

Recreation of Girard's "Scapegoating Mechanism" in Discourse of National Identity Politics

Notions of the nation-state and national identity are universally regarded as natural and "enhabited" concepts (i.e. from routine formation, or *enhabitation*),¹ even in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)² nation-states, where independence is fairly new. GCC nation-states have experienced shifts from a principally tribal system of governance to states with "modern" constitutional governments and oil based economies. These nation-states are notable for the transience of their populations and frequent flows of people in and out of the region, with Kuwait having had the third largest net migration rate globally of 16:1 in 2007.³ Furthermore, the population of nationals in GCC nation-states represents a much lower fraction of the total population. In Kuwait for instance, non-nationals make up 70 percent of the population.⁴ With ever-evolving populations in an urban environment, how do Gulf governments maintain a sense of collectivity and national identity? A common thread with GCC nation-states is the extensive nostalgic use of the past to construct their *imagined* community,⁵ which lies principally in the pre-oil era and the early decades following the discovery of oil. The large populations of non-nationals often go unnoticed in the historical narrative of these GCC nation-states, which could be likened to a form of a lesser caste system due to its divisionary nature.⁶ In his paper, Willbrink discusses how language and nation-building go hand in hand.⁷ That is, language creates knowledge, but also represents bias.⁸ While this could mean language use in terms of social interactions and sociolinguistics, political and public discourse are also a major influencer of how national identity is perceived and the *imagined community* is maintained. Using the case of GCC nation-states—and in particular, Kuwait—this paper argues that modern national identity

discourse enhances the collective self and diverts attention from internal conflict through processes of *scapegoating* and *victimimage*.

To achieve this, first the processes associated with identity construction will be presented. Second, discourse and how it relates to power relations and dynamics in a nation-state, followed by Girard's mimetic theories with relation to discourse, then the previous will be contextualized in terms of the GCC's *imagined community* in general and how it has been impacted by state formation post-colonially. Finally, the theoretical framework is contextualized in the aforementioned Kuwait case study before concluding.

Identity processes and theory

As social animals, humans have the need to belong to a group larger than themselves. For this reason, identity formation is fundamentally a very important *cognitive* process.⁹ The need for an ingroup is always prevalent, with diasporas presenting such an instance. Differences in methods and processes of identity creation and maintenance however, have been found to be inherently unconfined to specific cultures,¹⁰ meaning that identity processing is common to all human societies.

Berzonsky refers to these processes of social association as identity "construction," in that they are largely artificially specified by social interactions and norms.¹¹ The use of the word "construction" and the connotations associated with it are reiterated in the themes of identity processes specified in Willbrink's article. Willbrink identified the themes found in identity theory studies and scholarship as: the direct identity formation (i.e. "bottom up") where the intellectual foundation of an *individual* is created, and the indirect identity construction (i.e. "top down.")¹²

Although multiple theories to explain identity processes exist, they all commonly explore dichotomies such as “the self and the whole” or “us vs them.”¹³ Identity is constantly forming and re-forming to match the grand social landscape. Although direct identity formation occurs in institutionalized settings which foster and outline the contours of national identity,¹⁴ the normative dynamics of relationships among other groups and the ingroup (as well as members within the ingroup) are conditioned and modeled through indirect identity “construction” as one interacts with immediate family, friends, and peers.¹⁵ In order to maintain conformity and cohesion of the ingroup, “diffuse-avoidant” processes could be used to highlight differences of the Other and obscure shortcomings or negative traits of both the self and the ingroup as a whole.¹⁶

Why is possessing identity an essential need? According to Berzonsky, identity formation regulates how one views the “time continuum” (i.e. history), and provides a framework to “organize, encode, and understand experiences” as core values are identified.¹⁷ In short, when an identity is threatened or ceases to exist as it should, anomie results and the integrity of societal order is jeopardized.

Billig described society as being the “heart” of social science, but also as “created in the image of the nation-state,”¹⁸ which has led to the widespread assumption that social differences related to ethnicity and other ascriptive qualities are “natural” to humanity.¹⁹ With the nation-state being a socio-political construct following a *social* contract, the intertwined relationship between social identity and national identity becomes more clear.

Dominance: Power and Knowledge

MacDonnell describes discourse as, “[A] particular area of language use...identified by the institutions to which it relates and by the positions from which it comes and which it marks

out for the speaker. The position does not exist by itself, however. Indeed, it may be understood as a standpoint taken up by the discourse through its relation to another, ultimately an opposing discourse.”²⁰

This definition details the utility of discourse as an institutional and positional tool, as well as the existence of opposing discourses (and thus opposing identities.) Relatedly, Foucault asserts that discourse as a medium could never “mirror” reality.²¹ Foucault famously connected the production of discourse to knowledge and power. Foucault’s ideas are supported by Giddens’s classification of power density distribution, which is based on four factors: information surveillance, capacity for extra-economic organization, instrumentalization of force as a coercive tool, and the use of ideology to legitimize domination.²² All the previous factors define the nation-state and the sovereign rights of government, as well as other state-associated institutions.

