xxiv] Dagger follows Pettit in suggesting that the employer-employee relationship will be less likely to contribute to domination if 'at will' employment contracts are prohibited, as such an arrangement opens the door for domination of employees who are, for whatever reason, particularly attached to their present job.[xxv] WC does not require the significant forms of decision-making power associated with workplace democracy, but it may require some formalized consultation and contestation procedures to enhance rule enforcement. For Hsieh, such a regime "constrains the discretion of managerial decision-making and provides institutional guarantees for workers to be able to contest managerial directives" through "legal regulations that proscribe a range of interference that can be visited upon workers in the course of economically productive activity."[xxvi] For advocates of WC, there is a range of discretion in which employer interference with employees is both reasonable and acceptable, and the effective promotion of non-domination involves identifying and codifying that range, using legal prohibitions to constrain interference that falls outside that range.

The second strategy, advocated most forcefully by Robert Taylor, takes inspiration from Pettit's initial formulation of republican freedom as a kind of 'antipower'.[xxvii] Enhanced exit (EE) seeks to promote workplace freedom through a strategy of the destruction of power in the workplace in the hands of both employers and employees. Power can't be destroyed directly, EE advocates argue, through rules that prohibit its illicit exercise for at least two reasons. First, because the functional authority of management to control what the workers do and to make a number of other basic decisions is fundamental to the very nature of a firm; and second, because such rules are inclined to create power that can be worked around or exploited in unexpected and unintended ways. All potential forms of workplace power must be destroyed indirectly, by changes in the environment in which it takes place. The economy must be governed in a way that prohibits monopolistic and monopsonistic power from developing in labor markets, so no employer or group of employees has the power to dictate their terms in an employment contract. Taylor follows other republicans in endorsing a proposal for universal basic income (UBI) as part of this strategy.[xxviii] This tool would obviously lessen the need for a job to survive, thus reducing the likelihood of someone remaining in an abusive and dominating situation out of necessity. Along with a UBI, a "Nordic" style welfare state "which combines flexible labor markets (including ease of hiring and firing), free trade, and bracing competition with high levels of social support in the form of generous welfare benefits and job training" would further protect workers from finding themselves stuck in a job in which they are dominated.[xxix] The rules that would govern Taylor's labor markets would discourage union power, which could be a means to enhance employee power over employers; instead, the welfare state benefits would reduce employer power since the threat of job loss would be less frightening to employees in such an environment. This could, Taylor hopes, promote more stability, as employees (and employers) might both be inclined to make reasonable concessions, since neither side has the capacity to manipulate such negotiations with some non-market-based advantage. With no such power to fall back on—with power itself effectively destroyed in the context of the work relationship—there would be little capacity for a workplace relationship to slip into domination. At its best, this strategy would effectively remove the threat of abusive power by making the conditions of employment fundamentally voluntaristic: employers have little effective power over employees because workers can walk away, and vice-versa. Non-domination, presumably, will emerge from non-coercion, and non-coercion requires neither the employer nor employee needs to remain in

that relationship.

The third and final strategy, workplace democracy (WD), follows what Joshua Cohen influentially labelled the 'parallel case' with respect to the firm and the state. Just as it is through democratic control that renders the idea of a non-dominating state conceivable, so too would democratic control of the firm make the idea of non-domination in the workplace feasible.[xxx] Alex Gourevitch draws our attention to an important and generally overlooked part of the republican tradition—the "labor republicans" of the late 19th century labor movement, who articulated a case for the need to "transform control over productive assets and work activity"[xxxi] in order to achieve non-domination. Drawing on earlier workplace democracy advocates,[xxxii] republicans have good reason to argue compelling reasons to support participatory power in institutions whenever feasible, as this sort of power is a necessary check on potential domination. No set of rules can anticipate the various changes and shifts that might provide new opportunities for domination. Furthermore, there is some evidence that labor-managed firms have a relatively countercyclical character, performing better during recessions,[xxxiii] and in general exhibiting greater stability due in part to a more stable workforce.[xxxiv] These outcomes would seem to potentially contribute to republican goals, as people are more likely to be secure and free from domination (and less vulnerable to forces that might vitiate their resistance to domination) if they are able to remain in the same position for an extended period,[xxxv] offering another potential benefit of pursuing non-domination via WD.

Choosing a Republican Strategy

As I've already observed, Pettit himself has little to say directly about which strategy to pursue. This is, in part, because he tends to focus on the more theoretical structure of republican theory, treating the details as a matter of practical application of his work.[xxxvi] Some of his comments seem to support WC measures, and he's expressed some sympathy for EE, although he suggests that Taylor's argument would be of greater use under "more ideal circumstances."[xxxvii] Pettit's general focus on statist solutions to problems of domination places him perhaps most comfortably in the WC camp. But I will argue in this section that looking for an incomplete economic theory to figure out the proper republican strategy for the pursuit of freedom in the workplace is a strategic error. It is rather through his democratic theory that we might find guidance, although we'll need to make some modifications there. There are many areas of policy in which Pettit's political theory provides little guidance in specific policy questions. One response to such a conundrum might be to simply try all of them, hoping that together they can tame the threat of workplace domination. There are, of course, some fruitful ways to combine these three strategies.[xxxviii] But they are also, in other cases, in clear tension with each other, and times may arise when we must choose one over the other.[xxxix] In the broadest, most general sense, virtually everyone would support some WC rules—it is difficult to imagine, for example, anyone protesting rules that prohibited torture as a form of workplace discipline. But if WC is the central strategy by which we promote non-domination, those rules will necessarily become ever more complex and specific, attempting to deal with a wide variety of potential threats to freedom. This may have the effect of reducing the potential room for WD decision-making, by overly constraining the scope of choices and options a group of workers may have in organizing their own firm. WC may place restrictions on hiring and firing that work against the goal of EE, and WD is likely to lead to more development of firm-specific skills and knowledge as well as attachments and employment protections that also work against EE, and so on. Insofar as these strategies are

likely to conflict with each other, republican theory needs to identify a way to help guide that choice. So while all of these strategies may have something to contribute, their use is potentially limited by the deployment of the other two in a number of concrete ways.

Pettit's theory seems to offer little guidance in prioritizing amongst strategies for workplace non-domination, let alone for choosing auxiliary freedom-enhancing goals for the workplace. But this lack of guidance can be resolved by looking elsewhere in his theory. Instead of trying to derive an economic theory from the neo-republican model, we should look to republicanism's democratic theory. A legitimate republican democratic state, Pettit tells us, must track the avowed interests of the state in two ways. First, it should seek to do so through its authorial, legislative function; when that fails by producing 'false positives,' democracy's second, contestatory dimension should revise the original action. Both of democracy's dimensions, authorial and contestatory/editorial, must track the common avowable interests of the citizenry. The success of these mechanisms in controlling and forcing the state's actions to track that interest explain why the state can ever be non-dominating with respect to the citizenry. So, in light of Pettit's democratic theory, the question of what strategy to pursue or what complementary values to seek in the workplace takes on a different character—we should ask what sort of priority and strategy the workers themselves want.[xl]

With this approach in mind, what might we say about our three contenders? What do workers want? A comprehensive or definitive answer to that question is beyond the scope of this paper, but a preliminary assessment is at least possible. In the early 1970s, in the midst of the process of deindustrialization, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare conducted a major study on the state of working America today.[xli] This study was in part a response to the growing unrest known in the popular media at the time as the 'blue collar blues'—workers frustrated not merely with wages, hours, or more traditional labor concerns, but with their lack of control over a variety of the details of the work itself. An impetus for this report, and a symbol of the politics of the moment, was the labor unrest and eventual strike at the Lordstown, Ohio Chevy plant in 1972. Management was eager to launch a new assembly line model in this plant that was 40 percent faster than workers were accustomed to, but more mechanized and less labor intensive. For years prior to the strike, labor strife had been simmering here, but the unusually young and racially diverse workforce had a different set of "surprisingly non-economistic" complaints and issues than GM management were used to dealing with: "in a majority of cases the fundamental grievance was the petty despotism of the workplace incarnated in the capricious power of the foreman and the inhuman processes of mechanized production lines."[xlii] Ironically, the three-week strike won a number of major concessions for the union, but they were virtually all concessions of the traditional sort, relating to hours, pensions, benefits, and pay.[xliii] However, the new kind of complaints at least briefly got the attention of the US government, as work dissatisfaction and alienation became a significant concern. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare study found significant evidence that the complaints of Lordstown were hardly unique:

What the workers most want, as more than 100 studies in the past 20 years show, is to become masters of their immediate environments and to feel that their work and they themselves are important—the twin ingredients of self-esteem. Workers recognize that some of the dirty jobs can be transformed only into merely tolerable, but the most oppressive features of work are felt to be avoidable: constant supervision and coercion, lack of variety, monotony, meaningless tasks, and isolation. An increasing number of workers want more autonomy in tackling their tasks, greater opportunity for increasing their skills, rewards that

are directly connected to the intrinsic aspects of work, and greater participation in the design of work and the formulation of their tasks.[xliv]

The political agenda set forth in the study never gained much traction, and the ensuing acceleration of de-industrialization the wake of the 1973 oil crisis made the demands associated with it seem inconsequential as the disappearance of the jobs themselves accelerated. Nevertheless, the concern remained—an economist at the time proposed that the practical limit worker alienation placed on the capacity to increase efficiency by increasing the division of labor was a law of economics, expressible as a formal model.[xlv]

If the brief appearance of issues of worker dissatisfaction and alienation didn't remain on the political agenda for long, it's not because the problem went away. One of the most thorough surveys of American workers suggests a significant unmet desire for greater control on the part of workers:

> American workers want more of a say/influence/representation/participation/voice (call it what you will) at the workplace than they now have…because they think it will improve the quality of their working lives….Workers want more cooperative relations with management….and believe that management resistance is the primary reason they do not have the desired level of influence on their workplace.[xlvi]

Workers were more likely to give an essential or very high ranking to the importance of respect from their employers than they were for a living wage or job security.[xlvii] Follow-up research suggests similar conclusions across the Anglosphere countries.[xlviii] The research emphasizes that no single strategy for voice and representation, such as unions or particular workplace democracy schemes or constitutional rules, is likely to be broadly sufficient for meeting the demand for voice, and that satisfying employee demand for voice calls for greater flexibility and innovation in institutional structures to deliver it.[xlix] Furthermore, the more empowerment workers experience, the more enthusiastic they become about acquiring more; few things increase the popularity of workplace democracy than its experience.[l]

Conclusion

The examination of what workers want should help orient and guide our thinking about republican theory of freedom at work. It points us in a few clear directions: first, that WD must have a particularly prominent place in our approach to non-domination in the workplace; and second, that meaningfulness and/or non-alienation should be significant public policy goals; and finally, that measures that enhance WD are likely to enhance the latter goals as well, by virtue of changing one's relationship to the workplace. These findings should not be surprising for republicans. To be a free person in a republican polity is an outcome Pettit has long associated with one's recognized social status. As you will recall, the free person is one who can pass what Pettit calls the 'eyeball test': "they can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the public status, objective and subjective, of being equal, in this regard, with the best."[li] Workplace freedom, in republican terms, requires creating conditions for employees to be able to pass the eyeball test with respect to their employers. It might be the case that even if enhanced exit or constitutional rules frustrated the capacity of management to dominate workers in a variety of ways, there might still remain a sufficiently large gap between the degree of autonomy and power of workers and owners or management might make it unlikely

for the employee to pass the eyeball test in the specific context of the workplace.. While the worst forms of domination may be best prevented by exit or strongly enforced external rules, the kind of social equality often associated with republican political thought requires more than that, and democracy can help provide it.[lii] Fabian Schuppert has considered the demands of social equality in making the argument for non-alienation as a theoretical supplement to non-domination extensively; the examination here arrives at a similar conclusion through a different route.[liii]

To unpack the first conclusion a little more: the centrality of WD makes even more sense when we return to the issue of resistance, and the underappreciated role of resistance in republican theory. The space that resistance might occupy in Pettit's theory is occupied by his conception of insulation. Insulation, usually through norms, laws, and resources, gives us the assurances of protection from interference we need to act as a free person. It is outside of us; a product of our own making but social and political provision. It gives us the capacity to shape our lives in the manner fully free people do. Resistance can be understood as an effort to provide our own substitute for insulation when insulation against at a particular relationship of domination doesn't exist. The empirical evidence about what workers want—and how they go about trying to get it—paints a picture of people who found themselves under an arbitrary power, and who crafted their own set of responses and strategies to achieve greater freedom under that condition. Resistance, in a sense, is a way in which less than fully free people engage in the practice of freedom. In the workplace—and in the modern world in general—that defines most of us for whom full and complete republican freedom will likely always remain out of reach. Pursuing freedom via resistance often leads us beyond the pursuit of just non-domination. The search for meaning and control promotes conditions of non-domination but goes beyond it as well to include non-alienation. The core insight of republicanism's democratic theory—that power must be made to track the interests of those under it—helps us see how a theory that started out about primarily non-domination might come to promote a secondary value as well. When viewed through this lens, it becomes clearer that whatever role WC and EE might play in securing freedom at work, it should probably be secondary to WD. They are both strategies more clearly associated with insulation; providing legal protection against (WC) or a capacity to walk away from (EE) a dominating work environment. But neither are focused on providing tools to change the nature of one's work environment to make it one's own.

How do these policy options promote, enhance, or otherwise make possible resistance? WC offers a single and simple path for resistance—resistance through the threat of state intervention; an invocation of their legal insulation. If the relevant WC rules fail to adequately prevent a particular kind of domination, or if the relevant authorities are unable or unwilling to provide assistance, as is all too often the case, there is little empowerment available to resisters of domination under WC (as is so often the case with wage theft among low wage workers, for example). Under EE, resistance to domination can take place through exit itself, and is also presumably empowered by making the threat of exit sufficiently credible to dissuade would-be dominators. But can the mechanisms of EE successfully make exit a sufficiently credible threat in all cases? As noted earlier, for a variety of reasons that EE can't address, encompassing not just economic but also social, psychological, and identity-based reasons, people are often tied to particular firms and jobs. The path of resistance offered by EE may be ineffective or unattractive in these cases. Under WD, broadly conceived, the resistance strategies can be developed and chosen by the workers themselves. The scope of

the threat of domination at work is sufficiently broad and deep as to make the narrowing of resistance strategies necessitated by the strategies of WC and EE troubling, even if it were not the case that workers themselves seem to have a preference for WD. WD also uniquely provides a mechanism to force the tracking of avowed interests beyond mere non-domination, such as non-alienation. The capacity to collectively choose a path of resistance to domination, as well as the range of possible paths the WD model offers, are important reasons why this path must be part of a republican account of workplace freedom.

This is just the beginning of a republican account of freedom at work. Available models of WD contain a great deal of variation, and the different forms of WD may provide a variety of potential implications for worker empowerment.[liv] These forms may interact in a variety of ways with different efforts to advance freedom as non-domination via WC and EE provisions. While evaluating and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of different specific models of republican approaches to workplace freedom are beyond the scope of this paper, attention to the kind of efforts and demands workers engage in, and the kind of powers they attempt to build and secure for themselves, is a crucial and heretofore largely missing feature of the theorizing the struggle for freedom at work.

Notes

[1] On the issue and problem of precarity see James Chamberlain, “Bending Over Backwards: Flexibility, Freedom and Domination in Contemporary Work,” *Constellations* vol. 22, no. 1 (2015), pp. 94-108; Mika Lavaque-Manty, “Finding Theoretical Concepts in the Real World: The Case of the Precariat,” in B. de Bruin and C. Zurn, editors, *New Waves in Political Philosophy*. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009; Guy Standing, “The Case of the Precariat: From Denizens to Citizens?” *Polity* vol. 44, no. 4 (2012), pp. 588-608.

[ii] Ruth Yeoman, “Conceptualizing Meaningful Work as a Fundamental Human Need,” *Journal of Business Ethics* vol. 125, no. 2 (2014).

[iii] Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

[iv] Ibid, pp. 130-140.

[v] However, Pettit has recently argued that concern about *imperium* ought to be lexically prior to concern about *dominium* as a general matter. See *On The People’s Term: A Republican Theory and Model of Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 24-25; “Justice, Social and Political,” in D. Sobel, P. Vallentyne, and S. Wall, editors, *Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 9-36.

[vi] The structural and epistemic differences between *imperium* and *dominium* have rarely been considered at any length by republican theorists. A welcome exception can be found in Andreas Busen, “Non-domination, Non-normativity, and Neo-republican Politics,” *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* vol. 18, no. 4 (2015), pp. 407-423. I discuss these issues further, highlighting some additional tensions between *imperium* prevention and *dominium* prevention, in “Implementing Freedom as Non-domination: Democracy and the Role of the State,” *Polity,* advance online publication, doi:10.1057/pol.2015.18 (2015).

[vii] Pettit, *On The People’s Terms*, pp. 92-107.

[viii] Ibid, p. 84.

[ix] Judith Shklar identifies working as one half of the traditional markers of free person in American political culture, alongside voting. See Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998).

[x] Recent radical theories looking beyond work include Kathi Weeks, *The Problem with Work: Feminism, Marxism, Antiwork Politics, and Postwork Imaginaries*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), Andre Gorz, *Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Wage-Based Society.* (London: Polity, 1999) and Ruth Levitas, "Against Work: A Critical Incursion into Social Policy," *Critical Social Policy* vol. 21, no. 4 (2003), pp. 449-465. For arguments that tying a de facto work requirement to one's share of a society's wealth is unjust see Phillipe Van Parijs, "Why Surfers Should be Fed: A Liberal Defense of Unconditional Basic Income," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* vol. 20, no. 2 (1991), pp. 101-131 and Julie Maskivker, *Self-Realization and Justice: A Liberal-Perfectionist Defense of the Right to Freedom from Employment*. (New York: Routledge, 2011).

[xi] Ruth Yeoman, "Conceptualizing Meaningful Work," p. 235.

[xii] Pettit in particular has little to say about resistance. In early writings he dismisses 'individual resistance' against domination as a plausible alternative to state-centric means of securing nondomination *(Republicanism*, p. 94). In his more recent writings he sees value in resistance to unjust laws, through civil disobedience (*On The People's Terms*, p. 138). In general, though, he seems to wish to channel resistance into formal channels of contestation.

[xiii] Pettit discusses insulation in *On the People's Terms*, pp. 114-122 and *Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014), pp. 89-98.

[xiv] *On The People's Terms*, p. 115.

[xv] But not entirely absent. I explore how the various resistance strategies of slaves demonstrates a blind spot in Pettit's conception of freedom in "Slavery and Freedom in Theory and Practice," (unpublished manuscript, to be presented at the Association for Political Theory conference, Boulder, CO, October 2015).

[xvi] Kim Bobo, *Wage Theft in America: Why Millions of Working Americans are not Getting Paid—And What We Can Do About It*. (New York: The New Press, 2009).

[xvii] Lonnie Golden, "A Brief History of Long Work Time and Contemporary Sources of Overwork," *Journal of Business Ethics* vol. 82, no. 2 (2009), pp. 217-227 and Ofer Sharone, "Engineering Overwork: Bell Curve Management at a High Tech Firm," in C.F. Epstein and A.L. Kalleberg, editors, *Fighting For Time: Shifting Boundaries of Work and Social Life.* New York: Russell Sage, 2004.

[xviii] Penny Dick and Sara Nadin, "Exploiting the Exploited: The Psychological Contract, Workplace Domination and Symbolic Violence," *Culture and Organization* vol. 17, no. 4 (2011), pp. 293-311.

[xix] Joseph Stiglitz and Carl Shapiro, "Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," *American Economic Review* vol. 74, no. 4 (1984), pp. 433-444.

[xx] Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, "Power in a Theory of the Firm," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* vol. 113, no. 3 (1998), pp. 387-432.

[xxi] This is by no means the only possible justification for the kind of rules that comprise WC. It might also be justified on the grounds that the widespread presence of very poorly paid or frequently injured workers is an outcome contrary to the public good, imposing unreasonable costs on the rest of the society. My interpretation of the republican case for workplace constitutionalism focuses on the power dynamic between employer and employee.

[xxii] Richard Dagger, "Neo-republicanism and the civic economy," *Politics Philosophy Economics* vol. 5, no. 2 (2006), pp. 151-173; Nien-he Hsieh, "Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism," *Social Theory and Practice* vol. 31, no. 1 (2005), pp. 115-142 and

"Justice in Production," *Journal of Political Philosophy* vol. 16, no. 1 (2008), pp. 72-100.

[xxiii] Dagger, "Neo-republicanism," p. 162; Pettit, *Republicanism*, pp. 141-142.

[xxiv] Hsieh, "Rawlsian Justice," pp. 116 and 135.

[xxv] Robert Taylor, "Market Freedom as Antipower," *American Political Science Review* vol. 107, no. 3 (2013), pp. 593-602, taking inspiration from Phillip Pettit, "Freedom as Antipower," *Ethics* vol. 106, no. 3 (1996), pp. 576-604.

[xxvi] Frank Lovett, "Domination and Distributive Justice," *Journal of Politics* vol. 71, no. 3 (2009), pp. 817-830 and Pettit, "A Republican Right to Basic Income," *Basic Income Studies* vol. 2, no. 2 (2007), pp. 1-8.

[xxvii] Taylor, "Market Freedom," p. 594.

[xxviii] Joshua Cohen, "The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy," *Social Philosophy and Policy* vol. 6, no. 2 (1989), pp. 25-50.

[xxix] Alex Gourevitch, "Labor Republicanism and the Transformation of Work," *Political Theory* vol. 41, no. 4 (2013), p. 593.

[xxx] See, for example, Rodert Dahl, *A Preface to Economic Democracy*. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), Ronald Mason, *Participatory and Workplace Democracy: A Theoretical Development in Critique of Liberalism* (Carbondale, Ill: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982); Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970) and David Schweickart, "Should Rawls Be a Socialist? A Comparison of his Ideal Capitalism with Worker Controlled Socialism," *Social Theory and Practice* vol. 5, no. 1 (1979), pp. 1-27.

[xxxi] Virginie Perotin, "Entry Exit and the Business Cycle: Are Cooperatives Different?" *Journal of Comparative Economics* vol. 34 (2006), pp. 295-316.

[xxxii] Gabriel Burdin, "Are Worker-Managed Firms More Likely to Fail than Conventional Enterprises? Evidence from Uruguay," *ILR Review* vol. 76, no. 1 (2014).

[xxxiii] Pettit introduces the language of vitiation in his recent treatise on republican democracy, *On The People's Terms*. Our freedom can be threatened in two ways. Directly, by invasion, which takes away a specific option or choice the free person might have elected to pursue. Indirectly, vitiating hindrances are those that "deprive you of resources required for freedom in that choice, or that limit the use to which you can put your resources" (39) in a general way. In other words, if your choices are a series of heavy doors, an invasive hindrance reduces your freedom by locking one or more of them, whereas a vitiating hindrance saps your strength, making opening the door of your choice more difficult. This distinction is important for Pettit, but the bulk of his theory focuses on the problem of vitiating hindrances, which he argues are both necessary and sufficient for domination to have occurred (49-69). Closer attention to the concrete, specific ways workplace dynamics and conditions can psychologically, emotionally, and physically impact workers perhaps suggests renewed attention to the importance of organizing our institutions to avoid vitiating hindrances as well as invasive ones is an important and worthwhile project for republican theory.

[xxxiv] One exception is his "report card" on the Zapatero administration in Spain, in which he gave an assessment of that administration's accomplishments from a republican perspective. The main workplace issue Pettit addressed here was growing prevalence of precarity and temporary workers, and the importance of making more jobs secure and permanent. See Philip Pettit and Jose Luis Marti, *A Political Philosophy for Public Life: Civic Republicanism in Zapatero's Spain* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

[xxxv] Pettit, *Just Freedom*, p. 218n44.

[xxxvi] Inigo Gonzalez-Ricoy, "The Republican Case for Workplace Democracy," *Social Theory and Practice* vol. 40, no. 2 (2014), p. 253.

[xxxvii] Inigo Gonzalez-Ricoy argues for combining WC and WD, but does not address the potential conflicts between them at any length. See Ibid.

[xxxviii] I am taking some liberties with Pettit's approach here. He generally only considers the question of avowed interests as they apply to the citizenry as a whole. I believe this is a mistake—that groups within society may well have avowed interests that need to be tracked, independently of the citizenry as a whole. I argue this oversight can be tracked to Pettit's methodological nationalism in "Implementing Freedom as Non-domination."

[xxxix] United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, *Work in America: Report of a Special Task Force to the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1973).

[xl] Mike Davis, *Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the US Working Class.* (New York: Verso: 1999), p. 55; see also Jefferson Cowie, *Stayin' Alive: The 1970s and the Last Days of the Working Class*. (New York: The New Press, 2010), pp. 42-47.

[xli] Cowie, *Stayin' Alive*, p. 45

[xlii] *Work in America*, p. 13.

[xliii] Frank Jones, "The Division of Labor is Limited by Worker Alienation," *The American Economist* vol. 19, no. 2 (1975), pp. 18-20.

[xliv] Richard Freeman and Joel Rogers, *What Workers Want* (updated edition) (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 32-33.

[xlv] Freeman and Rogers, *What Workers Want*, p. 10.

[xlvi] Richard Freeman, Peter Boxall, and Peter Haynes, editors, *What Workers Say: Employee Voice in the Anglo-American Workplace*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

[xlvii] Ibid, pp. 23-24.

[xlviii] Ed Collum, "Two Classes and One Vision? Workers' and Managers' Attitudes towards Workplace Democracy," *Work and Organizations* vol. 30, no. 1 (2003), pp. 62-96.

[xlix] Pettit, *On The People's Terms*, p. 84.

[l] Fabian Schuppert, "Non-Domination, Non-Alienation, and Social Equality: Towards A Republican Understanding of Equality," *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* vol. 18, no. 4 (2015), pp. 440-455.

[li] See Ibid, as well as his *Freedom, Recognition and Non-domination: Toward a Republican Theory of (Global) Justice* (Heidelberg: Springer-Dordrecht, 2014).

[lii] For an excellent overview of the different models, along with an assessment of their economic viability, see Gregory Dow, *Governing the Firm: Worker's Control in Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Another useful discussion of different models' strengths and weaknesses can be found in a recent paper by Mark Kaswan, "Democratic Differences: How Type of Ownership Affects Workplace Democracy and Its Broader Social Effects," in Doug Kruse, editor, *Sharing Ownership, Profits, and Decision-Making in the 21st Century* (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing, 2013), pp. 261-294.

4.2.5 Beastly Politics: Derrida, Animals, and the Political Economy of Meat

Katherine E. Young, University of Hawai'i at Hilo (youngkat@hawaii.edu)

Abstract: In this essay, I employ Derrida's analysis of carnophallogocentrism in "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject" and beastly politics in *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1* to bring to view the carnivorism that drives contemporary politics and capitalist society. Via careful explication of Derrida's ideas and elaboration of his canonical analyses, especially Plato, Hobbes, and Machiavelli, I hope to show how Derrida's discussions of animals and politics offer an intriguing perspective with which to augment a Marxian analysis of the political economy of meat. Overall, I contend that when viewed in relation to the political economy of meat, Derrida's analyses reveal the irrational, ideological, and fetishized functions of the carnivorous center of politics and point to the potential shortcomings of theoretical strategies that do not directly confront the capitalist framework that sustains the "beastly" politics of contemporary liberalism and neoliberalism.

Keywords: Derrida, Animals, Sovereignty, Marxism, Capitalism

A specter is haunting politics—the specter of the animal, or animals to be more precise. The history of all hitherto existing society is not simply one of class struggles, as Marx argues in *The Communist Manifesto*, but also the menagerie of the political animal.[i] In this sense, the relentless opposition of oppressor and oppressed is also the all too human struggle to define and mark the limits of the human species and, by default, the animals outside of it. Animals are the *absent referents* of politics, to borrow from Carol Adams—the nameless and invisible bodies that must be excluded for politics to exist.[ii] And political theory carries these animals on its back. Contemporary politics, with liberalism and neoliberalism at the masthead, would like to shed these beasts of burden by dissolving them into the stew of market economies, but their presence remains. Certainly, Marxism gets us to the economic base of this ragoût, but more is needed to flesh out the contemporary political economy of meat. The critical theory of Jacques Derrida, specifically his work in the essay "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject" and his collection of lectures, *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1*, provide s a unique avenue through which to pause and bring to bear the specter of animals that haunts contemporary politics. Of course, Derrida himself comments on Marx in *Specters of Marx*.[iii] For Derrida, the specter of Marx calls us to conjure and expose the supernatural or the metaphoric ghosts haunting Marxism and to invite the transformative and radical spirit of his critique to politics, opening history to infinite and eternal returns, to many Marxisms. Like the Marxian ghosts that Derrida describes in *Specters of Marx*, the specters of animals, the animal menagerie, is likewise unfettered and unbound from the established order of time and also opens politics to many possibilities. [iv]

Derrida's discussions of animals and politics offer an intriguing perspective with which to augment a Marxian analysis of the political economy of meat in a way that reveals this economy's beastly genealogy and points to its embedded presence within the contemporary political imaginary. For the purposes of this essay, Derrida is both central and decentered. He is critically situated as a theoretical interlocutor, with his ideas in "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject" and *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1* setting the stage for

an interruption of the animal menagerie, but he is also decentered in the sense that this essay does not attempt to intervene in Derrida studies or engage in Derridean analysis per se.[v] Rather, I strategically employ two of Derrida's texts to elucidate the contemporary political economy of meat and, ultimately, point to the possibilities and limitations of using Derrida's concepts to disrupt this economy within the contemporary neoliberal capitalist frame.
To do this, I first analyze Derrida's discussion of carnophallogocentrism and dietary carnivorism in, "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject." Drawing from the Marxian tradition, I argue that the carnivorous economy of relations that Derrida unearths is particularly devastating within the context of late capitalism since meat is not simply animal flesh, but also represents the material and immaterial labor captured in the vast expanse of commodities produced and consumed on a daily basis.[vi] I then turn to a critical analysis of Derrida's premise in *The Beast & the Sovereign, Volume 1* that sovereignty and bestiality are related allegories, which appear throughout the history of political thought and which gesture to the exceptional limits of sovereign responsibility. Working from this premise, I elaborate on Derrida's canonical analyses in *The Beast & the Sovereign, Volume 1*, focusing specifically on the works of Hobbes, Machiavelli, and Plato to point to an embedded animal politics within the beastly imaginary that he delineates. This beastly imaginary, I argue, rests upon the materiality of meat in everyday life so that the choice to consume, and to consume meat in particular, appears as a fetish of sovereignty and political power situated between the two poles of beastly politics that Derrida describes. Through this careful explication, I hope to show how Derrida's ideas, when viewed in relation to the political economy of meat, reveal the irrational, ideological, and fetishized functions of the carnivorous center of politics that he discerns; and which point to the potential shortcomings of theoretical strategies that fail to directly confront the capitalist framework that sustains the "beastly" politics of contemporary liberalism and neoliberalism.

Derrida and the Meat of Subjectivity

Derrida briefly introduces his views on animals, animality, and the ingestion of animals in a 1989 interview with Jean-Luc Nancy entitled, "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject." Here, Derrida discusses what could easily be considered his most directly relevant concept for animal politics, *carnophallogocentrism*, which he describes as a schema of subjectivity that implies "carnivorous virility."[vii] Within this schema, the linguistic identification of "the animal" sustains a sacrificial structure, an economy of relations between animal and human that permits the non-criminal killing of animals in order to affirm the metaphysical reality of "the human."[viii] In turn, "the animal" becomes a totalizing sign and fantasy, which effectively crushes real animal differences in order to uphold the authority or voice of the speaking subject.[ix] The State, in particular, is carnophallogocentric because it is built upon the ingestion, incorporation, and introjection of corpses into the psyche of the political animal so that it must be carnivorous in order to be powerful. Here meat is a phallic sign to be circulated and consumed within a political economy of relations rooted in domination and signifies those human and animal bodies that remain subject to rather than subjects of power within this economy of relations, and who are thus to be consumed or sacrificed accordingly.[x] Thus, the subject of Western political thought is not simply a Eurocentric and masculine protagonist in a "virile and heroic schema" of the State over the state of nature, but also an eater of flesh according to Derrida.[xi]

What results is a metonymic schema in which this overbearing characterization comes to replace other and more hospitable significations of what it might mean to *eat well*.[xii] The literal

consequence of this carnophallogocentric metonymy of “eating well” is that it demands the introduction of non-criminal execution in the schematics of State power.[xiii] For Derrida, sacrifice is often a symbolic act with regard to humans who consume each other as “a matter of words or of things, of sentences, of daily bread or wine, of the tongue, the lips, or the breast of the other.”[xiv] In other words, humans consume these signs as fetishes in order to satiate our desire to devour one another.[xv] The State, then, regulates this metonymic economy so that fetishized consumption feigns real power over life and death (even one’s own life and death), a power that is ultimately held by the State.[xvi] Consequently, as Matthew Calarco observes in *Zoographies*, carnophallogocentrism exceeds metaphysical constructions of subjectivity to constitute an exclusionary juridical logic that defines existing legal and political institutions. As Calarco points out in his analysis, in order to become a full subject in contemporary society, one must accept the violence committed against non-subjects, especially animals. In short, one must directly or indirectly participate in carnivorism in order to become a full participant in society.[xvii]
For Calarco, those who resist carnivorous practices by eating vegan or vegetarian diets and circulating in animal rights circles “are often viewed as being outside the dominant forms of subjectivy.”[xviii] Yet, while Calarco concedes to the fundamentally deconstructive nature of vegetarianism, he is simultaneously making an ethical argument that hinges on actions and intentions. To some extent, Calarco’s ethical turn exonerates politically progressive vegetarians in advanced industrialized societies who realize the limits of their actions and who ask not how to be ethically pure, but how to achieve “the best, most respectful, most grateful, and also most giving way of relating.”[xix] Challenging Calarco, one could argue that carnophallogcentrism is not simply about ethical choices, but about a larger political-economic framework that requires subjects to consent to and tolerate structural carnivorism in order to fully participate in the good life.

Returning to “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” Derrida asks, “who can be made to believe that our cultures are carnivorous because animal proteins are irreplaceable?”[xx] Derrida poses the question in passing, but it brings to bear the irrationality of the carnivorism and sacrifice of life that sustains contemporary politics. Meat eating is no longer necessary for human health and well-being , especially in advanced industrialized societies. For example, researchers have demonstrated that the meat-based Western diet is linked to chronic and deadly diseases like hypertension, diabetes, and heart disease and , moreover, that a plant-based diet is actually much healthier and can, in many cases, reverse these kinds of diseases.[xxi] So why do advanced industrialized societies continue to be carnivorous? For Derrida, the answer lies in carnophallogocentrism, which amounts to certain death for animals. As Derrida explains, the ingestion of animal corpses is both literal *and* figurative in Western culture: humans literally consume animals as meat and figuratively consume them as metaphors, while on the surface it appears that humans consume other humans only metaphorically. Simultaneously, according to Derrida, there coexists the impossibility of delimiting human metaphorical sacrifice, which expands to the incorporation of the bodies of other humans via medical procedures like surrogacy, organ removal and transplant, and genetic engineering.[xxii] For Derrida, this kind of anthropological slippage from the metaphorical to the corporeal, from human to animal, emerges from scientific knowledge and calls into question the “single linear, indivisible, oppositional limit” between humans and animals. [xxiii] All of this, Derrida concludes, destabilizes and decenters human subjectivity, revealing our incapacity to effectively to “*cut up* a subject.”[xxiv] As Élizabeth De Fontenay discerns in *Without Offending Humans*, for Derrida, the ingestion, incorporation, or introjection

of human “corpses” can be real or symbolic and some form of “cannibalism” cannot be overcome.[xxv]
According to Derrida, it is not a matter of whether to eat, what to eat, or whether to eat animals.[xxvi] One has to eat something—if not, you will die—and more often than not in Western industrialized societies, it is going to be meat-based because it logically makes sense according to the larger symbolic structure: “The so-called non-anthropophagic cultures practice symbolic anthropology and even construct their most elevated socius, indeed the sublimity of their morality, their politics, and their right, on this anthropophagy. Vegetarians, too, partake of animals, even of men. They practice a different mode of denegation.”[xxvii] For Derrida, sacrifice is inexorable and built into the very codes of existence, even for the vegetarian. Calarco situates Derrida’s claim about the embedded carnivorism of vegetarians as “part of a complicated argument about the ethical questions concerning eating, incorporation, and violence toward the Other,” which recognizes that simply speaking or thinking about the Other inevitably requires at least its symbolic violation and its appropriation.[xxviii] Calarco implies that it is symbolic and not literal violence to which Derrida speaks in the passage noted above (even though Derrida does not exclusively delineate the two), in turn, deflecting deep reflection on the relation of carnophallogocentrism to the material violence of the political economy of meat.

Notably, De Fontenay objects to what she considers Derrida’s totalizing schema in “Eating Well, Or the Calculation of the Subject,” which she contends reduces diverse kinds of sacrificial functions to monolithic dietary sacrifice:

> I do not intend to deliver an apology for animal sacrifices here, to justify the blessed or sacred character of their cruelty, but only to affirm a conceptual unavailability. Their diversity in place and time, the plurality of their functions, their singularity, far from allowing for an understanding of contemporary practices of zootechnology and far from structuring the field of their practices into some immemorial time, seems to reserve irreducible enigmas.[xxix]

Here De Fontenay touches upon Derrida’s uneasy entanglement with a ubiquitous exchange economy, a complicity she gently critiques and which she contends runs counter to his work in general.[xxx] De Fontenay is somewhat in concert with Calarco, sharing a similar dismay with Derrida’s seemingly contradictory position on carnivorism, although perhaps less willing to integrate it into his larger opus. Instead, it seems that De Fontenay wishes to position Derrida’s quasi-structuralist leanings in “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject” as a perplexing anomaly in his oeuvre.[xxxi] Yet it is this disruptive quality of Derrida’s analysis in this interview—its dialectical positioning, perhaps—that renders it so useful in studying the contemporary political economy of meat, since it makes visible the fetishization of meat that sustains the State and the politics of everyday life, while at the same time refusing to act against it.