Miller regarded discourse as a system that denies the desirability and feasibility of evaluation, effectively creating some degree of ambiguity within discourse.²³ Similarly, Watts Miller described modern ideals associated with culture as being rather abstract, which leads to conflicting interpretations and constant power struggles in the maintenance of national, ethnic, and cultural conceptualizations (i.e. “the nation,” “the people,” etc.) akin to struggles of class.²⁴ At its root, discourse aims to consolidate a particular ideology into an image and certain worldview (i.e. as with Anderson’s *imagined community*). Through discourse, the public is confined to a specific moral space.²⁵ More particularly within the context of national identity; national identity politics is the state’s process of recognizing differences and actualizing social divisions, which effectively suppresses radical difference and the materialization of new agent social identities within the nation-state which might threaten the nation-state’s built solidarity.²⁶

Similarly, Foucault regarded power as coming into being through knowledge. Knowledge is then dispersed to the public to regard as their own collective perception.²⁷ Meaning in discourse is a subjective reality which promotes “coercive normalization,” as recursive communication could be a method of repression when other discourses and narratives are suppressed, which is determined by power relationships in society.²⁸ This expression of power however, was described by Foucault as being akin to a “chain”²⁹ in that members within the prevailing institution’s sphere of influence perpetuate and disseminate the subjective meaning within and through dominant discourse, further fortifying the “correctness” of constructed knowledge and the institutional power it begets the nation-state, in this case. Relatedly, Tilley recognizes nation-state elites as both conductors and regulators of what identifies a national.³⁰ Elites symbolically ascribe value to a particular set of qualities associated with language, religion, and culture to construct a distinct ethnic identity for the national ingroup.³¹ This process is directly related to the theme of “top down” identity processes or identity “construction” presented by Willbrink and suggests a clear asymmetrical power dynamic in the construction and maintenance of the national identity and *imagined community* of a nation-state. Due to a dominant ideology of a very small faction of society defining the reality of the nation-state and the socio-political dynamics within it between the members of the ingroup and the outgroup(s), nationalism has been studied from both Gramscian and Marxist lenses.³²

Akin to Foucault’s denial of discourse’s objectivity, Girard defines *myth* as: “distorted reflections of natural phenomena,” which evolve over time based on cultural and societal factors.³³ *Myths* most characteristically portray reality in extremes and stereotypes,³⁴ and Girard compares them to *texts of persecution* used to vilify a certain person or group.

As discourse is ideological in nature, it could be linked to philosophy. Bubbio regarded philosophy and religion as being of essentially, a singular origin.³⁵ Discourse represents the basis of the “civil religion” of nationalism.³⁶ Additionally, Bubbio described philosophy as possessing both “ritual” and “myth,” linking the metaphysical (in this case, ideology) to violence.³⁷ Consequently, a rhetoric of “self-divinization” of the dominant ingroup compared to marginalized or lesser integrated groups results,³⁸ and national identity discourse becomes a force enabling and justifying conflict as a certain image is created of the ingroup and the outgroup(s).³⁹ As national discourse seeks to solidify ingroup bonds, consolidate the power of elite nationals, and maintain the *imagined community*, those that are less integrated according to Girard are mythicized, and become the objects of *texts of persecution*.⁴⁰ Power relationships set by discourse become especially apparent in times of crisis, when the mimetic *scapegoating mechanism* is mobilized.

Identity and the Nation-state: Nationalism as Religion

What standards or commonalities bring societies together to form a single group? As language became more fixed and differentiated, it became connected to membership to particular communities which Anderson termed as “sacred”, and the nation was “conceived” through language rather than through blood and ethnic ties.⁴¹ Furthermore, language is what nations use to express patriotic admiration or even indignation to the unknown through national anthems, songs, and other mediums thus it is used to represent ideology.⁴² Similarly, Hobsbawm regarded language as possessing some level of “political self-assertion,” and considered politics the prime reason for linguistic manipulation. This has led him to conclude that language will always represent a source “for constant and artificial civil strife.”⁴³

The use of the word “artificial” in Hobsbawm’s article is reminiscent of the fragility of the *imagined community* and national identity *without* the continued and recursive processes of national identity construction. Additionally, while Hobsbawm prefers to use the term “politics,” he is essentially providing another perspective on the effect that power has on language use and discourse formation, which is extensively discussed by Foucault. Within the context of GCC states where there are only dialectal differences within the same language, it could be said language in terms of discourse is what solidifies the *imagined community* most prominently.

As language enables the expression of national identity, certain immaterial borders (which may translate as very material restrictions and policies) are constructed to separate the nation and the Other. According to Hobsbawm, despite the nation-state originally being an idea purely based on political aims, it eventually evolved to include a socio-anthropological aspect as ethnicity became a prime defining factor.⁴⁴ Tilley recognized that the state is far from passive in influencing how language is used, as it endeavors to maximize integration and minimize internal conflict to ensure national security.⁴⁵

In order for the *imagined community* to be sustained, the concept of nationalism and citizenry must be regarded as a sort of “civil religion”—i.e., “self-divinization.”⁴⁶ The “collective imagination” or fantasy of an *imagined community*, as referenced by Žižek, must be considered a reality by its members.⁴⁷ Without this belief in the reality of the fantastical *imagined community*, it cannot succeed in fulfilling its role in self-justification of conflict and identification of ingroups and outgroups. Similar to the beginnings of religion, Toffolo considered the creation of the *imagined community* and the nation-state as both possessing “myths of origin,”⁴⁸ which often leads to offensive rather than defensive displays of national identity, especially in times of conflict or crisis. For this reason, Billig explores the difference between “irrational, primordial”

forces of nationalism which rely on blood and ethnic ties compared to the more value-based and “rational” nature of patriotism.⁴⁹ This however, seems to be a very mutually exclusive distinction, as both ideologies can appear and reappear contextually, which Girard’s theory’s application may be able to explicate in the upcoming section.

Girard and Discourse: Victimage and the Scapegoating Mechanism

This paper argues that national discourse plays a similar role to *myth* and *texts of persecution* in modern societies. Additionally, despite Girard only principally considering physical sacrifice in his writings, this paper argues the *scapegoating mechanism* within nation-states brings upon intellectual sacrifice and victimage.⁵⁰ Relatedly, according to Girard, violence through force was the “crudest” form, in that violence could manifest in other ways, which would therefore include intellectual sacrifice and *victimage* through discourse.⁵¹

The metaphysical (i.e. ideology) begets violence and dominant discourse justifies conflict. Girard asserted that once the urge for violence is instigated, it must find an outlet.⁵² This is what brings forth the *sacrificial crisis* (otherwise termed “crisis of distinctions,”) as the ingroup redirects its hostilities toward a surrogate group or victim to release internal tensions.⁵³ In short, the determinant of who is and who is not sacrifice-able is dependent on their degree of social integration.⁵⁴ This surge of collective violence is transcultural: a feature of all human societies, although the “physiology” of violence is culturally variable.⁵⁵

The *scapegoating mechanism* is stimulated in crises (political or otherwise) when public opinion becomes more extreme. Paradoxically, in times of crisis, there is a heightened sense of both differentiation and undifferentiation in a mimetic bind of mutual desire for an object.⁵⁶ How might this fit into the context of the nation-state, and more particularly GCC nation-states? Persecutors might sense that the Other is encroaching on their privileges as citizens or

threatening their security in one way or other. Furthermore, the “reciprocity of negative exchanges” increases in visibility and frequency, eventually crystallizing in *texts of persecution* which codify difference, and scapegoats become substitute victims for the community in its totality.⁵⁷ Girard considered societal classifications a method to systematically identify victims of sacrifice in order to protect other categories in society which ultimately “reinforce[s] the social fabric.”⁵⁸

In times of crisis, the majority seeks to destroy difference because it threatens to uncover societal fragility and relativity.⁵⁹ However, the surrogate victim(s) are targeted not for being different, but for not being sufficiently different as expected based on ascribed societal values (i.e. possessing physical and/or moral “monstrosity.”)⁶⁰ These scattered differences are centered onto surrogate victims or “well-known stranger[s].”⁶¹ At its root, the *sacrificial crisis* and sacrificial substitution is spurred on by misunderstanding, which could be related to the abstractness and ambiguity of national discourse.

Girard regarded sacrifice as an institution, and the *sacrificial crisis* a “sacred obligation” that is almost entirely a symbolic process which legitimizes conflict and violence.⁶² Furthermore, the act(s) of sacrifice are a mediation between a “deity” and sacrificers.⁶³ However, Girard also considered the *scapegoating mechanism*, *victimage*, and *sacrifice* features of primitive societies whom regarded *myths* as truth and *texts of persecution* as valid. According to Girard, the establishment and use of judicial systems negates the need for “private vengeance” and replaces it with “public vengeance”⁶⁴ as the cycle of violence is demystified. Girard also extends this idea to discourse associated with the *scapegoating mechanism* (i.e. *texts of persecution*), in that these texts of “verbal exorcism” are no longer produced where public vengeance is sufficient.⁶⁵

Although, Girard further asserts the *scapegoating mechanism* could only be interrupted by “extinguishing all possible desire for reprisals,”⁶⁶ which owing to the nature of social relations and of language representing a cause of continuous “artificial” strife, this is not quite entirely possible when it comes to national discourse. As aforementioned, physical violence is regarded as the “crudest” by Girard, and therefore many other forms of violence may exist,⁶⁷ which would therefore include linguistic victimage through discourse (i.e. *texts of persecution*) that then translates into and imposes various consequences onto socio-political dynamics.