In neutralizing the value question of what to eat—which, as Calarco observes, is consistent with Derrida’s overall theoretical position—Derrida in effect avoids it altogether, instead focusing on how to eat hospitably which, as he describes it, is eating well by “learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat” and identifying with whom one is ingesting.[xxxii] Although Derrida convincingly dislodges the irrationality of sacrifice, one could argue that he fails to take on the materiality of sacrifice in contemporary life, which takes form in commodity exchange generally and in the

normalized production, distribution, and consumption of meat products. Instead, Derrida appears to romanticize a heterogeneous and primordial linguistic source-code that, once revealed, will bring about more hospitable relations or, arguably, a kind of gifting of the Other that is suspended outside of economic exchange. [xxxiii] Moreover, this kind of ontological continuity may work to mask the compulsory exploitation and sacrifice of life that characterizes liberal and neoliberal frameworks.[xxxiv] Even if one nutritionally abstains from eating meat, there is a trace of human flesh (the dissipation of human bodies in the life-long need to work, which can at its extreme, result in loss of life and limb under the grinding wheels of production) left as surplus value in commodities as well as the hidden animal ingredients in many commodities. Derrida gestures in this direction with his admission that even vegetarians practice carnophallogocentrism, but ultimately fails to address the political-economic conditions that render carnivorism a seemingly inevitable choice, or at least a condition that must be tolerated in the metonymic economy of relations that he describes.

John Bellamy Foster's discussion of the metabolism of nature and society in *Marx's Ecology* may provide a useful intervention here. As Foster notes in his analysis of Marx, an irreparable rift in the metabolism or organic exchange of matter between humans and nature occurs under the labor processes of capitalism: "Marx employed the concept of a 'rift' in the metabolic relation between human beings and the earth to capture the material estrangement of human beings within capitalist society from the natural conditions which formed the basis for their existence—what he called 'the everlasting nature-imposed condition[s] of human existence."[xxxv] Although Marx was certainly not advocating dietary vegetarianism, his awareness of the predatory consumptive patterns arising from industrialized agricultural production underscore the necessity to take seriously the material conditions of labor under capitalism, which alienate humans from nature and normalize the violent consumption of natural organisms. Like all needs, the act of eating is symbolically and culturally mediated, which means, as Ted Benton explains in his critique of Marx in *Natural Relations: Ecology, Animal Rights, and Social Justice*, that the pathological need to eat is driven by an immediacy directly related to alienated labor, which reinforces a sense of biological necessity and human-animal duality (even in Marx's analysis), leading to the deformation of the qualitative dimensions of animal and human life.[xxxvi] Working from this Marxian angle, animals and humans appear irrevocably tied together within a late capitalist economy in which sacrifice is literal for animals and humans, except that in the case of humans, it is a temporal sacrifice of the body via the sweat and blood of labor consumed as commodities on capitalist markets that appear to have a natural carnivorous metabolic function that demands the destruction of animals and humans alike.

To borrow from Marx, the consumption of meat, which as noted above, is really the stuff of commodities in general, is like the sigh of the oppressed creature, dually signified. [xxxvii] It is an attempt to gain power over animals and over oneself through the satisfaction of false needs as well as a comfortable, reasonable, convenient, and tasty choice. Moreover, animal death is both hidden in industrialized animal agriculture and celebrated in the postmodern sensibilities of the new gastronomy that advocate small scale husbandry and humane treatment, as much as the working class has become completely integrated into a welfare-warfare state that delivers the goods. Meat also signifies the reconciliation of opposites—life and death, exploitation and choice, freedom and servitude—for what Herbert Marcuse calls beneficial destruction in *One-Dimensional Man*.[xxxviii] Human language gives humans the power to devour literally and figuratively, in both language and body, a point that Derrida duly notes.

Ideology, which gives precedence to the mystical and figurative power of consumption, tells humans in advanced industrialized societies that meat is natural, good and that is emblematic of life and power—the fuel of protein, carbohydrates, and amino acids to enhance human life, or the power to vote with your fork or to eat authentically or ethically—while the actual consumption of meat is quite literally deadly for animals and humans. This, in turn, blinds humans from grasping their own subjugated positions within the economic system, within the larger meat market. The irrationality of carnivorism (the rhetorical question posed by Derrida) and the repressive function that it serves becomes visible in the contradictory existence of animals as both life and death in capitalist systems of production and the liberal and neoliberal political ideologies that support them. To do this requires the ruthless critique of capitalism, a point not lost on Marcuse: "[Materialism] admits the reality of Hell only at one definite place, here on earth, and asserts that this Hell was created by Man (and by Nature). Part of this Hell is the ill-treatment of animals—the work of a human society whose rationality is still the irrational." [xxxix]

Lycanthropy, Carnivorism, and the State

In *The Beast & the Sovereign*, *Volume 1*, Derrida carefully considers the anthropomorphized images that signify the carnophallogocentric economy of relations that define the modern State: sheep, foxes, lions, and especially wolves as well as mythological and biblical creatures. Here, one can derive a better sense of the political importance of Derrida's understanding of carnophallogocentrism. *Beast*, Derrida argues, is the common signifier for this animal menagerie and also a trope that makes sense only in the human world, and especially in the world of politics. Moreover, bestiality takes two sovereign forms in Western political thought: one divine and the other animalistic, and both related to nonresponse.[xl] Like the good shepherd, the sovereign takes care of his flock. Nonetheless, the shepherd always holds the power to sacrifice his flock, in turn, casting two related metonymic figures: like a wolf disguised among sheep, the sovereign may turn on his flock; similarly, the sovereign, like God, may always choose not to respond to the cries of the people, and consequently, the people, like animals, will not be heard.

What this implies, it seems, is that sovereignty has two faces that dissolve into each other: one virtuous and one vicious, both metonymic. Wolves specifically symbolize this latter sullied political imaginary. Derrida's presentation of a "political lycanthropy" of the Western canon points to a violent sovereignty lodged at the center of Western political thought. Wolves roam the canon, always threatening to consume the polity.[xli] Wolves, in particular, are a constant threat to sovereign power at both the individual and State levels since, by means of the modern social contract, it is not only the ruler that risks lycanthropy, but also the people (as lone wolves, lawbreakers). Certainly this impending lycanthropy reinforces Derrida's claim in "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject" that the *chef d'Etat*, the head of State, must be "an eater of flesh" and never publicly vegetarian.[xlii] Notably, this portrait of the *chef d'Etat* coincides with what Derrida later describes in the *Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1* as the devouring or lycan impulse of sovereignty:

> Devourment and voracity. *Devoro, vorax, vorator*. It's about mouth, teeth, tongue, and the violent rush to bite, engulf, swallow the other, to take the other into oneself too, to kill or mourn it. Might sovereignty be devouring? Might its force, its power, its greatest force, its absolute potency be, in essence and always in the last instance, a power of devourment (mouth, teeth, tongue, violent rush to bite, engulf, swallow the other, to

take the other into oneself too, to kill or mourn it)?[xliii]

Here one can turn to Hobbes for further illustration of the lycanthropic trope. Hobbes declares in *De Cive*: "That Man to Man is a kind of God; and that Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe: the first is true if we compare Citizens amongst themselves; and the second, if we compare Cities." [xliv] Not only is Hobbes describing the domestic ties of a State and the antagonism between states, but he is also pointing to the sovereign right to kill. In *Leviathan*, absolute sovereignty rests upon the introjection of subjects into the body politic *and* the right to self-preservation. It is the two bodies, that of the State and that of the individual, which collide to create the paradox of sovereignty. In her classic analysis of Hobbes, Jean Hampton maintains that the power of the absolute sovereign is on loan from the people, because it is always they who determine whether sovereign interests conflict with their own right to self-protection broadly construed. [xlv] Thus, the sovereign obligation to protect the state by maintaining military force is in conflict with the individual right to life. In other words, one cannot be forced to give up his life or take the life of another; or, to sacrifice human flesh. Simultaneously, the absolute sovereign maintains the right to pursue or kill those who are disobedient. [xlvi] Contra this interpretation, Giorgio Agamben argues in *Homo Sacer* that the foundation of sovereign power is not the individual right to freely give up his or her natural right to self-preservation, but the sovereign right to punish.[xlvii] Working from Agamben's observation, if one returns to Hobbes's claim in *De Cive*, man to man is God within the commonwealth because the interior of sovereignty models divinity or inclusion, which is regulated by the sovereign right to punish at will, and man to man is a wolf outside of sovereignty because its exterior is patterned after the state of nature or dissolution.

In *Political Theology*, Carl Schmitt discerns that all major concepts of the modern state are secularized theological concepts: "The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology."[xlviii] More specifically and in line with the power of sovereign punishment that Agamben delineates in *Homo Sacer*, the sovereign has the singular power of direct intervention into an official system of legal order: "Sovereign is he who decides on the exception." [xlix] According to Schmitt, Hobbes falls squarely into this tradition: "The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were dominated by the idea of a sole sovereign, which is one of the reasons why, in addition to the decisionist cast of his thinking, Hobbes remained personalistic and postulated an ultimate concrete deciding instance, and why he also heightened his state, the Leviathan, into an immense person and thus point-blank straight into mythology."[l] Notably, Hobbes concedes that the actual state of human governance is one that is situated between the brute and the divine due to the very human attribute of pride: "Hitherto I have set forth the nature of Man, (whose Pride and other Passions have compelled him to submit himselfe to Government;) together with the great power of his Governour, whom I compared to *Leviathan*, taking that comparison out of the last two verses of the one and fortieth of *Job*; where God having set forth the great power of *Leviathan*, calleth him King of the Proud."[li] Here, Derrida's point (as well as Schmitt's) that Hobbes's *Leviathan* is invested in copying the work of God within a secular framework despite all of his effort to liberate it from an ecclesiastical frame is obvious.[lii] Moreover, this passage from *Leviathan* illustrates that the human condition, which is not simply driven by fear but also by pride for Hobbes, is beyond that of the beasts and far from the heavenly.[liii] In choosing the image of Leviathan, Hobbes chooses a creation of God, but one that is also to be destroyed and literally fed to the people of the wilderness in the bible, and served along with the great land beast, Behemoth, at the feast of the righteous in the Talmud.[liv]

Setting aside theological debates, which go beyond the purposes of this essay, two additional scriptural details regarding these biblical beasts deserve attention: Behemoth is described in the Book of Job as a vegetarian animal, while Leviathan is described as consuming everything in its wake; while in the Talmud, both Leviathan and Behemoth are described as castrated males having had their female partners destroyed by God in order to prevent them from mating and destroying the earth.[lv] Hobbes names two of his works after these biblical creatures: *Leviathan*, his treatise of absolute sovereignty and *Behemoth*,[lvi] his account of the English Civil War. *Leviathan* is the artificial animal of government, separate from God, yet likened after His terrifying biblical sea creature and signifying the beast of human hubris in the Book of Job.[lvii] To other nations, England is a wolf among wolves, a carnivore, which will devour the world with its imperial force. All the while, the English people under the guard of their absolute sovereign are protected from their own passions and are, in effect, politically castrated. *Behemoth*, on the other hand, is the division of the English people, corrupted by religion and greed.[lviii] Arguably, the vegetarian *Behemoth*, despite its power, lacks a clear *chef d'Etat,* who at least according to Derrida, must eat meat; in other words, the chef d'Etat must be willing to sacrifice others for security. What is important for the current discussion is that it is the vegetarian beast, *Behemoth*, who is rife with tension and unable to distinguish the ecclesiastical and entrepreneurial wolves among men. *Behemoth*, unlike *Leviathan*, represents the state of nature in which the multitude has descended into bestiality and is devouring itself. Arguably, *Behemoth* and *Leviathan* are divine beasts that must chastised or else risk devolving into animalistic passions—the desire for everything, in the Hobbesian sense. From this angle, it seems that the lycanthropy that Hobbes describes in *De Cive* is the desire of the multitude, ultimately leading to democratic uprising. [lix]

One could argue that Hobbes's state of nature is one of desire, and if one accepts C.B. Macpherson's analysis in *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, it is also a competitive marketplace driven by materialist assumptions about the nature of humankind. Within this context, one could argue that sovereignty is organized around a materialist conception of desire—one in which political subjects confront subordination (or political castration reinforced by the sovereign right to punish, in this case) within the polis while simultaneously seeking out alternative pleasurable practices.[lx] In this sense, the individual must be willing to give up the right to everything, to sublimate his or her own desires and sovereignty as well as the subversive disarray of the multitude, and instead pursue that desire in a regulated market economy.

Arguably, meat signifies the original division of labor that marks bodies as commodities and is apparent in status, simple market, and possessive market societies (from slavery to feudal bondage to the proletariat workforce). [lxi] Within the contemporary context, commodities or *Goods* define our relationships and are the modern sacrificial trick—surrogates for human flesh that retain traces of human and animal bodies.[lxii] A trace of human flesh is hidden in the exchange value of commodities and abstract labor power, and while animals are no longer specific sacrificial representations within the modern context, one could argue that they are *everywhere*: literally as visible and invisible ingredients in commodities, and figuratively as specters of sacrifice, nourishing the hyperbolic metabolism of the neoliberal capitalist economy.

Eating Well in the Polis

> [T]he taste of human flesh is always described as like that of pork. At any rate, later on all civilizations preferred to call swine all those who instinct was for another pleasure, pigs being animals sanctioned by society for its own ends.[lxiii]

In Homer's *Odyssey*, the goddess Circe transforms Odysseus's men into pigs. Horkheimer and Adorno observe in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that, unlike Circe's other victims, these men did not become "sacred creatures of the wilderness, but unclean domestic animals—swine."[lxiv] Circe's choice to turn the men into swine is telling. If pigs are to be used at will by society and represent those whose desires fall outside of societal prerogative as Horkheimer and Adorno claim, one could interpret Circe's choice as a sign of the men's fate. Having escaped Circe's wrath, they are ultimately killed for sacrificing and feasting upon the sacred and immortal cattle of Helios; in other words, they are slaughtered for indulging in desires for which they were not fit.[lxv] Similarly in *The Republic*, Plato chooses to define the luxurious state with the introduction of swineherds, effectively incorporating animals into the economic life of Athens as a source of food. Perhaps even more interesting is that Plato describes the primitive city preceding the luxurious state as vegetarian, prompting Glaucon to respond: "That is just the sort of provender you would supply, Socrates, if you were founding a community of pigs."[lxvi] It is not until Chapter VII, in which Socrates describes the swelling of the polis, that animals are displaced as meat and intimately linked to the multitudinous desires of the polis:

Then we must once more enlarge our community. The healthy one will not be big enough now; it must be swollen up with a whole multitude of callings not ministering to any bare necessity: hunters and fishermen, for instance; artists in sculpture, painting, and music; poets with their attendant train of professional reciters, actors, dancers, producers; and makers of all sorts of household gear, including everything for women's adornment. […] And then swineherds — there was no need for them in our original state, but we shall want them now; and a great quantity of sheep and cattle too, if people are going to live on meat.[lxvii]

The Republic begins with a feast. However, the festival to Bendis appears as little more than a backdrop for the creation of Plato's ideal polis in *The Republic*. At first glance, Cephalus, Socrates' interlocutor in Chapter I, is gregarious and averse to confrontation—he accepts Socrates' argument with little resistance and leaves the political debate to return to the feast. Still, certain details of the scene appear provocative: the choice to begin *The Republic* with the festival of Bendis, the goddess of animals, fertility, and the hunt; Cephalus' admission of sexual impotency; and Cephalus' exit from the dialogue to return to the festival and attend the sacrifice. Arguably, sacrifice, femininity, and the consumption of flesh are inaugural themes in *The Republic*, yet outwardly they appear trivial, if only for the reason that Socrates and his students do not attend. Instead it is Cephalus, the retired manufacturer, who leaves his own house—his *oikos*, and the setting for the invention of Plato's political community—to indulge in the festival. After a brief and genteel conversation on the nature of justice, Cephalus gracefully exits to attend the festival sacrifice, leaving the business of politics to the young men: "Well, well, said Cephalus, I will bequeath the argument to you. It is time for me to attend the sacrifice. Your part, then, said Polymarchus, will fall to me as your heir. By all means, said Cephalus with a smile; and with that he left us, to see the sacrifice." [lxviii] With his departure, Cephalus effectively abstains from politics to go eat some meat. Paradoxically, it was Cephalus who had just conceded that as bodily passions weaken with age, intellectual appetites continue to grow.

If this is Cephalus' belief, why does he leave? One could interpret Cephalus' role as signifying

the oikos of Plato's *Republic*—the private and the feminine. As a producer (which for Plato included not just workers but anyone involved in economic production, including the merchant class) he represents the private sphere of Athenian life shaped by material objects and sequestered from politics. As Jacques Rancière explains in *The Philosopher and His Poor*: "By relegating artisans to the order of pure reproduction, philosophy pretended to confirm them only where they had been placed by their love for the solid realities of technical success and financial gain." [lxix] So it is of little surprise that Cephalus' definition of justice—honesty and paying back one's debts—is squarely centered on a naïve interpretation of the value of money and that his interests lie in his personal life. [lxx] Politically flaccid, one could argue that Cephalus, as a member of the producing class, must indulge in the fetishization of his desire for political knowledge by leaving the dialogue and departing for the feast of the divine feminine. Certainly at a feast he will *eat well*. What will he eat? If one considers Plato's characterization of the multitude of the luxurious state in Chapter VII of *The Republic*, one conclusion comes to mind—meat.

All of this points to a narrative of voracity, virility, meat, and perhaps even madness (after all, what is madness, but the becoming-bestial of man) at the center of politics. [lxxi] Certainly Western political thought is no stranger to the fabulous, from Plato's allegory of the cave to the metaphorical state of nature in modern social contract theory. Honestly fantastic, these stories are about making known the origins of political life; in other words, they convey truth via necessary fiction. Or, as Derrida discerns, politics and political knowledge generally are about making known the truth.[lxxii] This kind of truth-making, of course, is Plato's objective in *The Republic* and is notably accomplished by means of fabulous allegories throughout. One such allegory is Plato's description in Chapter XXXII of the polis descending into violence after the institution of democracy, similar to the Arcadian king who was transformed into a wolf by Zeus for serving the god a mixture of animal and human flesh and challenging his divinity:

You have heard the legend they tell of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia: how one who tastes a single piece of human flesh mixed in with the flesh of the sacrificial victims is fated to be changed into a wolf. In the same way the people's champion, finding himself in full control of the mob, may not scruple to shed a brother's blood; dragging him before a tribunal with the usual unjust charges, he may foully murder him, blotting out a man's life and tasting kindred blood with unhallowed tongue and lips; he may send men to death or exile with hinted promises of debts to be cancelled and estates to be redistributed. Is it not thenceforth his inevitable fate to either be destroyed by his enemies or to seize absolute power and be transformed from a human being into a wolf?[lxxiii]

Agamben too points to this passage in *The Republic* to illustrate the proximity of the werewolf and the tyrant, although with little elaboration.[lxxiv] Derrida argues that not only does a fable "make known" but it does so in a double sense: first, by sharing or making known to the other; and second, by "making like" knowledge in the sense that one pretends to know. What this means is that it is not simply the rhetoric or logic of politics that is a simulacrum of knowledge, *but everything in the public sphere*.[lxxv] Thus, working from Derrida's analysis, it seems that Plato's lycanthropic allegory makes known two prominent themes in the history of Western political thought related to the fetishization of desire: the bestiality and impotency of both the force of law and the use of violence; and the consumption of flesh in the name of private property.

Commodity fetishism operates in the fantastic way that Derrida describes by allowing commodities to stand in place for actual human relations. Modern social contract theory and capitalism take for granted the self-signifying subject—who knows himself and his preferences and is ultimately the original point of reference for civil society—and then take this narrative all the way to the origins of the human species so that owning and contracting oneself becomes fundamental to human identity. [lxxvi] Given the above explication of Plato's *The Republic*, it seems that the choice to subject oneself to another is an illusion of freedom fueled by the fetishization of flesh (in contemporary terms, the everyday homologies of citizens, consumers, workers, and animals as meat) to be circulated in an exchange economy. This is not simply a modern practice, however, but a logic that traces back to antiquity as Horkheimer and Adorno suggest in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*.[lxxvii] For Plato in a pre-capitalist, customary economy, it is sacrifice that takes precedence at the beginning of *The Republic*. Cephalus, as citizen and economic producer, must sublimate his self-governing desire and instead go to the sacrifice to consume the animal-qua-meat, which is a substitute for his own flesh. Plato's economic division of labor and the subjugated and precarious position of the artisan worker in particular are founded on a double lie about nature and function, according to Rancière:

> There is no virtue or education that belongs to the laboring people. Their 'own' virtue—moderation, common 'wisdom' (sōphrosunē)—must come to them from the outside. There is no 'self-mastery' that the inferior can claim as its own virtue since, by definition, mastery presupposes a superior. […] This wisdom of the artisan, which exists outside him, is simply the order of the state that puts him in his place.[lxxviii]

Plato's brand of justice, as Rancière eludes in the above passage, is really an ideological rhetoric that justifies the silencing and exclusion of the laboring people. Moreover, the vegetarian city of pigs that Plato describes is an "egalitarian republic of labor" that is deliberately disordered so that it can once again be made healthy. [lxxix] In Plato's ideal state, those false imitators (artists and poets) who rhetorically feed the demos are cooks on campaigns and hunters of gifts, votes, and bodies who can only see the world through the eyes of consumers and, therefore, are blind to the form of beauty and only see beautiful objects.[lxxx] As Rancière explains, for Plato, the poets confuse the distinction between divine imitations and artisanal fabrications.[lxxxi] "Theatrocracy [la théâtrocratie] is the mother of democracy." [lxxxii] Artists create the popular aesthetics consumed by the likes of Cephalus and, if not regulated by philosophy and its resultant division of labor, they may possibly incite the descent of the demos into a cacophony of phonic animals that are driven by material pleasure: "Just as the lovers of the spectacle were only the Many shouting here and dozing there, the artisan folk must be governed solely by the alteration of work and sleep so that the philosopher-cicada may preserve his sanctuary."[lxxxiii] The just ordering of the state organized along the division of labor, the noble lie introduced in *The Republic*, excludes the laboring people from politics and serves the policing function of the state in the division of the sensible.[lxxxiv]

With the progression of Western political thought from antiquity to modernity, as noted in the earlier discussion of Hobbes, comes the transformation of the noble lie of sacrifice to universal exchange value under capitalism. More specifically, within the context of late capitalism, sacrifice secretly remains in the false resolution of the collective and the individual, which emerges as subjectivity, or the right to relinquish oneself to another.[lxxxv] As Marx

explains in *Capital, Volume 1*, commodity fetishism is a "fantastic form of a relation between things" that is built upon the strange quality of exchange value, which also hides the exploitation of labor and the fact that while on the surface the worker freely sells his or her labor (*chooses* to labor or to resign himself to another), in reality the choice is not free.[lxxxvi] This kind of surrender of oneself to another exposes sovereignty as a fabulation because, as Derrida notes: "A divisible sovereignty is no longer a sovereignty worth of the name, i.e. pure and unconditional." [lxxxvii]

Notably, Machiavelli presents a curious interruption to this fabulation of sovereignty in *The Prince*. In *History of Madness*, Foucault distinguishes the Renaissance period as being one in which madness and related forms of bestiality were present everywhere and integrated into everyday life as a creative force.[lxxxviii] It is not surprising that it is Machiavelli, writing during the Renaissance, who capitalizes on knowing and harnessing this imaginative power. Close reading of *The Prince* suggests that Machiavelli is aware of the fabulous nature of sovereignty as well as the corpses that its divine and animalized forms demand. Machiavelli is instructive on this point when recognizing that there are two ways of fighting, one legal and one forceful: "The first belongs properly to man, the second to animals."[lxxxix] Derrida invests a great deal of time on this theme in *The Beast and the Sovereign*, *Volume 1,* analyzing Machiavelli's implication of Chiron not only as an allegory for instructing princes on the two ways of fighting, but as a gesture towards the fabulous core of sovereignty as signified in the double nature of the half-man, half-beast. Chiron, of course, is a man supported by the body of a horse. This image suggests that the virtuous prince is one who understands that sovereignty and its ensuing human condition are, in fact, supported by an understanding of beastly politics. More specifically, while force signifies bestiality and lack of understanding, law reflects religion and morality, if only superficially, "[a prince] must never appear to be anything but the very soul of clemency, faithfulness, frankness, humanity, and religion to all who see and hear him. But of all the qualities he must seem to have, none is more important than the last."[xc] A virtuous prince knows that law and the morality that it represents is but a veneer, and if held too steadfastly will destroy him, and that violence too often applied will do the same.[xci] Yet it is only the foxy prince that is able to see this since, as Derrida discerns, this foxy prince is only pretending to be a lion.[xcii] Necessitas, in line with Derrida's argument, becomes a political morality that circulates this bestial fetishization within an *economy of violence*. [xciii]

Certainly the fox is important, as Derrida describes, but one should not forget the lion. Expanding upon Derrida's observation, one is reminded of the importance of the lion in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*—a beast that is not only brute force or will, but also one that signifies the inversion of Christian values and the crisis of modernity. [xciv] In this sense, one could argue that the lion is simply *unthinking*, only saying "yes" to itself as the hyper-individual of modernity. A Nietzschean reading of *The Prince* suggests that Machiavelli's lion signifies the will, but in a way that demoralizes and emasculates the people: "Still a prince should make himself feared in such a way that, though he does not gain love, he escapes hatred; for being feared but not hated go readily together. Such a condition he may always attain if he will not touch the property of his citizens and subjects, nor their women."[xcv] Machiavelli also observes in Chapter XXI that the esteemed prince will occupy the people with festivals and spectacles—where one could logically infer that meat is served.[xcvi] Thus, Machiavelli implies that the unsuccessful princely lion will consume the fetishes of the people, believing that he can create anew, outside of the old morality or economy of relations.[xcvii] Machiavelli, of course, advises against this because, as Nietzsche would later observe, even this the lion

cannot do.[xcviii]

Derrida compares sovereignty to prosthesis, a marionette or phallus in hyperbolic overdrive "that never gives anything up, that is an absolute stranger to all thought." [xcix] If one extends this logic to Machiavelli's lion, it is sovereignty experienced as priapism, permanently erect yet lacking generative power—impotent. [c] Likewise, the too-foxy prince becomes a castrated and feminine ruler, as the story of Alexander Severus illustrates.[ci] Allegorically this kind of characterization and attention to the artificiality or simulacrum of politics is strikingly similar to the Hobbes's *Leviathan* and *Behemoth*. It also underscores the fantastic power of carnivorous violence. Returning to Machiavelli, it is the deceptive fox, and only the fox if one takes Derrida at his word, that signifies political morality and who is able to feign goodness; that is, to pretend or make known the virtues of princely rule, only to discard them when necessary. It is when the foxy-prince believes his own ruse and forgets his brute skill—forgets his own fetishization, or simulacrum—that the people consume him. Alone, the fox and the lion are all too human for accepting the fetish as the real thing. Together as the virtuous prince, the fox and the lion, like the centaur, become something altogether different and fabulous—perhaps prototypes of Nietzsche's sovereign individual, whom transvalue the violent and hyperbolic core of modern life and, by extension, the political-economic system that supports and sustains it.[cii]

Towards a Beastly Politics?

Animals are not and cannot be beasts, according to Derrida, for the reason that *beast* is a strictly anthropological signifier. God and animals are polar extremes of enlightenment and stupidity, peace and violence, respectively. These are also the poles that represent the extremes of community and individuality—the divine flock and the blond beast, both of which suffer the disease of humanity.[ciii] As Gilles Deleuze points out in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, Zarathustra tells the story of nihilism from religion to secular humanism: "From God to God's murderer, from God's murderer to the last man."[civ] It is as if Nietzsche instinctively knew what Derrida describes: that sovereignty is empty, a simulacrum of power, and a fabulation rooted in knowing or *pretending to know* the mysteries of divinity and animality. It is this "making like" knowledge that finds its form in the fetish of flesh, the commodity form of meat, which must be circulated and consumed on the market.

Moreover, it is this gastronomic materiality that Nietzsche is acutely aware of, and which perhaps Derrida loses track of in *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1*. To be fair, Derrida does address the issue of death, characterizing death as an autopsic model in which humans see themselves in the dead body of another—the mortal body, the political body, and the sacramental body. For Derrida, it is this impulse which then drives our curious need to be spectators of animals (in zoos, for example) and to limit their freedom.[cv] Nonetheless, food and meat in particular, do not significantly find their way into this conversation.[cvi] This is not to downplay the political importance of Derrida's concept of beastly politics, but to point to its limits, its material threshold. Returning to Nietzsche, the question of nutrition is, both literally and philosophically, what he considers to be the focal point for the salvation of humanity: "I am much more interested in a question on which the 'salvation of humanity' depends far more than on any theologians' curio: the question of *nutrition*. For ordinary use, one may formulate it thus: 'how do *you*, among all people, have to eat to attain your maximum of strength, of *virtu* in the Renaissance style, of moraline-free virtue?'"[cvii] As the above passage illustrates, consumption for Nietzsche is a double entendre that is moral and material—one must know

what they are eating or consuming as well as what it pretends to be.

Of course, making known the ruse necessitates understanding the economy that sustains it: whether it is the economy of violence of the absolute sovereign, or the political economy of meat that is embedded within capitalism. This is why, one could argue, vegetarianism does not escape the sacrificial problematic. One thing that Derrida does not do, for all of his talk of animals, is unthinkingly shift from carnophallogocentrism to vegetarianism or animal advocacy. To do so would be to simply invert sacrificial values, rather than call them into suspicion. Vegetarianism, and especially ethical vegetarianism, risks lapsing into a politics of purity, the new Good or correct belief. In this sense, the law, which is commonly the basis for animal rights, takes on a divine form reminiscent of the natural law that Plato espouses and Machiavelli denounces. While animal rights advocates bring to bear the material violence against animals that underpins capitalist relations (and this is certainly an important disruption, and one that should not be downplayed) to assume that one escapes that violence via the choice to abstain from eating meat or that one's consumer choices amount to a politics ignores the materiality of meat implicit in all commodities. Although animal rights do bring animals back into the polis and restore material animal presence, they fall short by reiterating the fabulous truth-telling ruse of politics that Derrida perceives. Carnivorism similarly embraces the other extreme of sovereignty with equal vigor, naturalizing the necessity of human violence.[cviii] It is the latter that Derrida fails to fully interrogate. Both unthinkingly accept sovereignty in its fabulous forms. To get beyond these forms, one must recognize them for what they are: flesh for flesh fetishes of political desire that demand deep critique of neoliberal capitalist values. As Nietzsche was well aware: "[B]lood and cruelty lie at the bottom of all 'good things'!"[cix]

Notes

_____

i Karl Marx, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2 nd Edition, ed. by Robert C. Tucker (New York: WW Norton, 1978), pp. 469-500.
ii Carol Adams, *The Sexual Politics of Meat: A Feminist-Vegetarian Critical Theory* (Continuum Publishing Company, New York: 2000).
iii Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, & the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf, New York: Routledge, 1994).
iv It is well known that famous Marxists like Terry Eagleton and Fredric Jameson criticized Derrida's interpretation of Marx and that Derrida responded to their critiques, but that exchange is beyond the scope of discussion in this essay, since there will be no attempt to turn Derrida into a Marxist or vice versa. See, for example Michael Sprinker, Michael (ed.), *Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida's Specters of Marx* (Verso, London: 2008).
v Jacques Derrida, *The Beast & the Sovereign*, *Volume 1*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009) and Jacques Derrida, "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject," trans. Peter Connor and Avital Ronell in *Points… Interviews, 1974-1994, Jacques Derrida*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 255-287.
vi Immaterial labor here is defined as information, communication, and cultural production in postindustrial capitalist societies. See Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 2000).
vii Derrida, "Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject," p. 280.
viii Derrida expands his discussion of the carnophallogocentrism of the Western canon in the

1997 lecture, “The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow).” Cary Wolfe, *Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist Theory*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago: 2003), p. 66. Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David Wills (Fordham, New York: 2008), p. 32.
ix Wolfe, *Animal Rites*, p. 66.
x Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” pp. 278-281; Élizabeth De Fontenay, *Without Offending Humans: A Critique of Animal Rights*, trans. Will Bishop (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012), pp. 13-14.
xi Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 281.
xii Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 282.
xiii Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 278, p. 283.
xiv Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 280.
xv De Fontenay, *Without Offending Humans*, p. 13.
xvi Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 283.
xvii Matthew Calarco, *Zoographies: The Question of the Animal from Heidegger to Derrida* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), p. 132.
xviii Calarco, *Zoographies*, p. 132.
xix Calarco, *Zoographies*, pp. 133-135, p. 136.
xx Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 278.
xxi For more information on the medical evidence supporting a plant-based diet over carnivorism, see *Forks over Knives,* directed by Lee Fulkerson (2011; New York: Virgil Films and Entertainment, 2011), DVD.
xxii Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 278-83.
xxiii Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 285.
xxiv Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 285.
xxv De Fontenay, *Without Offending Humans*, p. 13.
xxvi Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 282.
xxvii Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 282.
xxviii Calarco, *Zoographies*, p. 135, p. 136.
xxix De Fontenay, *Without Offending Humans*, pp. 15-16.
xxx De Fontenay, *Without Offending Humans*, pp. 14-15.
xxxi De Fontenay, *Without Offending Humans*, p. 17.
xxxii Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 282, pp. 282-283.
xxxiii For a more detailed discussion of giving, hospitality, and debt, see Jacque Derrida, *The Gift of Death*, trans. David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995) and Jacques Derrida, *Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
xxxiv Derrida is explicit that his attempt is to get beyond the “who” of subjectivity to an unstable and heterogeneous pre-subjective zone of relations; an important part of recognizing this zone is perceiving unstable boundaries between animals and humans. Derrida declares that there is no choice but to eat; one cannot escape this core relationship of consuming the Other, implying certain violence. Derrida’s solution is to eat well, to learn and give to the Other with and which one eats (“Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject” pp. 282-285). One could argue that Derrida’s ethical imperative to be hospitable to the Other manifests as a jargon of authenticity, accepting the core violence of these heterogeneous relations; practically this amounts to better choices of what to eat within the late capitalist life-world (for example Slow Food, farm to table, green consumerism). For an extended discussion of Adorno’s *The Jargon of Authenticity* as it relates to local food movements, see Katherine

Young, “Adorno, Gastronomic Authenticity, and the Politics of Eating Well,” in *New Political Science*, vol. 36, no. 3, 2014, pp. 387-405. See also Theodor Adorno, *The Jargon of Authenticity*, trans. Knut Tarnowski and Frederic Will (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
xxxv John Bellamy Foster, *Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 163.
xxxvi Ted Benton, *Ecology, Animal Rights & Social Justice*, London: Verso, 1993), pp. 49-59.
xxxvii See Karl Marx, “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*: Introduction” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 2 nd Edition, ed. by Robert C. Tucker (New York: WW Norton, 1978), p. 54.
xxxviii Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 89.
xxxix Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man*, p. 237.
xl Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1*, pp. 48-57. See also Plato, “Timaeus” in *The Dialogues of Plato: A Selection*, ed. William Chase Greene, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1927), pp. 505-522 and Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, trans. Francis MacDonald Cornford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 27, p. 209.
xli Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1*, pp. 9-12.
xlii Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject,” p. 281.
xliii Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1*, p. 23.
xliv Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive*, ed. Howard Warrender (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 24.
xlv Jean Hampton, “The Failure of Hobbes’s Social Contract Argument” in *Leviathan: An Authoritative Text: Backgrounds Interpretations*, ed. Richard E. Flatham and David Johnston (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1997), p. 354.

xlvi Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: An Authoritative Text: Backgrounds Interpretations*, ed. Richard E. Flatham and David Johnston (New York: WW Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 119-120.
xlvii Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 106.
xlviii Carl Schmitt. *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty*, trans. by George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 36.
xlix Schmitt, *Political Theology*, pp. 36-37, p. 5.
l Schmitt, *Political Theology*, p. 47.
li Hobbes, *Leviathan*, p. 161; Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1*, p. 27. The passage from Job reads: “Upon earth there is not his like, who is made without fear. He beholdeth all high [things]: he [is] a king over all the children of pride” (Job 41:33-41:34, King James Bible, <kingjamesbibleonline.org/>).
lii Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1*, p. 53.
liii Hobbes, Leviathan, p.76-77; Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1*, p. 55. Derrida discusses the primacy of fear as the root of sovereignty and also as being coextensive with all of the political passions (*The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1*, pp. 40-41). My related focus is on Hobbes’s specific attention to human pride in relation to sovereignty.
liv Psalms 74:14, King James Bible, <kingjamesbibleonline.org/>; Tractate Baba Bathra, Folio 74b, Soncino Babylonian Talmud, trans. Rabbi Dr. I Epstein,< http://www.come-and-hear.com/bababathra/bababathra_74.html >; Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal,* trans. Kevin Attell, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), p. 2-3.

lv Job 40:15, Job 41, King James Bible, <kingjamesbibleonline.org/> Tractate Baba Bathra, Folio 74b, < http://www.come-and-hear.com/bababathra/bababathra_74.html >.
lvi Thomas Hobbes, *Behemoth*, ed. William Molesworth (New York: Burt Franklin, 1969).
lvii Job 41, King James Bible, <kingjamesbibleonline.org/>.
lviii CB Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 64-65.
lix Hobbes, *De Cive*, pp. 151-152.
lx Bradley Macdonald, *Performing Marx: Contemporary Negotiations of a Living Tradition* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2006), p. 43.
lxi See Macpherson's discussion of these three models of society (in *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, pp. 46-70).
lxii Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1999), p. 10, pp. 50-53.
lxiii Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, p. 71.
lxiv Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, pp. 70-71.
lxv Homer, *Odyssey*, trans. Stanley Lombardo (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000), p.182.
lxvi Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, p. 60.
lxvii Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, p.61.
lxviii Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, p. 7.
lxix Jacques Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, trans. John Drury, Corinne Oster, and Andrew Parker (Durham, NC: Duke University Press), p. 203.
lxx Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, p. 25.
lxxi Note Socrates' refutation of Cephalus' argument—the madman defense. Also, Derrida specifically speaks of the link of madness and animality, zoos, and mental asylums (*The Beast and the Sovereign*, p. 297).
lxxii Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, *Volume 1,* p. 34.
lxxiii Plato, *The Republic of Plato*, p. 292.
lxxiv Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1998), p. 108.
lxxv Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, *Volume 1,* p. 35, pp. 34-35.
lxxvi For a detailed discussion of contracting, liberalism, exploitation, and identity, see Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988).
lxxvii Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, pp. 50-57.
lxxviii Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, pp. 24-5.
lxxix Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, p. 8, p. 9.
lxxx Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, pp. 44-45.
lxxxi Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, pp. 45-47.
lxxxii Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, p. 45.
lxxxiii Rancière, *The Philosopher and His Poor*, p. 49.
lxxxiv Young, "The Politics of Eating Well," p. 392.
lxxxv# Horkheimer and Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, pp. 55-56.
lxxxvi Karl Marx, *Capital, Volume 1*, trans. Ben Fowkes (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), p. 165.
lxxxvii Derrida, *The Beast & the Sovereign, Volume 1*, pp. 76-77.
lxxxviii Michel Foucault, *History of Madness*, ed. by Jean Khalfa and trans. by Jonathan Murphy and Jean Khalfa (London: Routledge, 2009), p. 19.
lxxxix Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ed. Daniel Donno, (New York: Bantam, 1966), p. 62.
xc Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 62, p. 63. Derrida discusses the allegorical importance of

Chiron; however, he does not directly tie Machiavelli's discussion of the force of law to religion (although one could argue that he implies it via his use of the immortal figure of Chiron) (*The Beast and the Sovereign*, *Volume 1,* pp. 85-88). Rather, this is my expansion of Derrida's earlier argument regarding the two extremes of sovereignty.

xci Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 38, pp. 56-57.

xcii Derrida, *The Beast & the Sovereign, Volume 1*, pp. 90-91.

xciii For a detailed discussion of the economy of violence in Machiavelli's *Prince*, see Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

xciv Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for None and All*, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Penguin, 1978), pp. 25-28.

xcv Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 60.

xcvi Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 79.

xcvii Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 79.

xcviii Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, p. 27.

xcix Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, *Volume 1,* pp. 222-225, p. 224.

c Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, *Volume 1,* p. 84. Here Derrida notes that Machiavelli describes combat through the law as impotent. I am expanding this notion of impotency to forceful combat, as represented by the lion.

ci Machiavelli, *The Prince*, p. 68-69.

cii Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Genealogy of Morals" in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 2000), pp. 494-496. See also Walter Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, 4 th Edition, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 312-13. Here Kaufmann analyzes Nietzsche's interpretation of the human species, wherein the overman is "the truly human" in defying his instrumentality and animality with regard to society. Within each human, Kaufmann notes, there is the human and the all-too-human, the creator and the creature, and the will represents the constant strain of the two on human life.

ciii Note that I am applying Kaufmann's interpretation of Nietzsche's "blond beast" as the lion. See Friedrich Nietzsche, "The Genealogy of Morals" in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 2000), pp. 476-479; Kaufmann, *Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist*, p. 225; Walter Kaufmann, "Translator's Footnotes" for "Genealogy of Morals" in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 2000), p. 477.

civ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 151.

cv Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, *Volume 1,* pp. 294-300.

cvi Dietary choices/food minimally appear in *The Beast and the Sovereign, Volume 1* (for example, see *The Beast and the Sovereign*, *Volume 1,* p. 19, pp. 110-111, p. 195, pp. 196-198).

cvii Friedrich Nietzsche, "Ecce Homo" in *Basic Writings of Nietzsche*, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Modern Library, 2000), p. 693.

cviii Deleuze questions the reduction of human life to species activity, to rote performance of the will to domination in its material forms. The will to difference, affirmation, in turn, is irreconcilably in tension with the will to nothingness. As Deleuze explains, this tension ends with active destruction and joyful annihilation, which celebrates all that has not returned, which wishes to perish (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 170-175). "The Overman as species is in fact 'the superior species of *everything that is*'" (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 177). The

temporality is obvious in this passage, as it points to the celebration of the moment of eternal return in daily life, which rests not upon idols or supermen, but instead laughs at and defies the embedded violence of the human condition and seeks the will to difference. One must take care not to read this as an implicit acceptance of violence in Nietzsche. As Deleuze explains, nihilism is the demon that bids the weak to do its dirty work, to carry it on their backs by reifying that the only means to power is to individually seize it, to dominate, to destroy in the name of the nothingness (*Nietzsche and Philosophy*, p. 191). Affirmation and negation remain in constant struggle. What Derrida offers in this way is a potentially celebratory deconstruction, a dislocation of everything that is, and a revelation of the animal specter that lies at the heart of all good things.

cix Nietzsche, “The Genealogy of Morals,” p. 498.

4.2.6 Bitcoin and the Philosophy of Money: Evaluating the Commodity Status of Digital Currencies

Andrew Barber, Virginia Tech (n7asb@vt.edu)

Abstract: The rhetoric in Satoshi Nakamoto's "White Paper" on the origins of Bitcoin suggests that the digital currency was envisioned as an entirely autonomous money. Due to the increase in popularity and circulation of Bitcoin and other digital currencies, an intense regulatory debate has been sparked at the global level. These debates reveal a fundamental tension regarding the role of the state in establishing money. While the digital currency community insists that Bitcoin is money, states and monetary authorities have declared Bitcoin a commodity, a declaration that can be traced back to Georg Friedrich Knapp's foundational text The State Theory of Money and reinforced by A. Mitchell Innes' The Credit Theory of Money. Circulating alongside state monies, Bitcoin is then 'accessory money,' unable to satisfy tax obligations and behaving as a commodity. This chartalist account of Bitcoin is refuted by what I identify as a libertarian/von Misean understanding of money motivating the circulation of digital currencies. I argue that the circulation of digital currencies is better explained by the chartalist narrative. I then prescribe Georg Simmel's Philosophy of Money, a broader understanding of money in which more abstract monies might create a supranational economic society, as an ideological alternative to digital currency advocates -- one that better conforms to the nature of money gestured to in Nakamoto's "White Paper". However, even through the lens of Simmel, the limitations imposed by domestic authorities and taxation prevent digital currencies from reaching the envisioned state of autonomy. Synthesizing these understandings of money, Bitcoin may exist as a compromise, a means of international money transfer that weakens the abstract, international economic borders created by state monies.

Keywords: Bitcoin, digital currency, money, globalization, society, community

Introduction

In a cash transaction, one party directly exchanges cash for goods or services from another. This is not the case for online transactions, where third parties are relied upon to ensure secure payment processing. For an online transaction, payment flows from one party through financial institutions, such as banks and processing firms (e.g. Visa, MasterCard, PayPal), to the account of the other, rendering the payment many times removed from being purely peer-to-peer, like the physical exchange of cash, in most instances. Proposing that the many inefficiencies resulting from this online payment model may be avoided by purely peer-to-peer electronic cash, Satoshi Nakamoto[i] published "Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System," more commonly referred to as the "White Paper," in October of 2008, describing the ideas and technology behind Bitcoin before the currency's official release in January of 2009.[ii]

Bitcoin is a digital currency that implements cryptography as a means of verifying and securing online transactions. An electronic coin, as Nakamoto defines it, is "a chain of digital signatures." As coins are transferred the current owner leaves a signature that includes identifying information validating legitimate acquisition of the coin and a unique public key of the next owner. The receiver is then able to trace the attached signatures to "verify the chain

of ownership." [iii] To prevent double spending, or the transfer of the same coin twice, transactions are broadcasted and then "timestamped" by external nodes to create a network that legitimizes coin transfers and stores this information in a block. A block consists of the transaction history and a complex mathematical algorithm. Nodes, or individual CPUs, compete to solve these mathematical problems, and in doing so creates a new block, rewarding the node with brand new Bitcoin. This incentivizes both the maintenance of the network and the honesty of the nodes while allowing for decentralized issuance.[iv] Bitcoin does not rely on a central authority to issue and regulate the currency, implementing, instead, these many autonomous regulatory features in an attempt to replace the need for trust-bearing financial institutions to mediate instances of fraud. As the "White Paper" suggests, Bitcoin is an attempt at establishing an autonomous payment system, making online transactions purely peer-to-peer. Digital currencies, in general, have created an expansive online community strongly advocating for the circulation of these new currencies.
Bitcoin's inception occurred in the midst of the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, when trust in financial institutions, regulatory agencies, and real estate dwindled significantly. A form of money that is able to circumvent the institutions largely viewed as responsible for such a lengthy period of economic hardship is understandably desirable, potentially explaining the rise in Bitcoin's popularity. As Nakamoto notes, a cash-only economy would avoid the same problems that Bitcoin aimed at resolving by removing the uncertainties associated with online exchange. While localization movements do exist, they have not received the same level of participatory popularity compared to the movement towards digital currency. Despite this desirability, because Bitcoin is not issued by a state and does not have legal tender status, it also receives widespread skepticism.

The increasing popularity and circulation of digital currencies sparked an intense global debate surrounding the regulatory treatment of Bitcoin and other digital currencies such as Ripple and Litecoin. The discussion ranges from macro areas of campaign finance and national security to more micro issues, such as personal finance and accounting. These debates reveal a fundamental uncertainty regarding the nature of money. Describing what Bitcoin is, a video on Bitcoin.org's front page claims that Bitcoin is to money what the Internet was to property.[v] The Internet, through file-sharing, video streaming, etc., shook the understanding of the definition of property, as seen through the intensity of the intellectual property debates that continue as of this writing.[vi] Paralleling the property debate, Bitcoin forces the fundamental understanding of money to be revisited. Is Bitcoin *money*? If not, then what is it? What, then, constitutes *money*? This essay is an attempt to address these questions in the context of Bitcoin and other digital currencies.

At the heart of this discussion is the relevance of the state. Typically, states issue their own money and legally require the circulation of this currency through legal tender laws, legitimizing and obligating its acceptance as a satisfactory means of payment. However, a government does not issue and regulate Bitcoin and its related infrastructure. The question is: does money require the presence of the state? This uncertainty is evidenced by writers such as Abe Cofnas, who poses the question "[is] Bitcoin a currency or commodity?" in *Futures Magazine* to discuss the essence of Bitcoin outside of a purely regulatory context. [vii] A common argument one may encounter from authorities is that Bitcoin, not being issued by a state and not being legal tender in any jurisdiction, is therefore not money, and must be some other thing, like a commodity. For example, Deputy Governor Grant Spencer of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand claimed "[…] Bitcoin […] seems to behave more like a commodity than

a currency." [viii] While Spencer does not explicitly cite Knapp in making such claims, his argument directly parallels that of Georg Friedrich Knapp, author of *The State Theory of Money* where he founded "chartalism," or the state money approach, influencing canonical economists such as John Maynard Keynes. [ix] The lasting influence this work has had created the monetary understanding within which the Bitcoin debate is currently taking place.

I proceed by reconstructing Knapp's *State Theory of Money* to elucidate the argument between Bitcoin as money or commodity. Following this, I invoke Alfred Mitchell Innes to reinforce Knapp's claims. This discussion shows in theory that Bitcoin is not money proper, resembling something more commodity-like instead. In practice, this distinction is affirmed by the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) treatment of digital currencies. The digital currency community rejects this *State Theory*, embracing what I identify as a libertarian understanding of money, resembling Ludwig von Mises' *Theory of Money and Credit*. I then introduce Georg Simmel and *The Philosophy of Money* as a more viable theoretical alternative to those insisting digital currencies are monies. The purpose of this writing is not to ascribe Simmel's theory to those advocating for the circulation of digital currencies, but to prescribe. In closing, I argue that Bitcoin is not money proper even with an adherence to Simmel's theory. Instead, under Simmel's framework Bitcoin is a money-like commodity allowing for more efficient currency exchange in a globalized economic society.

Knapp and *the State Theory of Money*

Georg Friedrich Knapp founded the "chartalist," or state theory, approach to money. Chartalism refutes the idea that the circulatory value of money was ever derived from the intrinsic worth of the substance comprising the money. Instead, money obtains its value from the state when it issues the money and declares it as the form of money it will accept at its pay offices as satisfactory payment for taxes. Unlike his opponents (the metallists, as Knapp calls them), the material substance behind the money is not relevant in determining the "circulatory value" of the money. Since the purpose of money is to circulate in exchange, only the circulatory value is important. Therefore, the state as the issuer of money, validating its circulation by tax policy, ultimately provides money with value.

In *The State Theory of Money*, Knapp creates an expansive vocabulary for the numerous forms money may take, rendering it a glossary as much as it is a work of economic thought. For our purposes, we only need to focus on two essential kinds of money for Knapp: valuta and accessory. Valuta is the state-issued, definitive money that is always kept ready by the state to be paid out for government purchases. This money is "definitive" in the sense that it is non-convertible, meaning that valuta money is not redeemable for any other form of money; it is final. In order for an economy to function properly, Knapp argues that valuta money must be circulating within it. On the other hand, accessory money is, as Knapp puts, it "all other forms of money" that are not valuta. [x] [xi] Accessory *may* circulate alongside definitive state money, but is not necessary. Being convertible, accessory money may be exchanged for other forms of money at some determined rate, which the state may or may not have an official role in. In this sense, it is not final because the recipient of accessory money must convert it into the definitive state money in order to satisfy her tax obligations. For example, a restaurant in the southwestern U.S. may accept the peso as a means of payment, but the restaurant owner must convert these pesos into U.S. dollars, according to some rate of exchange, to pay her taxes.

Accessory money, being convertible and non-definitive, behaves as both a commodity and

money. When exchanged for goods or services, accessory behaves as money, serving as a medium of exchange. However, being convertible, accessory may be exchanged for definitive state money in order to realize a profit. As Knapp puts it:

> […] all obligations expressed simply in money refer in the last resort to valuta [or the definitive state money], because judicial decision is final and the state as fountain of law only compels obligations to be performed in the money in which itself (by its Treasury) makes payments.
> For this reason it is always valuta money which is contrasted with commodities […] So that it is not money simply which is contrasted with the concept commodity, but only valuta money; for *ex definition* it is only valuta money which is never purchased. But there is absolutely no difficulty in conceiving that accessory kinds of money are purchased; so that they are commodities[…][xii]

This passage indicates two important relationships that valuta money has with commodities. The first is quite clear: the concept 'definitive money' and the concept 'commodity' are in opposition with one another. Because valuta money cannot be bought or sold, it cannot be treated as a commodity. Accessory money, capable of being purchased and sold in terms of the domestic state money, may then be treated as both money and a commodity. Only when accessory is used as a means of payment is it being used as money. Investors focusing in foreign exchange markets offer an excellent example of money acting as a commodity. Foreign money circulates as accessory relative to the domestic state money, and investors speculate on foreign exchange rates, investing accordingly in order to realize a profit in terms of the domestic state money.

But there is another facet to the cited passage that is crucial to Knapp's theory. "[…] All obligations expressed *simply in money* […]" are to be understood in terms of the valuta money (italics added). At this point, when establishing the commodity status of monies, Knapp does not explicitly distinguish between valuta and accessory. Obligations expressed in money terms, or prices in general, regardless of which money the price is expressed in terms of, are rooted domestically in the state's definitive money. Having understood this, we can see where some contemporary criticisms of digital currencies are derived from.

Bitcoin is circulating as accessory money[xiii] alongside state currencies, which particular currency depends on the geopolitical location. I will consider the case of Bitcoin (BTC) and U.S. Dollars (USD) with USD being the valuta money. In order to obtain Bitcoin, one must typically head to an exchange such as BTC-e or Bitstamp where state money may be exchanged for Bitcoin. Exchanging or converting United States Dollars into Bitcoin is a transaction where BTC is being purchased with USD. In this transaction, Bitcoin behaves as a commodity. Only when taking BTC to a vendor and purchasing a good/service with it is BTC's function as money realized. If and when BTC is later sold for USD, it reverts back to its commodity state. USD, being definitive, may not be purchased in the United States, and may therefore never act as a commodity. In Knapp's formulation, this means that when exchanging Bitcoin for Dollars, Bitcoin is being *sold* for Dollars as opposed to *purchasing* Dollars. *The State Theory of Money* implies that conversions between accessory and valuta money be referred to in such a language. While the developers of Bitcoin have suggested that their aim is to provide an autonomous currency that stands apart from state monies, it is interesting that the adopting community's literature gestures to the ultimate exchangeability of Bitcoin

into U.S. Dollars, with prominent sections of their official wiki headed “Buying Bitcoin” and “Selling Bitcoin.” [xiv]

Innes and *The Credit Theory of Money*

The idea that prices expressed in accessory are ultimately referring to valuta money suggests that Bitcoin, an accessory money, cannot circulate autonomously alongside valuta. However, Knapp does not discuss this idea beyond the cited passage. More insight into the relationship between accessory money and valuta is offered by Alfred Mitchell Innes, who expounds where the value of money is derived from. If Bitcoin is to circulate as an autonomous currency, then the digital currency community will need to address the issues that Knapp presents. Assuming Knapp is correct in deeming accessory ultimately valuable in terms of valuta, then Bitcoin would not be circulating autonomously as its value is derived from the money of the state. The digital currency community, viewing Bitcoin as money, would need to refute this claim. This may not be an easy accomplishment, as Innes demonstrates that taxation has a prominent impact on everyday exchange.

Innes’ argument proceeds by refuting the traditional economic account of the myth of barter,[xv] leading to the inception of *The Credit Theory of Money*. The traditional story told about the evolution of money out of ancient barter economies claims that as exchanging societies grew, the *double coincidence of wants* problem emerged. Each bartering party must demand the good/service the other has, making trade impracticable. Intermediate commodities, and then money, were introduced as a medium of exchange, solving this inefficiency. Transacting parties could now pay with this medium of exchange, using it to purchase goods/services that they demand at some other point in time. This means of payment eventually evolved into the economies we have today, an idea popularized by Adam Smith. For Innes, the idea of introducing an intermediate commodity into exchange is unnecessarily complicated, so much so that it was not likely to have ever occurred. If these transacting parties had been involved in trade prior to the time when one party did not have an interest in the goods offered by the other, a loan would be more feasible. Introducing an intermediate commodity is a complicated idea; accepting it as payment *now* in order to purchase something *later* depends on all other parties in the economic society being willing to accept the medium in the future. A simple loan where party *A* gives *B* some good or service with an agreement to be paid at a later time is much more likely to have occurred[xvi], as a trust relationship between two individuals is the only prerequisite. For Innes, this means that money must have evolved out of primitive *credit* systems as a means of quantifying and exchanging debts and credits. Money is then a credit document, and obtains its value as a credit.[xvii]

The role of the state in establishing the value of money in *The Credit Theory* is largely similar to that of *The State Theory*. While Innes goes into much less detail on the state than Knapp, Innes is able to elaborate on the significant influence that the state has on the circulation of money. For Knapp, state money obtains its value by being both issued by the state and being accepted at state pay offices (merely declaring a form of money ‘legal tender’ was not satisfactory). In *The Credit Theory*, state money is a credit that the government issues, placing society in a debt that can only be repaid through taxation, the legal obligation to pay off this debt. For the best illustration of this, we must turn to Innes himself:

> The government by law obliges certain selected persons to become its debtors. It declares that so-and-so, who imports goods from abroad, shall owe the government so much on all that he imports, or that so-and-so, who owns land, shall owe to the

> government so much per acre. This procedure is called levying a tax, and the persons thus forced into the position of debtors to the government must in theory seek out the holder of the tallies or other instrument acknowledging a debt due by the government, and acquire from them the tallies by selling to them some commodity or in doing them some service, in exchange for which they may be induced to part with their tallies. When these are returned to the government treasury, the taxes are paid. [xviii]

Taxation, such as property tax, places property owners in the position of a debtor, compelling them to obtain a credit instrument (money) in order to pay the state and absolve the debt. If the property itself does not generate monetary revenue in the terms of state money, individuals must earn, or convert their labor or property, into state money to pay the state in a satisfactory manner.

A synthesis of Knapp and Innes' theories reveals a deeper understanding of the nature of state issued money, and the presence of the state in every-day economic exchange. States place those living within their governance in a debt by declaring each citizen responsible for a tax liability. By only accepting state-issued currency as a satisfactory medium of payment for these taxes, state money is then a credit document used to absolve the citizenry's debt. Those obligated to pay taxes must seek this credit document, or state money, in order to absolve their debt, ensuring the circulation of state money in the public and private realms of exchange. Accessory money, not being issued by the state, can only function as a money up until it is time to pay taxes, at which point it must be converted into state issued, valuta money. As it is the money of the state that is accepted at tax offices, this is then the money individuals are ultimately concerned with. Only state money definitively absolves tax obligations, and it is therefore taxes that drive the circulation of money. This is the same conclusion reached by L. Randall Wray, a proponent of Modern Money Theory (MMT) or "neo-chartalism," in conducting a similar literary analysis and synthesis, deeming money as "that which is needed to pay taxes" (twintopt).[xix] I will now move to apply the theory to a recent notice issued by the Internal Revenue Service, a payment agency of the state, in order to offer a chartalist account of the circulation of Bitcoin alongside USD.

The IRS on Bitcoin

In early 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) released a notice explaining how they would interpret current tax codes as applying to digital currencies (i.e. Bitcoin).[xx] The IRS, a federal agency of the United States government tasked with enforcing tax compliance, is an example of a state pay office, as Knapp calls it. Applying the framework of Knapp and Innes to this notice offers an explanation as to why the IRS treats digital currencies in the manner that exemplifies Bitcoin behaving as a commodity in circulation alongside state money.

Bitcoin, having an equivalent value in "real currency" (i.e. USD, or state money) and acting as a substitute for real currency in "some environments," is thus referred to as "convertible." In other words, Bitcoin "can be purchased for, or exchanged into, U.S. dollars," rendering it a convertible currency, sometimes functioning as a medium of exchange during some transactions, rhetorically paralleling Knapp's distinction between accessory and valuta. It does not have legal tender status, but Bitcoin transactions may still have tax consequences due to their convertibility. Digital currencies are then property in the eyes of the IRS, and are treated as property under current tax law.[xxi] When Bitcoin is received as payment for a good or service, the "fair market value" on the date of exchange must be recorded and reported to the

IRS as income, with fair market value being the exchange rate into USD.
The notice largely corresponds to the theory Knapp has established. Without authority over monetary media itself, the IRS is responsible solely for collecting this tax revenue and handing it over to the Treasury. The U.S. dollar, being the only currency the federal government accepts as payment for tax liabilities, must therefore be the *definitive* money. Given this, the IRS cannot treat Bitcoin as a money. Rendering Bitcoin a commodity (property) allows for the application of current tax law with relative ease.

By declaring income in Bitcoin as taxable income, the IRS has effectively implicated all prices expressed in Bitcoin as referring to USD in the last resort. All Bitcoin income must be recorded in terms of the U.S. dollar in order to comply with the current tax codes. While the IRS' interpretation of current tax codes does not mandate constant conversion of Bitcoin into USD in every instance of acquisition, it does necessitate awareness of the exchange rate. The actual conversion is only necessary when it is time to pay the government. However, requiring the recording of Bitcoin revenue in USD terms introduces the money of the state into every Bitcoin exchange. While not actually selling Bitcoin for USD, the conversion occurs conceptually in each transaction. In the language of the IRS, Bitcoin is serving as a "substitute" for USD, a convertible certificate redeemable for USD at a later occasion, with the USD value of the certificate being the ultimate concern of the recipient and government. This held true prior to the release of the IRS notice. Prices listed in Bitcoin fluctuated with the exchange rate in terms of USD. For example, Overstock.com,[xxii] which accepts Bitcoin as payment, lists all of their prices in USD. When paying with Bitcoin, the U.S. dollar price is converted into an equivalent Bitcoin price as determined by a Bitcoin exchange. With the prices being listed in USD, and only the Bitcoin price being adjusted for fluctuations in the exchange rate, it is clear that the firm is concerned, in the final sense, with receiving a specified quantity of state money. The desired income for the sale of a particular good must be determined in the terms of a definitive monetary unit, as this is the unit where income is final.[xxiii] Again, this behavior resembles the valuating process established by *The State Theory*, where in order for an economy to function properly, there must exist a valuta money that severs the obligations of all involved parties, effectively finalizing the transaction. Under this chartalist account, Bitcoin is not money. The epistemological assumptions of valuta money rule out accessory as money proper purely by definition.[xxiv] As I have argued, the IRS treatment of digital currencies and the behavior of firms and agents accepting them is effectively chartalist. As Innes and Knapp demonstrate, the history of money shows the prominence of the state in how we have come to understand money today. The essential role of the state in the nature of money is refuted by advocates of digital currency circulation, evidenced by the recent Silk Road trial.

The Silk Road and Ludwig von Mises

Bitcoin garnered significant media and regulatory attention due to the payment technology being implemented on the Silk Road. The Silk Road was a dark web, online marketplace for vendors and buyers of illicit goods ranging from narcotics and forged documents to illegal fireworks. The anonymity software Tor was employed by the moderator(s) and users of the site to make tracking the illegal activities incredibly difficult for law enforcement agencies. However, Dread Pirate Roberts (DPR), the pseudonym under which Ross Ulbricht operated the Silk Road's endeavors, was arrested in 2013 and convicted in February, 2015 on charges of narcotics and money laundering conspiracy. Ulbricht's trial brought global attention to Bitcoin, unveiling many of the ideological motivations behind those advocating for digital

currencies. While discussing Silk Road and the trial, I will refer to the operator of Silk Road as DPR in the context of correspondence Ulbricht posted online before his arrest, and will refer to Ulbricht by his legal name when citing him in the context of the trial.[xxv]

Shortly before the arrest of Ulbricht, DPR engaged in an interview with Andy Greenberg of Forbes over the Silk Road's messaging system. During this interview, DPR claimed that "[…] Silk Road is a way to get around regulation from the state," and "with Bitcoin giving people control over their money and trade again, [there is] the potential for a monumental shift in the power structure of the world."[xxvi] In Ulbricht's pre-trial hearings, these motivations are front and center as the defense motioned to dismiss charges of money laundering conspiracy. In an attempt to use the IRS' declaration that Bitcoin is not money against the state, the defense interestingly argued that since Bitcoin is not money, citing the same IRS notice as above, a transaction involving Bitcoin does not constitute a "financial transaction," and, therefore, "cannot form the basis for a money laundering conspiracy."[xxvii] The court disagreed, citing Bitcoin's ultimate convertibility into state money as a source of value. Recognizing, much like the IRS, that Bitcoin behaves similarly to money when acting as a medium of exchange, the court declared that reducing the status of Bitcoin to a commodity does not strip the digital currency of its money-like qualities. Likening Bitcoin to gold, District Judge Katherine B. Forrest claimed, "[t]here is no doubt that if a narcotics transaction was paid for in cash, which was later exchanged for gold, and then converted back to cash, that would constitute a money laundering transaction." [xxviii]

DPR's claim that Bitcoin is a means to avoid state regulation and take back monetary power from the state largely resembles the thought of Ludwig von Mises and *The Theory of Money and Credit*.[xxix] [xxx] Ludwig von Mises directly rejects the idea that money is given its value from the state. Mises also agrees with the chartalist account that legal tender laws do not suffice in creating money, claiming that it is exchanging individuals employing a "common media of exchange" that determines what is money. "Quite possibly, commerce may take into use those things to which the state has ascribed the power of payment; but it *need* not do so. It may, if it likes, reject them."[xxxi] As previously mentioned, chartalism claims that taxation is what drives the circulation of state issued money. Mises refutes this, understanding taxation as a tool states employ to coerce exchanging individuals into adopting their monetary instruments, "persuading commerce to abandon one sort of money and adopt another."[xxxii] Tax policy may be influential in a state's effort to implement a particular monetary media, but it is ultimately those exchanging who must decide to adopt this media as a common media of exchange for this policy to be effective, according to Mises. The power to collectively determine what functions as money in an exchange economy is the Misean idea DPR alludes to in his claim that Bitcoin returns monetary power to individuals.

Despite this libertarian/von Misean monetary ideology motivating DPR's use of Bitcoin on Silk Road, the chartalist account of Bitcoin as accessory money better explains the monetary phenomenon of this illicit marketplace. While only Bitcoin was exchanged on Silk Road, prices were eventually switched from being purely expressed in Bitcoin over to the user's domestic state currency.[xxxiii] Much like the earlier example of Overstock.com, the money of the state fundamentally underlies each Bitcoin transaction to the point where even the black market enterprise Silk Road recognized and legitimized it. The von Misean motivation behind digital currency advocates and users does not adequately explain the commodity-like behavior of Bitcoin, especially in the case of those wishing to use Bitcoin in a more legitimate marketplace

such as Overstock.com. For these reasons, I maintain digital currency advocates should turn to Georg Simmel's understanding of money and communities as an ideological alternative to the libertarian/von Misean monetary theory.

Simmel and *The Philosophy of Money*

Instead of creating a narrow work deriving the value of money, Simmel aimed to understand how money, as an instrument and a construct, affects human relationships both to each other and the world. Making this move is important for the digital currency community as I have shown that a strictly economic understanding of money does not fit Bitcoin. Adopting a broader conception of money, as not only an economic instrument, but a social instrument is more appropriate to the idea that Bitcoin is money while additionally explaining the emergence of communities distinguished by the utilization of digital currencies.

Simmel understands money as the objectifying medium of value. Only once economic transactions occur can an objective value be assigned to an object. [xxxiv] Money, as a tool for comparing the values of objects in exchange, is the quantification of "abstract economic value," or an object's worth in terms of other objects.[xxxv] Yet, it is difficult to replace value with a symbol; trusting that others will accept it as a form of payment complicates the matter even further. The freedom of an individual to participate in exchange is limited by the liberty of all the other individuals that make up the collective to refuse her money. Since community is largely the result of exchange, the community depends on all of those who comprise it to accept each other's money. Trust in the state, to coin and mint money, is derived from this community exchange. If the state guarantees that each transacting party will accept the currency payment of the other, individuals can then participate in exchange without worry.[xxxvi]

Simmel argues that money is continually evolving from material states into more abstract forms towards a state of pure abstraction, which Nigel Dodd refers to as "perfect money."[xxxvii] More abstract forms of money are necessary to encapsulate larger populations. Economic societies grow as more individuals accept a particular money. Material forms, such as gold coins or specie more generally, made the transfer of money difficult across vast distances or large quantities. The substance value of the material was eventually replaced with state guarantees in response to these difficulties. However, circulation of state money is confined to the geopolitical borders of that state, since the state cannot guarantee international traders will accept the domestic currency. Simmel argues that this explains the rise of precious metals as a form of currency. If trade across national communities were to exist, currency of higher intrinsic value must necessarily be offered as payment to promote acceptation. Gold and silver were highly valued commodities nearly worldwide, which explained the tendency for large, powerful nations to mint them. However, as global trade increased, trust relationships and interdependencies were established, creating "the basis for the diminishing intrinsic value of money and its replacement by functional value."[xxxviii] Paper notes, and then eventually checks, debit/credit cards, and online payment systems allowed for more efficient trade to expand into the global realm.

The Eurozone exemplifies the trend of interdependency, with the agreement of now eighteen European Union states to accept the Euro as legal tender. Instead of each state issuing and circulating their own currency, the Eurozone abstracted the money beyond the individual guarantees of each nation to the European Central Bank, an entity existing above domestic authority. Under Simmel's terms we can envision this union as a synthesis of previously

separate economic societies into a singular society. Individuals in the Eurozone are now members to a much larger economic totality when they possess the Euro, a society that transcends the borders of their domestic nations, with the Euro being the symbol of membership to this exchange society. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel notoriously stated, "the Euro is the guarantor of a unified Europe."[xxxix]

For Simmel, money, in addition to being a medium of exchange, is the symbol of membership to economic society. It cannot exclude any particular agent, and is not dependent upon the agent's productive role. This allows for larger economic spheres to emerge. By removing "everything personal and specific" from trade, money has been able to unite people of such diverse cultural, social, and spatial backgrounds that would otherwise be inaccessible. The form of money must then be more abstract the greater the economic sphere in order to permit acceptability among its members.[xl]

Money's ability to transcend distances is one of many reasons global trade has reached such an immense and complex scale, according to Simmel. However, there are still costs and inefficiencies associated with trade in the international market. Money remains the symbol of membership to an abstract economic society. Thus, even with the emergence of monetary unions like the Eurozone many different state monies are still circulating. International trade requires sellers to accept foreign currencies or the buyers to convert their domestic money into one the seller accepts. State money restricts economic societies to geopolitical borders, with individuals constantly entering and exiting as they convert their respective currencies.

If we accept Simmel's understanding of how money unites exchanging individuals into economic totalities, with membership determined by the money one is exchanging, then Bitcoin holds a unique place in money's evolution. Money's value has been abstracted from material substance to state assurance as exchange expanded globally. Continuing along Simmel's logic, as money approaches a purely abstract form, further abstraction promotes growth of the economic societies by including a more vast population. With economic societies being defined by the currency in circulation and value of the currency coming from states, it would follow that the next step in monetary evolution would be an attempt to transcend states. Nakamoto's "White Paper" indicates intent to establish an autonomous payment system that eliminates the need for third-party mediation and relying on financial institutions and states to ensure online transactions to purely peer-to-peer online exchange. Using the Internet as a vessel for global communication and trade, Bitcoin as a payment system consists of many internal features that significantly reduce possibilities for fraud, counterfeit, and double spending in the hopes of eliminating the need for institutions of trust.[xli] Digital currencies, in general, have tried to abstract money beyond a form that requires valuation from an institution or state by incorporating the functions of these institutions that make their money functionally valuable directly into the design of these digital currency payment systems themselves. It is then understandable for the digital currency community to insist that Bitcoin is *money* because they are a Simmelian society coalescing around these technical features.

Embracing Simmel's evolutionary understanding of money may be beneficial to advancing digital currencies, as the ideas behind it largely resemble what I have identified as being the motivations behind the creation of digital currencies. States limit the size of economic societies and financial institutions, as third parties, distance transacting individuals from one

another. By favoring money that does not rely on these obstructing institutions, the digital currency community reveals a preference for a more coherent and inclusive economic society, mediated instead by the relationship of each transacting member to one another under such a society. In an economic exchange:

> [t]he pivotal point in the interaction of the two parties recedes from the direct line of contact between them, and moves to the relationship which each of them, through his interest in money, has with the economic community that accepts the money, and demonstrates this fact by having money minted by its highest representative.[xlii]

But if the state, as the issuer of money, defines economic society, then a global society cannot fully be realized. Questioning the essential role of the state in the nature of money allows for replacing the state as the "highest representative" with a global economic community. At the very least, the conceptual logic of forming a supranational exchange society is more coherent in Simmel's formulation.

However, it was not within the scope of Simmel's project to expose the hindrances along money's evolutionary path to its ideal form. The philosophical role of the state as a vehicle ensuring acceptation of money is minute relative to *The Philosophy of Money* as a whole. Knapp, on the other hand, focused specifically on the state's role and elaborated on the implications of state money. As Knapp and Innes have collectively demonstrated, the state is much more prominent in money than Simmel articulates. States necessarily treat accessory currencies as if they are commodities because the money issued by the state must be definitive, as illustrated previously in this essay. If Bitcoin is truly meant to be a payment instrument that transcends the binds of the state in the name of creating one global economic society, then it appears to have already failed in practice. Taxation reduces Bitcoin to a commodity-like state, ultimately valuable in terms of state money. Even Simmel, himself, viewed the idea of perfect money as fictitious, an asymptotic point money was evolving towards.[xliii] So where does that leave Bitcoin?

Simmel offers an account of where the evolution of money is heading towards in its perfect, ideal state. While I have argued that Bitcoin fits Simmel's evolutionary understanding of money, Bitcoin is effectively accessory money, or a commodity that may behave like money in some instances. Given these implications in practice, as illustrated by the IRS' treatment of Bitcoin and the operations of Bitcoin price listing, I do not expect Bitcoin to reach the status of an autonomous currency, as envisioned by Nakamoto. It is the money of the state that is of ultimate concern to transacting individuals, with Bitcoin serving as a new means of transferring these state currencies. As the IRS notice shows, Bitcoin is not definitive, having its value rooted in the money of the state. Bitcoin is then not autonomous as its circulation depends on the definitive state money. Nevertheless, the features that Bitcoin's developers implemented as a means of security have greatly reduced the need for financial third parties, whether they be governments or firms, and the costs associated with them. Digital currencies, like Bitcoin, may be a means of compromise between Ludwig von Mises' voluntary common media of exchange and the limitations of accessory money identified by Knapp and Innes, given this understanding of Simmelian economic societies.

While it does not appear that Bitcoin can succeed as an autonomous currency, Bitcoin is a significant innovation in money transfer technologies. As Ben Bernanke, former chairman of

the U.S. Federal Reserve system, said in a letter addressed to Congress, "[Bitcoin] may hold long-term promise, particularly if [digital currencies] promote a faster, more secure and more efficient payment system."[xliv] Sending money across the globe can be done in seconds with current digital currency technologies. In the realm of international exchange transacting parties do not need to be concerned with the domestic money of one another with the introduction of digital currencies. Party A, concerned with state money X, can pay Party B, concerned with state money Y, using Bitcoin as an intermediate money, or a certificate redeemable for numerous other state monies. Neither A nor B needs to be interested in the money of the other if Bitcoin is used as the medium of exchange; conversion is the responsibility of each party on their respective end. Bitcoin, then, has the potential to be the symbol of membership to a global exchange community while allowing for independent states to conduct their monetary endeavors in a manner similar to Knapp's theory and the IRS.

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Chad Lavin for his invaluable feedback and guidance throughout this entire project, as well as Michael Moehler, Francois Debrix, Daniel Breslau, Mark Lucht, Sascha Engel, and Anthony Szczurek. Additionally, I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for their thorough and insightful critique of an earlier draft of this essay. These ideas, in large, were presented at the 2015 ASPECT Graduate Conference *Representations of Resistance* and 2015 ACC Meeting of the Minds and will be presented at the Conference of the International Network for Economic Method in November 2015.