Bubbio also argues that the targeting of surrogate victims could also occur in an “intellectual operation” due to civilizations being built upon “intellectual symbolism” that later manifests itself in specific sociocultural dynamics.⁶⁸ Bubbio’s conceptualization of Girard’s *scapegoating mechanism* through an intellectual lens mirrors ideas of “myths of origin” of *imagined communities*, Foucault’s subjectivity of discourse, and Girard’s *myth* discussed in above sections. Due to the inherent bias in language, and its instrumentality to nation-building, *texts of persecution* supporting *victimage* will continue to be produced in nation-states’ discourse during times of crisis.

The Arabian Gulf: A Narrative

Despite divergence and variance in policies throughout the GCC today, they share similar origins in terms of how the *imagined community* is constructed and maintained, and their association with British colonial powers. In examining the effects of globalization on GCC states, Sulayman Khalaf divides the evolution of GCC cities into multiple stages: the traditional phase (“pre-oil,”) initial phase, rapid urbanization phase (peak of oil revenue and development), and the late gradual phase (the late 1980s onwards).⁶⁹ Sulayman Khalaf attributes the rampant culture of welfarism to GCC socio-political history, as it represents a “natural reaction to the pre-

oil phase along deprivation,”⁷³ which was characterized by pearling and minimal inland trade. Parallel to rapid urbanization, roles in society shifted rapidly as well: merchant families became business owners and large influxes of foreign labor became the norm, which transformed demographics dramatically.⁷¹ In order to “balance out” the resulting disproportionate nature of the social landscape, regulations were designed with regards to marriage laws, employment, dress code, and even infrastructural zoning to create social and political divisions.⁷⁵ Prior to the stages of Khalaf’s initial phase onwards, GCC societies were more open to integration. However, as GCC nation-states gained independence, the *imagined community* and associated discourse began to take shape more definitely.

Additionally, GCC nation-states draw from the pre-oil phase extensively to form their identity, relying on an almost rigidly framed narrative of the past to construct national identity, often recreating the cultural past in romanticized “heritage shrines,”⁷³ arguably both physically and in discourse. Similarly, Tibi regarded GCC governments and elites as forming *imagined community* narratives based on a “parallel existence” of old tribes and the modern nation-state.⁷⁴ As a result, the discourse associated with these *imagined communities* is largely tied to welfarism policies given out to nationals by governments, whom almost represent a patriarchal figure to nationals; which is also hugely linked to the *kafala* or sponsorship system.⁷⁵

Al Shehabi’s article explores the origins of the *kafala* or sponsorship system, which is most commonly thought to have originated in GCC states.⁷⁶ However, the evolution of policies to finally culminate in the *kafala* system is rooted in the British colonial control of the Gulf region as “protectorates” throughout the 1920s and 1970s⁷⁷ before they had finally gained full independence around the 1960s onwards (which coincides with Khalaf’s initial and rapid urbanization phases).

As the availability of oil reserves in Bahrain and other areas around the Gulf became apparent, the British worked to consolidate more control “on the ground,” utilizing the ruling families as mediators to their rule as the oil industry began to take form from the 1930s up until the 1950s.⁷⁸ The British sought to control flows of people from and to countries and ports to ensure that those within borders of countries holding their chartered oil companies were there exclusively for purposes of labor.⁷⁹ This created a demographic imbalance, and additionally, an imbalance in how workers were treated based on the type of permit they possessed and where they were from in a process of “segmentation.”⁸⁰

By 1925, the permit system had spread across the Gulf. A shift began to occur around the 1950s as Kuwait regarded British control of permit issuances an assault to Arab sovereignty.⁸¹ This was regarded as a direct reaction to the rise of Pan Arabism. Eventually, the Kuwaiti government phased out British involvement in issuing permits.⁸² Thus, the *kafala* system went from being a result of imperial involvement to an enabler of certain power relations in GCC political institutions.⁸³ By 1960, a new nationality law shifted naturalization from *jus soli* to *jus sanguinis*, and in 1961, independence from the British was achieved in Kuwait.