Notes

---

i Nakamoto is likely a pseudonym for one or many different individuals responsible for Bitcoin. As of this writing, the developer(s) of Bitcoin is (are) anonymous.
ii "History," *Bitcoin Wiki*, accessed on Dec. 13, 2014, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/History_of_Bitcoin#cite_note-1
iii Satoshi Nakamoto, *Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System*, (2008). https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
iv*Ibid*, page 4. "If a greedy attacker is able to assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth."
v WeUseCoins, *What is Bitcoin? (v2)*, Video, 1:36, Apr. 24, 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gc2en3nHxA4
vi Lawrence Lessig , *Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity* (New York: Penguin, 2004).
vii Abe Cofnas, "Bitcoin: Currency or Commodity?" *Futures Magazine*, Jun. 1, 2014, http://www.futuresmag.com/2014/06/01/bitcoin-currency-or-commodity For an additional example of this debate, see Jeffrey I Snyder, "Bitcoin: Currency, Commodity, or None of the Above?" *The National Law Review*, Oct. 16, 2014, http://www.natlawreview.com/article/bitcoin-currency-commodity-or-none-above
viii Grant Spencer, "Reserve Bank Perspectives on Payments," (Speech, Payments New Zealand Conference, Auckland, NZ, Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/research_and_publications/speeches/2014/5930114.pdf
ix John Maynard Keynes, *A Treatise On* Money (New York, Harcourt Brace and Co., 1930).

x Georg Friedrich Knapp, *The State Theory of Money*, trans. H.M. Lucas and J. Bonar, (Clifton: A.M. Kelley, 1905/1976), 150. Originally translated into English in 1924.
xi L. Randall Wray, *Understanding Modern Money: The Key to Full Employment and Price Stability* (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 1998), 27.Here, Wray uses a more narrow definition of accessory money when reconstructing Knapp's theory. I interpret Knapp's definition of accessory to be *every* form of money circulating in exchange alongside definitive state money, or *all* other money that is not valuta (see p. 105, 158-9).
xii Georg Friedrich Knapp, *The State Theory of Money*, trans. H.M. Lucas and J. Bonar, (Clifton: A.M. Kelley, 1905/1976), 158.
xiii*Ibid.*, 155-157. Knapp would not classify Bitcoin as 'money.' In the most general sense, referring to the exchange of money, Knapp is discussing a literal exchange of a physical note, token, etc., with the substance being irrelevant. Money exists as a physical medium. Bitcoin resembles what Knapp calls a "Giro payment," or payment without money. Giro exchange is merely a matter of bookkeeping, "transferring units of value," or altering the numbers in transacting parties' accounts within an institution they share in common such as a bank. For Bitcoin this would be the block chain. Knapp's analysis remains conceptually applicable as payment technologies evolved beyond what was present in his time.
xiv "Buying Bitcoin," *Bitcoin Wiki,* accessed on Nov. 19, 2014, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Buying_Bitcoins_(the_noob_version)The Bitcoin wiki, linked to from bitcoin.org, the unofficial authority on Bitcoin, refers to exchanging Bitcoin as "Buying Bitcoin" and "selling Bitcoin," conforming to the rhetoric of the state theory.
xv David Graeber, *Debt: The First 5,000 Years* (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2011). Graeber refers to the theory that money evolved from the inefficiencies of primitive barter economies as "the myth of barter." As of this writing, this doctrine is still held to be true in economics courses, despite an abundance of anthropological and historical evidence suggesting otherwise.
xvi L. Randall Wray, "Conclusion: The Credit Money and State Money Approaches," in *Credit and State Theories of Money: The Contribution of A. Mitchell Innes,* ed. L. Randall Wray (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004), 223.Wray notes that Innes' historical theory is "based on little more than hunches about the history of money," a history that was largely verified, in the general sense, after Innes' writing.
xvii Alfred Mitchell Innes, "What is Money?", *Banking Law Journal,* (May, 1913): 377-408 andAlfred Mitchell Innes, "The Credit Theory of Money," *Banking Law Journal*, (Dec./Jan., 1914): 151-168.
Reprinted in: *Credit and State Theories of Money: The Contributions of A. Mitchell Innes*, ed. L. Randall Wray (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004), 14-49 and 50-78.
xviii Alfred Mitchell Innes, "What is Money?", in *Credit and State Theories of Money: The Contributions of A. Mitchell Innes*, ed. L. Randall Wray (Northampton: Edward Elgar, 2004), 37.
xix L. Randall Wray, *Modern Money Theory: A Primer on Macroeconomics for Sovereign Monetary Systems* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) 47-52. See also Wray (1998, 2004)
xx "Notice 2014-21" (Online, Internal Revenue Service, 2014) http://www.irs.gov/irb/2014-16_IRB/ar12.html In this notice, the IRS refers to Bitcoin as a "virtual currency." To avoid confusion with the anthropological definition of virtual currency, I will continue to refer to Bitcoin, and similar currencies, as digital currency. The IRS also uses Bitcoin and USD as example money; for consistency, I will continue to do the same.
xxi According to private correspondence (November, 2014) with Scott Johnson, Assistant Professor of Accounting at Virginia Tech, we can consider the IRS deeming Bitcoin as

'property' synonymous with 'commodity' as both are taxed similarly.
xxii Overstock.com is widely considered to be the first major retail firm to accept Bitcoin for payment, with their first Bitcoin transactions occurring in January of 2014, prior to the March 2014 release of the IRS notice.
xxiii This does not mean that determining the desired income from a sale necessitates expressing prices in terms of the definitive monetary unit. Vendors such as those on the Silk Road (albeit, largely illicit) listed prices in terms of Bitcoin only, for some duration. However, fluctuations in the value of Bitcoin were reflected by an equivalent change in the listed prices, demonstrating again that it was some other money the sellers were ultimately interested in. Before the federal investigation shut down Silk Road, the pricing system was converted to one expressing prices in the purchasing party's domestic currency.
xxiv For this observation in particular, I am indebted to the anonymous reviewer.
xxv This is done merely because Ulbricht's defense maintains that he was framed as the identity behind Dread Pirate Roberts. Ulbricht was convicted by a jury for operating the Silk Road enterprise, officially declaring Ulbricht to be DPR. Given this conviction, Ulbricht and Dread Pirate Roberts refer to the same individual. See:Andy Greenberg, "Silk Road Mastermind Ross Ulbricht Convicted of All 7 Charges," *Wired*, Feb, 4, 2015, http://www.wired.com/2015/02/silk-road-ross-ulbricht-verdict/ Accessed on: Jun. 29, 2015.
xxvi Andy Greenberg, "An Interview With A Digital Drug Lord: The Silk Road's Dread Pirate Roberts," *Forbes*, Apr. 14, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/14/an-interview-with-a-digital-drug-lord-the-silk-roads-dread-pirate-roberts-qa/ Accessed on: Jun. 29, 2015.
xxvii District Judge Katherine B. Forrest, "United States of America v. Ross William Ulbricht," (Opinion & Order, United States District Court: Southern District of New York, Jul. 9, 2014) 47-48, http://www.scribd.com/doc/233234104/Forrest-Denial-of-Defense-Motion-in-Silk-Road-Case Accessed on: Jun. 30, 2015.
xxviii *Ibid*., 50.
xxix A recent popular publication's article claims that Ulbricht was directly influenced by Ludwig von Mises. However, I am hesitant to cite the article authoritatively as it is a rather sensational biographical piece. I merely intend to draw out the ideological parallels between Ulbricht (DPR) without relying on third-party publications. See: Joshua Bearman, "The Rise & Fall of Silk Road: Part 1," *Wired*, Apr., 2015, http://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1/ Accessed on: Jul. 9, 2015.
xxx Ludwig von Mises, *The Theory of Money and Credit*, trans. H.E. Batson (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1981). Original work published in German in 1912.
xxxi *Ibid*., 43.
xxxii *Ibid*., 49.
xxxiii Andy Greenberg, "An Interview With A Digital Drug Lord: The Silk Road's Dread Pirate Roberts," *Forbes*, Apr. 14, 2013, http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/14/an-interview-with-a-digital-drug-lord-the-silk-roads-dread-pirate-roberts-qa/ Accessed on: Jun. 29, 2015.
xxxiv Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, trans. David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2004), 82. Original work published in German in 1900.
xxxv *Ibid.*, 127.
xxxvi *Ibid.*, 192-193
xxxvii Nigel Dodd, "Simmel's Perfect Money: Fiction, Socialism, and Utopia in *The Philosophy of Money,*" *Theory, Culture & Society* 29, no. 7-8 (2012): 148, accessed on Dec. 9, 2014, DOI: 10.177/0263276411435570

xxxviii Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, trans. David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2004), 193-195. Intrinsic value, here, refers to the value of the substance the money is comprised. Functional value is synonymous with circulatory value, or the value of money as a medium of exchange.
xxxix Angela Merkel, "Merkel: If the Euro fails, Europe fails," *BBC News*, Sept. 7, 2011, http://www.bbc.com/news/business-14827834
xl *Ibid.*, 373, 375.
xli Nakamoto does note that these issues may be avoided in pure physical-cash economies, but payments over a channel of communication require trust institutions in the model Nakamoto is trying to replace.
xlii Georg Simmel, *The Philosophy of Money*, trans. David Frisby (London: Routledge, 2004), 190.
xliii Nigel Dodd, "Simmel's Perfect Money: Fiction, Socialism, and Utopia in *The Philosophy of Money,*" *Theory, Culture & Society* 29, no. 7-8 (2012): 146-176, accessed on Dec. 9, 2014, DOI: 10.177/0263276411435570
xliv Ben S. Bernanke, Letter to Sen. Thomas R. Carper and Sen. Tom Coburn, (Letter, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2013), 10-12, accessed on Mar. 1, 2015, https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/835843-virtual-currency-hearings.html Cited in: Steven Perlberg, "Bernanke: Bitcoin May Hold Long-Term Promise,'" *Business Insider,* Nov. 18, 2013, http://www.businessinsider.com/ben-bernanke-on-bitcoin-2013-11 and Zachary M. Seward, "Ben Bernanke's Letter to Congress: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currencies 'May Hold Long-Term Promise,'" *Quartz*, No. 18, 2013, http://qz.com/148399/ben-bernanke-bitcoin-may-hold-long-term-promise/

4.2.7 – Spaces of Suppression, Resistance; Strategies of Cohesion, Momentum

Rachael Kennedy, Virginia Tech (kennedy3@vt.edu)

Abstract Resistance occurs across a broad spectrum. Strategies exercised in the space between covert, or diffuse, and demonstrative, or revolutionary, resistance have not been fully clarified. Five themes inductively emerged from analysis of modern social movements in repressive contexts within Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Estonia, Guyana, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Suriname, and Thailand. Focusing on these strategies brings a new understanding of representations of middle-of-the-spectrum resistance. These may be keys to expanding concepts of how cohesion and momentum are achieved. Further, no current social movement theory adequately allowed for analysis of the cases; thus a new social movement theory must emerge.

Keywords Social movements, repression, cohesion, momentum, middle-of-the-spectrum

Photo by 16:9 Clue, uploaded to Flickr Commons 2010. (https://www.flickr.com/photos/53255320@N07/4926945840/) "Mural on a wall of the main square (Zocalo) of Oaxaca. The people united will never be defeated.

Photo by People's Advancement Centre, uploaded to Flickr Commons 2011. (https://www.flickr.com/photos/69081811@N05/6340073692/) Celestine AkpoBari Addressing a cross section of the media in Port Harcourt during the 16th anniversary commemoration of the murder of Ogoni leaders.

And the little screaming fact that sounds through all history: repression works only to strengthen and knit the repressed.[1]

Introduction

We congratulate ourselves for our freedoms found by way of pleasure-giving purchases,

extravagant vacations abroad, and exotic meals out. We relax into our perceived liberty brought by technology that has unbound us from restrictions of mundane living. Daily we embrace our personal rites of sovereignty. However, a peek beneath the veneer of modernity shows that the foundation of perceived reality appears corroded. Instead of luxury, many still feel the sting of deprivation and cruelty. Across the globe, instead of freedom, liberty, and sovereignty, modernity creates heartless spaces of domination, real and profound. In these spaces of suppression, resistance is born. However, actions of defiance are quite varied and consequences wide ranging.

Social movements (SMs) theorists seek to understand resistance and advance theories to undercover potentialities for momentum to occur in repressive contexts[2, 3]. Further, social change agents are hungry to understand strategies that might lead to movement success and thereby lead to a more just and equitable world[4,5,6,7]. Yet, a fortified understanding of collectivization and mobilization is still elusive[8].
Evidence shows that repertoires of resistance occur across a broad spectrum. Much has been said about the portion of the spectrum that takes the form of violent activisms. On the opposite end of the spectrum are the tell-tale signs of resistance in daily life and the numerous examples of covert but cumulative actions[9]. However, strategies enacted in the space between covert or diffuse resistance and demonstrative or revolutionary resistance are not equally elucidated. Could it be that the bulk of action takes place in this middle ground? Is this the space where cohesion is born and momentum generated?



Figure 1. Forms of actions adopted by social movement actors occur along a continuum and include covert, middle-of-the-spectrum, and demonstrative. Theorists and activists seek to understand what leads to social movement success.

If we open the “black box” of actions taken by actors in the middle-of-the-spectrum resistance movements, what can we learn about strategies employed? As activists seek cohesion and momentum are common strategies exercised? In seeking to answer these questions, I

investigated modern SMs in repressive contexts where middle-of-the-spectrum repertoires of action were reported. In this paper, I present five strategic themes that emerged from reviewing this body of literature. The strategies found include: asserting informal power, evoking emotions, community skill building, framing of "space", and ritualistic tactics. Focusing on these strategies brings about a new understanding of resistance in the spaces between violent uprisings and quotidian opposition actions. This expands conceptualizations of how cohesion and momentum are achieved. Further, I observe that none of the existing social movement theories (SMTs) are adequate frameworks for thinking through the questions posed and argue that inductive reasoning should take precedence until a new theory can be formulated.

Locating Social Movements

Prior to delving into the themes found, in order to obviate confusion, it is important to locate SMs within a modern context. Authoritative SMs scholars trace the beginning of contemporary SMs to the 1960s and state that the explosive interest accompanying them resulted in numerous social movement theories (SMT)[10]. Philosophies on social change by de Tocqueville, Durkheim, Kornhauser, Le Bon, Marx, Smelser, Tönnies, and Weber weave through SMT, yet paradigmatic ways of thinking about collective action continue to shift significantly as society evolves[11]. Numerous definitions of SMs abound and scholars defend their definition of SMs and the SMTs that align to their epistemology. For purposes of this paper, I provide the following foundational definition. Social movements are "sustained campaigns of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise the claim, based on organization, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these claims. The campaign is sustained challenges to power holders in the name of the population…" [12]. Next I provide a brief exposé of major theories to aid grounding of this research.

Major Social Movement Theories

Social movement theories (SMTs) each have their own epistemological leanings and provide scholars with lenses through which to look. In order to taken into full consideration how the theoretical orientations might affect the scholarly publications reviewed, in this section, I provide a précis of each of the major SMTs. Understanding the focus of each SMT and thus its limitations further supports the claim made in this paper that none of these are adequate for the questions I asked when setting out on this research project.

Theory of Resistance in Daily Life (RDL)

At the core of this theory is that people can and will confront oppression with numerous small and individually enacted forms of resistance [13]. Short of collective defiance, and not necessarily needing group coordination, these activities over time create a culture of resistance.

Political Opportunity/Contentious Politics Theory (PO/CP)

PO/CP focuses on long cycles of mobilization. It asks about the opening and closing of a SMs access to political processes and how this leads to success or failure[14]. The focus is generally on movements as networks rather than on individual SMs organizations or actors.

Resource Mobilization Theory (RM)

RM asks about the type and amount of resources available to organizations and the effects of such on their mobilization, structure, and strategy[15]. A fundamental aspect of the theory is that

formal social movement organizations are established prior to mobilization and are necessary components for SMs' evolution. The focus is generally on organizational dynamics.

New Social Movements Theory (NSM)
NSM raises questions that deal with social and cultural concerns arising from post-modern life, such as the shift of control from individual to corporate actors[16]. Scholars ask about values, identity, ideas, repertoires of action, and organizational forms. The focus can be on a formal group, non-formal assemblages, or even global movements.

Collective Action Frames Theory (CAF)
CAF proposes that aggregation of messages based on the SMs' ideations are utilized to articulate problems, identify alternatives, and develop a rationale for mobilization, activity, and sustainability [17]. It asks questions about beliefs and values that shape construction of meaning and how this foments resistance and guides action. It also asks about variations in messages: resonance, inclusivity, disputes, and diffusion, and seeks to understand how frame articulation/amplification and alignment affect scale and scope.

Culture Theory (CT)
CT takes a Janus approach to SMs; acknowledging that cultural production is affected by social conflicts, it also sees culture as a tool-kit that influences SMs' structures and practices[18]. Questions are asked about conventional wisdom and shared views and the interpretations and influences of these. Scholars seek to understand attributes of collective identity and production of meaning.
It is important to note that the swing toward inclusion of culture in the 1990s brought the constructs of ideology and emotion back into focus. Not distinctly tied to culture, theorists suggest that they should be embedded in all existing theories. Oliver and Johnston[19] state that only by looking at the ideology can we understand the "why" of the SMs. It has been pointed out that the artificial bifurcation between rational and emotional actions is incongruent with our understanding of cohesion and mobilization[20, 21, 22].

What is Resistance?
Resistance is at the core of this paper; thus it behooves us to consider the terminology. Although its popularity has spurred a rapid proliferation of scholarly work, it remains a fuzzy term with numerous competing definitions among various disciplines [23]. A recent meta-analysis of the usage of the term "resistance" in scholarly works showed that "although there is virtual consensus that resistance involves oppositional action of some kind, there is considerable disagreement about whether resistance must be intended by actors and whether it must be recognized by targets and/or observers"[24]. The authors propose a typology of resistance that "highlights the central issues involved in disagreements about resistance—recognition and intent… and presents seven types of resistance, each defined by a different combination of actors' intent, target's recognition, and observers' recognition"[25]. For purposes of this research, when analyzing papers for examples of resistance, I specifically looked for instances of action that were intended by the actors to be actions of resistance.

Type of resistance found in the literature	Intended as resistance by actor?	Recognized as resistance by outsiders?
Overt	Yes	Yes
Covert	Yes	Yes
Missed	Yes	Yes
Attempted	Yes	No
Externally-defined	No	Yes
Target-defined	No	Yes
Unwitting	No	Yes

Table 1. Synopsis of resistance typologies proposed by Hollander and Einwohner (2004)

Methodology

Impetus for this paper came during study of “Comparative Social Movements” with Professor Wilma Dunaway, social movement scholar. Access to Dr. Dunaway’s large repository of social movement literature enabled this research. Seeking to understand suppression and resistance in a modern context, literature detailing international social movements published between 2000 and 2013 were included in the study. After eliminating those that either concentrated on resistance in daily life or violent uprising, a total of seventeen articles were further analyzed. The literature spans movements within the nations of Argentina, Chile, Egypt, Estonia, Guyana, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Suriname, and Thailand. The majority of publications were the result of long term ethnographies and included interview data, participant observation, and document analysis (diaries, written reports, and print media). Inductively probing each article, themes began to emerge. Five major themes were settled on and are reported here. These include asserting informal power, community skill building, evoking emotions, framing of “space”, and ritualistic tactics.

Inductively Derived Themes

Asserting Informal Power

Numerous scholars investigate the supportive subcultures, specifically non-formal structures, which exist within nations marred by repressive regimes. These subcultures and/or subaltern ideologies assert what informal power they hold; and they seek ways to claim more. Strategies undertaken by indigenous groups are predominant in the literature. Malseed’s[26]work with Myanmar’s Karen tribes points to a diffuse network with no formal leadership; yet they created and maintained rebellious activities with causal effects. For example, the informal power of the elder females in villages was enacted repetitively against demands made by the military to move from their native lands. Similarly, autonomous peasant communities were powerful actors in Mexico’s Zapatista campaigns, motivating the logic of *mandar obedeciendo* (governing by obeying the will of the community)[27]. Indigenous communities in Nigeria strategized to create the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People and claimed power by utilizing connections to the mass media to their benefit [28].

Another example of indigenous people claiming power was seen in the fight against mining development in Suriname. Understanding their dire need to gain bargaining rights and legal land rights, tribal communities chose to collaborate with an urban, bureaucratic organization (The Association of Indigenous Village Leaders in Suriname) to create an "indigenous rights frame".

Three examples of gender-based resistance and their usage of informal authority were detected in this analysis. In Argentina, Chile, and Guyana, female activists coalesced to resist various gender-based discriminations. In Argentina, women strongly challenged the Catholic church via newspaper ads "that denounced reproductive rights violations of the church"[29]. This led to legislation proposals and passage of a law guaranteeing the right to family planning information and contraception in public hospitals. Another example in Argentina highlighted female laypersons conducting neighborhood health surveys[30]. In Chile, contestations revolving around symbolic meanings of citizenship resulted in poor, working-class, rural, and indigenous women creating formal networks "to contribute to improving the situation of discrimination, both gender and class, that women of the popular sector suffer …to promote a more substantive and inclusive citizenship"[31]. A similar scenario in Guyana highlighted women of varied backgrounds (class/status, race/ethnicity) who came together in creation of the "Red Thread Women's Development Organisation" and their struggle to redefine their political culture [32]. A display of power is heard in this quote:

> We decided to develop patterns that were based on Guyanese reality. We developed images that were rooted in African, East Indian, and Amerindian Guyanese experiences. So we took a formally traditional skill that was practiced by middle-class women and used it in a revolutionary manner….revolutionary art form…

Assertion of informal power is also noted in the post-soviet nations. Specifically, Johnston[24] found that coffee shop, bars, and even parks, were tolerated as centers of oppositional speech because they "drew upon a Chechen tradition whereby kinsmen gathered in village centers to discuss issues and settle disputes" (p. 198) and that traditional social functionalities (beekeepers and horticulture clubs and folk-dancing events) became "boundary-spanning groups" where talk of their governance desires and hopes of independence were undertaken (p. 201).

Similarly, the controversial Muslim Brotherhood enacted resistance toward the Egyptian government by infiltrating traditional social and education venues and asserting informal power. Munson[33] sought to understand "why did the Muslim Brotherhood succeed rather than one of the dozens of alternative religious reform societies that existed in Egypt?" (p. 493) and concluded that along with their "public service projects", which developed good will among the Egyptians in need of public services, their informal organization allowed them to shift power and communication responsibilities from branch office to branch office, thus gaining them the ability to coordinate despite extreme repression.

Community Skill Building

Examples of community skill building, both formal and informal, occur despite restrictions to civil society. In the articles analyzed, the majority depict scenarios where an inherent part of the SMs strategy was community skill building to create places for empowerment. Three of the six texts tell of repressive regimes in Central and South America. Female political activists

in Guyana organized resistance to International Monetary Fund structural adjustment mandates. Their mission was to create a space of empowerment where women could use their skills or learn a new skill to generate income, while simultaneously learning about disparities in society and how to fight these [34]. Similarly, in Mexico, women's artisan cooperatives provided commingled training in arts, economics, and political advocacy[35]. Communal kitchens feeding neighborhood children also "became political hubs in movements challenging neoliberalisms and places where women met and began to question their subordination collectively" in Argentina[36]. Thus we see that the activist "changed and politicized the mundane and created new spaces to challenge the status quo, even as certain traditions continued despite economic disruption" (p. 714).

On the other side of the globe, laborers in Thailand and Korea mobilized for workers' rights. In Thailand, women factory workers combined forces with both feminist and human rights groups to resist the oppressive rationality of conformity they lived under [37]. Small study groups, approved by older female factory workers (an important commentary on social power structures in their society), were sponsored by independent unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and taught women "their legal rights and how to analyze their experiences in relation to these rights as well as in relation to broader structures of inequality within Thai society as a whole" (p. 125). Suh[38] considered Korean white collar labor activists' process in developing union coalitions and thereafter negotiating for rights during years of union repression. He observed that during the period of the union's community skills development, the government's repression worked in a "positive way to enhance union members' political consciousness and their voluntary engagement in political protests" (p. 450).

Lastly, I choose to highlight how the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt used the strategy of community skill building. Munson[39] documented that they often connected to newly urban Egyptians and worked within their existing social networks to create a stronger sense of community that included a three tiered membership structure. Additionally, the members agreed to use member money in creation of schools, clubs, and mosques and provided for training of more doctors and neighborhood *imams* (priests).

Evoking Emotions

Options for resistance within an oppressive regime may be limited. However, there are two ways activists use emotions to evoke change. One way is to rile the emotions of participants and the other is to bring emotionality to the fore when pressuring the dominant regime. The only case of overt emotional manipulation is noted in Perry's[40] account of Chinese revolutionaries using shame and fear tactics when obliging comrades to embrace Maoism. However, several examples of emotions being evoked to keep participants motivated are reported. In Thailand, "images of unionists as siblings therefore evoke both intimate contexts of familial support and…suggests the obligations workers have as rural migrants to assist distant kin are compatible with the sacrifices they can make for one another as coworkers in order to protect their collective interests against those of employers"[41]. Further, in Korea, Suh[42] found that evoking emotions among workers stimulated SMs participation during the period of government oppression of union collectivism. In Mexico, the retelling of ancient mythical heroes who resisted authority enforced the deep-seated respect for justified rebellion against outside exploitation and spurred activist mobilization [43].

Bringing emotionality to actions against the repressive regime stirs not only participants but the general public and may be an effective strategy for member recruitment. In three cases analyzed, it also appeared to be a strategy to shame the repressive regime on the world scene. Both in Mexico and Nigeria, indigenous people used emotions in their fight to secure land rights and to have an improved quality of life. The Ogoni in Nigeria used media to get their message out. For example, one media message argued that "the land as the material embodiment of the Ogoni lies at the root of Ogoni identity, 'community memory' of their past, present, and future, Ogoni prosperity and guidelines for negotiating the world"[44]. Their plea, broadcast by radio and print, motivated international human rights and environmental groups to their aid. In a similar occurrence in Mexico, relating indigenous creation stories and people's inherent spiritual connection to the land stirred emotions among international allies and "created a political opportunity structure that placed the Mexican government in a position where it was unable to either ignore or fully repress EZLN collective action"[45]. Further, Borland and Sutton[46] found shaming of local politicians to be a strategy used by Argentinean women's groups.

Framing of "Space"

Creative usage of resources is key for activists. The ability to frame "space" as a major resource or to re-frame "space" in a new light is a documented strategy. Stolle-McAllister[47] recounted the struggle in Mexico against planned construction of a golf course and international airport. Mobilization resulted from community discussions of protecting the *pueblo.* Looking through the lens of cultural politics, *pueblo* meant "both territory and social structure, therefore these conflicts were seen as threats not only to the territorial integrity of the communities but also to basic relationships and culture, making the stakes that much higher for participants" (p. 170). Another example from Mexico saw communities strategically "repeat gatherings in particular public spaces and on culturally significant days [thereby] sustaining the viability and duration of a movement"[48]. Further, permanent resistance art installations accompanied by repeated staged performances of song and dance occupied some city squares (p. 301).

Two authors investigated framing of space in African nations fighting environmental battles. Kenya's "Green Belt Movement" framed space from an ecofeminist perspective grounding its work in "linkages between environmental degradation, the marginalization of women and poverty, and the need to approach development from the grassroots upward by empowering women to directly intervene in and control, the environment"[49]. Invoking heritage land rights, Nigeria's Ogoni "frequently allude to the role of the gods, ancestors, and spirits in their mobilization" [50]. Thus, via framing of space, they asserted their legitimate claim to the lands and "cast the State and Shell as the tenants on the land. What they expected from the latter is their *miideekor* or fair share as landowners" (p. 255).

Analogously, indigenous people in Suriname fought off conservation and development schemes that would remove them from their lands. Reframing of their relationship to the space and evoking a "rights frame" was elucidated in this quote:

> We can have no agreement granted for the establishment of a nature reserve in Kaboeri Creek….we shall, as we always have done, continue with the protection and preservation of Kaboeri Creek for the benefit of the animals, plants, fish, and our community. [51]

Many cultural groups in post-soviet nations found themselves as hotbeds of contentious dialogue about the restructuring of newly formed nations and strategies to avoid repressive government tactics. In a twist of irony, what had once been purely social space was increasingly reframed as political space. In an effort to remain legitimate and safe, some cultural and intellectual associations assumed formal organizations to take advantage of state and party resources…One member of an English Language Circle recounted how the group enjoyed summer retreats at resorts, paid for by the state…when they gathered, there was freedom of discussion where, 'under the surface was the truth'[52].

Ritualistic Tactics

As a tactic of resistance, ritual enactments can create unity or cause discord depending on the organizers' intent. Analysis of Nicaragua's Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs shows a strong connection between the ritualized ceremonies created and the women's affinity toward remaining as activists[53]. In the same way, feminist seeking reproductive rights in both Argentina and Chile used rituals to reinforce their collective anger at the Catholic church. Borland [54]reported on ritual tactics she witnessed during years of ethnographic work. In Chile, activists "erected altars in memory of women who died from botched illegal abortions" (p. 327) and held ceremonies around them. In Argentina a common riposte was "take your rosaries from our ovaries" (p. 336).

In Mexico, ritual space was amplified with drumming, speaking the voice of the earth and of the dead[47], theatrical expositions, and "organized mourners" [55]. Further, "annual cycles of rituals commemorating important local myths is vital to the maintenance of what denotes the 'hard nucleus' (*nucleo duro*) of the *pueblos*" stated Stolle-McAllister[56] when speaking of movements in central Mexico. Moreover, another example from the Oaxaca region of Mexico highlighted activists who created modern day rituals. Using culturally and historically significant places (such as the location where activists and a journalist were killed by police) to create modern shrines included in silent march rituals allowed for "collective moral commitment and serve to maintain collective identity" [57].

Whether strategies for mobilizing or identity building, evidence of ritual approaches occurred worldwide. An evocative accounting of ritualistic tactics was shared from Nigeria's Ogoni tribes[58]. On the day of their major plea before their national government, the Ogoni "took advantage of extant spiritual resources by mobilizing supra-human actors in their environment"; this included elders pouring libations to the ancestors, prayers at gravesites, and women fasting and praying to the ancestors for their tribes (p. 258).

Conclusion

Parallel Strategies of Cohesion and Momentum

In this review of published literature, I sought to understand strategies employed by actors within middle-of-the-spectrum resistance movements. By inductively probing the literature, I found that common strategies for cohesion and momentum were evidenced. What came to light is that a gamut of resistant actions exists that is far different from what has been reported in furtive, non-violent actions and in revolutionary, violent actions. As the five thematic strategies showed, there are parallel, although nuanced, strategies exercised as activists seek cohesion and momentum.

It appears that part of the divergence may be caused by culturally based political imaginaries[59,60] . However, I say that with caution since none of the authors wrote about such

in their research. At the same time, the evidence showing movement actors boldly enacting informal powers also showed that they often did so by using their extant legitimized traditional power claims. These cases showed how the culture imagined and embraced certain assertions. Further, the examples of community skill building showed a preponderance of social centers and work sites hosting trainings that merged political messaging with skill building, resulting in innovative political strategies.

Another way to conceptualize how cohesion and momentum developed in distinct ways comes by way of the framework of ideologies and emotions. As mentioned in the section on major SMTs, there is no codified theory that keenly looks at ideology and emotions. However, it may be that the underlying rationales that allowed participants to use the evoking of emotions to create cohesion among participants, aid recruitment, and bring shame to the repressive regime's actions were ideologically based. Similarly, the framing of "space" occurred in varied ways again, suggesting an ideological foundation. Sometimes it came via legitimacy claims from extant micro-cosmologies; in other cases embodied expressions conjoined the space and the people; and in a few cases reframing the meaning of the space occurred to maintain safety and access. The last theme, use of ritualistic tactics, showed enactment of parody rituals taken from other contexts as well as enactment of authentic indigenous rituals. It was often a tactic to aid collective identity development and mobilization.

Recommendations

In closing, I argue that further research should continue exploring methods that can dissect the "black box" of these strategies in an attempt to further understand activists' orientations toward these strategies and gauge their thoughts on effectiveness of ones enacted. Although this literature review shines light on the subject and spurs our curiosity, the limitations of working with preexisting documentation weakens our understanding of exactly why and to what end these actions were performed.

Additionally, SMs scholars should continue to address, both philosophically and empirically, the inadequacy of SMTs for decoding modern SMs. This paper shows that an inductive approach allowed new themes to emerge, and there is suspicion that many of these strategies cohere within the SMs explored; however, none of the extant SMTs could speak to these themes. Expansion of SMTs is warranted.

Notes

1 Steinbeck, John. *The Grapes of Wrath.* New York: The Viking Press, 1939.
2 Klandermas Bert and Conny Roggeband. (Eds.). Handbook of social movements across disciplines. New York, NY: Spring, 2007.
3 Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. *Contentious politics.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishing, 2007. Appendix A.
4 Hall, Budd, L., Darlene E. Clover, Jim Crowther, and Eurig Scandrett (Eds.) *Learning and Education for a better world: The role of social movements.* New York, NY: Springer Science and Business Media, 2013.
5 Mommaerts, Marissa and Ken White. *Weaving the community resilience and new economy movement: Voices and reflections from the field*. Santa Rosa, CA: Post Carbon Institute, 2014.
6 Mayer, Brian. Cross-movement coalition formation: Bridging the labor-environment divide.

Sociological Inquiry 79, no. 2 (2009): 219-239.
7 Somma, Nicolas M. How do voluntary organizations foster protest? The role of organizational involvement on individual protest participation. *The Sociological Quarterly* 51, (2010): 384-407.
8 Klandermas and Roggeband.
9 McAdam, Douglas, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. (Eds.) *Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p.xi
10 Macionis, John J. *Sociology (15th edition).* Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2013.
11 Tilly and Tarrow.
12 Scott, James C. "Everyday forms of peasant resistance." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 13, no.1 (1986): 5-35.
13 McAdam, Douglas, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. *Dynamics of contention.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
14 McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald.
15 Tarrow, Sidney. *Struggle, politics, and reform: Collective action, social movements, and cycles of protest.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.
16 Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. "Framing process and social movements: An overview and assessment." *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611-639.
17 Melucci, Alberto. "The symbolic challenge of contemporary movements." *Social Research* 54, no.4 (1985): 789-816.
18 Oliver, Pamela E. and Hank Johnston. "What a good idea! Ideologies and frames in social movement research." *Mobilization* 4, no.1 (2000): 37-54.
19 Aminzade, Ron and Douglas McAdam. "Emotions and contentious politics" *Mobilization* 7, no. 2 (2002): 107-109.
20 Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta. "The return of the repressed: The fall and rise of emotions in social movement theory". *Mobilization* 5, no.1 (2000): 65-83.
21 Johnston, Hank and Bert Klandermas. (Eds.). *Social movements and culture*. London, UK: Routledge, 1995/2013.
22 Weitz, Rose. "Women and their hair: Seeking power through resistance and accommodation." *Gender & Society* 15 (2001): 667–686.
23 Hollander, J. A. and R. L. Einwohner. "Conceptualizing resistance." *Sociological Forum* 19, no. 4 (2004): 533-554. p.544
24 Malseed, Kevin. "Where there is no movement: Local resistance and the potential for solidarity, in *Transnational agrarian movements confronting globalization*, edited by S. M. Borras, M. Edelman, and C. Kay, 323-348. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.
25 Muñoz, José A. "International opportunities and domestic protest: Zapatistas, Mexico and the New World Economy." *Social Movement Studies* 5, no.3 (2006): 251-274. p.253.
26 Erickson Nepstad, Sharon and Clifford Bob. "When do leaders matter? Hypothesis on leadership dynamics in social movements." Mobilization 1 (2006): 1-22.
27 Borland, Elizabeth "Cultural opportunities and tactical choice in the Argentine and Chilean reproductive rights movements." *Mobilization* 3, (2004): 327-339. p. 335.
28 Borland, Elizabeth and Barbara Sutton. "Quotidian disruption and women's activism in times of crisis, Argentina 2002-2003." *Gender and Society* 21, no.5 (2007): 700-722. p. 710.
29 Franceschet, Susan and Laura Macdonald. "Hard times for citizenship: Women's movements in Chile and Mexico." Citizenship Studies 8, no.1 (2004): 3-23. p. 13.
30 Nettles, Kimberly D. "Becoming Red Thread Women: Alternative visions of gendered

politics in post-independence Guyana." *Social Movement Studies* 6, no.1 (2007): 57-82.
31 Johnston, Hank. "'Let's get small': The dynamics of (Small) contention in repressive states." *Mobilization* 2 (2006): 195-212.
32 Munson, Ziad. "Islamic mobilization: Social movement theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood." *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2001): 487-510.
33 Nettles, p. 58.
34 Muson
35 Borland and Sutton
36 Mills, Mary Beth "From nimble fingers to raised fists: Women and labor activism in globalizing Thailand." *Signs* 31, no.1 (2005): 117-144.
37 Suh, Doowon. "How do political opportunities matter for social movements? Political opportunity, misframing, pseudosuccess, and pseudofailure." *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no.3 (2001): 437-460.
38 Muson
39 Perry, Elizabeth J. "Moving the masses: Emotion work in the Chinese Revolution." *Mobilization* 7, no. 2 (2002): 111-128.
40 Mills, pp. 130-131.
41 Suh
42 Stolle-McAllister, John. "Local social movements and Mesoamerican cultural resistance and adaption." *Social Movement Studies* 6, no. 2 (2007): 161-175. p. 169.
43 Agbonifo, John. "Territorialising Niger Delta conflicts: place and contentious mobilisation." *Interface* 3, no.1 (2011): 240-265. p. 257.
44 Muñoz, p. 37.
45 Borland and Sutton
46 Stolle-McAllister
407 Adler, Marina. "Collective identity formation and collective action framing in Mexican 'movement of movements'". *Interface* 4, no.1 (2012): 287-315. p. 301.
48 Obi, Cyril I. "Environmental movements in Sub-saharan Africa: A political ecology of power and conflict." *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development,* 2005. Para.3.
49 Agbonifo, p. 256.
50 Haalboom, Bethany. "Framed encounters with conservation and mining development: Indigenous peoples' use of strategic framing in Suriname." *Social Movement Studies* 10, no. 4 (2011): 387-406. p. 397.
51 Johnston, p. 202.
52 de Volo, Lorraine B. "The dynamics of emotions and activism: Grief, gender, and collective identity in revolutionary Nicaragua". *Mobilization* 11, no. 4 (2006): 461-474.
53 Borland and Sutton
54 Muñoz, p. 258.
55 Perry, p. 125.
56 Stolle-McAllister, p. 167.
57 Adler, p. 302.
58 Agbonifo
59 Taylor, Charles. *Modern social imaginaries*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press (2004).
60 Warner, Michael. *Publics and counterpublics*. New York: Zone Books (2002).

Works Cited

Adler, Marina. "Collective identity formation and collective action framing in Mexican 'movement of movements'". *Interface* 4, no.1 (2012): 287-315.

Agbonifo, John. "Territorialising Niger Delta conflicts: place and contentious mobilisation." *Interface* 3, no.1 (2011): 240-265.

Aminzade, Ron and Doug McAdam. “Emotions and contentious politics” *Mobilization* 7, no. 2 (2002): 107-109.

Benford, Robert D. and David A. Snow. “Framing process and social movements: An overview and assessment.” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 611-639.

Borland, Elizabeth and Barbara Sutton. "Quotidian disruption and women's activism in times of crisis, Argentina 2002-2003." *Gender and Society* 21, no.5 (2007): 700-722.

Borland, Elizabeth. "Cultural opportunities and tactical choice in the Argentine and Chilean reproductive rights movements." *Mobilization* 3, (2004): 327-339.

de Volo, Lorraine B. “The dynamics of emotions and activism: Grief, gender, and collective identity in revolutionary Nicaragua”. *Mobilization* 11, no. 4 (2006): 461-474.

Erickson Nepstad, Sharon and Clifford Bob. "When do leaders matter? Hypothesis on leadership dynamics in social movements." *Mobilization* 1 (2006): 1-22.

Franceschet, Susan and Laura Macdonald. "Hard times for citizenship: Women's movements in Chile and Mexico." *Citizenship Studies* 8, no.1 (2004): 3-23.

Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta. “The return of the repressed: The fall and rise of emotions in social movement theory”. *Mobilization* 5, no.1 (2000): 65-83.

Haalboom, Bethany. "Framed encounters with conservation and mining development: Indigenous peoples' use of strategic framing in Suriname." *Social Movement Studies* 10, no. 4 (2011): 387-406.

Hall, Budd, L., Darlene, E. Clover, Jim Crowther, and Eurig, Scandrett (Eds.) *Learning and Education for a better world: The role of social movements.* New York, NY: Springer Science and Business Media, 2013.

Hollander, J. A. and R. L. Einwohner. “Conceptualizing resistance.” *Sociological Forum* 19, no. 4 (2004): 533-554.

Johnston, Hank. “‘Let's get small’: The dynamics of (Small) contention in repressive states.” *Mobilization* 2 (2006): 195-212.

Johnston, Hank and Bert Klandermas. (Eds.). *Social movements and culture*. London, UK: Routledge, 1995/2013.

Klandermas, Bert and Conny Roggeband. (Eds.). *Handbook of social movements across disciplines*. New York, NY: Spring, 2007.

McAdam, Doug, James McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald. (Eds.) *Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. *Dynamics of contention.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Macionis, John J. *Sociology (15th edition).*Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, Inc., 2013.

Malseed, Kevin. “Where there is no movement: Local resistance and the potential for solidarity, in *Transnational agrarian movements confronting globalization*, edited by S. M. Borras, M. Edelman, and C. Kay, 323-348. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008.

Mayer, Brian. Cross-movement coalition formation: Bridging the labor-environment divide. Sociological Inquiry 79, no. 2 (2009): 219-239.

Melucci, Alberto. “The symbolic challenge of contemporary movements.” *Social Research* 54, no.4 (1985): 789-816.

Mills, Mary Beth "From nimble fingers to raised fists: Women and labor activism in globalizing Thailand." *Signs* 31, no.1 (2005): 117-144.

Mommaerts, Marissa and Ken White. *Weaving the community resilience and new economy movement: Voices and reflections from the field.* Santa Rosa, CA: Post Carbon Institute, 2014.

Muñoz, José A. "International opportunities and domestic protest: Zapatistas, Mexico and the New World Economy." *Social Movement Studies* 5, no.3 (2006): 251-274.

Munson, Ziad. "Islamic mobilization: Social movement theory and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood." *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 4 (2001): 487-510.

Nettles, Kimberly D. "Becoming Red Thread Women: Alternative visions of gendered politics in post-independence Guyana." *Social Movement Studies* 6, no.1 (2007): 57-82.

Obi, Cyril I. "Environmental movements in Sub-saharan Africa: A political ecology of power and conflict." *United Nations Research Institute for Social Development,* 2005.

Oliver, Pamela E. and Hank Johnston. “What a good idea! Ideologies and frames in social movement research.” *Mobilization* 4, no.1 (2000): 37-54.

Perry, Elizabeth J. “Moving the masses: Emotion work in the Chinese Revolution.” *Mobilization* 7, no. 2 (2002): 111-128.

Scott, John C. “Everyday forms of peasant resistance.” *Journal of Peasant Studies* 13, no.1 (1986): 5-35.

Steinbeck, John. *The Grapes of Wrath.* New York: The Viking Press, 1939.

Stolle-McAllister, John. "Local social movements and Mesoamerican cultural resistance and adaption." *Social Movement Studies* 6, no. 2 (2007): 161-175.

Somma, Nicolas M. How do voluntary organizations foster protest? The role of organizational involvement on individual protest participation. *The Sociological Quarterly* 51, (2010): 384-407.

Suh, Doowon. "How do political opportunities matter for social movements? Political opportunity, misframing, pseudosuccess, and pseudofailure." *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no.3 (2001): 437-460.

Tarrow, Sidney. *Struggle, politics, and reform: Collective action, social movements, and cycles of protest.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Taylor, Charles. *Modern social imaginaries*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press (2004).

Tilly, Charles and Sidney Tarrow. *Contentious politics.* Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishing, 2007.

Warner, Michael. *Publics and counterpublics*. New York: Zone Books (2002).

Weitz, Rose. “Women and their hair: Seeking power through resistance and accommodation.” *Gender & Society* 15 (2001): 667–686.

4.2.8 – We Are All Anonymous: Beyond Hacktivist Stereotypes

Emma Stamm, The New School for Public Engagement (stame613@newschool.edu)

Dedicated to Aaron Swartz (1986-2013) and Ilya Zhitomirskiy (1989-2011), the legacies of whom continue to this day

And to hackers-for-good and digital activists worldwide
with the hope that their voices will be heard for generations to come

May freedom flourish!

Introduction: Merry Christmas, Nerds!

On the morning of December 25th, 2014, a hacker group known as "Lizard Squad" broke into Sony Playstation and Xbox networks, effectively shutting all of its users out of the globally popular video game systems.iii All over the Internet, those who had plans to spend the day gaming leveled their outrage at Lizard Squad via online platforms such as Twitter, 4Chan and Reddit. Cartoons and scathing verbal attacks depicting Squad members as stereotypical geeks—young white or Asian males occupying their parents' basement, pulling nihilistic pranks on any target they deemed fit—spread throughout these sites. Xbox and Sony, which was still recovering from a major public relations crisis done by a hack on its internal security system, scrambled to restore service to their networks while a particular strain of humor-spiked outrage unique to the Internet set the tone for many a gamer's holiday.

Hacking is an activity capable of exacting enormous abuses against its victims, damages that far outweigh the minor inconvenience of an inability to enjoy one's brand-new video game on Christmas morning. 2014 was dubbed "the year of the hacker" by technology news site CIO Today.iii Indeed, it seemed that each week brought a fresh case of malicious hacking to the forefront of broadcast news and social media feeds worldwide. By the time the end of 2014 rolled around, a question loomed large in the minds of those in the global computing community: what next?

Thanks to the Squad, that Christmas also saw individuals all over the world engaging in the activity popularly known to the Internet community as a "facepalm," or a gesture of regret in the event of a gaffe or significant embarrassment. Lizard Squad's seemingly senseless operations evoked the ire of the most famous hacker group in the world, a collective known simply as “Anonymous.” Although their attacks on Sony and were enough to warrant a sharp reaction, the harshest vitriol directed toward Lizard Squad by Anonymous was inspired by an announcement of their intended next victim: the Tor network. The Tor network comprises a number of technologies developed to protect online privacy and is well known among techies, hackers and anti-surveillance activists.iv Noted for combining technical sophistication with user-friendliness, technologists praise its inner workings, while those with no functional knowledge of online security are still capable of enjoying its services. Tor is available to the public entirely for free and has been publicized as one of the best privacy protection tools available. v Because of its relative popularity, Anonymous and their supporters understood that an attack on Tor would do more than just secure Lizard Squad's place in the hacker hall

of fame. Indeed, it would provide yet another opportunity for the media to offer significant misrepresentations of the personalities and motivations behind hacking. This is arguably as destructive as any attack on Tor's network; I personally believe that it is worse. I hold that common misrepresentations of hacking and hacktivism are ultimately more destructive than any isolated incident of hacking, as they discourage populations who do not see themselves and their values in these images from engaging with a practice that has the potential to do an enormous amount of good.

Despite popular culture's love affair with its image and mythos, a common misunderstanding as to why so many proudly bear the title "hacker" remains. The case of the Christmas attacks by Lizard Squad served as a reminder to non-malicious hackers around the world that there will always be those who hack for nefarious purposes. Indeed, the entire community around and evolution of the practice would not exist without its darker variations. However, not only do these ill-intentioned actions fail to wholly represent hacking as a practice and culture, they deviate widely from the original meaning of term, which championed curiosity, playfulness, cleverness and innovation without commanding any malicious actions. In fact, a subset of those who claim title of "hacker" insist on distinguishing bad hacking from "real" hacking with names such as "black hat hacking" and "cracking." Though not popularly known outside of technology communities, these monikers serve as reminders within the hacking universe that many among them regard profit-seeking or intentionally destructive practices as undeserving of the title "hack."

Because the media frequently takes up hacking and digital activism as a subject of interest (if not straightforward sensationalism), it is more crucial than ever for those who call themselves hackers to promote positive and accurate depictions of hacking and hacktivism in the media. Fighting the operative stereotypes of hackers and (by extension) hacktivists, because the wide variety of practices and groups that go by these names is currently suffering from media representations whose agenda is to perpetuate a scintillating but ultimately narrow and divisive vision of hackers. My thesis is that these images, which denote hacking as the province of heterosexual men of white or Asian descent, are inaccurate and have a chilling effect on the activities of hacktivists. I furthermore submit that in order to move beyond this, it is essential to offer more constructive images of hacking. In illuminating the ways that negative hacker stereotypes misrepresent hacktivism, and through the provision of positive counter-examples, I aim to demonstrate the need for and possibility of better representations of hacking and hacktivism.

We’re From The Internet: Hacktivism and Hacker Identity

The term “hacktivist”—a portmanteau of the words “hacker” and “activist”—was coined in 1996 by Omega, a member of hacker collective The Cult of the Dead Cow.[vi] Because the term “hacking” is conceptually nebulous, I believe it is key to confront it before exploring the various ways in which “hacktivism,” a subset of hacking, is used. The phrase “hacking” emerged in the 1950s, several decades before “hacktivist” was conceptualized, and has been redefined frequently since then.[vii] It encompasses a distinctly heterogeneous set of practices, individuals and groups across the world. A definition of "hacking" that suits all possible contexts and applications is therefore difficult to pin down. This is also accounted for by one of the few cultural values of hacking that would, in all likelihood, be agreed on by most who identify with it: the fact that hacking rewards cleverness, trickery, and (at times) intentional obfuscation. These qualities dovetail with a sort of bull-headed individualism and

stubbornness that characterizes many who willfully assume the title "hacker."
Hacking praises the capacity of individuals to find their own definitions for loosely-construed terms and abstractions, up to and including the word “hack” itself; thus an attempt to say what it is *not* would surely raise red flags among quite a few. Because of this, it can be easier to speak of hacking in terms of loosely bound social and technical elements than well-defined actions and identity markers. Famous hacker and free software proponent Richard M. Stallman is quoted as follows: “It is hard to write a simple definition of something as varied as hacking, but I think what these activities have in common is playfulness, cleverness, and exploration. Thus, hacking means exploring the limits of what is possible, in a spirit of playful cleverness. Activities that display playful cleverness have “hack value.” [viii] Of course, not everybody agrees with Stallman’s definition of hacking. He notes that “everybody’s first hack” is “running the wrong way on an escalator,” which fits one of his definitions—“playfully doing something difficult.” [ix] This is certainly a far cry from the destructive security breaches that, under the same name, topped the list of crimes that most concerned Americans in 2014.[x] Yet the programmer, whose definition of hacking also includes creative misuses of chopsticks,[xi] is internationally recognized as an authority on the topic. The truth is that hacking exists within a number of cultural and political contexts that vary widely from country to country, between and within cities, and among global subcultures.

Gabriella Coleman, the foremost scholar on Anonymous, notes that the collective—which began in the United States of America—would not exist without its European contingents, [xii] and has also stated that international styles of and attitudes toward hacking are highly diverse.[xiii] Insofar as it is frequently used to refer to illegal behavior, what constitutes "hacking" is, for many, inextricably linked to its legal status. What can be said definitively is that there exists a significant divide between the way the word "hacking" is perceived within the technology community and the public at large. Whereas hacking is most frequently portrayed in the context of criminal activity, the term “hacker” also frequently appears in the job descriptions and biographies of computer programmers and is often deployed in tech-focused journalistic pieces in an unambiguously positive context. On this division, Stallman notes:

> Around 1980, when the news media took notice of hackers, they fixated on one narrow aspect of real hacking: the security breaking which some hackers occasionally did. They ignored all the rest of hacking, and took the term to mean breaking security, no more and no less. The media have since spread that definition, disregarding our attempts to correct them. As a result, most people have a mistaken idea of what we hackers actually do and what we think. [xiv]

This situation is made more complex by the fact that even the good sort of hacking, which sometimes goes by the name “white hat hacking,” can venture into territories of subversiveness, trickery, and play, making it difficult to ascertain the motivation behind such behaviors. In a sense, hackers are always performing computer science experiments; a spirit of exploration is at the heart of what they do. These excursions into the unknown have lead individuals into ethical territory uncharted not only by fellow programmers, but by lawyers, policy makers and journalists whose task it is to interpret such activities in the context of right-versus-wrong. The truth is that it is exceedingly difficult to impose a traditional moral framework on the activities of even the most lawful and ethical hackers.

In terms of how they regard their practice, it must be made clear that constant revision and mutability is not only critical to the way hackers approach code and network infrastructures, but reflects a wider attitude of way many hackers conceive of themselves and their lives. There are several cases of those who began as criminal hackers before going to work for the government, often as part of a plea deal, such as the notorious Hector Monsegur, AKA Sabu, a founding member of hacktivist group LulzSec and a high-level member of Anonymous who became an informant for the FBI following his arrest in June 2011.[xv] Monsegur was exposed as a double agent for the FBI in March 2012, [xvi] earning him no small measure of disrepute among the activists and community of which he had once been a hero. Hacking history contains several instances of individuals whose lives are definitively unconventional, blurring the boundaries between institutional fidelity and anarchy, profit motivations and vigilante justice, playfulness and threatening behavior. I believe that this is not coincidence or tangent of the intrinsic definition of hacking. Lack of concern for fitting into conventional societal frameworks is part and parcel of the impulses that drive individuals to hack.

Both within and outside of the community, those who seek to represent hacking accurately must possess both the patience to learn about it from a technical perspective and a high tolerance for the eccentric personalities that populate its world. While it is essential that those who work with hackers gain some familiarity with its techniques and shared cultural features, I submit that a sophisticated understanding of hacker personalities—the true selves of hackers—precedes any ability to explain or represent the practice in good faith. The personal lives of those associated with cybercriminality often inspire as much intrigue as do their actions. That cases of hacking have historically offered rich fodder to the media is no coincidence; behind many a famous hack is a programmer that demonstrated highly interesting behavior long before their story appeared on television and Internet newsfeeds worldwide.

For many groups and individuals across the globe, declaring themselves hackers is tantamount in importance to the assumption of a spiritual, cultural, professional or otherwise deeply ingrained and socially legitimated identity. Among those who bear the name “hacker,”there is an implicit understanding that though it may manifest in discrete actions, the quintessence of hacking is in an all-encompassing mindset that is commonly, though not always, expressed as a fascination with and ethos of technology. This ethos is palpable among the chat rooms in which DDoS attacks (a common collective strategy that involves the crashing of web servers by sending them a huge volume of requests *en masse*) are coordinated. It is also at the heart of whistleblowing actions, through the providence of malware scripts masquerading as Adobe Flash downloads, and in the consumption of a piece of sushi with four chopsticks in each hand. Despite their differences, each of these activities resolves to a particular mentality that forms the basis of what I acknowledge as a distinct and fully formed culture: hacking culture.

Hacking culture includes many of the same distinguishing points as other more widely-studied social and intellectual movements of the 20th century, such as futurism and feminism. As with futurism and feminism, hacking culture contains, under its broad umbrella, a number of smaller schools of thought and practice. It also features a canonical, if not unanimously agreed-on, manifesto. The document, titled "The Conscience of a Hacker,"[xvii] was written by a hacker known pseudonymously as The Mentor. In spite of the fact that it lacks particular reference to what hackers actually do (or, perhaps, because of it), the document is interwoven

with hacking history. The work is referenced on many a t-shirt and Internet meme as well as throughout the film “Hackers" which, artistic merit notwithstanding, is notable for being one of the earliest mainstream depictions of hacking. Toward the end of The Manifesto, the mindset of a hacker is laid bare:

> This is our world now... the world of the electron and the switch, the beauty of the baud. We make use of a service already existing without paying for what could be dirt-cheap if it wasn't run by profiteering gluttons, and you call us criminals. We explore... and you call us criminals. We seek after knowledge... and you call us criminals. We exist without skin color, without nationality, without religious bias... and you call us criminals. You build atomic bombs, you wage wars, you murder, cheat, and lie to us and try to make us believe it's for our own good, yet we're the criminals.
> Yes, I am a criminal. My crime is that of curiosity. My crime is that of judging people by what they say and think, not what they look like. My crime is that of outsmarting you, something that you will never forgive me for.[xviii]

This effusive spiel is designed as a clarion call—a motivational speech for the dispossessed, those who seek language to describe and vitalize nameless urges. Unlike manifestos published to inspire and engage those already primed to join a growing force-for-positivity, it addresses a population that evidently regards itself as victims of misunderstanding. This sense of dispossession characterizes its intended audience above and beyond any identification as creative vanguards or crusaders for justice. I hold that this is intentional and possibly accounted for by the fact that its author was aware that his readers included individuals who might well find themselves in a position similar to the one he was in at the time. The Manifesto was published shortly after The Mentor, otherwise known as Loyd Blankenship, was convicted of cybersecurity related crimes.[xix]

Within its visionary effusiveness exists a truth that dwells at the kernel of hacker culture: it is globally powerful as a form of self-identification in part because it bypasses typical demographic or culturally-determined features. While the observation that hackers exist “without skin color, without nationality, without religious bias,” “judging people by what they say and think, not what they look like” is utopian, I believe that it is grounded firmly in reality. The practice is wholly divorced from the identity of individuals as determined by their race, gender identity, disability status or sexual orientation. Hacking takes place through the veil of anonymity. One’s hacking identity is a function of activities determined solely by one’s desire, imagination, and individuality.

As with Loyd Blankenship/The Mentor, most hackers have at least one pseudonym. While the use of a false moniker is common to anyone with an e-mail account, the hacker handle is of a slightly different order. Its function is more akin to a name conferred as part of a religious initiation, only becoming operative in the spaces of, say, the chatroom or the monastery. Many well-known hackers are known by these two names (if not more): the one bestowed on them at birth and the one they take on as a function of their work. Julian Assange, one of the most currently famous hacktivists, began his cyber career as “Mendax.”[xx] The choice of Mendax for his name was a nod to the nature of his activities: coming from Horace’s *splendide mendax*, meaning “nobly untruthful,” [xxi] it was the pseudonym under which he formed the ethical hacker group the International Subversives. The Subversives’ members swore by a set of golden rules: “Don’t damage computer systems you break into (including crashing them);

don’t change the information in those systems (except for altering logs to cover your tracks); and share information." These rules reflect a commitment to an ethical framework that activates as the members carry out the actions with which their names and group membership are inextricably interwoven. The Subversives included two other members, “Trax” and “Prime Suspect,”[xxii] neither of whom are publicly associated with their legal names. The hacker handle and hacking activities come as a pair.

The Mentor’s Manifesto, Stallman’s “On Hacking” and the International Subversive’s ruleset enshrine perspectives on hacking rarely cited in mainstream media: the hacker’s own views. Though they diverge widely in tone and content, these documents are philosophically united in a commitment to principle and value that supersedes sheer instrumentality or goal-oriented behavior. “On Hacking” and “The Hacker Manifesto” speak to deeply-felt personal experiences and issues of selfhood, topics more frequently written on by those who study psychology and philosophy than computer science. Neither work confronts the technical specificities of hacking. This compounds the notion that, at its heart, hacking is about topics a bit loftier than those details of computer science that, at first blush, appear to occupy the entirety of the hacker mind. All three works focus on the subjective relationship the authors have to their practice as opposed to an intended target or narrowly defined array of activities.

I assert that the guiding value behind each of these documents is *honor*: a dedication to intangible qualities recognized for their intrinsic value. The “noble” in the noble untruthfulness sworn by Assange in his *nom de guerre* has turned out to be more descriptive of his career than “untruthfulness.” Regardless of whether one sees Assange's actions as ethical, "untruthfulness" does not factor into the way his projects have operated. The organization for which he is famous, WikiLeaks, deals in the provision of documents concealed from the public by powerful political and corporate entities. In their exposition of these materials, WikiLeaks has revealed a great many untruths.

That the life of so many hackers across the entirety of North America may be so finely and thoroughly distilled to the framework outlined in Coleman's work is possible because there is such a thing as a distinct “hacker identity;” those who bear these features comprise hacking culture. This identity is replete with features and designations as operative and tangible as any other more widely acknowledged form of self-identification, such as those derived from spiritual, ethnic, or professional affiliations. It is profoundly important to many, and I believe that its preeminent values are why many hackers engage in activist work. However, not only are these positive values excluded from their media representations, they are frequently inverted in favor of a darker, and arguably more interesting, narrative.

Although the causes for their misrepresentations are powerful and thus difficult to dismantle, I maintain that it is the ethical imperative of the media to offer a more representatively accurate image of hackers. This is so that those who may accede to a higher degree of self-awareness and perform meaningful work as a function of the conscious identification as a hacker and/or hacktivist are not deterred. Images that may lead would-be hacktivists to perceive their natural curiosity and individuality as societally deviant or otherwise "weird" or "wrong" must be supplemented by more constructive visions.

An important issue that comes to bear on the recognition of hacker identity is the notion of cultural legitimacy: the need for marginalized identities to be depicted and explained

realistically in order to attain power in the greater sociopolitical milieu. Neşe Devenot, a scholar of philosophy and art history, identifies "psychedelic identity" as a subject of similar mischaracterizations. In her essay: “A Declaration of Psychedelic Studies,” Devenot promotes the notion that "psychedelic identity" is societally valid as a form of queer identity insofar as it follows a definition of the term “queer” advanced by theorist David Halperin:

> Unlike gay identity, which, though deliberately proclaimed in an act of affirmation, is nonetheless rooted in the positive fact of homosexual object-choice, queer identity need not be grounded in any positive truth or in any stable reality. As the very word implies, “queer” does not name some natural kind or refer to some determinate object; it acquires its meaning from its oppositional relation to the norm. Queer is by definition *whatever* is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. *There is nothing in particular to which it necessarily refers.* It is an identity without an essence. “Queer,” then, demarcates not a positivity but a positionality vis-à-vis the normative… “Queer”… describes a horizon of possibility whose precise extent and heterogeneous scope cannot in principle be delimited in advance. It is from the eccentric positionality occupied by the queer subject that it may become possible to envision a variety of possibilities for reordering the relations among… forms of knowledge, regimes of enunciation, logics of representation, modes of self-constitution, and practices of community-for restructuring, that is, the relations among power, truth, and desire.[xxiii]

I would argue that “hacker identity” is queer on virtue of the same logic by which Devenot determines “psychedelic identity” to be so. Both “The Hacker Manifesto” and “On Hacking” assert that hacking exists in oppositional relation to a norm. This norm is the “you” addressed in the former text and the notions of conventionality of which the latter commands playful, curiosity-driven subversion. Hacking always denotes *difference*: finding routes through systems and toward objectives that stray from what is considered "typical" or "standard." This is also a critical part of what it means to be a progressive activist: to recognize something in one’s society or worldly context that, at a fundamental level, needs to be *different* than what is currently the norm.

I believe that as per Halperin’s queerness, hacktivism functions not as a positivity but a positionality. The identity of any sort of activist always exists as a subject of the entity on which she or he works, which is to say that it exists in relation to it. The documentary film, *We Are Legion: The Story of Anonymous,* quotes a member of the collective as follows: “[to] get out the hump of the bell curve and move forward to a par of the masters of society and do battle with them on an even playing field. That's hacktivism." [xxiv] Since hacking and activism are both positional as activities, I believe that we could also think of hacktivism as doubly queered, and thus doubly exiled from what is normal and dominant. The external force against which hacker identity positions itself are technical programs that present themselves as authoritative—such as a closed-source software program (a program that prevents users from accessing the code on which it is built). Hackers see such systems as an affront to their intelligence and technical prowess. I believe that this drive for mastery over technical systems and a high degree of self-assuredness is one of the characterizing features of hacker identity. In their paper "Insights Into The Hacking Underground," Michael Bachmann and Jay Corzine write of "the predominant role of inquisitive motives for hacking activities, [and] hackers' unusually high self-confidence in their decision making ability." [xxv] I believe that the impulses which manifest themselves as seemingly anti-authoritarian actions are inherent to hacker

identity, and that these impulses stem more from unusually high levels of self-trust than stubbornness or anti-authoritarianism. This mechanism of deep trust and almost-incontrovertible belief in one's own legitimacy are perhaps why hackers themselves have not stepped forward en masse to demand recognition by media and legislative forces.

“A Declaration of Psychedelic Studies” argues for the recognition of psychedelic studies as a legitimate field of inquiry within humanities scholarship. Devenot claims that, as a selfhood, “psychedelicness” is on par with more widely acknowledged identity markers such as sexuality in terms of the extent to which individuals meaningfully understand it as part of who they are. In response to counter-arguments that claim such an equation is offensive—that "psychedelic people" have neither the same history of oppression nor the tangible cultural objects through which that self-image can become culturally valid—she writes “how can one be certain that a psychedelic lifestyle is less of an identitarian issue than a queer lifestyle? Many view their psychedelic identities, interests, or religious views as inherent to who they are.”[xxvi] In a conversation I had with Devenot, she reflected on the fact that she believed that she was a “psychedelic person” before ever having psychedelic experiences, and that her psychedelic identity is not contingent on any experience with a hallucinogenic chemical or more broadly construed psychedelic occurrences. [xxvii]

Hacker identity and the culture for which it serves the basis are likewise indispensably meaningful to its members. *Coding Freedom* offers a substantial amount of evidence for this, as do many other first-person reports given by notable hackers. Jacob Appelbaum, independent security researcher and Tor Network developer, is noted as saying: “The Internet is the only reason I’m alive today,” [xxviii] in reference to the passion that served as a stabilizing force through his adolescence. Maddy Varner, a young female programmer, is quoted in an interview as saying: “when I was in middle school, I was obsessed with reading hacker manifestoes and I was like, I want to be a hacker, I want to be a hacker…”[xxix] It was only when given opportunities to act on this impulse, such as the offer to be a part of an all-female hacking collective, that she gained the confidence necessary to refer to herself as such.

The desire to hack, particularly in the Stallmanian sense, emerges organically. It is a manifestation of resourcefulness, critical thinking and, perhaps most importantly of all, curiosity. Self-confidence is essential in empowering the would-be hacker to fuse these qualities together in the service of their craft. The master narrative of hacking projects such a narrow vision of the individual that claims it as a selfhood that those who do not share its stereotypical features—such as Ms. Varner on account of her gender—may not feel the self-assuredness necessary to pursue the practice. An explicit affirmation of hacking as a queer identity that is inclusive of all forms of otherness via more progressive media representations will, I believe, function to assist those like her in gaining the confidence necessary to associate themselves with it. This will not only bring a wider array of individuals into the hacking sphere, but may help to engage a wider population in a conversation about hacker motivations. These are the impulses whose misconstructions are fodder for a sensationalizing media. The impact of their misrepresentations is compounded by the fact popular image of hackers is arguably a deterring factor for those who do not see themselves reflected in it, i.e., those who do not identify as white or Asian, heterosexual, cisgender and male. The ultimate effect of this is a vicious cycle in which lack of truthful representation leads to a popular notion of hacking which bears lesser and lesser resemblance to its origins and current reality as time

moves forward.

For the lack of knowledge about what drives hackers to hack, many individuals have faced extreme legal consequences. On January 22nd, 2015, journalist Barrett Brown was sentenced to 63 months in prison for the crime of sharing a link to data obtained in a breach of private intelligence contractor Stratfor. xxx Brown, who was associated with Anonymous until a formal renunciation of his ties with them in 2011xxxi did not himself carry out the hack (that would be an individual named Jeremy Hammond, who is also serving a prison sentence), he simply made the information available. I believe that what Barrett Brown did—a leaking of documents akin to the way in which WikiLeaks works—is as an act of hacktivism, although he had no role in carrying out the security breach itself. Another example of this is given by Matt DeHart—a former American soldier who claims that he was tortured by the U.S. government in an attempt by the F.B.I. to gain information about Anonymous. DeHart had been involved with Anonymous at a young age and ran a computer server using Tor through which he had unwittingly received a file that contained "information that demonstrated malfeasance and criminal activity on the part of a government agency."xxxii He had sought asylum in Canada to escape a country that he claims not only tortured him, but falsely charged him on accounts of child pornography as a ruse to investigate Anonymous. He was denied this reprieve. xxxiii

One of the most famous and illustrative cases of the outcome of zealous anti-hacktivist prosecution is the untimely death of Aaron Swartz. Swartzwas a programming prodigy noted for helping to develop the syndication protocol RSS, the website Reddit, and the content licenses which form Creative Commons along with several web technologies (Schwartz).xxxiv Aaron's death occurred after years of engagement in a difficult legal battle. In 2011 Swartz gained access to JSTOR, a subscription-based journal for distributing scholarly work, and automated the download of over four million articles from its database. The potential penalties he faced for this included up to thirty-five years in prison and one million dollars in fines (Schwartz). xxxv Extenuating circumstances surrounding Aaron's death have led many of Aaron's more prominent friends, including Harvard professor and copyright law expert Lawrence Lessig, to point a finger at the justice system that pursued Swartz even after JSTOR itself dropped the charges against him. Lessig writes:

> Aaron got lost in a story that Kafka could have penned—a two-year struggle with an over-eager federal prosecutor, keen to make an example out of this young man's delict but failing to see that instead he was making Aaron a martyr. I knew some of the despair that Aaron suffered as he watched his fortune bleed away on legal fees, and as he argued again and again that, in the open network of MIT, his behavior was not actually criminal. But the government was not to be moved.xxxvi

The legal exigencies that come to bear on whether Aaron actually committed a crime have been hotly debated. It seems that the actions under which he was convicted were threatening simply as a matter of scale; many people casually share articles culled from JSTOR and similar databases with others who may not have direct access to it. As for Swartz's motivations, it is clear that he believed strongly that JSTOR was acting unethically by erecting a paywall around scientific and scholarly resources. "Information is power," wrote Swartz in an online memo dated July 2008. "But like all power, there are those who want to keep it for themselves. The world's entire scientific and cultural heritage, published over centuries in

books and journals, is increasingly being digitized and locked up by a handful of private corporations." xxxvii In a talk he gave at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Swartz informed computer science students that they had a "moral obligation" to make knowledge easily accessible.xxxviii It is noted that one of his interests in obtaining massive amounts of documents from JSTOR was in illuminating the trajectory of papers that denied the impact of climate change denial from scientific journals to their citations in federal policy communique.xxxix

I contend that Carmen Ortiz, the "over-eager federal prosecutor" that sought to hold Swartz up as a warning to other would-be hacktivists, was able to pursue Swartz in such an unchecked fashion because hacktivism (an activity for which Swartz was, and remains, a figurehead) is profoundly misunderstood. As stated, the difficulties of demarcating ill-intentioned, "black hat" hacking from curiosity-based or ethically motivated hacking demand a familiarity with hacking not common among those beyond the technology community. Without such an awareness, it would be easy to misinterpret why Swartz would engage in behavior that could be seen as deliberately destructive. This is compounded by an environment in which most individuals come to understand hacking as a definitively criminal activity, and hacktivists as either poseurs who deploy "social justice" as a façade to indulge aggressive impulses or as a straightforward danger to the state: the Government Communications Headquarters of Britain (GCHQ) officially recognizes Anonymous as a threat to national security, and they have been referred to by journalists in the United States as "domestic terrorists." xl

Though the motivations behind hacking are nebulous on first encounter, they are not so abstract as to be meaningless to those without esoteric cybersecurity knowledge. I hold that hacker drives and tendencies have suffered more from mistakes and mischaracterizations made by journalists than from their own conceptual impenetrability. Hacking has been the target of a media campaign that has, unwittingly or not, supplanted hacking and hacktivism with a series of stereotypes that make it appear profoundly unattractive to those who may share the ethical compass of those like Aaron Swartz. I would argue that Swartz was simply trying to apply his intelligence to making society a more just and open place for people of all classes, ages, and backgrounds. To conceal an honest portrayal of him and those who share his ethics from those who may follow in his footsteps would constitute an act of deep injustice.

For The Lulz: Hacker Portrayals and Hacktivist Realities

In the summer of 2007, Los Angeles-based Fox news affiliate KTTV Fox 11 ran a report on Anonymous that painted the group in no uncertain terms: it opens with a furrow-browed reporter declaring that members of Anonymous "attack innocent people, like an Internet hate machine" before launching into a lurid depiction of the collective's activities. xli The clip has attained a certain level of infamy among Internet-culture junkies—it is cited on the website "Know Your Meme" as the source of a particular short video frequently used in comical treatments of media sensationalism.xlii This video features a van turned into an explosive device and makes reference to a threat stated as coming from Anonymous, though it offers no credible citation toward that end. Even on YouTube, whose popularity is not a function of any bias toward the more net-savvy (unlike Know Your Meme), the popularity of this image and the KTTV report exist as a result of the implicit, shared understanding that they exemplify journalistic hype. There is something deeply *funny* about the video, a comic air that requires no familiarity with Anonymous to grasp.

As amusing as the piece may be, however, its disregard for objectivity differs from other representations of Anonymous and hacktivism only in the *extent* to which it appeals to paranoia. While most portrayals of hacktivism are not quite as easily satirized, the truth is that many pander to a deep and widespread fear of cyber criminality. The large knowledge gap that exists between technologists and the general public where hacking, data and network security is concerned offers journalists an empty space that can be filled by any story with the air of technical plausibility. Even as individuals all over the world become more technologically adept, journalists addressing a mainstream audience may, I believe, act on the assumption that a story that makes reference to a host of dry and detailed technological specifics will go unchecked by its intended audience. With a large measure of hacker mythos already widely disseminated across the world, it is eminently possible to weave a series of details more fit for scholarly analysis into the tales of intrigue, deception, and cabalistic behavior that have come to characterize the Hollywood Hacker.

In his essay "The Devil Drives A Lada: The Social Construction of Hackers as the Cybercriminal," David S. Wall writes "the roots of cybercrime… are actually cultural rather than scientific, and shape the way that we view and react societally to online deviance."[xliii] He argues that the public has come to understand cybercrime partially as a function of representations offered through films, science fiction literature and artworks that fall into the genre of cyberpunk. "It is important to understand this relationship," Wall writes, "because it also frames legal and policy responses to cybercrime." He elaborates on what that looks like in the public sphere:

> Fear of the future tends to rear its head whenever there is a significant period of technological transformation. The fear of the future easily becomes articulated as a fear of technology because technology symbolically and literally reflects the future… One of the knock-on effects of the growing societal concern over risk has been a proliferation of fears about the future and the development of a "culture of fear" about everyday issues such as technology and also crime. [It has been] argued that the fear of technology, or 'Franken-Tech,' now exists because the 'public debate on complex policy issues is often dominated by information entrepreneurs (including activists and the media) who attempt to engender information cascades to further their own agenda.[xliv]

That "information entrepreneurs" use information they have available about any subject or another to further their own aims is not unique or surprising. It is, however, of distinct concern when the agenda at hand influences profoundly impactful legal decisions and the image of hacktivists. These are the two realms of influence that I believe are most operative (and therefore dangerous) in terms of hacktivist misrepresentations, though it would be misleading to view the two as wholly distinct. The well-established precedent for strong prosecutorial actions against hackers leads individuals to believe that it is incorrect to regard computer science as a field in which deviation from the norm is rewarded. This creates a sort of vicious cycle that results in ethical hacking being relegated further and further to the margins of society, until it becomes conceptually bundled with nefarious hacking and other variations of cybercrime.

This situation works symbiotically with the professional and academic institutionalization of

computer science as it stands today. Whereas work in the humanities champions free thought as a creative tool, and other scientific disciplines may encourage outside-the-box thinking as a part of problem solving, this principle takes on a sinister air in the context of mainstream academic and professional computer science. Institutionalized hacking education is largely in its infancy in part because it is a decidedly difficult subject to formalize. In a lecture given at the Army Cyber Institute in 2014, cyber security expert Bruce Potter noted:

> One thing I've noticed over the last number of years is that our industry has become much more professionalized and there are some good aspects of that and there are some really bad aspects of that as well. It tends to hamper innovation as we professionalize people, as we provide course material and curricula and tests, it becomes standardized. And we tend to make a bunch of people that all look the same, they all look like the tests, like the course material... this ultimately causes problems. [xlv]

Potter was specifically addressing the topic of cyber security as it pertains to malicious attacks, particularly those done on government networks. However, he also devoted a significant period of his lecture introducing himself as a college dropout who fell more or less unassumingly into the field of security after a chance encounter with an early distribution of Linux, a free and open-source operating system that is the largest competitor of those made by Windows and Mac. What at first blush may have struck some as non-essential autobiographic information was included as a way of situating his very successful cyber security career in the context of a sort of old guard of computing. This is important because it suggests that his work existed not in spite of his unorthodox history, but because of it. Steve Jobs and Bill Gates have told similar life stories.

The reality that Potter gets at in decrying the professionalization of the cybersecurity industry is that as a practice and field of inquiry it resists institutionalization. The skills and mindset required to think like a hacker are difficult to impart in a conventional academic or vocational setting because they demand, indeed, what one might think of as a criminal—or at least "alternative"—mindset. This is why accounts of dropping out of college, frustrating parents and employers, and holding unusual political views are common among self-identified hackers. Because they do not fit easily into such frameworks, it is easy to regard these individuals and activities as actual criminals (not just criminal minds) or otherwise dangerous, even in cases when they are not. This is compounded by some of the aforementioned identity features of hackers and can result in a toxic combination wherein these characteristics, on contact with a high degree of public suspicion cultivated by the media, can lead to devastating circumstances.

I do not mean to suggest that hacking is never dangerous or that it should exist uninvestigated and perfunctorily praised. It is, in fact, a growing threat to individuals and nations worldwide, particularly in the United States; the need for a greater number of highly skilled security experts was among the reasons Potter addressed the Army Cyber Institute. However, there is nothing inherently malicious about subversion, just as there is nothing categorically *wrong* with a programmer who recognizes that they possess the power to change features on a computer's operating system in ways different from the functionalities described in its instruction manual. In fact, this very programmer may be precisely the type of person necessary to protect the security of states and citizens. What is essential is that the

mindset of hacking is worked *with* and not *against*, which can often lead one into territories that challenge one's tolerance for ambiguity and complexity. In a media environment that seeks to condense as much content into as little space as possible, however, the nuances of hacking are dispensed with in favor of its more marketable elements. This has frequently been the case with reports on Anonymous; the KTTV Fox story, while a particularly notable case, is but one among many that promotes a particularly dark version of the collective.