After independence and adjustments to nationality law, more defined borders began to take shape to separate nationals and non-nationals. As the *kafala* system became a nationally integrated legal process, nationals were to be the only sponsors as opposed to previous regulations which allowed companies, investors (i.e. the British), and nationals to sponsor workers.⁸⁴ Governments after independence strived to design policies in order to imbue nationals with privilege. Furthermore, due to the socio-political history of how GCC governments came to power, citizenship became the prime tool to create inclusion in order to counter pulls of “Pan Arab and Islamic identities.”⁸⁵ Relatedly, Dito regarded *kafala* exclusivity as a way of

institutionally fusing the power of the state into that of civil society, as nationals become tasked with a “civil duty” to monitor “alien[s].”⁸⁶

This concept could be related to the idea of the nation-state and nationality representing a “civil religion.” Understandably, this represents a rigid “power relationship” as discussed by Foucault due to the persistence of a “dyadic” dependency-power relationship between nationals and non-nationals, especially that nationals benefit from the import of migrant labor through permit issuances, which ultimately molded national identity discourse and the *imagined community* in new ways.⁸⁷ Additionally, internal tensions brought upon by decreasing oil prices and the increased influx of non-Arab migrant workers into the GCC post-1991, which brought on mounting pressures on GCC governments to include nationals into the job market more intensively both in the public and private sectors (quite unsuccessfully in the latter.)⁸⁸ In short, GCC state societies possess a rigid, dual nature built on exclusion: that of non-nationals and nationals.⁸⁹

Public Political Discourse: A Case Study—Kuwait

According to Mills, analyzing discourse makes implicit norms and hierarchal relationships explicit as it uncovers interactions within the social structure through internal textual interactions.⁹⁰ To Mills, the specific vocabulary utilized in newspapers makes them a mediator between political institutions and the public.⁹¹ Similarly, Scholsberg highlights the impact discourse has on how issues are defined and framed societally in news media, which in turn impacts how policy is formed.⁹² Further, Scholsberg recognized that the “ownership” of media by elites and other entities of influence fundamentally affects both language use and scope,⁹³ which could be connected to Tilley’s observation regarding elites forming, permeating, and perpetuating ideology (i.e. nationalism.)⁹⁴ In order to examine common trends in public

discourse across the GCC, newspaper headlines and excerpts on the *Al Rai* website spanning from the years of 2010-2015 will be qualitatively and quantitatively examined as a case study.

Methodology

The choice of assessing Kuwait as a case study was due to the more lax publication laws compared to other GCC states, as well as own my personal familiarity with the economic and sociopolitical context of the country. As for the chosen time frame of 2010-2015, this was to avoid any political sensitivities in terms of parliamentary membership, and to examine gradual changes in political sentiment following the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession.⁹⁵ The keyword *wafid* was used to aggregate articles discussing non-nationals via the search function on the *Al Rai* website, as well as other keywords to be presented in more detail below, all articles included in the sample however must have had to discuss non-nationals in some capacity. After aggregation was completed, the articles were then clustered into thematic groupings and then tallied.

Al Rai is a Kuwaiti newspaper founded in 1995 and originally published as *Al Rai Al 'Aam*. Currently a subsidiary of the *Al Rai* Media Group Co., *Al Rai* is considered relatively pro-government paper in its stance compared to other Kuwaiti news outlets such as *Al Watan* or *Al Qabas*. The *Al Rai* news outlet was the first to offer its content free of charge to the public online. For this reason, the articles used for this section were gathered from *Al Rai*'s website due to the extensive online archives relative to other newspaper agencies such as the aforementioned *Al Qabas*, *Al Watan*, or even *Al Anba* '.

Jørgensen and Phillips draw from Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory to explicate the "primacy" of politics in discourse.⁹⁶ Similarly, Fairclough identifies three dimensions or


concepts to critical discourse analysis: social identities, social relations, and systems of knowledge and meaning.⁹⁷

The themes were selected with the sociopolitical context of Kuwait and other GCC nation-states like it in mind. As aforementioned, the *kafala* system is a major definer of the “dyadic” relationship between nationals and non-nationals, and was described as “racialized institutional humiliation” precisely for its role in reinforcing this dynamic.⁹⁸ Coupled with the fact that the *imagined community* Gulf welfare states seek to maintain and cultivate is one of artificial uniformity and homogeneity, a specific tone and pattern emerges in the language used within the *Al Rai* articles selected when discussing either nationals or non-nationals. In this context, Fairclough’s 3 dimensions⁹⁹ are represented by: the power relationships maintained through the *kafala* system, being a national vs. a non-national, and the system of nationalism.

Findings and Discussion

Upon reading through a total of 101 articles, subject matter was clustered into nine groups and color coded accordingly: deportation, demographical balance, national crime, non-national crime, economy, national integrity, satire, worker’s rights, and non-national perspective. The themes listed above here are a “staple” both in Kuwaiti news and political discussions online or in *diwanias*¹⁰⁰ (formal and informal alike). What changes about the themes presented above however, is how topics within them are discussed, and how the groups of interest associated with them are perceived with relation to national security as well as larger economic and political issues due to the ideological dimension and nature of language.