A subtler but perhaps more insidious example of this is found in the article "The Truth About Anonymous's Activism," written by Internet culture specialist Adrian Chen for *The Nation* in November 2014.[xlvi] Chen opens the piece by invoking an incident in which members of Anonymous misidentified the police officer that killed Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in August of the same year:

> The absurdity of the Ferguson debacle is overshadowed only by the fact that somehow we are still expected to take Anonymous seriously. How did we get to a point where people expect a gang of young geeks with nanosecond attention spans wearing masks from an action movie, who write manifestos in faux-revolutionary prose and play amateur detective in chat rooms, to help a fraught social cause like Ferguson? [xlvii]

Chen's description of Anonymous as a gang of "young geeks...wearing masks from an action movie" (he was referring to the mask worn by the character of V in the 2005 film *V For Vendetta*, which has been adopted as an unofficial uniform and logo of Anonymous)[xlviii] is neither entirely incorrect nor particularly damning, but his intention is clear. He believes Anonymous does more harm than good and seeks to enlighten the general public about their "truth" so as to quell the steady flow of positive attention they have received in recent years. Chen's article suggests that Anonymous misunderstands sensitive racial issues due to the fact that they planned a strategic operation to show support for the Ferguson community that coincided with the time and location of a protest organized by a Black female blogger. It also portrays Anonymous as a categorically sexist organization: "Any female-identified person who seriously engages the group, positively or negatively (but especially negatively), can expect to receive a torrent of sexist remarks." Chen proceeds to imply Gabriella Coleman's treatment of sexism within Anonymous is naïve:

> When Coleman encounters 'constant belittling of female contributions from certain Anons' during her research, she pauses to wonder: 'Is this sexism or just trolling?' When Coleman introduces Topiary, the spokesman of an Anonymous offshoot called LulzSec, we are told he is a master of 'brilliant nonsense and absurdist media manipulation.' Then Coleman offers this bit of chatroom banter to illustrate his charm: 'Anyway,' Topiary chats, 'just got done talking with some monstrous homogay named Andy who's writing up on our latest fax shenanigans.' Perhaps this is some sort of meta-troll and the joke is getting a respected leftist publisher to put out a book that offers stupid frat-boy humor as the epitome of wit. In which case: lulz. [xlix]

"Lulz" is a style of humor that has emerged from Internet culture. Understanding its features and how it is used among members of Anonymous is important to a working understanding of how Chen regards the group, as well as conclusions Coleman has drawn from her research on them. While it is difficult to conceive of hacker Topiary's homophobic epithets as anything other than reprehensible, there is, in fact, a broader framework in which such a tasteless

insult takes on a character markedly different than it might have had in a less clandestine environment. The concept of "lulz" is inextricably interwoven with this distinction.

"Lulz is a corruption of L O L, which stands for 'Laugh Out Loud," writes Coleman.[i] She notes that lulz typically comes from "random pranks" and is "longer, girthier and more pleasurable" than other forms of humor due to a particularly sinister nature. She writes:
As an anthropologist, it is tempting, no matter how ridiculous it seems, to view lulz in terms of epistemology—through the social production of knowledge. At one level, the lulz functions as an epistemic object, stabilizing a set of experiences by making them available for reflection. For decades, there was no term for the lulz, but trolls and hackers nevertheless experienced the distinctive pleasures of pranking.[ii]

Coleman takes care to note the absurdity of giving a profoundly silly concept such serious analysis. This, I believe, is not only to indicate that she is aware of the tension that exists between the often lowbrow, "lulzy" behavior of Anonymous and the intellectual sincerity of her work, but to draw attention to the incisive thought and sensitivity to subtlety necessary to grapple with Anonymous. The risks of being misunderstood as a hacktivist apply likewise to those who take an interest in it, and in some cases it is critical to distance oneself from the subject at hand. Coleman's doctoral degree offers her some measure of immunity to an equation with Anonymous' stranger and decidedly unappealing exponents. Her painstaking efforts to identify Anonymous as a worthy subject of research and to locate them in the broader context of activism, millennial culture and the digital humanities are pronounced throughout *Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy,* almost as if she was anticipating responses akin to that of Adrian Chen's. Indeed, hacktivist depictions such as Chen's are far more common than Coleman's. In light of this, it is particularly noteworthy that Chen—who is himself a longtime researcher and reporter on Internet culture, and was no stranger to Anonymous well before "The Truth About Anonymous's Activism" was published—took the position he did.

Chen's proximity to Anonymous and the network of websites, memes and related groups that surround them places him in a slightly different category than most who write journalistic pieces about hacking and hacktivism; he has cultural awareness of the subjects. From the outside looking in, it may appear that Chen's resume, which includes prior work on Anonymous, 4Chan, Reddit, and a number of Internet-related scandals offers him the credentials necessary to give Anonymous a proper media treatment. However, it must be mentioned here that hacker culture and Internet culture are fundamentally different. While hacktivism groups such as Anonymous use network infrastructure to self-coordinate, the artifacts by which the Internet has made an impact on popular culture—such as memes and social media platforms—are, I would argue, only related to hacker culture insofar as they both exist under the broad category of "digital culture." In fact, those associated with hacking frequently evince disdain for the way non-technical types use the Internet, including the fact that for many, "computing" is synonymous with opening up a browser window and going online. Well-loved platforms for programmers and hackers, such as IRC and Pastebin, enjoy the popularity that they do partially because they are not well-known among those outside the tech community.

This situation indicates that Chen's article is the result of the same lack of familiarity with hacktivism that underscored the KTTV Fox Piece or, perhaps, the same opportunistic mindset

that seeks to profit off a lack of general understanding about hacking in the mainstream media. Needless to say, this is unfortunate. However, it is not enough to simply acknowledge this information gap and its abuses. The current image of hackers, hacker culture and hacktivism must be supplanted by those whose work directly challenges these stereotypes. Fortunately, there is no shortage of worthy examples.

Removing The Mask, Undoing The Stereotypes

On November 14th, 2014, news hit European headlines that Turkish hacker group Red Hack illegally entered the Turkey Electricity Transmission Company website and erased what they claimed to be 1.5 trillion lira (or $675 billion U.S. dollars) in unpaid bills. [lii] This act of Robin Hood-esque vigilante-style justice was both an offering to the people Turkey and a message to the state. Red Hack's aims are expressly political: they are Marxist-Leninist and target the Turkish government almost exclusively in a series of operations that, though relatively infrequent, are well-planned and strategized for deep impact. Red Hack is the only hacker group in the world classified as a terrorist organization, and while they obscure the identities of their individual members, they also openly claim responsibility for each of their operations.[liii]

As part of their November 2014 operation, Red Hack released a list of government-related username and password combinations that it publicized via its website and Twitter account. Their motivations are clear; in an article regarding this incident, an English-speaking Red Hack spokesperson (who chose to remain unidentified) writes: “The current government is [the] enemy of the environment and humanity." Of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, s/he states: “He is on route to be a ruthless dictator. Every single day people are killed by the police and not a single person in authority brought in front of the justice system.”[liv] Unsurprisingly, the actions of Red Hack have attracted the attention of Turkish authorities. In an operation that took the central Turkish police website and related domains offline in 2012, members of the group and those accused of being associated with the group have faced up to 24 years in prison under anti-terrorism laws.[lv] As of the time of writing, I have not been able to find information on whether or not any individuals are currently serving this sentence in whole or part.

Red Hack is one of the most internationally famous hacktivist groups. It offers a distinctly different flavor of the practice than that generally associated with Anonymous. Anonymous got its start as a quasi-nihilistic, lulz-seeking Internet pranking brigade; the descriptor "Internet hate machine," applied quite seriously to the group in the KTTV Fox News report was, in fact, a moniker the group had first jokingly taken on for itself. Red Hack, on the other hand, began as an explicitly political organization. It has continually demonstrated higher measures of intentionality and coordination than has Anonymous. Formed in 1997, they predate the inception of Anonymous by six years and the beginning of Anonymous' hacktivist work, which began in 2008, by eleven. On specific occasions, Anonymous works in concert with Red Hack to offer their assistance to them, but Red Hack only associates itself with Anonymous operations that specifically regard its own plans.

Because they openly promote a specific ideology and operate in strict accordance with it, it is easier to attain a general idea of who Red Hack are, and to speak of them summarily, than it is with Anonymous. Several Anonymous factions around the world are expressly political. Some roughly delineated "chapters" of Anonymous, particularly those that exist in oppressive

regimes, are primarily devoted to executing anti-government actions similar to those of Red Hack. However, Anonymous exists overall in the same conceptually vague space as the term "hacking" itself; whereas Red Hack is, by design, easier to understand.

Red Hack also does not perform the mischievous and oft-reviled humor of Anonymous. It would be difficult to justify critical speculation as to why individuals take them seriously (as per Adrian Chen's assertion, which is a common refrain of reporting on Anonymous). Following the November 2014 attacks, Turkey's oldest English-language daily paper, the Hürriyet Daily News, reported an erasure of only 1.5 million lira's worth of citizen debt. [lvi] This is, of course, significantly less than the 1.5 trillion claimed by Red Hack. This report features an official statement from the Turkish government that the hack failed because their system did not allow for full erasure of debt records. Regardless of the sum and whether the action was effective, however, hacking blog Cryptosphere notes that "the hack is much more than a propaganda victory." [lvii] Illuminating this perspective is a quote from its spokesperson: "We will continue our action despite a threat against us, threats to kill us or capture us and imprison us for long period. We have been declared a terrorist organisation and thanks to Twitter bowing down to the Turkish government our main account @theredhack [is] censored in Turkey." S/he also relayed a message on behalf of Red Hack:

> We are a hackers [sic] collective only to work for the needs of the people and show the corrupt system that no one is untouchable. Our previous hacks have proved this numerous times. Greetings to our Anonymous brothers and Jeremy Hammond. Hackers of the world unite against tyrants. We have nothing to lose but our keyboards.[lviii]

Despite the fact that Red Hack is significantly smaller in size and scope than Anonymous (one report lists them as comprising only twelve individuals), [lix] I maintain that they are as salient an example of hacktivism as Anonymous. Although humor and playfulness are important angles of hacker identity and culture—particularly in the United States, which gave birth to the perpetually lulzy Anonymous, and in which Richard Stallman continues to champion these childlike qualities as essential to the practice—it is not a prerequisite of hacktivism. Red Hack's existence and the seriousness with which they execute their operations destabilizes current Western narratives about what a hacker group looks like. With an "official" photo that features stern-looking men with faces largely obscured by red bandanas, Red Hack bears closer resemblance to the popular romantic notion of a communist or anarchist revolutionary than it does to the images of Lizard Squad members that spread throughout the Internet on Christmas day. It is easier to imagine Che Guevara than Bart Simpson at home among the Red Hack contingent.

One deeply-entrenched stereotype of hacking is, however, eminent in the photo of Red Hack: maleness. That hacking is almost exclusively the province of male-identified individuals is so widely held that, where pop-culture depictions are concerned, the female hacker generally exists as little more than a novelty in science fiction and suspense-genre films and literature. Lisbeth Salander from the novel and film series *The Girl With The Dragon Tattoo* is an illustration of this; [lx] likewise is the character of Kate Libby in the film *Hackers*.[lxi] Female digital activists are largely overlooked, and while it is true that women are underrepresented within hacktivist culture, they very much exist.

One month after Red Hack's infiltration of the Turkey Electricity Transmission Company's website, a hacker group of an entirely different order met in person for the first time on the campus of Carnegie Mellon University. The collective known as “Deep Lab” was formed by artist Addie Wagenknecht, who sought to bring together female hackers and artists to explore issues related to cybersecurity, anonymity, and big data through a number of technical, artistic and research-focused initiatives. In late 2014 and early 2015, Deep Lab created a series of filmed lectures, a short documentary, and a two hundred and forty page book reflecting the critical perspectives of its members on their respective fields of inquiry.

The status of Deep Lab as a bona fide hacker collective is tenuous. They exist with formal institutional support and refer to themselves as a "cyberfeminist congress" with a very obvious mission to make not only their work but their legal names and personal identities public. This constitutes a major departure from the modus operandi of precedent-setting hacktivist collectives such as LulzSec and The Cult of the Dead Cow. Those groups were resolutely grassroots and institutionally unaffiliated. For them, privacy was seen as a necessity and taken as a point of subcultural distinction. However, forthrightness is part of the manner in which Deep Lab "hacks." One of the reasons for the existence of Deep Lab is to offer the public a new perspective on the critical engagement with technology that defines hacking. In the Stallmanian sense, I believe that Deep Lab arguable counts as a hack on the popular vision of hacking. In the Deep Lab documentary, Wagenknecht observes:

> The presumed identity of anybody on the internet is, you know, a straight white male and anybody who shows themselves on the Internet not to conform to that is put through a lot of scrutiny and a lot of criticism, and really for no reason. When we try to protect ourselves, we offer up solutions that anyone can pick up to protect themselves. It seems to me that once one person starts trolling you, that more and more people start getting on your back… waking up to an inbox full of hate can emotionally drain you to the point where you want to escape or just quit.[lxii]

The situation of online harassment to which Wagenknecht speaks is extremely common and, unfortunately, discouraging to its victims. Yet the need for women not to "escape" or lose interest in the subjects that Deep Lab creates projects on is urgently needed. Women comprise only 24% of the Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (also known as STEM) workforce, and despite the fact that 41% of STEM PhDs awarded every year go to women, only 28% of tenure-track positions in STEM fields are given to female professors.[lxiii] While this certainly resolves to circumstances that extend beyond hacktivism, I believe that all issues related to the relative lack of women in STEM are interrelated; by addressing one or a handful of these subjects, one calls attention to the whole.

While Deep Lab offers a notable case of female hacktivism, their ethos and polished output does not represent the entirety of hacktivist work done by women (and certainly, they themselves would not claim this). *We Are Legion* opens with a vignette featuring Mercedes Haefer,[lxiv] who was nineteen years old when she participated in the first famous Anonymous hacktivist operation. An ardent supporter of both Anonymous and WikiLeaks, Haefer participated in "Operation Avenge Assange," a strategy to freeze the websites for PayPal, Amazon, MasterCard, Visa, and other groups that stopped processing payments to WikiLeaks due to political pressure. Haefer and thirteen others (who came to be known as "The Paypal Fourteen") were arrested for coordinating a DDoS attack toward this end in December 2010.

[lxv] The charges were later dropped, and Haefer is a vocal supporter of Anonymous and her actions with them to this day.

While Wagenknecht observes that the Internet presumes its inhabitants are straight, white and male, statistical evidence tells a different story. A 2014 Pew poll offers a breakdown of Internet use via mobile device in the United States by gender: 87% of men and 86% of women have mobile access to the web, a very narrow difference. The Pew poll also includes information on race: for White, African-American and Hispanic populations respectively, the numbers stand at 85%, 81%, and 83%. [lxvi]

This diversity also reaches into the upper echelons of hacktivist fame. Chelsea Manning is a transgendered woman; Hector Monsegur/Sabu is of Puerto Rican descent. Where their hacking activities are concerned, however, Monsegur and Manning are very much distinct: the former is famous for his actions as an agent of the U.S. government, and the latter is currently serving a prison sentence for her actions against it. In fact, the only manner in which the two are alike is in the way their respective fame as non-stereotypical hackers has been treated by the media: both have suffered from tokenization. In his deployment as an emblem of non-white/non-Asian hacking, Monsegur and other hacktivists of color suffer the same treatment offered to the female hacker: they are mythologized and upheld for their uniqueness, which calls attention away from their specific contributions to hacking. The existence of Deep Lab, Chelsea Manning, Mercedes Haefer and other hackers who challenge this on a regular basis prove that there is, indeed, a way out of this feedback cycle. The perpetual occupation of the space of queerness, of otherness, allows for such groups and individuals to declare their own norms and promote them as a precedent for those who will follow such a path in the future.

Conclusion: We Are Everywhere

With respect to the enormous diversity that exists within the hacker and hacktivist community, the difficulty of defining hacktivism and the misrepresentations produced by this vagueness are easy to understand. Activities that count as hacktivism range from those that require sophisticated programming skills, such as the techniques deployed by Red Hack to erase the debt of Turkish citizens, or may be as simple as the provision of a link that contains information gleaned from another person's illegal security breach (it is for this latter activity that Barrett Brown is serving a sixty-three month prison sentence). These instances are widespread, but generally still exist in legal, ethical and cultural gray areas.

Hacktivism is very much in its infancy; the concepts and words that afford it any measure of definition are, by and large, still obscured from and intellectually inaccessible to all but those who take an active interest in it. I believe that at this particular juncture in time, those individuals have a moral duty to make proactive efforts to raise awareness of the realities of digital activism, particularly insofar as they diverge from its depictions. This is so the narratives by which it will come to be understood in future generations are fair and representative.

One of Anonymous' slogans is "We Are Everywhere," a phrase whose seemingly performative ominousness belies the extent to which it might be true. Those who have partaken in strategically oriented hacktivism may not even be aware of it. During the Arab Spring in 2009, users of the social media platform Twitter across the world changed their profiles to identify

their location as Tehran, Iran. What some users may not have recognized is that the effectiveness of this act superseded that of a symbolic gesture of solidarity with the Iranian people, at least in theory. It was thought to have been impactful as a hacktivist strategy because of its potential to render location data gathered by Iranian censors effectively meaningless: using a false location online generates user data that, naturally, is useless to those looking to attach real identities to Internet users.[lxvii] Generation of false data as a means to obscure identity or bypass censors, a tactic known in this context as "obfuscation," is yet another way in which digital activists undertake their work. This usage of the term is advanced by Helen Nissenbaum, who has promoted it via her work as a theorist and software developer. Nissenbaum's research develops a political theory of obfuscation. [lxviii] She was involved in the creation of AdNauseum,[lxix] a piece of software that uses obfuscation as a tactic to diminish the usefulness of user data collection by adware. Though she does not proclaim it openly, I believe these actions align her with hacktivism and offer female programmers in particular a worthy role model.

I hold that the evolution of the Internet and all code-based technology constitutes a revolution whose magnitude may only be compared to that of the invention of the printing press. It is impossible to overstate the measure of power the Internet stows on those who are highly skilled and familiar with its mechanisms. The reality of this new order of power, however, is that it excludes many. Indeed, the division between those who have access to and working knowledge of network technology and those who do not constitutes an entirely new strain of haves-versus-have-nots across the world. Because the Internet is a superstructure whose maintenance must be overseen by governments, large corporations and human interest groups, those whose work exists beyond the control of these large entities must fight for their recognition and just representation.

It is my hope that a more positive and constructive view of hacktivism will leads those who identify as hackers-for-good to take pride in their identity and be inspired to reach out to others like themselves. This is of particular importance to those who fall outside the narrowly-defined popular image of the hacker: women, people of color, people with disabilities, the elderly, the LGBTQ community and all who have not followed traditional academic or professional routes through their lives. These individuals will undoubtedly have to work harder for recognition than those whose personalities and demographic markers match that of the mythologized media hacker. Fortunately, there exists an abundance of precedents from the past and present that challenge this. It is in the recognition of these individuals for their ethics, innovation and courage that we will ensure a future in which all feel at liberty to use technology for the proliferation of freedom worldwide.

Notes

_____

[i] McCormick, David and Richard Spillett. "Please Let Us Play!" *The Daily Mail*. 25 Dec. 2014. Web. Accessed 3 Jan. 2015. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2887270/Hackers-calling-Lizard-Squad-ruin-Christmas-gaming-fun-millions-taking-Sony-Playstation-Microsoft-Xbox-servers.html

[ii]

[iii] "2014, Year of the Hacker, More To Come in 2015." *CIO Today*. 31 Dec. 2014. Accessed Jan. 27th 2015. http://www.ciotoday.com/article/index.php?story_id=011000CR2B4C

[iv] "Tor: Overview." *Tor.org*. N.d. Web. 28 Feb. 2015.

v Quinton, Cooper. “Tor is for Everyone: Why You Should Use Tor.” *Electronic Frontier Foundation*, 13 June 2014. Web. 4 Dec. 2014.
vi We Are Legion—The Story of the Hacktivists (Full Movie). *YouTube*, 9 Nov. 2012. Web. 14 Feb. 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSqurTMe7Rw
vii Coleman, E. Gabriella. “Hackers [draft] [#digitalkeywords].” *Culture Digitally*. 6 Oct. 2010. Web. Jan. 27th 2015. http://culturedigitally.org/2014/10/hackers-draft-digitalkeywords/
viii Stallman, Richard. “On Hacking.” *Stallman.org*. N.d. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. https://stallman.org/articles/on-hacking.html/p>
ix Ibid.
x Rifkin, Rebecca. “Hacking Tops List of Crimes Americans Worry About Most.” *Gallup*, 27 Oct. 2014. Web. 8 Dec. 2014. http://www.gallup.com/poll/178856/hacking-tops-list-crimes-americans-worry.aspx
xi Stallman, Richard. “On Hacking.” Stallman.org. N.d. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. https://stallman.org/articles/on-hacking.html
xii Coleman, E. Gabriella. *Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous*. Brooklyn: Verso Books, 2014, 61.
xiii Coleman, E. Gabriella. *Coding Freedom: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Hacking*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012, 19.
xiv Stallman, Richard. “On Hacking.” *Stallman.org*. Web. N.d. Accessed 9 Dec. 2014. https://stallman.org/articles/on-hacking.html
xv Sengupta, Somini. “Arrests Sow Mistrust Inside A Clan of Hackers.” *The New York Times*, 6 Mar. 2012. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/technology/lulzsec-hacking-suspects-are-arrested.html?_r=0
xvi Ibid.
xvii Blankenship, Loyd. “The Conscience of a Hacker.” *Phrack, Inc*. 8 Jan. 1986. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. http://phrack.org/issues/7/3.html
xviii Ibid.
xix Qrin, Elf. Elf Qrin's Cyberlab."Elf Qrin Interviews The Mentor." *Elf Qrin's Cyber Lab*, 21 July 2000. Web. 4 December 2014. http://www.elfqrin.com/hacklab/menu/interviews.php
xx Khatchadourian, Raffi. “No Secrets: Julian Assange’s Mission For Total Transparency.” *The New Yorker*, 7 June 2010. Web. 14 Jan. 2015. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/06/07/no-secrets
xxi Ibid.
xxii Ibid.
xxiii Devenot, Neşe (writing as Senol, Neşe). “A Declaration of Psychedelic Studies," *MAPS Bulletin: Volume XXI*, Number 3. (July 2011). Print: Journal.
xxiv We Are Legion—The Story of the Hacktivists (Full Movie). *YouTube*, 9 Nov. 2012. Web. Accessed 14 Feb. 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSqurTMe7Rw
xxv Bachmann, Michael, and Jay Corzine. "Insights Into The Hacking Underground.” *The Future Challenges of Cybercrime*. Volume 5: Proceedings of the Futures Working Group (2008). Quantico,VA. Print: conference publication.
xxvi Devenot, Neşe, interview by Emma Stamm, 11 Aug. 2014.
xxvii Ibid.
xxviii Rich, Nathaniel. “The American Wikileaks Hacker.” *Rolling Stone Magazine*, 1 Dec. 2010. Web. Accessed 27 Jan. 2015. http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/news/meet-the-american-hacker-behind-wikileaks-20101201
xxix "Deep Lab." Online documentary. *Studio for Creative Inquiry at Carnegie Mellon*, 8 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 17 Feb. 2015. https://vimeo.com/116314844

xxx Ibid.
xxxi "Barrett Brown Sentenced to 63 Months for 'Merely Linking To Hacked Material.'" *The Guardian.* 22 Jan. 2015. Web. 11 Feb. 2015. http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jan/22/barrett-brown-trial-warns-dangerous-precedent-hacking-sentencing
xxxii O'Brien, Kelly J. "How Hacking Confusion Threatens Tech Reporters:" *Columbia Journalism Review*, 26 Jan. 2015. Web. Accessed 27 Jan. 2015. http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/barrett_brown_hacking_tech.php
xxxiii Humphreys, Adrian. "Matt DeHart, Former American Soldier Claiming He Was Tortured By U.S., Loses Bid for Asylum In Canada." *National Post*, 11 Feb. 2015. Web. Accessed 14 Feb. 2015. http://news.nationalpost.com/news/canada/matt-dehart-former-american-soldier-claiming-he-was-tortured-by-u-s-loses-bid-for-asylum-in-canada
xxxiv Schwartz, John. "Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently A Suicide." *The New York Times*, 12 Jan. 2013. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaron-swartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html
xxxv Ibid.
xxxvi Swartz, Aaron. "Guerilla Open Access Manifesto." *Pastebin*, July 2008. Web. Accessed 9 Dec. 2014. https://archive.org/stream/GuerillaOpenAccessManifesto/Goamjuly2008_djvu.txt
xxxvii Lessig, Lauren. "Why They Mattered: Aaron Swartz." *Politico Magazine*, 22 Dec. 2013. Web. 9 Dec. 2014. http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/12/aaron-swartz-obituary-101418.html#.VaK9PflViko
xxxviii ""Additional Outtakes and Interviews from the Internet's Own Boy." *Youtube*. Online video clip. Youtube, 7 Jan. 2015. Web. Accessed 11 Jan. 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vR3eX0HSJ8c
xxxix "Prying Eyes: Inside The NSA's War On Internet Security." *Spiegel Online*, 28 Dec. 2014. Web. Accessed 3 Jan. 2015. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/inside-the-nsa-s-war-on-internet-security-a-1010361.html
xl # "Anonymous on FOX11." YouTube. Online video clip. YouTube, 27 Jul. 2007. Web. Accessed 13 Feb. 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DNO6G4ApJQY
xli Ibid.
xlii Dubs, Jamie. "Anonymous." *Know Your Meme*, N.d. Web. 3 Jan. 2015. http://knowyourmeme.com/memes/subcultures/anonymous
xliii Wall, David S. "The Devil Drives a Lada: The Social Construction of Hackers as the Cybercriminal." *The Construction of Crime.,* C. Gregoriou ed., London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, 18.
xliv Ibid.
xlv "Cyber Talks 2014 - Bruce Potter." *YouTube*, 25 Jan. 2015. Web. Accessed 11 Feb. 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DzWTAD_B-BA
xlvi Chen, Adrian. "The Truth About Anonymous's Activism." *The Nation*, 11 Nov. 2014. Web. Accessed 17 Feb. 2015. http://www.thenation.com/article/truth-about-anonymouss-activism/
xlvii *V for Vendetta*. Dir. James McTeigue. (Burbank, CA. Warner Bros, 2005). DVD.
xlviii Chen, Adrian. "The Truth About Anonymous's Activism." *The Nation*, 11 Nov. 2014. Web. Accessed 17 Feb. 2015. http://www.thenation.com/article/truth-about-anonymouss-activism/
xlix Coleman, E. Gabriella. *Hacker, Hoaxer, Whistleblower, Spy: The Many Faces of Anonymous*. Brooklyn: Verso Books, 2014, 36.
l Ibid.
li Raincoaster. $670 Billion Served: An Interview with Redhack Hacktivist Collective. *Cryptosphere*, 20 Nov. 2014. Web. Accessed 14 Feb. 2014.

http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/11/20/670-billion-served-an-interview-with-redhack-hacktivist-collective/
[lii] "RedHack." *Tracking Terrorism*, N.d. Web. Accessed 1 Dec. 2014. http://www.trackingterrorism.org/group/redhack
[liii] Raincoaster. $670 Billion Served: An Interview with Redhack Hacktivist Collective. *Cryptosphere*, 20 Nov. 2014. Web. Accessed 14 Feb. 2014. http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/11/20/670-billion-served-an-interview-with-redhack-hacktivist-collective/
[liv] Ibid.
[lv] "Turkey Denies Hackers Wrote Off Electricity Bill Debts." *Hurriyet Daily News*, 14 Nov. 2014. Web. Accessed 6 Jan. 2015. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-denies-hackers-wrote-off-electricity-bill-debts.aspx?pageID=238&nID=74358&NewsCatID=341
[lvi] Ibid
[lvii] Ibid.
[lviii] Raincoaster. $670 Billion Served: An Interview with Redhack Hacktivist Collective. *Cryptosphere*. 20 Nov. 2014. Web. 14 Feb. 2014. http://thecryptosphere.com/2014/11/20/670-billion-served-an-interview-with-redhack-hacktivist-collective/
[lix] Ibid.
[lx] Larsson, Stieg, *The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo.* New York, Vintage, 2011.
[lxi] *Hackers*. Dir. Iain Softley. (Beverly Hills, CA. United Artists, 1995). DVD.
[lxii] "Deep Lab." Online documentary. *Vimeo*. Studio for Creative Inquiry at Carnegie Mellon, 8 Jan. 2014. Web. Accessed 17 Feb. 2015. https://vimeo.com/116314844
[lxiii] “Women In STEM” *Whitehouse.gov*, 2013 February. Web. Accessed 9 Dec. 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/ostp/women
[lxiv] We Are Legion—The Story of the Hacktivists (Full Movie). *YouTube*, 9 Nov. 2012. Web. 14 Feb. 2015. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lSqurTMe7Rw
[lxv] FBI Exposes The Terrifying Face of ‘Anonymous.’” *The Smoking Gun*. 19 July 2011. Web. Accessed 9 Dec. 2014.
[lxvi] “Internet User Demographics.” *Pew Research Center.* January 2014. Web. Accessed 11 February 2015. http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/internet-use/latest-stats/
[lxvii] Terdiman, Daniel. "Twitterverse working to confuse Iranian censors." *CNET*, 16 June 2009. Web. Accessed 26 Feb. 2015. http://www.cnet.com/news/twitterverse-working-to-confuse-iranian-censors/
[lxviii] Brunton, Finn and Helen Nissenbaum. “Vernacular Resistance to Data Collection and Analysis: A Political Theory of Obfuscation.” *First Monday, Volume 5-2, Number 11*. (May 2011). Web: Online Journal. N.d. Accessed 29 June 2015. http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3493/2955
[lxix] “AdNauseam.” Software tool. Web. Accessed 9 Dec. 2014. https://www.adnauseam.io

4.2.9 – Individuality as Ideology and the Possibilities of Resistance

Amiel Bernal, Virginia Tech (abernal@vt.edu)

Abstract This paper tracks the pervasive appeal to individuality as a basis for blame ascription and moral responsibility. It is argued that the reification of individual responsibility has politically pernicious effects. In particular, atomization of the individual undermines possibilities of collective resistance. Indeed, the atomized postulate of critical thought serves to reinforce dominant ideology regarding blame, responsibility, and individual efficacy. By reviewing the work of William Connolly and Frantz Fanon, it is argued that ascriptions of individual blame function as colonial control mechanisms that isolate and decontextualize the occurrence of violence. While this first set of insights is not entirely novel, I argue that appeal to the isolated individual is not restricted to early modern or colonial thought. Rather, recent critical thinkers such as Louis Althusser and Michel De Certeau continue to appeal to the atomized individual as a basis for resistance. I criticize these authors for the contention that resistance can spontaneously emerge ex nihilo. In particular, given Althusser's commitment to ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), the atomized individual is inconsistent with his postulation of individual heroes' and as all individuals operate within prevailing ISAs. By appealing to what Fanon calls the lumpenproletariat, I recommend a historicized and properly contextualized conception of resistance that can explain the possibility of genuine resistance.

Keywords atomized, individual, Fanon, resistance, Althusser, blame, political efficacy

It did me little good to be holding the helm; no matter how strong my hands, the sudden and numerous waves were stronger still… Thus I never was truly my own master but was always ruled by circumstances. – Napoleon Bonaparte

Introduction

One of the most pervasive postulates of Western thought is the centrality of the individual. René Descartes, the "Father of Early Modern Philosophy," starts his resuscitation of Western philosophy with one epistemic and ontological certainty: *I* think.[i] Sigmund Freud develops psychoanalysis by recognizing that the self is not fully transparent, but retains the central significance of the ego as mediator and curator of mental life. The centrality of the individual is not limited to a description of human nature; it is a basic postulate of normative theory. Individual choice is the locus of moral assessment and justification. Individuals make choices and are ascribed responsibility. Contract accounts posit individual consent as a basic criterion of justification for the state. The basis for generating and assessing the justness of principles for John Rawls depends on the cogitations of an individual, removed from the contingencies of social circumstance.[ii] Members of a society can only think morally if they can properly introspect and achieve reflective equilibrium, Rawls contends.[iii] The atomized individual is one who acts and chooses freely, despite social and material context.

Harkening to social contract tradition and the birth of capitalism, the atomized individual is a concept that supposes that people act in an autonomous, rational fashion. This agent is

treated as uniquely responsible for their actions and worthy of respect in virtue of the supposed fact that their behavior is not contingent on socialization. This humanist impulse serves to justify neoliberal postulates regarding private property and rights as freedom in the marketplace.[iv] Further, it serves to place conceptions of merit and blame on individuals rather than institutions. The atomized individual is also a political unit of analysis found in discussions of population and demographics. Social contract tradition maintains that this individual justifies the state in virtue of our consent to hypothetical contracts (e.g., Thomas Hobbes, Rawls). This postulate of individual atomization is often taken axiomatically. As Hobbes aptly stated, "The passions that incline men to peace are… And reason suggests convenient articles of peace upon which men may be drawn to agreement. These articles are they which otherwise called the laws of nature…"[v]

This tradition faces challenges from a perspective that views the atomized individual skeptically. Jennifer Spiegel discusses atomized individuals in the context of student protests in Montreal stating, "The individual had to be codeable as an atomized unit, an individual, or what [Gilles] Deleuze calls a 'dividual' able to be processed by various legal institutions."[vi] Recent scholarship evidences this critical turn and is skeptical about the prospects of atomized individuality as an explanation of deviance and moral responsibility.[vii] Yet, despite this turn away from the atomized individual, it is still a prevalent postulate of contemporary thought. Indeed, this essay will show that the atomized individual is prevalent in recent political and critical theory, even among the ostensibly critical figures. Nonetheless, the function of this project is not to determine whether there is an atomized subject. Rather, the purpose is to negotiate the politically pernicious effects of individual atomization as it deters and demobilizes possibilities of collective resistance. By putting a number of critical figures in conversation, this paper develops the problematic of the atomized individual as well as its prevalence in contemporary critical thought.

The problem of the atomized subject will be developed via analyzing William Connolly and Frantz Fanon. Both scholars contend that the atomization of individuals serves to perpetuate dominant hegemonies. First, An analysis of William Connolly's "Desire to Punish" will serve as a case study for this contention.[viii] Second, Fanon contends that the colonized are not politically efficacious as individuals, and this explains the prevalence of the atomized individual as an operant in Western thought. Third, Michel de Certeau and Louis Althusser are put into conversation insofar as they are both committed to the atomized individual.[ix] In the final analysis, Fanon is again utilized to provide historically and socially situated resources that allow for the possibility of resistance without positing an individual who is totally free from prevailing ideological forces.

This intervention facilitates understanding of the late-modern and critical turn. As intellectual forces for the analysis of regimes of power and practices of repression it is crucial to turn a critical lens on key figures within this tradition. This paper shows that even figures such as De Certeau and Althusser retain elements of the atomized individual or fail to push their premises to their logical conclusions. Further, this paper provides a way forward for those interested in the possibilities of resistance by showing how resistance need not emerge from nothing, but can be historically and culturally informed.

The insistence that the atomized individual persists in thinking, even in the critical fields, requires further motivation. What is problematic about thinking of one as the atomized

individual? Of what consequence is this postulate of the 'I' apart from one's circumstance? To better assess these questions, I turn to the resources of William Connolly and Franz Fanon. For illustrative purposes, I motivate the problematic by way of reference to Nietzsche, without straying far from twentieth century thought.

The Individualized Problematic

Nietzsche recognizes one of the potential problems entailed in the concept of the atomized individual. He describes the beliefs of those meek individuals who seek to blame by claiming, "in fact, [they] do not defend any belief more passionately than that *the strong are free* to be weak, and the birds of prey are free to be lambs: in this way, they gain the right to make the birds of prey *responsible* for being birds of prey."[x] By postulating individuals and their agency, blame can be freely ascribed. If it is simply a matter of choosing or not choosing to do something, moral failures are obvious evils. The bird of prey chooses to attack the lamb and this violence is an evil that is attributed to the bird's individual choice. I call this ascription of blame to individuals due to their alleged free choice, the "problem of responsibility." By disregarding the formative influences individuals undergo, the problem of responsibility serves to place the burden of blame on individuals rather than contingencies of context. A second problem regards the fomentation of effective political activity as isolated individuals. First, the relationship between blame ascription and the atomization of the individual will be considered in the works of William Connolly.

William Connolly contends that the desire to punish is motivated by a desire for revenge. Despite abysmal rates of recidivism, incarceration is at an all-time high.[xi] As Marc Mauer and Ryan S. King demonstrate, incarceration rates have increased five hundred percent between the 1970s and 2007.[xii] These rates reached their peak in 2008 and have only decreased moderately. Currently, the Bureau of Justice estimates that nearly one percent of the total United States population is incarcerated.[xiii] Nationally, recidivism stands at around seventy-one percent for violent offenders.[xiv] Thus, a considerable portion of the U.S. population cycles through the prison system. Of course, this phenomenon is especially prevalent among populations who were most adversely affected by the legacy of colonialism—indeed, incarceration rates themselves are probably one symptom of this legacy.[xv] Black men are five times more likely to be imprisoned than white men. Further, these rates are unique to the United States among affluent countries. [xvi] The conjunction of these facts presents a startling and unique problem. The cycle of incarceration is massive, unevenly applied, and ineffective. As such, an explanation of current models of penalization is in order.

What explains harsh sentencing and prison conditions despite the apparent inefficacy of sentencing felons to prisons? Connolly cites ascriptions of blame based on individual agency and responsibility to explain the desire to punish.[xvii] The problem of responsibility cultivates a culture in which moral shortcomings are individual failures. One deserves punishment precisely because they freely make immoral choices. Calls to be "hard on crime" persist despite the fact that "hard" sentences often only "harden" the criminal, because, after all, the criminal chose a hard life.

Further, the atomized individual is a basic unit of economic analysis. As individuals are presumed to act rationally, criminal behavior is no exception. [xviii] Neoliberal interpretations of criminality may lead to two results. First, sufficient disutility must be generated to deter ostensibly rational crime. If one is acting rationally by being a violent criminal, incentives must

change to deter individual actors from violence. This explains emphasis on imprisonment as a determent; rational acts are contingent on the cost-benefit analysis. Second, privatized correctional facilities exist foremost (as any corporation does) to maximize profit. The ideological view that conforms to the position that hard sentences deter criminals also serves to promote profit in the context of individual corporations. Indeed, documented cases show a close connection between proscribing high levels of individual responsibility to young offenders, hard sentences, and profit. [xix]

Connolly reviews the case of Dontay Carter, a man accused of escaping prison and murdering a man in downtown Baltimore in 1993. The comments and questions directed towards Carter by prosecutors fixate on his personal choices. Connolly recites the opprobrium against Dontay as he is lambasted for "throwing his life away" and described as "a devil in Gucci a sweater" by prosecutors and the family of the victim.[xx] Little media coverage was given to Carter's final statement upon sentencing that addressed the social and institutional structures that perpetuate racial violence. Connolly remarks on the operating procedure of the judicial system, "[t]he governing injunction; save the categories, waste those who disturb their stability." [xxi] Rather than recognize the empirical evidence that suggests that social conditions explain much of our behavior and that "hard" sentences are poor deterrents, the judicial system perpetuates the belief in autonomous responsibility in order to persecute via prosecution. [xxii] Thus, the category of responsibility as individual choice is unaltered while the individuals who pose a challenge to our understanding of responsibility are institutionalized.