The following graph summarizes the findings in terms of thematic content:




Despite the total of articles read being 101, the bar chart above represents 107 articles. Three articles had two themes within them and were therefore counted in both categories. Before examining patterns in the articles summarized in the chart above and their connections to the theoretical framework presented earlier, it is important to review the keywords used to filter through the *Al Rai* online archive and their meanings and/or connotations.

The word *wafid* to identify relevant articles with non-nationals as the focus. *Wafid* is translated as “entrant” by the *Reverso Context* dictionary, alluding to invasiveness. This keyword has appeared in the headlines and text of the examined articles 603 times, almost always preceded by ‘*amala* (عمالة), the word for “worker/s.” *Wafid* exclusively refers to non-nationals. A more neutral term to refer to non-nationals is *moqeem*, meaning “resident” and has in contrast appeared thirty times, often to demonstrate that the non-nationals referred to are not migrant workers but rather more long term residents. All words referring to non-nationals however, reflect the transience brought upon by the *kafala* system.

Although the word *mowatin* meaning “citizen” refers to nationals, it was not used as a keyword. That is because articles filtered through the use of *mowatin* would most likely cover topics such as amendments to state subsidies, provision of grants, opinion pieces criticizing the quality of government services, or other similarly national-focused articles often centered on delivering a message of discontent to government officials or parliament members. Instead, articles with keywords representing adjectives were included in the sample to ensure that filtered articles would discuss both nationals and non-nationals within the text, allowing the examination of the tone and wording used to describe both groups. These adjectives usually appeared in articles discussing crime (i.e. theme of “national crime.”) It is significant to note that despite non-national and national crime articles both having high percentages, headlines use adjectives such as “intoxicated,”¹⁰¹ “thieves,”¹⁰² “reckless,”¹⁰³ “delinquent,”¹⁰⁴ and on multiple occasions “*iqama* merchants,” when referring to nationals in a negative context rather than initially identifying them as such to the reader in an act of “personalization” of crime to a specific “corrupt” faction of society.¹⁰⁵ This could be related to “diffuse-avoidant” identity processes mentioned *earlier*, which aim to distance the negative from the ingroup.

As aforementioned, the label “*iqama* merchant” was especially prominent. There was a congruent mention of *iqama* merchants when referring to threats to national security brought on by *wafideen*. Curiously, rather than the discussion focusing on systemic changes to prevent corrupt *iqama* permit issuances or holding the merchants fully accountable, the articles instead focused on another angle. The articles frequently attributed the *iqama* merchants’ activities as merely another confounding factor to the increase in the ongoing demographic imbalance, or law enforcement overlooking *iqama* merchants’ illegal conduct. The column chart below demonstrates this pattern and where it was seen most according to theme, where demographic

balance and national integrity represent the focus on national security and non-national population increases. What is noteworthy as well is the mention of *iqama* merchants in all articles with a supposedly “non-national perspective,” and this will be discussed further below.



In contrast to the deliberate process of linguistically distancing undesirables from the collective of the national population, the opposite was occurring when non-nationals were written about with regards to crime (i.e. “non-national crime” themed articles) as the *scapegoating mechanism* manifests. Generalization was common in the examined articles, often attributing higher crime rates and faltering economic performance to the non-national population. Discourse in the examined articles uses “aggregation,” and even “objectification”¹⁰⁶ by either identifying non-nationals through a statistic as a working population or defining them as “*wafideen* criminals” and lawbreakers in headlines, or an economic burden due to their remittances funneling funds out of country. In other words, both the intangible and tangible barriers in society separating nationals and non-nationals are restated in linguistic social categorizations and the “impersonalization” of non-nationals while also stressing their transience.¹⁰⁷

Another pattern observed in the examined articles complementing the “roles” non-nationals are assigned as mentioned in the previous paragraph, is that “non-nationalist perspective” themed articles were written by nationals vicariously narrating the non-national voice. In one article, a conversation between a national and non-national is used to make a point about exclusionary practices against non-nationals: linguistic, legal, and social. This conversation centered around the question: “Why are we called foreigners when we are also Arab?”¹⁰⁸ It did not, however, use any quotes, relying instead on the national author’s recounting of the facts.

The passive voice persists when *iqama* merchants are mentioned in the “non-national perspective” themed articles where the indiscretions of *iqama* merchants are instrumentally demonstrated through violations by the *wafid* when mentioning *iqama* violations, security issues, or falsified records. This presentation of *wafid* violations to draw attention to nationals dealing *iqama* permits illegally effectively represents the aforementioned “dependency-power relationship” between nationals and non-nationals, while also deflecting the focus from national crime. The only exception to non-nationals being directly included in a “non-national perspective” themed article was in one about a housing project.¹⁰⁹ All non-nationals featured in the article however had “worker” or their nationality preceding their name, relegating them as the “Other” or highlighting the *kafeel-makfool* dynamic once again.

In that same vein, the “deportation” theme was found in eleven articles covering non-nationals. Out of those eleven articles, five mentioned “correcting” or “improving” the demographic balance in terms of the ratio of nationals to non-nationals by simply sending them away. The remaining six articles discussed deportation mainly if driving without a license, which is most likely due to a 2014 law change requiring non-nationals to show proof of monthly

income exceeding 600 Kuwaiti Dinars to obtain a license. Other reasons mentioned that may give cause to a non-national's deportation are repeated offenses, public criticism or protest involving politics and/or religion.¹¹⁰

Additionally, word choice when discussing non-nationals was very particular and imparted certain connotations. For instance articles covering governorate populations, illegal alcohol trade, and rising unemployment used words such as “threat,”¹¹¹ “most dangerous,”¹¹² over three accounts of “capture,”¹¹³ “overrun,”¹¹⁴ and “crowding out”¹¹⁵ when referring to non-nationals. Rather than discussing housing shortages, unemployment rates, and smuggling more holistically by investigating root causes, word choices with connotative meanings implying immense threat reminiscent of propaganda texts were used in a different narrative centering non-nationals negatively instead (i.e. *texts of persecution*). This is also shown in the use of exaggerated phrases such as “governmental coma”¹¹⁶ and “national execution”¹¹⁷ when referring to the demographic structure of the country. This tone is most prominent in articles discussing “national integrity” which often refer to national rights and nationality as an almost sacred privilege bestowed to a limited group (i.e. nationals) and those that are considered worthy (what articles refer to as those who have committed “honorable deeds”²¹ for the nation)—effectively reiterating nationalistic discourse as “civil religion.”

Examined articles with a “workers rights” theme covered housing projects for workers, policies regarding inmates, policies to prevent human trafficking, and proper working conditions. Articles within this theme often mentioned the GCC and featured quotes from a government official. “International standards” are referred to when criticizing policies toward non-nationals, demonstrating adherence to said standards to both promote economic development and uphold human rights—therefore imparting certain policies with further validity and not others using

international law as a blueprint. In one instance for example, a government official described the deportation of a non-national for barbequing in a public park as “hooliganism” and against international law, while calling for the amendment of municipality laws to be both clearer and more reasonable.¹¹⁸

“Satire” themed articles were very few in number and were published as opinion pieces within series by various regular Kuwaiti contributors, named “Message in a Bottle,” “My Message,” and “Diaries of a Vagrant.” These articles criticized certain policies, with one article titled “No Wafids Allowed!” referring to measures in place to remedy various issues as ineffective “tranquilizing shots” that delayed total resolution, while governmental services were described as a “bikini”—as in barely covering the needs of the population as a whole.¹¹⁹ By the end of the article, the author then rebukes non-nationals for reading to the end, saying they had broken yet another law. The tone used effectively satirizes the stance toward non-nationals within the context of their service to the nation (i.e. their labor), alludes to the responsibilities of patriotism, and presents the disproportionate blame shifted upon non-nationals to explain issues such as waning services or poor traffic management for instance. However, even satirically themed articles carry a heavily divisionary tone that signified an “us and them” division (extensive use of “we” etc.).

Generally, public national discourse discusses non-nationals as a “necessary evil,” or as having a parasitic presence rather than being part and parcel of the typical demographic makeup of a rentier state, but do not consider the non-national population as diasporas representing cultural and “social capital.”¹²⁰

A Globalized World: Why not Multiculturalism?

As globalization becomes a stronger force internationally, scholars such as Toffolo, Appadurai, Young, and Fukuyama explore the possibilities for future alternative political developments to the institutional structure of the nation-state. In his article, Young discusses the “families” of nationalism, the forms of cultural pluralism, and the ideal conditions for cultural pluralism to occur.¹²¹ As mentioned by Tilley earlier, Young also regards the nation-state as not being “culturally neutral.”¹²²