Connolly urges us to recognize that desires are conditioned by the subject and a model that frames some ends as desirable.[xxiii] Carter attests to this when he speaks of his childhood in a juvenile correctional facility. He recalls, "I learned… it was a place where you fought almost every day because everybody trying to be tougher than the next person."[xxiv] Indeed, even Carter's desire for violent action was cultivated by a cultural context of revenge and by his childhood upbringing in which violence was a source of control, authority, legitimacy, and individual safety. When incited by the perceived injustice of his initial incarceration, his recourse was further violence. The best available explanation of his response is not that he wanted to be "a devil," or "throw his life away" but that violence begets violence, especially when it is framed as a source of legitimacy. Thus, the atomization of individuals fosters a revenge culture that punishes individuals for their learned behaviors. Further, it perpetuates, as revenge is itself a motive for ongoing attempts to rectify perceived systemic persecution. Individuals get "back at the man" by attacking random individuals as perceived symbols of "the system." While this account identifies the pernicious effects of atomized individualization, Connolly does not explicitly develop these considerations in the context of political mobilization. By considering Frantz Fanon, the problem of responsibility becomes of political import as it serves to isolate individuals from social means of resistance. [xxv]

Fanon views colonialism and decolonization as an existential struggle. The terms are absolute and cast in violence. An uprising and casting out of colonial forces is necessary in order for the colonized to be free from oppression. More accommodating approaches comprise the liberatory ends of the colonized. Means of accommodation and compromise are appeals to morality that intend to moderate the action of revolutionaries.[xxvi] The priest and ethics professor do not come to the direct aid of the oppressed, but only lament about the terms of freedom (violence), especially when the colonized seek to emancipate themselves. Thus, ideological entreats are seen as a rearguard action to secure the safety and status quo

of colonizers. The individual is implored to be ethical or to stop their sinful ways, but doing so often undermines their interest. Fanon sees these appeals to the individual as ideological weapons. His most direct and trenchant indictment of individualism is offered in this context: The native intellectual had learnt from his masters that the individual ought to express himself fully. The colonialist bourgeoisie had hammered into the native's mind the idea of a society of individuals where each person shuts himself up in his own subjectivity, and whose only wealth is individual thought. Now the native who has the opportunity to return to the people during the struggle for freedom will discover the falseness of this theory. The very forms of organization of the struggle will suggest to him a different vocabulary. Brother, sister, friend—these are words outlawed by the colonialist bourgeoisie, because for them my brother is my purse, my friend is part of my scheme for getting on. [xxvii]

Bourgeoisie ideology represents life as a zero-sum game in which atomized individuals compete among each other for relative advantage. Viewing one's neighbor as an adversary for a job ensures that both parties become entrenched in a localized dual in which neither recognizes the broader social conditions that impose limited financial opportunities, or that financial opportunities are not synonymous with living well. Indeed, the tendency to use the contexts of liberation and emancipation for personal gain is attributed to the Western legacy of the bourgeoisie colonists.[xxviii] Natives who do not view themselves as members of a common struggle are subject to the ideology of individualization.[xxix]

One of the symptoms of this violent individualization is a retaliatory response by atomized individuals. Fanon contends that the inculcation of violence by oppressors conditions the colonized to respond violently. [xxx] The legacy of torture, rape, and slavery produces recognition in the local that reconciliation is not an option. The rearguard action of ideology is a means to perpetuate a social order. The cognizant native mocks these ideological apparatuses as such.[xxxi] The legacy of violence forms a resentment that is turned outward. The colonized adopt the totalizing methods of direct confrontation. One way for the colonist to negotiate this realization is by stimulating feudal, tribal, and familial divisions. Fanon writes, "Colonialism does not simply state the existence of tribes; it also reinforces it and separates them."[xxxii] By instigating tribalism, two ends are achieved. First, the necessary "letting-of-blood" is attained. The cultural conditioning of violence induces the inevitable response of violence. As violence is ultimately unavoidable, the colonists redirect it in ways that do not challenge their hegemony.[xxxiii] A further result arises as the mutual weakening of resistance and deprivation of a unified and politically efficacious force. If the enemy is a fellow native, one cannot coordinate the material means or the ideological awareness necessary to usurp the dominant power structure. To explain the prevalence of violence towards one's fellow native, Fanon engages in a genealogical account of violence towards fellow colonized people.

Fanon contends that violence towards one's brethren is a type of internalization of resentment. He writes, "[b]y throwing himself with all his force into the vendetta, the native tries to persuade himself that colonialism does not exist, that everything is going on as before, that history continues."[xxxiv] Applying his psychiatric expertise, Fanon suggests that the tendency to attack one's brethren is a form of avoidance. Frustration regarding prevailing social conditions is warranted and a culture of violence stimulates the expression of aggression. The well-fed and well-fortified colonist towns cannot be attacked directly (yet) as they are too strong. So the alternative candidates for expressing these tendencies are fellow natives. Thus, the native displaced their frustration on a weaker target.[xxxv]

An intuitive response to Fanon's challenge to atomized individualism is recourse to communitarian action. Rather than leave individuals to fight one another or to individually evict colonists, communities can rally to do so. Yet, Fanon views various forms of tribalism and feudalism as basic impediments to revolutionary aspirations. Thus, one of the first targets of revolutionary fervor will be the colonialist structures that promote distinction and difference. xxxvi These sources of division may be in the form of the bourgeois individualism or the tribal conflicts. Hostile energy expressed in tribalism and individualism is redirected for the common purpose of decolonization.

As has been argued by reference to Fanon, the atomized individual produces a political impotence that serves to perpetuate dominant colonial power structures. The ineffectual individual response in turn induces a physically or psychologically aggressive demeanor in which the oppressed react with hostility to perceived threats. These perceived threats are often proximate threats such as rival community members. xxxvii As such, it seems that there are strong reasons for considering the atomized individual as an ideological apparatus .xxxviii

Connolly and Fanon provide the resources to reject the postulate of the atomized individual for its problematic ascriptions of responsibility and the pernicious influence it has on effective political mobilization and solidarity. One may be content concluding that the atomized individual is a relic. Contrary to this sanguine scene, prominent and oft-cited scholars retain axioms of the atomized individual in their thought. De Certeau and Althusser are two examples of this ongoing tendency, though they do not fully acknowledge it.

The Specter Returns: Latent Individualism in Althusser and De Certeau

Louis Althusser recognizes the role of the individual in Marxist thought. He construes individuals as "free-and-equal," presenting market pressures and exploitation of labor as a consensual and mutually beneficial arrangement.xxxix Althusser's insight is to recognize that ideological mechanisms play a predominant role in perpetuating the dominant modes of production. These mechanisms are not primarily overt expressions of power. As with Fanon, Althusser views moral and academic treatises skeptically as they serve to reinforce values that perpetuate current social and economic relations. Althusser writes, "[i]ndeed, we shall be showing that the vast majority of philosophies are forms of *resignation* or, to be more precise, forms of *submission* to the 'ideas of the ruling class' and thus to class rule."xl Therefore the historical function of philosophy is as an ideological state apparatus (ISA), and it serves to passively reinforce prevailing social relations without direct use of force.xli The analysis of social institutions as ideological state apparatuses is extended to the family unit, church, and army.xlii Each is autonomous, yet they function to perpetuate the dominant mode of production via socialization. It is only in rare cases that the coercive powers of repressive apparatuses are necessary to shape public perceptions and activity. In most cases, the passive and multifarious mechanisms of ISAs are sufficient.

Despite remarks in the preface regarding the Marxist contention that capitalism differentiates and atomizes individuals, Althusser does not address this theme directly. He is content to think of individuals as such. One of his most well-known contributions provides evidence of Althusser's retention of the atomized individual. The concept of interpellation denotes the relation that arises when a state or public entity acts upon subjects.xliii One's status as a subject is established as a member of the state when a police officer exclaims "Hey you!" By

recognizing this demand, I individuate myself as a subject, as subject to law, and subject to the concrete instantiation of power as represented by the officer. My identity is shaped in the context of this interaction, and others like it. Althusser writes, “We say that the category of the subject is constitutive of all ideology, but we also immediately add that the category of the subject is constitutive of every ideology only insofar as every ideology has the function (which defines it) of ‘constituting’ concrete subjects (such as you and me).”[xliv] Althusser contends that constructions of identities *as individuals* is constitutive of all ideology, all social order. Thus, while individual interpolation *as subject* may be a problematic imposition by the dominant order; it is not a unique fact. Every age and social order interpolates the preexisting individual. Yet, many social orders construe discrete humans as vessels towards the service of others or part of collectives (castes, families, tribes) first and foremost. [xlv] The individual as a basic unit is not as universal as Althusser suggests.

Althusser does not draw conclusions about the uniquely pernicious role of atomization in which individuals are interpolated as free subjects. He simply takes the fact of isolated individuals to be a given, and adds that social orders interpolate them. The pernicious value added by social orders is the various identities ascriptions (e.g., free-agent, serf, Christian, woman). He neglects the possibility of social orders in which subjects are not interpolated primarily as *individuals*. It seems that the individual as such remains a latent *tabula rasa* for Althusser. The individual is always present; it is just a matter of various identity structures being ascribed to the individual through interpolation. [xlvi] He does not recognize that there need not be a subject apart from identity ascriptions. Fanon, for example, envisions a revolutionary order in which subjects are foremost a part of communal emancipatory project. The revolutionarily mobilized natives view their activity as a collective action and demand. If a genuinely revolutionary movement obtains, conceiving of oneself as an individual revolutionary is beside the point. As with cohesive military units, the unit is itself the basic level of analysis. While this objection—that Althusser assumes a latent individual subject—may seem to be a minute matter, it has implications for the ways in which Althusser conceptualizes resistance to the dominant economic and social order.

Althusser contends that the party leaders, aware of the exploitation endemic to capitalism must be precisely one step ahead of the proletariat in their march towards separation from the capitalist state.[xlvii] Problematically, the means by which this ideological separation occurs is not made evident. Althusser seems to believe that simple recognition of exploitation will motivate action. This is a contentious proposition on two grounds. First, it is not clear that recognition of facts is motivationally potent at all.[xlviii] Without some further normative input, one can see proletariat labor conditions, or other descriptive conditions, and feel no motivation force. Second, and relatedly, the motivational force necessary for separation—for standing one step ahead of the masses—must either come from the agent alone or from the agent as they are influenced by prevailing ISAs.

There is strong reason to contend that the supposed vanguards ahead of the masses are iterations of ideology. The indoctrination of ISAs is constant and pervasive. The family unit, schools, and the media are all taken to be perpetuating the dominant ideology. As Althusser contends, political subjects cannot escape its influence as it occurs even *in utero*.[xlix] Thus, it is not clear how the leaders of the proletariat could be free from the influences of ISAs. Revolutionary ardor may be a means to allow the state to use direct repressive force on a particularly recalcitrant population, for example.[l] These leaders think they are acting in the

interests of the workers of the world, but they just make resistances more evident and thus easier to suppress. Althusser seems to believe that party leaders for social reform and revolution are somehow capable of defying the influence of ISAs in a way that no one else is.

The alternative is that revolutionary ardor would be a product of the autonomous initiative of leaders. Despite the ubiquitous pressures that condition subjects, these few stand apart from and resistant to ISAs. These individuals recognize the descriptive facts about labor conditions, and generate their own moral sentiments that guide them towards revolution. Yet, given what Althusser said regarding the ubiquity of ISAs, why would such autonomous action be possible? A telling passage suggests Althusser's view. Althusser writes, "I ask the pardon of those teachers who, in dreadful conditions, attempt to turn the few weapons they can and in the history and learning they 'teach' against the ideology, the system and the practices in which they are trapped. They are a kind of hero."[li] This individual, the lone and brave teacher, is heroically capable of teaching against the ideology that they have been raised under and teach within. Their pedagogical methods and content are formed by ISAs (within public schools and education programs at a university), yet they can stand opposed to this influence. Althusser provides no explanation for this possibility. These individuals stand alone and apart from the tide of ISAs. The alternative explanation for the possibility of such heroic action by leaders of the proletariat and teachers is their autonomous agency. ISAs abound but these individuals are unaffected.

They are atomized individuals, capable of restructuring their interpellation by state apparatuses in ways contrary to the ends of those very apparatuses. These are figures that do not learn their moral code from their upbringing, but generate their own. Thus, in the final analysis it seems that the atomized individual remains in even radical Marxists such as Althusser. An analysis of De Certeau suggests that this finding is not anomalous; rather the atomized individual is still a central tenet of much critical thought.

The fundamental distinction in De Certeau's work is between the strategic and tactical behavior. Strategies are force-relationships that can be demarcated institutionally and spatially.[lii] These spaces are circumscribed as "proper" and also include conceptual spaces. De Certeau provides the examples of a proprietor, city, and scientific institution as entities that enact strategies. [liii] Each can demarcate, spatially or conceptually, what is their domain and what is legitimate within that domain. Thus, the terms of relations within these spaces are circumscribed by the purveyors of the dominant strategy. On the other hand, tactics occur between or within the spaces circumscribed by strategies. Tactics lack a proper place, so instead they rely on fortuitous moments to seize opportunities. Everyday practices are often tactical as they operate within strategic spaces. The housewife who makes a decision about what to buy is engaged in a tactical exercise. Though the spaces of legitimate activity are largely circumscribed, individuals can operate within those spaces at their own discretion. De Certeau takes special interest in *la perreques* as examples of tactical maneuvering. While officially working within the strategic space of one's employers, individuals tactically shirk by appropriating their time towards their own ends. The man who writes a love letter while on the job acts tactically in a strategic environment.[liv]

Despite this apparently individualistic conception of people as capable of freely and spontaneously taking back their time for their own ends, De Certeau contends that "the examination of such practices does not imply a return to individuality." [lv] De Certeau does not

intend to overturn conceptions of individuals as primarily a product of their contexts, rather than creators. Indeed, it is clear that De Certeau's model suggests a serious delimitation and structuring of tactics. After all, purchases in the supermarket are considered cases of tactics; the range of "choice" is circumscribed to decisions between brands of cereal. Tactics are reduced to the activities in the bathroom of a train—we are free to engage in an array of irrationalities in this space.[lvi] Alternatively, consider the act of wandering in New York City. De Certeau takes this activity, as a creative activity that variously defines spaces, constitutes the city, and configures meanings.[lvii] As De Certeau states in his preface, "within a grid of socio-economic constraints, these pursuits unfailingly establish relational tactics (a struggle for life), artistic creations (an aesthetic), and autonomous initiatives (an ethic)."[lviii]

Given his own acknowledgements about the sociality of humans and the near ubiquity of strategies, De Certeau has placed a large burden of proof upon himself to show how daily practices are genuinely tactical insofar as they serve to defy strategies and afford opportunities for enjoyment and self-expression. Problematically, tactical behavior is only plausible if De Certeau denies a key psychological premise. Namely, the premise that political subjects are conditioned by social context precludes the possibility of autonomous activity within strategies. If the terms of justification, acceptable conduct, and physical spaces have all been delimited and preconfigured by strategies, it is not clear how one can act apart from these institutional configurations. A prisoner may enjoy the confines of their cell, and even find entertaining activities which use the narrow walls and bars, but this enjoyment does not suggest any important accomplishment unless one also believes they are psychologically free. If the prisoner is represented as enjoying their stay, this merely seems like a positive construal, or worse, as evidence of the prisoner's indoctrination. A dilemma again emerges. Either political subjects are truly free to engage in tactical enjoyments or they are merely suffering from a sort of false consciousness in which they take choosing between brands or the prisoner's freedom within his cell as important tactical achievements. [lix] The latter interpretation reduces De Certeau's study to a treatise that serves to legitimate social and economic structures. If De Certeau is to be understood as a critical theorist, we must also recognize his belief that political subjects are somehow free to enjoy themselves despite the ubiquity of strategies. Thus, the study of everyday practices and the value placed in tactical defiance is predicated on the assumption that individuals are capable of defying strategic social configurations which exist in order to condition our responses. But this further premise regarding the free capacity for creative resistance is a latent and undefended postulate.

Resources of Resistance

The problem has been made plain: theorists of resistance posit the capacity for resistance as deriving from individual agents, *ex nihilo.* Such atomization has the pernicious effects of justifying individual blame ascription rather than confronting institutional evils and undermining collective action by isolating persons. But given their own claims regarding the importance and omnipresence of indoctrinating forces, the potential for individual resistance is not plausibly motivated. By reviewing Fanon, I hope to provide one suggestion for how the discourse on resistance can move forward without supposing free and atomized individualism. Consider the *Lumpenproletariat.* In Fanon's work, these are not the workers who will achieve class-consciousness, but those members of the colonized who have not been enveloped by the institutions of colonization. Indigenous members of tribes are one example. Fanon writes of the *Lumpenproletariat* as "one of the most spontaneous and the most radically revolutionary of the colonized forces."[lx] This is a result of the fact that these

individuals have not been coopted into the dominant mode of production. Relying on the land and their own social institutions, these individuals do not suffer from the false-consciousness of individualism, and they are not reliant on selling their labor to others for subsistence. They have independent mythos, vocabulary, and oral tradition that conceptualize life and social space in ways that are largely untouched by the colonizers. The ISAs of the church and nuclear family have not fully captivated these cultures.

While one cannot reasonably hope to return to an Emersonian state apart from society, it is possible that consciously or unconsciously, political subjects have retained a vocabulary and ideological apparatuses that are not exclusively the productive of neoliberal forces. Alternatively, a theorist interested in resistance can seek out such resources as a basis for explaining the possibility of genuine resistance. While indigenous ways of life are fast disappearing, there are still alternative sources of socialization available to us or *latent* within us; socialization inherited through generations that continue to provide inklings of alternative conceptions of social and economic relations. Thus, resistance need not be an individual and spontaneous task of willing oneself to resist. Resistance can be situated in socially inherited or learned practices and historically grounded. While this suggestion is tentative, it provides a way for theorists to retain the centrality of the human as a socially influenced individual, while also arguing for the possibility of resistance.

Conclusion

It is useful to specify what has not been done. First, it has not been argued that there are no individuals. The thesis of this paper is not metaphysical, but political.[lxi] Rather, the contention is that fixating on the individual is morally and politically misguided. Further, this misdirection is perpetuated by influential critical theorists. As such, this project has been primarily interpretive. By identifying latent assumptions the discourse regarding figures such as Althusser and De Certeau can be fruitfully reassessed. Yet, the construct of individualism need not be abandoned.

Appeal to the individual is an irreducible feature of contemporary thought. Denying the centrality of the individual as the locus of decision-making is to deny what seems most evident in our lives: we make decisions. This phenomenological axiom cannot be easily dismissed. The important further step is to recognize that these decisions always arise in the context of prevailing social, psychological, biological, and physical facts. Thus, the dialectic move is to set-aside questions of blame. The important normative question is not, why would you do that? These questions can be readily answered by the special sciences. The important moral questions regard modes of life, models, and systems that foster certain tendencies rather than others. Thus, moral thinking should focus on the institutional and social level.

A further conclusion regards the faculties of the individual. If it is possible to resist systems of oppression, this must be defended by appeal to additional considerations. Maybe, as Fanon contends, there are pockets of resistance to be found in the rural peasantry that have not been subsumed under capitalist false consciousness. Alternatively, one may posit some basic human moral sentiments are tendencies that will lead to the rejection of oppressive hegemony.[lxii] The essential discursive advancement that must be made is that possibilities of resistance can only be substantiated in some existing, material grounds. This recognition serves to enhance theory construction for the numerous scholars interested in liberation, emancipation, and resistance. They must find the resources in prevailing facts. This need not

require structural changes. The critical step is to argue for this position, rather than assume it. These findings are not restricted to the advancement of academic discourse.
The problem of responsibility suggests that blame ascriptions should be recast. Social contexts are a precondition for the emergence of all individual persons. At least, recognition of the problem of responsibility should lead to serious reconsideration of the motives that justify penal practices. Some (e.g., Igor Primoratz) contend that retributive justice is its own reward, but many believe that harsh punishments are important deterrents or protect the public.[lxiii] With these myths set aside, the collective desire to punish can be reassessed. Retributive punishments are propagated because individuals are deemed blameworthy.

A second finding is more clearly motivated by the preceding analysis. Political action is a social project. Fanon explained that colonists foment divisions (whether into atomized individuals or tribal units) in order to undermine effective political action. Appealing to heroic individuals for resistance relies on individuals to willfully upturn their life-world. Althusser and De Certeau leave hope for individual resistance, but they provide no clear reason for believing this individual resistance is possible. As such, scholars should be skeptical of individual tactical resistance. One clear target of this analysis is localized "political activity." For example, "voting with your dollar" engages in activities that are constitutive of neo-liberal practices. Further, these choices are circumscribed in modes of production that negate all significant choice. The type of jeans that one buys does little to influence the means by which jeans are produced in a globalized economy. As such, historically and socially grounded forms of resistance should be developed.

Notes

_____

i Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy* isolates the individual and maintains that certain sorts of self-knowledge are infallible.
ii John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009).
iii Ibid., 42-44.
iv Robert Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia* is a case study in this line of political philosophy.
v Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan: with selected variants from the Latin edition of 1668*, Editor Edwin Curley (New York: Hackett Publishing, 1994).
vi Jennifer B. Spiegel, "Masked Protest in the Age of Austerity: State Violence, Anonymous Bodies, and Resistance In the Red," *Critical Inquiry* 41, no. 4 (2015): 791.
vii Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); Simon Critchley, *Infinitely Demanding: Ethics of Commitment, Politics of Resistance* (London: Verso, 2012).
viii William E. Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995).
ix Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses (Notes Towards an Investigation)," in *The Anthropology of the State: A reader*, Aradhana Sharma and Akhil Gupta, eds. (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 86-111.
x It is interesting to note that Nietzsche both recognizes the atomized individual and that ascriptions of blame are generated from this conception of the individual. Two considerations can make sense of this. First, he locates responsibility to a free will, not just willing as such. If the strong are free to be weak, then they can be held accountable for choosing to impose their strength. Second, Nietzsche is dismissive of ascriptions of blame as symptomatic of slave morality. The weak and persecuted blame the strong simply to conquer or are

conquered. Thus, he can consistently recognize both propositions as he views blame ascriptions as little more than evincing by the weak. He does not believe the indictments of slave morality hold any moral authority. Friedrich, Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo* (New York: Vintage, 2010).
xi Indeed, incarceration rates are dramatically higher now than when Connolly wrote “Desire and Punish.”
xii Marc Mauer and Ryan S. King, *Uneven Justice: State Rates of Incarceration by Race and Ethnicity* (Washington, DC: Sentencing Project, 2007), x.
xiii Adam Liptak, "1 in 100 U.S. Adults Behind Bars, New Study Says," *New York Times*, February 28, 2008.
xiv Matthew R. Durose, Alexia D. Cooper, and Howard N. Snyder, "Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 30 States in 2005: Patterns from 2005 to 2010, "*Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics* (2014).
xv Bruce Western and Christopher Wildeman, "The Black Family and Mass Incarceration," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 621, no. 1 (2009): 221-242.
xvi "Highest to Lowest - Prison Population Total," Highest to Lowest, 2014, Accessed July 31, 2015. http://www.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total
xvii Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization*, 39.
xviii Indeed, the entire school of Rational Choice Theory within criminology adheres to this premise. (See: Simpson, Sally, ed. *Of crime and criminality: the use of theory in everyday life*. Sage Publications, 2000).
xix Jon Hurdle and Sabrina Tavernise, "Former Judge Is on Trial in 'Cash for Kids’ Scheme," *New York Times*, February 8, 2011, Accessed July 31, 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/09/us/09judge.html
xx Connolly, *The Ethos of Pluralization* , 44.
xxi Ibid., 46.
xxii The ideology of atomized individualization has important ramification for the relationship between the privatization of prisoners and incarceration rates. Neo-liberal values seem to correspond with the individualized conceptions of the agent as rational and autonomous as well as the tendency to privatize public institutions.
xxiii Connolly’s conception of a model is not elucidated, yet it is clear that socio-cultural factors frame the ways in which we view our goals and human relations.
xxiv Hurdle and Tavernise, “Former Judge Is on Trial in ‘Cash for Kids’ Scheme,” 59.
xxv Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Vol. 149 (New York: Grove Press, 1965).
xxvi Ibid., 44.
xxvii Ibid, 45.
xxviii Ibid., 48.
xxix This can be related back to the problem of responsibility as corrupt despots are blamed for their self-seeking ways. In attributing such blame, commentators fail to consider where the tendency to seek personal financial fortune was learned.
xxx Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 40.
xxxi Ibid.
xxxii Ibid., 94.
xxxiii Ibid., 54.
xxxiv Ibid.
xxxv Three comments are in order. First, aggression displacement is a well-documented phenomenon, and has received ongoing empirical testing (See: Marcus-Newhall, Amy,

William C. Pedersen, Mike Carlson, and Norman Miller. "Displaced aggression is alive and well: a meta-analytic review." *Journal of personality and social psychology* 78, no. 4 (2000): 670). It is not merely a bygone Freudian postulate. Second, it is interesting to note that this displacement perpetuates the cycle of violence that Fanon describes. The next generation is raised in a context of violence, but now the perpetrators are their ostensive brethren. This serves to further bifurcate natives and undermine prospects of solidarity. Third, this genealogical account has interesting parallels with Nietzsche's work.

xxxvi Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 96.

xxxvii Indeed, this is a narrative that conforms to the North American experience of violence associated with ongoing decolonization and neocolonialism in urban areas.

xxxviii Louis Althusser employs the terminology of ideological state apparatus which will be addressed in the following section. Althusser, Louis. *On the reproduction of capitalism: Ideology and ideological state apparatuses*. Verso Books, 2014.

xxxix Ibid., preface xxviii

xl Ibid., 192

xli Ibid., 192

xlii Ibid., 194

xliii Ibid., 241

xliv Ibid., 241

xlv Of course, the individual is also evident in manifestations of caste systems, human-chattel, diplomatic trading of children, etc.

xlvi

xlvii Ibid., 179

xlviii Michael Smith contends that Hume first observed that facts alone are not motivationally efficacious. Michael Smith, "The Human Theory of Motivation," *Mind* 96 (1987): 36-61.

xlix Ibid., 242

l Fanon recounts the fomentation of Disinherited Madagascans for just these sorts of ends. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 115.

li Althusser, Louis. "Ideology and ideological state apparatuses (notes towards an investigation)." *The anthropology of the state: A reader* (2006): 86-111. Pg 311

lii Michel De Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life: Living and Cooking*, Vol. *2* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998.

liii Ibid., xix.

liv Ibid., xix.

lv Ibid., xi.

lvi Ibid., 111.

lvii Ibid., 111.

lviii Ibid,. ix.

lix Indeed, figures such as Althusser and Marx might wonder whether De Certeau is serving a priestly role by justifying dominant economic relations with emphasis on tactical "freedoms."

lx Ibid., 129

lxi This is an adaptation of a Rawlsian phrase.

lxii Though one may have Foucauldian reasons for reticence here.

lxiii Igor Primoratz, *Justifying Legal Punishment* (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1989).

4.2.10 – Philopoesis and/as Resistance[i]

Sam Okoth Opondo, Vassar College (saopondo@vassar.edu)

I.

The invitation to be one of the keynote speakers at the *Representations of Resistance* Conference is both an honor and a provocation. I wish to express my gratitude by going straight to the provocation arising from the generous and, I would add, risky invitation. An exposure that can only be reciprocated through further exposure, risk and experimentation.

First, I would like to render thanks to Francois Debrix for inviting me to the conference and for going further to allow me to speak about a topic of my choice in relation to the already demarcated conference theme (*Representations of Resistance*). When I received the invitation, my initial response to the generous offer was to turn to the problematic of negative preference; to state, "I would prefer not to". In part, this is because my work speaks more to amateur diplomacies of everyday life and the problematics of resisting representations (more so colonial and ethnological representations) rather than the representations of resistance. However, owing to the provocation and generosity of this invitation, and with some abusive fidelity[ii] to my own work and interests, I will explore how *philopoesis* as a method and orientation presents a heterogeneous site from which one can think about multiple scenes of resistance and representation.[iii]

Provoked by the simultaneous insistence and hesitation that marked my response to Francois Debrix's invitation, I will perform the philopoetic work of juxtaposing fragments from a number of literary texts and inter-articulating them with a set of philosophical texts which I hope to read diplomatically — side by side. The discontinuity in the side-by-side reading of these texts proceeds through three main operations and an interlude. First, I engage the prosaics of resistance, negative preference, and the image of a 'man without references' in Herman Melville's short story *Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street.* Heeding insights from the philosophical and linguistic interference in Melville's short story, and attentive to the critical locus of enunciation provided by actual and fictional migrants, I proceed to read Abdulrazak Gurnah's novel *By the Sea;* a text that invokes Melville's *Bartleby* as it explores the entanglements of refuge, nativity and the familial through the perspective of an asylum-seeker whose name, stories, objects and choice of words disturb and redistribute colonial and postcolonial worlds*.* Through a brief interlude, I read the prosaic (novelistic) representation of the migrant in Gurnah's text alongside the prosaic (everyday) discourses on migrancy in Europe as presented in a *Guardian* OpEd piece by the novelist Hanif Kureishi.[iv] This interlude facilitates a shift from the prosaic to the poetic, as well as from the human to the extra-human migrant/monster. A philopoetic engagement with the gene/genre intertext that enables me to explore the possibilities of coordinating conjunctions and relations by embracing the migrant/monster/daughter in Warsan Shire's poems *Ugly* and *Conversations about home (At a Deportation Centre*) in a manner that raises critical questions for political thought/life.

Rather than attempt to offer an exhaustive account of the capacities of philopoesis as a method in general or as a mode of resistance, I will attempt the modest task of offering an

introductory account of philopoesis and then proceed to look at how the interruptions, interferences and genre-mixing characteristic of this practice create the possibilities for a more *philobarbaric,* or *teratologic,* orientation from which one can raise questions of resistance, resilience, representation and cohabitation with the figures of the refugee, the barbarian and the monster. Simply put, this is an invitation to experiment with a mode of reading otherwise as an entry point for experimenting with ways of living and relating that embrace the monstrosity that present-day representations moralize, disavow and resist.

II
A Note on Philopoesis

But what is philopoesis? Why philopoesis? Inspired especially by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's definition of philosophy as production of concepts, and of literature as production of affects and percepts in their "*What is Philosophy?,* Cesare Casarino notes that philopoesis names a certain discontinuous and refractive interference between philosophy and literature that "produces the different zones of indiscernibility between philosophy and literature".[v] In order to pose the question of philopoesis, Casarino turns to Deleuze and Guattari's thought on interference in order to map an 'interferential ontology' which requires one to engage the way in which analogous problems are placed for the "plane of immanence of philosophy, the plane of composition of art, the plane of reference or coordination of science". For Deleuze and Guattari, what is most significant is the 'problem of interference between the planes that join up in the brain', which they divide into three categories; namely extrinsic interference, intrinsic interference and nonlocalizable interference. [vi] It is worth quoting Deleuze and Guattari at length on the political implications of this last type of inference:

Philosophy needs a non-philosophy that comprehends it; it needs a non-philosophical comprehension just as art needs non-art and science needs non-science. They do not need the No as beginning, or as the end in which they would be called upon to disappear by being realized [it is not the question of the end of history]...Now, if the three 'No's are still distinct in relation to the cerebral plane, they are no longer distinct in relation to chaos in which the brain plunges. In this submersion it seems that there is extracted from chaos the shadow of 'people to come' in the form that art, but also philosophy and science, summon forth, but which leaves all three behind: mass-people, world-people, brain-people, chaospeople – non-thinking thought that lodges in the three.[vii]

The above formulation is an invitation to call up, and call into question, some of the familiar ways in which resistance is represented through attentiveness to a constellation of interferential expression, relation, and becoming made possible through "extrinsic, intrinsic, and non-localizable interferences". As a method, philopoesis draws on these interferences to mark **"**an increasing degree of indiscernibility among the practices" thus making literature and philosophy question each other and by questioning each other they put the whole world into question. Key here is the willingness to "read literary texts as if" one were a " philosopher who is trying to read as if he were a literary critic" or to read "philosophical texts as if" one were " a literary critic who is trying to read as if he were a philosopher (but who cannot help himself also to read as if he were a literary critic)". [viii].Given that I am neither a professional philosopher nor a literary critic, I will try and read these two areas diplomatically, or through recourse to *amateur* diplomacies (*amor*), where I read each of them 'as if' I was reading from their own domains while slipping onto the other plane in a manner that stages an encounter with something beyond the domain of recognition. For in such a reading practice, what is key is the willingness and capacity to engage, or relate, ''as if'' while recognizing the impossibility

of occupying that position. For, as Cassarino puts it, this ‘‘as if” is what enables interference. [ix] It is both lack and capacity. It is a love of poesis; [x] a love of the making of words, worlds, and the zones where words and worlds collapse into bodies. Bodies that we do not yet know what they can do.[xi]

III
A Formula for Interference

Let us return to the provocative response, “I prefer not to” with which I began this address. A response that appears numerous times in Abdulrazak Gurnah’s novel, *By the Sea* (2001) a story on negative preference, colonial and postcolonial entanglements, asylum-seeking, intergenerational family feuds, the social life of things and refuge among other things. This response made familiar in the western literary and philosophical tradition by Herman Melville’s short story *Bartleby the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Stree*t, [xii] will also serve as my point of entry into an area, not of expertise, but of political, philosophical and aesthetic concern:the world of refuge and the possibilities of refuge in/ through words.

Rendered philopoetically, the response “I prefer not to” provides a model of speech and relation that interrupts normal language and has been the subject of macropolitical concerns insofar as questions of modernity, capitalism, homelessness and urban alienation are concerned. The appropriation and abrogation of Bartleby’s formula also enables Gurnah’s characters to superimpose multiple sensory worlds on the one that Melville makes/depicts, or to superimpose Bartleby’s words/world on colonial and postcolonial worlds in order to create “a combination of different senses of sense” that enables a dis-identification with familial, national and colonial sensory codes. [xiii] In order to gain a politically perspicuous view of the interferences made possible by the language and textual strategies in Gurnah’s novel, I will take a detour via Melville’s short story and the philosophical reflection it invites before returning to Gurnah’s *By the Sea*.

In Melville’s story, the repetition of the formula (I would prefer not to) by Bartleby, a scrivener who copies legal documents but prefers not to compare (proofread) them and who eventually occupies his boss’s office, marks an act of resistance that unmans and disarms his lawyer boss. Through the formula (I would prefer not to) and other practices of non-conformity such as turning the office into his living quarters, Bartleby interrupts the language of his scrivener colleagues and redistributes the use and meanings of (office) space. Whether intentionally or unintentionally, Bartleby’s mere presence and manner of being reorients the relations in the office thus provoking both ethical and political responses with regard to questions of charity, professionalism, order, the body, language and responsibility.

When Bartleby gives up copying altogether and stops working while preferring not to be dismissed or to be ‘a little reasonable’ with his boss, the lawyer finds a new office to rent while leaving Bartleby in his old office. With the new tenant, Bartleby is exposed to the force of law given the tenant’s intolerance for his (Bartleby’s) supposedly meaningless presence. Not only is he removed from the premises, he is arrested for vagrancy and taken to the Tombs (a prison in New York) where his continued refusal to receive the lawyer’s extensions of generosity and special meals eventually lead to his death.

Bartleby’s obstinacy and passive resistance has become a figure of popular and philosophical imagination. From Occupy Wall Street to Michael Hardt’s and Antonio Negri’s *Empire*[xiv] and

Giorgio Agamben's *Potentialities* ,[xv] the figure of the white / white-collar worker's solitary interruption of the rhythms of work and life enables us to imagine a figure who, in refusing the authority and charity of the boss and by taking it to the extreme, becomes 'generic man, being as such, being and nothing more'.[xvi] At a minimum, this mode of resistance 'calls up' and reveals the pretensions of the ways of life or modes of being of those that it seeks to resist. It is also a site of resistance and interference from which we witness the "becoming-philosophy of literature and becoming-literature of philosophy."

For instance, Gilles Deleuze tells us that Bartleby's formula ("I would prefer not to") is an *agrammatical formula* that 'stands at the limit of a series of normal expressions' (I would prefer this. I would prefer not to do that).[xvii] By being "neither an affirmation nor a negation, a refusal nor acceptance," Bartleby's formula simply rejects the "nonpreffered". However, this rejection of the nonpreffered also eliminates the preferred activity, as evinced by the scrivener's annihilation of "copying, the only preference in relation to which something might not be preferred".[xviii]

Insofar as the question of language is concerned, Deleuze notes that this formula at "first seems like the bad translation of a foreign language"; however, it soon becomes clear that rather than being a bad translation between languages, the logic or "negative preferences, a negativism beyond all negation", is a "formula [that] carves out a kind of foreign language within language".[xix] This carving out a foreign language within a familiar language enables Bartleby's formula to interrupt the familiar speech acts and gestures that the boss uses to issue commands, or the acts of generosity and responsibility, through which friends and men of faith regulate relations and affects. Through an affirmation of the nonpreffered, Bartleby becomes a man outside the zone of philanthropy, friendship and management. His sadness and suffering exists outside a zone of intervention. His "withdrawal is severe, and this leads to his self-destruction". As Jane Desmarais puts it, this withdrawal is paradoxical as it "inverts the whole notion of defence which is to keep out the dangerous object". The denial of others, which is central to Bartleby's resistance, involves a 'self-denial', and 'withdrawal *in extremis*', which results in a slow suicide.[xx] Through his resistance, Bartleby remains an object of his Boss's sympathy; a figure of " miserable friendlessness and loneliness" whose " poverty is great" and "solitude horrible"; a figure whose resistance draws the narrator to respond by feeling a "bond of a common humanity" that draws the boss into gloom and "a fraternal melancholy" for both he and Bartleby are "sons of Adam".[xxi]

If Bartleby's resistance interrupts the office rhythms and calls up the recognition of a shared humanity, and with it a sense of responsibility for the suffering other, it is precisely the impossibility of such a recognition that underlines the initial engagements with difference, insistence and negative preference in Abdulrazak Gurnah's novel, *By the Sea* (2001). Here, the conflicting family narratives of the two main characters, Saleh Omar and Latif Mahmud, offer some insights into the violent encounters, displacements, and entanglements between lives in the Indian Ocean Island of Zanzibar and the world at large. Through creative use of language, memory work, and attentiveness to the body and the movement of objects, the novel disturbs official histories and cartographies while pointing to other ways of relating to things, human beings, and being in general. Among other things, Gurnah's novel invokes narratives from other texts – with Melville's Bartleby and Shahrazad's *One Thousand and One Nights* as anchors – other times, and other places in order to weave or superimpose one literary world on another, and in so doing, revealing the colonial practices that superimposed

a colonial imaginary on a more connected Indian Ocean world. For instance, the relationship between Omar and Latif is partly mediated by Bartleby and the story of *A Thousand and One Nights* where storytelling is the means of survival. As such, tales of "migrating jinns and princes, magic carpets, and enchanted fish" are used to provide a memory beyond the colonial memory and the colonial education provided by the works of Rudyard Kipling, Rider Haggard and G. Henty..[xxii]

At the center of *By the Sea* is the encounter between Omar and Latif in England after the latter is called in to act as a translator for the former. When the two men meet, old family rivalries from Zanzibar are enacted as Latif accuses Omar (who travels under the name Rajab Shaaban as a result of using Latif's father's birth certificate to acquire a counterfeit passport) of stealing both his father's name and their family home. As the narrative progresses, and new dimensions are added to their respective understating of their family history, not only does Omar reveal the shared family history that led to his possession of Latif's family property, he also reveals how the nativist politics in Zanzibar, and the false accusations by Latif's family led to his imprisonment, dispossession and the death of his wife and daughter. As each comes to terms with the other's version of their own "family history", they also come to terms with the "conflicting narratives of Zanzibar's post revolutionary identity".[xxiii] Similarly, the family also acts as an allegory of the nation such that the long-lasting family feud between Omar and Shaaban's family, and their unexpected friendship that develops in a foreign land, leads them to each narrate their own version of their entangled, and contested, family and national history. Speaking about his daughter's birth and the conditions under which she was named Ruqiya (after the Prophet's daughter with his first wife Khadija), Omar informs Latif how he had thought of naming her Raiiya, but had to settle for a less provocative name in order to save her from ridicule. [xxiv] As Omar puts it:.

> Raiiya, citizen to make her life an utterance, a demand that our rulers should treat us with humanity, as indigenes and citizens of the land of our birth. It was a name with a pedigree…used for centuries to describe citizens of nations which had been overwhelmed by conquest. It was true that the conquerors in its use were muslims and the conquered were not, and that to offer the vanquished rights after having taken away their freedom to conduct their affairs was hardly magnanimous, but the idea of citizen rights was a noble one, and we would use it for our own meaning.[xxv]

While the citizen-name relationship above is based on claims of nativity and being well-born, the name as an inscription and passage to refuge is at the center of a significant event in the novel where Saleh Omar/Shaaban pretends to speak no English upon his arrival at Gatwick Airport. From the narratives and flashbacks, it is clear that Omar is fleeing the precarity induced by an intergenerational family feud, the long-lasting effects of colonialism, and the nativist macropolitics of the Zanzibar Revolution that led to his imprisonment and suffering. By acquiring a new name and preferring not to speak English, a language that he is eloquent in, Omar/Shaaban enacts a form of passive resistance predicated on transgressive or tactical use of language and silence.[xxvi] Out of a rich vocabulary, he chooses to use only two words --"refugee" and "asylum"-- in response to all the questions posed by Kevin Edelman, an immigration officer at Gatwick. While his willful silence enables him to get past the immigration officer, it also exposes him to the bureaucracy induced relationships that make him loose his most prized possession - a mahogany casket containing incense (*ud-al-qamari)* of the best quality. However, Omar's silence in the face of official interrogation provides an

opportunity for an extended external analepsis, through which he informs the readers of the special place of *ud-al-qamari* within his own memory, and that of the history of East Africa and the Indian Ocean at large:

> *Ud-al-qamari*: its fragrance comes back to me at odd times, unexpectedly, like a fragment of a voice or the memory of my beloved's arm on my neck. Every Idd I used to prepare an incense burner and walk around my house with it, waving clouds of perfume into its deepest corners, pacing the labors it had taken me to possess such beautiful things, rejoicing in the pleasure they brought—incense burner in one hand and a brass dish filled with ud in the other Aloe wood, *ud-al-qa- mari*, the wood of the moon. That was what I thought the words meant, but the man I obtained my consignment from explained that qamari was really a corruption of Qimari, Khmer, Cambodia, because that was one of the few places in the world where the right kind of aloe wood was to be found…I had obtained the *ud-al-qamari* from a trader who had come to our part of the world with the *musim*, the winds of the monsoons, he and thousands of other traders from Arabia, the Gulf, India and Sind, and the Horn of Africa. They had been doing this every year for at least a thousand years. In the last months of the year, the winds blow steadily across the Indian Ocean toward the coast of Africa, where the currents obligingly provide a channel to harbor. [xxvii]

Through his reflection on the *Ud-al-qamari* and the translation and travel that made it meaningful to his own world, Omar maps a long history of Indian Ocean trade that ties the East African coast to Qamari (Khmer Cambodia), Arabia, the Gulf, India and Sind, and the Horn of Africa. The dispossession at the airport also recalls the history of plunder of the same Islands by the Omanis, Portuguese, Germans, French, British thus revealing that "postcolonial migration, of people and things" is best read in this " historical context, rather than as a product of the more recent and publicized trend of globalization as something new". [xxviii] The resonances between the old and new plunder is well captured in Omar/Shaaban's depiction of his encounter with Kevin Edelman:

> […] the bawab of Europe, and the gatekeeper to the orchards in the family courtyard, the same gate which had released hordes that went out to consume the world and to which we have come slimming up to beg admittance. Refuge. Asylum-seeker. Mercy. [xxix]

Earlier in the text, Omar had reflected on how his precarious and fragile life resonated with the "endless catalog of objects that were taken away to Europe because they were too fragile and delicate to be left in the clumsy and careless hands of natives". As an asylum-seeker subjected to interrogation, he notes that he "knew the meaning of silence, the danger of words" given that his dispossession and imprisonment at home was accompanied by long periods interrogation. [xxx] Based on his inattentiveness to the specificity of migrant lives and the conditions under which different people seek asylum, Kevin Edelman attempts to discourage Omar/Shaaban from applying for asylum, given that he is too old for this 'young man's game', does not speak the language, and does not belong to the 'European family' because he does not "value any of the things" that 'they' value, and has not paid for those things "through generations" of familial relations in Europe.[xxxi]

Rather than respond to Edelman's claims, the silence, maps, object trajectories and smells (fragrances) that Shaaban/Omar summons invokes a sensory world that disturbs the mode of making sense of Europe that Edelman privileges. Most significantly, the novel's characters'

movement from Zanzibar to England through migration and within different parts of the Indian Ocean world through narration disturbs the nation-state's attempt to manage bodies or fix "historical narratives as well as territorial space". xxxii This world of co-presences that the novel depicts is predicated not on consensus but the "singularities of subjects who find themselves in common" as a result of "a juncture and sharing of a space of encounter" that is mediated by family stories, story books, friendship, enmities and memories of political intrigue. xxxiii While Omar appears before the immigration system as a man without papers, or a man, who like Bartelby, exists without references, the refrain from Bartelby's story; 'I prefer not to', offers a point of reflection and encounter from which friendship, reconciliation and clandestine movement become possible. The narratives that he weaves in concert with Latif, and their mutual appreciation of Bartleby's formula and disposition, enables them to tell each others' stories that call into question Latif's understanding of his family's genealogy, while enabling them to stand before each other in a manner that draws out their mutual 'references' and entangled lives in Zanzibar and England where nativist anxieties about entitlement, the proper and well-born, limit the possibilities of ethical co-habitation. In spite of Omar's suffering at home and abroad, the image of the asylum-seeker that his flashback provides does not comport with the humanitarian narratives that privilege the image of the refugee or asylum-seeker as a generality of helpless victims, speechless emissaries, or purveyors of familiar testimonies.xxxiv

By highlighting the co-presences, practices and entanglements that a presentist, statist geophilosophy disavows, Gurnah's novel points to the violences of the postcolonial present and explores ways of being-in-common that existed elsewhere in another time (before colonialism), and can still be explored in the here and now 'after empire'. During a conversation with the commanding officer at a detention center where he is held with other Zanzibaris of Arabic descent in the period following the Zanzibar revolution, Omar points to the possibility of a shared ancestry and brotherhood with his imprisoners. Interestingly enough, the commanding officer acknowledges that the Arab prisoners are his "brothers too" given that the "Omani's fucked all our mothers" such that Zanzibar is as much his home as it is Omar's – they are all "children of the land". However, he continues listening to radio programs that rewrite history through narratives that privilege autochthony while providing "homespun moralities that justified oppression and torture" he performs as part of his official duty.xxxv

In spite of all the maps and memories of pain and suffering that Gurnah's novel depicts, *By the Sea* also presents us with the task and possibility of imagining and exploring how "we might invent conceptions of humanity that allow for the presumption of equal value and go beyond the issue of tolerance into more active engagement with the irreducible value of diversity within sameneness". xxxvi Not only does it illustrate that "no one had a monopoly over suffering and loss", the novel also depicts everyday moments and practices of kindness that disturb conceptions of political subjectivity rooted in citizenship, or the privileging of the rights and desires of the well-born.xxxvii Such practices, Paul Gilroy tells us, point to the possibility of a demotic or vulgar cosmopolitanism cultivated "in the ordinary virtues and ironies –listening, looking, discretion, friendship—that can be cultivated when mundane encounters with difference become rewarding".xxxviii Ultimately, asylum-seeking is presented as a way out of the violence and necropolitics of the postcolony with the asylum-seeker as a complex character with desires beyond generic life and a subjectivity beyond naked life. That is, with Omar Saleh's story and the multiple layers of his life that are revealed in his

conversation with Latif, as well as through his flashbacks, one cannot reduce him to naked life --'the ultimate biopolitical subject whose life is stripped of cultural and political forms'; a form of life that is best suited for accommodation in camps or "non-places where they are held in a permanent state of exception or detention centers into which they are forced without trial".[xxxix]

IV
Interlude: Spectres and Monstrosities

By juxtaposing the asylum-seeker's practice of negative preference with the stories of the movements of bodies and things within England, Zanzibar and the Indian Ocean worlds, as well as the stasis and erasure arising from colonial, familial and state practices, Gurnah illustrates how various modes of recognition and valuation regimes regulate affective and ethical dispositions, thus framing our responsiveness to the suffering of others. [xl] Given that it is a story told from the perspective of the asylum-seeker, *By the Sea* presents an image of the immigrant that is very different from that which dominates popular xenophobic and humanitarian imagination where the migrant is reduced to a generic threat or generic victim. This image of the migrant as a figure with "no face, status or story" is well captured in a recent *Guardian* OpEd piece by the novelist Hanif Kureishi where he highlights the special place of the migrant in the European political imaginary. [xli] Unlike Gurnah who used objects, colonial and Arabic texts and Bartelby's formula to mediate immigrant experiences by going back to another place and time and mining them for narratives that enable him to become otherwise, Kureishi highlights and criticizes the moral panics and teratological discourses that represent the immigrant as a monster. Oscillating between fictional and historical representation, Kureishi's offers a diagnosis of the European present where:

> Unlike other monsters, the foreign body of the immigrant is unslayable. Resembling a zombie in a video game, he is impossible to kill or finally eliminate not only because he is already silent and dead, but also because there are waves of other similar immigrants just over the border coming right at you…we like to believe that there was a better time when the world didn't shift so much and everything appeared more permanent. We were all alike and comprehensible to one another, and these spectres didn't forever seethe at the windows. Now there seems to be general agreement that all this global movement could be a catastrophe, since these omnivorous figures will eat us alive. From this point of view, the immigrant is eternal: unless we act, he will forever be a source of contagion and horror…the migrant has no face, no status, no protection and no story. His single identity is to be discussed within the limited rules of the community. [xlii]

As a result of this partiality and the imaginary that accompanies it, the immigrant "has not only migrated from one country to another, he has migrated from reality to the collective imagination where he has been transformed into a terrible fiction". Rather than invite hospitable responses and compassion, this fictionalized uninvited 'guest', this monstrous being is also a ghost figure who has been transformed into "something resembling an alien. He is an example of the undead, who will invade, colonise and contaminate, a figure we can never quite digest or vomit".[xliii] In addition to their teratological characterization, Kureishi goes on to remind us that the popular European discourses on the immigrant are best read in terms of their hauntological character. That is, the "uncanny, semi-fictional figures" of the migrant is both " a familiar, insidious figure, and a new edition of an old idea expressed with

refreshed and forceful rhetoric". Not only is the familiar figure of the migrant, migrants lives, and migrant deaths a symptom of the material conditions of 'our times', the migrant, and responses to migration, as Gurnah's novel already illustrated, reveal the entanglements between the past and the present, as well as Europe's entanglement with places and lives that it tries to disavow, moralize or normalize.

The image of the migrant as a spectre, zombie or monster is not new, nor is it unique, to the European popular imaginary. In a critique of millennial capitalism and occult economies in South Africa, John and Jean Comaroff illustrate how the "disquieting figure of the zombie, an embodied, dispirited phantasm widely associated with the production, the possibility and impossibility, of these new forms of wealth" arise in periods of social and economic disruption. [xliv] Interestingly enough, the zombie is linked to the figure of the immigrant who is said to be "characterized by their impaired speech". [xlv] Thus the wide use of the term *makwerekwere* to mark the immigrant as one who has limited competence in the vernacular language. One whose voice and language is nothing but unintelligible noise. A barbarian of sorts whose silence, stuttering or noisy voice invites the xenophobe's machete -- the horror and tragedy of apartheid's Afrophobic ghosts.

[M]Other Monstrosities

Let us set aside the representation of migrant as zombie or spectre, and focus on the teratological domain in order to think both the quest and desire to resist representation and the conference's key problematic; the representation of resistance. To do so, we can turn to Warsan Shire's poem *Ugly.* Here, Shire illustrates her love for words and worlds through a poetic assemblage that highlights some of the tensions between representation, beauty and being well-born, as well as the manifestation of an image of the monster that exceeds the teratological concern with monstrous races on the edge of European civilization (who are now arriving at Europe's gates), or gendered discourses on monsters that linked it to " the female body" through discourses on abnormal reproduction. [xlvi] Whereas Shire's other poem, *Conversations about home (at a deportation centre),* maps the world of asylum-seekers and refugees as their bodies move from a threatening home to cities, camps, deserts and camp-cities, *Ugly* is a composite nomadic female body that is at once colony, border and camp. That is, in *Conversations about home*, Shire poetically emphasizes that "No one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark" and then proceeds to highlight the precarious journey where migrants die in Libya's deserts or drown at Europe's gates, as well as the tactics of survival, memories and traumas that give the migrant's mouth/tongue and body multiple meanings and uses:

> I've been carrying the old anthem in my mouth for so long that there's no space for another song, another tongue or another language…. I tore up and ate my own passport in an airport hotel. I'm bloated with language I can't afford to forget… I hope the journey meant more than miles because all of my children are in the water. I thought the sea was safer than the land. [xlvii]

In addition to highlighting the precarity of the place one considers home, Shire provides a necrography that makes the demand for hospitality more urgent. When one asks her persona how she got here, the signs of the dangerous journey are on her migrant body. However, it is in *Ugly* that the full force of the migrant women bodies/spaces comes across as a potent site of her poetic interference. Here, Shire presents us with a migrant/monster figure who, unlike

the familiar yet suffering human body in *Conversations about home* or Kureishi's migrant/monster (who has no 'face, name or status'), is a feminine/stranger assemblage for which we do not yet have a name, and whose body is pure potentiality. As displayed by the persona in *Ugly,* this daughter is at once a face/body/object/place. Her form exceeds the familiar and normalized conception of the human body and as a heterogeneous body; she wears the world in a beautiful untamed way. She does not appeal for refuge. She is the riotous carrier of refuge. Here, Shire's play on aesthetic qualities is quickly transformed into an interferential ontology:

> Your daughter is ugly.
> She knows loss intimately,
> carries whole cities in her belly
> […]You are her mother.
> Why did you not warn her,
> hold her like a rotting boat,
> and tell her that men will not love her if she is covered in continents,
> if her teeth are small colonies,
> if her stomach is an island if her thighs are borders?
> .
> […]Your daughter's face is a small riot,
> her hands are a civil war,
> a refugee camp behind each ear,
> a body littered with ugly things
> but God,
> doesn't she wear
> the world well.[xlviii]

With refuge-natality rather than nativity as one of the scenes of Shire's poetic interference, we can discern a tension within this poem that is pertinent to how one thinks and unhinges the forms of life that animate some of the categories privileged by modern political thought. To appreciate fully the way the monstrous daughter in *Ugly* -- as both aesthetic subject and conceptual persona -- frees the question of difference from the representations that seek to domesticate it, we can consider the discourse on monsters that Rosi Braidotti provides in her *Nomadic Subjects.* According to Braidotti:

> Monsters are human beings who are born with congenital malformations of their bodily organism. They also represent the in between, the mixed, the ambivalent as implied in ancient Greek root of the word *monster, teras* which means both horrible and wonderful, object of aberration and adoration…Before any scientific classification was reached, however, natural philosophy had struggled to come to terms with these objects of abjection. The constitution of teratology as a science was a paradigmatic example of the ways in which science dealt with differences of the bodily kind. [xlix]

Through the image of the ugly daughter born with objects and territories as part of her body, *Ugly* performs a philopoetic interference that brings the normative space in science, literature and philosophy into conversation with their unthought zones which are often represented as the abnormal or the excess. This teratological concern with difference from the human norm is highlighted in the ways in which the female body and its capacities (reproductive and

cyclical) has been the site of thinking and articulating the abnormal. A similar articulation of the abnormal emerges within the domain of immigration where the migrant's body becomes the site of inscription within a regime of the 'biopolitics of otherness', where the feminized or racialized body is presented as a marker of a form of reproduction that introduce bodies with insurmountable differences, while the suffering body is presented as the marker of a "common humanity" that one can live with provided it stays within its proper spaces.[l]

The full force of the female assemblage (body/border/colony/boat/camp) that *Ugly* conjures is felt when we read it alongside a philosophical text such as Giorgio Agamben's ' *We Refugees'.* Read side by side, the poem and the philosophical text present conjunctions that force us to rethink the "principle of the inscription of nativity" as well as the "trinity of state/nation/territory" that the nation-state is based upon. While Agamben already treats the refugee as a human figure that calls into question the law of the citizen by foregrounding that of refuge, such that it becomes possible to think of an "aterritorial or extraterritorial space in which all the residents of the European states (citizens and noncitizens) would be in a position of exodus or refuge," Shire's ugly female body-in-formation is more than human being, she is an *inter-being*, an extra-being that take us further than Agamben's extra-territorial promise of making the status of the European that of "the citizen's being-in-exodus (obviously also immobile)". [li] Agamben goes on to illustrate how privileging refuge over citizenship would mean that "European space would thus represent an unbridgeable gap between birth and nation, in which the old concept of people (which, as is well known, is always a minority) could again find a political sense by decisively opposing the concept of nation (which until now has unduly usurped it)".[lii] If the refugee as a human body already holds the capacity to perform such an unhinging function, how much more can the monster/daughter in Shire's poems do given that she exceeds human, territory and other normalizing categories? How much more does she call into question the normalized human form, as well as the normalized spaces of refuge and their corresponding forms of life? How does the monster reconfigure the representations privileged by citizenship, humanitarian and some critical discourses on biopolitics?

V
Philopoesis, Monstrosity, Resistance

So much for the questions, let us consider some monstrous conjunctions and conjurations made possible by reading philosophy AND literature. Let us be moved by *Ugly* so that we can move between things and embrace this moving body of disjunctive co-presences and conjunctions. Your daughter is Ugly, Shire tells us. She is part city AND part continent AND part camp AND part colony AND part border…and many ugly things…She wears the world well.

Shire's poetics of relation(s) expresses and creates something new. It provides what Deleuze characterizes as a "crucial subtension of relations that makes relations shoot beyond their terms and outside the set of their terms, and outside everything that could be determined as being. One, or whole".[liii] The conjunction AND is of philosophical, political, aesthetic and ethical significance. [liv] It generates new concepts, percepts, functions and relations. It is an interferential experimentation that points to the possibilities of new becomings.

Among other things, *Ugly* calls up a monstrous daughter inter-being who, in her ugliness is also a space of refuge. She is ugly and in/appropriately born. In being ill-born, yet

conceivable, she reveals the logic of eugenics that privileges those who are considered well-born, or beautiful, and its place in an ontology that disqualifies the monster or any other being that exceeds eugenic ontology.[lv] As Antonio Negri notes, the 'monster is the fable that ontology cannot accept' and it has only been partially admitted in modern philosophy as a metaphor (most significant being the Leviathan). For Negri, the modern philosophy of the state, in an attempt to make the "monster reasonable, actually makes all the rest, the whole of life and society monstrous". This means that rather than the Leviathan being monstrous, "what is monstrous now are the plebs or the multitude…within the logic of monstrous reason Leviathan is disarmed; in fact he is completely ineffective in the order of rational courses; he is no longer a monster, he is an instrument".[lvi] By situating the monster outside of the domain of sovereign power and capital, Negri is able to illustrate how modern sovereignty has been animated by a deep logic of eugenia that runs through its genealogy down to modern ideas of nationalism and racism, some of which are displayed in the Zanzibari anxieties that Gurnah captures so well in *By the Sea*. To go beyond this eugenic rationality and its related *dispositif,* Negri calls upon us to reclaim the monster and imagine the possibilities of monstrous resistances.[lvii]

It is important to note that possibilities of these monstrous resistances exist. From Shire's poetic interference, the ugly daughter dis-identifies with men who reject her because she is not well-born. The rejection of monstrous daughter reveals the eugenic rationality that makes us identify more and more with the rationality of power, rather than the monstrosity of suffering. That is, like Negri, Shire, calls upon us to see history and politics from the point of view of the monster. From this vantage point, we can register resistances and suffering of those "deported in concentration camps, those tortured in wars of liberation; the evidence from apartheid; from the Palestinians in their struggle and the African American in the ghettos".[lviii]

While others have presented these spaces of suffering in terms of the negations of life and politics, Negri, in his attentiveness to the capacities of bodies and the affective register, asserts that this monster is a positive ghost. It infiltrates life, is moved and moves, or at least attempts to move, around the world. Writing against Giorgio Agamben's theory of 'naked life', Negri notes that it is an ideological formation that "reduces man to negative essence" while affirming the "eugenic constitution of being against the monster's possible power".[lix] That is, rather than allow the monster to emerge, the theory of naked life negates it. Simply put, through theories and images of naked life, "power continually needs to show us the nakedness of suffering in order to terrorize us".[lx] Naked life tries to dissolve or dilute the monster by pointing out that any act of resistance is in vain, and in so doing, this theory "repeats the same scenario that Hobbes' Leviathan is founded on. This is the scenario of undefended life" which is pushed to the limit of "of an impossible resistance". From this space/time of negation, a new Leviathan appears; one that exalts pity and humiliation and does not even promise peace but only life. [lxi]

However, hope for resistance persists, and this is because we are dealing with men/women "rather than naked life, with the monstrous rather than the helpless".[lxii] This is the same horrific hope that Omar/Shaaban in *By the Sea* enacts through his negative preference such that he manages to simultaneously invoke and move beyond the space and image of helpless asylum-seeker. It is the wearing of the world rather than being worn out by it that Shire's *Ugly* enacts through its juxtapositions that imply a body of multiple conjunctions. And, it is a force

that has precedents as evinced by figures like the more vocal Caliban in Aime Cesaire's *A Tempest*, an adaptation of Shakespeare's *The Tempest*, for a 'Black Theatre' where Caliban contests Eurocentric and colonial constructions. [lxiii] Together, these literary and poetic texts interfere with a philosophy and politics that is predicated on eugenic thought. Together, they open a space in philosophy, literature and science where one can interrogate both the ontology and ethics that underlines modern/colonial and postcolonial claims to rights, asylum, refuge, cohabitation and ethical encounter. While the European colonizer in *A Tempest* considers the Caliban figure the monster to be caught up in "the dialectical struggle between reason and madness, progress and barbarism, modernity and anti-modernity", Caliban can break from this dialectic. From the perspective of the colonized, he participates in a "struggle for liberation" and is "endowed with as much or more reason and civilization than the colonizers, is monstrous only to the extent that his desire for freedom exceeds the bounds of the colonial relationship of biopower, blowing apart the chains of the dialectic". [lxiv] Similar visions of excess or monstrous resistance can be identified today. Following Negri , Shire, Gurnah and others, we can resist the image and representations that reduce "all figures of anti-modernity to a tame dialectical play of opposite identities". We can resist or interfere with images and imaginations that reduce our capacity to think, appreciate, or be affected by the 'liberatory possibilities" of "monstrous imaginings" that exist outside of the realm of recognized political life.[lxv]

Conclusion

Reading the literary and philosophical texts together, we encounter and then disturb narratives that exclude migrants and others who are not considered well-born (or well-spoken) from certain sites of political imagination. By resisting the moralistic representation of the monster and pursuing monstrous resistances, we can call into question the subtle forms of eugenic thought that contain our political imagination and relations, therefore enabling us to imagine or enact scenes where a people yet to come, or a people who are missing, can emerge. Whatever the means through which this imaginative dissensus is formed, it will be useful to heed the insights from practices of interference that provoke or force us to think the unthought, or become otherwise, be they artistic (generating other percepts), philosophical (new concepts) or scientific (new functions). Like Bartleby, Gurnah's characters, or the Ugly daughter in Shire's *Ugly*, philopoesis as the love of words, worlds, and potentiality enables us to resist representations that privilege the figure of generic humanity as "absolute victim" who is "nothing else or other than absolute and essentialized humanity when it is suffering". [lxvi] Reading these philosophical and literary texts together interferes with the idea of the citizen of rights or the humanitarian subject who is destined for the camp, and nowhere else but the camp, or its surrogates in Lampedusa, Woomera, Manus Island, Guantanamo, Kasarani,Saharonim etc. These ways of being and their limited representations of resistance will have to be resisted in the name of other ways of becoming.

To highlight the possibilities of such an interference, we can conclude by revisiting Deleuze and Guattari's call for an interference that has the capacity to summon "mass-people, world-people, brain-people, chaospeople"- a people who are missing.[lxvii] While a disciplined reading of texts and worlds allows for alternative representations, and new forms of resistance by already formed people, the juxtaposition of texts, the engagement with words and worlds, otherwise enables us to think the possibilities of a people yet to come. A people that interferes with our concept of the people. In Shire's poem, this interference is enabled by refuge in words/worlds that summon bodies and forms of life that are, in themselves, camp-

city-border-bodies. The conjunction and bringing together of that which police order and some philosophies set apart, enables us to interrupt the dominant framings of the 'refugee crisis' predicated on the notion of naked life destined for the camp. Through such an instantiation of the monstrous or the common body upon which colonialism, refuge and other possibilities are inscribed, the bodies, spaces and words/worlds that Shire invokes force a conversation about hospitality and hostility, love and the impossibility of being in that place one calls or desires to call home. In so doing, she produces a new common body from which 'we' can interrogate the partialities arising from eugenic formulations and their idea of the beautiful, the good, and the right; a space of conjunction where people can live and keep company otherwise, or the foreign body can live "as if…". Here, resilience is not seen as part of trauma or security discourses given that it experiments with multiple ways of making up, and making do, of asylum-seeker women.[lxviii]

In Shire's poetry, much like Gurnah's story, we encounter the exiles of the pitfalls of national consciousness, as well as the unraveling of familial narrative and its fiction of beauty and being born well. We encounter multiple zones of hope and horror, horrific hope. Here, there, elsewhere. Through these moving narratives, we are provoked to reflect on how we are moved, and can relate to moving stories, but remain inattentive to the moving body. While we can accommodate the movement from one genre to another, the body that moves between cities, or from city to city via desserts and seas, remains disavowed, sacrificed or abjected. The philopoetic invitation is to read and live 'as if' one were another. To experiment with the AND that joins those that disciplines, genes, genres and borders separate. Ultimately, "philopoesis loves potentialities", it is the love of poesis; a love of the making of words, worlds and the zones where words collapse into bodies. A love of the literature that makes philosophy confront its own unthought which cannot be thought and yet must be thought. As Casarino puts it, philopoesis is the love of that "which remains unmade in such a making… the love of words as unspent potentials…the love of potentiality is the only love that is worth that name".[lxix]

To return to the problematic of representations of resistance, philopoetic engagements have the capacity to reveal how some representations of resistance move us to embrace images of resistance without embracing the resistors themselves in their barbarity or monstrosity. It reveals how 'we', in the aftermath of some scenes of resistance, embrace the familiar or normal victims of violence devoid of their political stories; without their monstrosities. The juxtaposition of genres, times, spaces and bodies forces us to reconsider our responses to the representations of those who insist on moving, when presented with the stasis and sanctuary of refugee camps and welcome centers. Philopoesis enables new encounters with the asylum-seeker who flees, swims or drowns in the face of manhunts that seek to force them back into their 'proper' places where they can fulfill their 'proper' functions. It enables us to apprehend the dead body on the sandy beach, or in the desert sand, as part of a political story; a story that resists easy representation, classification and capture. These body-stories send a message to those who want asylum-seekers to embrace or acquiesce with the current eugenic model of nativist citizenship, refuge and limited conceptions of hospitality. Their message is clear; "they prefer not to." …Asylum! Refuge! Mercy!... AND…

Notes

[i] Extended version of the paper presented at the *Representations of Resistance, 2015*

ASPECT Graduate Conference, Friday, March 20 – Saturday, March 21, The Alliance for Social, Political, Ethical, and Cultural Thought, Squires Student Center & Newman Library, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA. I would like to thank Giovanna Borradori, Paul Clarke, Connie Ndonye, Lorenzo Rinelli, Michael J. Shapiro, and Teresia Wairimu for insightful conversations from which this paper has been developed.

ii For more on abusive fidelity, see Venuti L, Translating Derrida on Translation: Relevance and Disciplinary Resistance', *The Yale Journal of Criticism* 16.2 (2003) 237-262 p.252 also see Venuti L., (2002), *The Translator's Invisibility: A History of Translation* New York: Routledge

iii For a detailed treatment of philopoesis, see Casarino, Cesare, "Philopoesis: A Theoretico-Methodological Manifesto," *Boundary*

iv Hanif Kureishi, The Migrant Has no Face, Status or Story, The Guardian, May, 30, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/30/hanif-kureishi-migrant-immigration-1

v Casarino, Cesare, "Philopoesis". p.75

vi With the risk of reducing the complexity of Deleuze and Guattari's formulation of interference, and with some assistance from Casarino's interpretation of the same, the three types of interference can be presented schematically as : 1) *Extrinsic interference*: This is an interference that "occurs when a practice attempts to grasp from within its own domain and according to its own methods the defining features of another practice." For example, a philosopher may attempt "to create the concept of a sensation" or an artist may create "pure sensations of concepts or function". The rule is "that the interfering discipline must proceed with its own method" that is, "each discipline remains in its own plane and utilizes its own elements." 2.) *Intrinsic interference.* This form of interference occurs "when concepts and conceptual personae seem to leave a plane of immanence…so as to slip…on to another plane." The subtle slippage into another domain makes it difficult to qualify the resulting plane. As Casarino puts it, the practice "begins to assume the functions or methods of the latter….we witness a becoming-philosophy of literature and becoming-literature of philosophy." 3) Finally, there exist *non- localizable interferences:* This arises from the fact that each discipline "is in its own way, in relation with a negative." With the No that concerns it. For example, the philosophical encounter with the plane of immanence which is the non-conceptual space and immanent horizon of non-philosophy that "is perhaps closer to the heart of philosophy than philosophy itself.' See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy*?, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) p.217-218. For more on the interferences, see Casarino, Cesare, "Philopoesis". p.71-73

vii Gilles Deleuze and Fe´lix Guattari, "What is Philosophy?". p.218

viii Casarino, Cesare, "Philopoesis". p.76

ix see Casarino, Cesare, "Philopoesis". p. 66

x Casarino, Cesare, "Philopoesis". p.79

xi Deleuze Gilles, 1988, *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy,* Trans Hurley, R., San Francisco: City Lights Books. p.17

xii Herman Melville. *Bartleby; and, Benito Cereno*

xiii Jacques Rancière *, Aesthetic Separation, Aesthetic Community: Scenes from the Aesthetic Regime of Art in* ART&RESEARCH: A Journal of Ideas, Contexts and Methods. Volume 2. No. 1. Summer 2008. p. 4-5

xiv Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. *Empire*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000. p.204-5

xv Agamben Giorgio, "Bartleby, or On Contingency," in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in*

Philosophy
xvi Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. *Empire.* p.204
xvii Deleuze, Gilles. Bartleby; Or the Formula, in <>*Essays Critical and Clinical*
xviii Deleuze, Gilles. Bartleby; Or the Formula. p.71
xix Ibid
xx Jane Desmarais, Preferring not to: The Paradox of Passive Resistance in Herman Melville's "Bartleby", *Journal of the Short Story in English* , 36, spring 2001. p.25-40
xxi Herman Melville. *Bartleby; and, Benito Cereno.*
xxii Cooper, Brenda, Returning the Jinns to the Jar: Material culture, stories and migration in Abdulrazak Gurnah's By the Sea, Kunapipi, 30(1), 2008. p.80
xxiii Hand, Felicity. 2010. "Untangling Stories and Healing Rifts: Abdulrazak Gurnah's By the Sea". *Research in African Literatures.*
xxiv Gurnah, *By the Sea.* p.151
xxv Gurnah, *By the Sea*
xxvi Cooper, Brenda, Returning the Jinns to the Jar: Material culture, stories and migration in Abdulrazak Gurnah's By the Sea, Kunapipi, 30(1), 2008. p.91
xxvii Gurnah, Abdulrazak. *By the Sea* . London: Bloomsbury, 2002. p.14
xxviii Cooper, Brenda, Returning the Jinns to the Jar. p.90
xxix Gurnah, Abdulrazak. *By the Sea* . London: Bloomsbury, 2002. p.31
xxx Gurnah, Abdulrazak. *By the Sea* . p.12
xxxi Gurnah, Abdulrazak. *By the Sea* . p.12
xxxii Shapiro, Michael J. (2000) 'National Times And Other Times: Re-Thinking Citizenship', Cultural Studies, 14: 1, 79 — 98. p. 82
xxxiii Ibid
xxxiv As Liisa Malkki puts it, the idea of refugee as a helpless being is linked to the constitution of refugees as a speechless sea of humanity in need of protection and someone to speak for them. See Malkki, Liisa H. "Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism and Dehistoricization." *Cultural Anthropology: Journal of the Society for Cultural Anthropology* . 11 (1996): 377-404. p.388
xxxv Gurnah , By the Sea. p.228
xxxvi Gilroy, Paul. *After Empire: Multiculture or Postcolonial Melancholia*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004. p.75
xxxvii Gurnah By the Sea. p.234
xxxviii Gilroy, Paul. *After Empire: Multiculture or Postcolonial Melancholia*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2004. p.75
xxxix Diken, Bülent, (2004). 'From refugee camps to gated communities: biopolitics and the end of the city,' Citizenship Studies. Vol. 8, No. 1, 83–106. p.94
xl Judith Butler, 'Precarious Life, Grievable Life' Excerpt from: Judith Butler, *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable* (London: Verso, 2009)
xli Hanif Kureishi, The Migrant Has no Face, Status or Story, The Guardian, May, 30, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2014/may/30/hanif-kureishi-migrant-immigration-1
xlii Ibid
xliii Ibid
xliv Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Alien-Nation: Zombies, Immigrants, and Millennial Capitalism in *The South Atlantic Quarterly*
xlv Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Alien-Nation. p.790
xlvi According to V.Y. Mudimbe, one can identify a "geography of monstrosity" in earlier texts by Herodotus and Pliny as a way of speaking about unknown spaces and their inhabitants.

See Mudimbe, V Y. *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* . Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988. p.71; *Between Monsters, Goddesses and Cyborgs: Feminist Confrontations with Science, Medicine and Cyberspace*. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1996. 135-151.
xlvii Shire, Warsan, Conversations about home (at a deportation centre*)* in *Our Men Do Not Belong to Us*
xlviii Shire, Warsan, Ugly*,* in *Our Men Do Not Belong to Us*
xlix Braidotti, Rosi. *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory* . New York: Columbia University Press, 2011. p.77
l Fassin, Didier. (2001). The biopolitics of otherness. *ANTHROPOLOGY TODAY.* 17, 3-7. p.4
li Agamben Giorgio, . "We Refugees."
lii Ibid
liii Deleuze Gilles, and Parnet Claire, 1987 *Dialogues*, Hugh Tomlison and Barbara Habberjam Trans. New York: Columbia University Press. p.57
liv For the implications of Deleuze's thinking with conjunction and ellipses to see Agamben, Giorgio, (2003) „ Absolute Immanence&8223;, in Jean Khalfa Ed., An Introduction to the Philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, London & New York: Continuum, p, 151-169, Also see Opondo O. Sam, Cinema-Body- Thought: Race-habits and the Ethics of Encounter in Saldanha, Arun, and Jason M. Adams. *Deleuze and Race* . Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013. p.247-268 p.254
lv Antonio Negri , 'The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life,' in Casarino, Cesare, and Antonio Negri. 2008. *In praise of the common: a conversation on philosophy and politics* . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p193 Casarino, Cesare, and Antonio Negri. 2008. *In praise of the common: a conversation on philosophy and politics* . Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. p.194
lvi Negri Antonio , The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life. p.195
lvii Negri Antonio , The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life. p.196
lviii Negri Antonio , The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life. P.198
lix Negri Antonio , The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life. p.209
lx Ibid
lxi Negri Antonio , The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life.
lxii Negri Antonio , The Political Monster: Power and Naked Life. p.210
lxiii Aime Cesaire, *A Tempest; Based on Shakespeares The Tempest Adaptation for a Black Theatre,* trans. Richard Miller (New York; TCG Translations, 2002)
lxiv Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2011. <>*Commonwealth* . Cambridge (Mass.): Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. p.90
lxv Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2011. <>*Commonwealth* . p.91
lxvi Michel Agier , Humanity as an Identity and Its Political Effects (A Note on Camps and Humanitarian Government) , Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, Volume 1, Number 1, Fall 2010. p. 29-45
lxvii Gilles Deleuze and Fe´lix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, p.218.
lxviii Russell, West-Pavlov. Shadows of the past, visions of the future in African literatures and cultures. *Tydskr. letterkd.* [online]. 2014, vol.51, n.2 [cited 2015-03-19]. p. 05-08
lxix Casarino, Cesare, "Philopoesis". p.79

.