For cultural pluralism to truly exist, sustained consent and a deeply democratic process are both required to capitalize on “social capital.”¹²³ Young realized however, that with “emancipating” cultural pluralism, dilemmas of varying intensities surface with regards to societies (i.e. nation states) and their relationship with theology, race, and ethnicity.¹²⁴ The sociopolitical nature of GCC governments makes the maintenance of the *imagined community* largely reliant on exclusion.¹²⁵ In other words, the “family” of nationalism in GCC states is not strictly based on territory, but on ethnic ties as well. For this reason, the rigid emphasis on the purity and integrity of tribal ethnic groups (i.e. “nationals”) is very central to the GCC nation-state. Furthermore, although forms of the democratic system do exist in the GCC in one form or another, it is not what Western thought considers a “pure” democratic system, in that restrictions exist with regards to: tribal ties, religion, the ruling family, and other cultural elements when it comes to public expression, forming a rather clear cut “box” of socially sanctioned topics (reminiscent of Young’s state dilemmas), which is in turn reflected in public discourse through media or otherwise. Therefore, the idea of achieving or promoting cultural inclusion and pluralism through a democratic process becomes farfetched, especially within the context of

GCC states, as political participation is also very exclusive to nationals and at times, nationals selected by the state in most GCC countries.

Conclusion

The significance of examining the relationship between GCC nationals and resident non-nationals in GCC national identity discourse from different perspectives becomes even more essential when keeping the colonial history within the GCC before the formation of its nation-states, the shared *imagined community* to define the “mythical origins” of GCC nation-states, and finally the *kafala*’s role in “managing” populations drawn in by GCC economies. In other words, the study of GCC governments’ structuring of national discourse, and its impact on sociopolitical dynamics and policy is also examining how globalism evolves in different countries and how younger post-colonial states define what it is to be a national—particularly with the existence of differing nationalism “families.”¹²⁶

Throughout this paper, it was demonstrated how Girard’s sociological theories not only apply to social crises with aftermaths of a particularly physically violent nature, but that the mimetic mechanisms of *scapegoating* and *victimage* also apply to the statecraft of the demographically and politically unique societies of GCC rentier states as GCC governments monitor and delineate discourse, constantly redrawing the “dividing lines” between nationals and non-nationals as well as continually reconstructing national identities.

There is a definite exclusion and suppression in national discourse when examining the case study. Furthermore, crime (violence, alcohol, drugs, extortion, etc.) and economic stalls were attributed to the demographic “dysfunction” brought upon by the Other: the non-nationals, or *wafideen*.

An identified pattern was that subject matter mentioning non-nationals in public discourse often impersonalizes and aggregates them into a single faceless outgroup with a purely functional existence. Rather than acknowledge cultural diversity of GCC populations, instead non-nationals were almost exclusively the subjects of very technical and overwhelmingly negative topics such as labor, crime, deportation rates, naturalization restriction policies, or fee increases. The lack of articles humanizing the non-national population indicate a centralization of power and control of representation that frames dominant public discourse and suppresses other discourses (both socially and legally), which effectively excludes the non-national from society and keeps him unintegrated on the fringes of the social landscape—i.e. “coercive normalization.” This was also clear in the scarcity of articles satirizing the status quo, and the tone imparted within them. Additionally, there was an abundance of exaggerated absolute adjectives when detailing crime rates and demographic makeup nationally and regionally for instance. This exaggeration is reminiscent of the *texts of persecution* and *myth* discussed by Girard.

The systematic framing of the non-national, or as Girard described the “well-known stranger,” allows him to be viewed as the source of social and economic crises, as well as an invasive competitor to the national (despite that being constitutionally impossible.)¹²⁷ This puts the non-national, the Other, or the *wafid*, in the position of *scapegoat* as he is intellectually sacrificed through *victimage* within the *scapegoating mechanism* for the purposes of channeling public dissatisfaction and reinforcing societal bonds in times of economic hardship and anomic social turmoil. This process also simultaneously reinforces the *imagined community* and the “civil” religion” or nationalist sentiment. As GCC governments continue to implement their welfarism policies, populations continue to shift within their borders, and the *kafala* system

continues to be utilized, the trends observed in national identity discourse appear to be here to stay.

Further Study

The choice to assess discourse through language used in news articles was due to issues of accessibility, legal necessity, and time constraints. Had more resources been available to me at the time of researching this paper, perhaps more news outlets with different political stances could have been included along with *Al Rai*. Further, an analysis of Twitter posts could have been incorporated as well to observe how official national discourses reflect on the public's opinions and vice versa.

Additionally, as the mimetic mechanism of *scapegoating* and *victimage* are most acutely activated during times of crisis as described throughout this paper, the examination of dynamics presented here throughout the COVID-19 pandemic in the years of 2020-2021 would be valuable.

ENDNOTES

¹ Michael Billig, "Remembering Banal Nationalism" in *Banal nationalism*. Los Angeles: Sage, 1995a, 42.

² The Gulf Cooperation Council was established in 1981 and includes countries of the Arabian Peninsula such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. A political and economic alliance owing to the geographic proximity, shared cultural ideals and Islamic religion of member states. Citizens of members states can also enjoy benefits like greater freedom of movement when crossing borders, employment at ministries, and the ability to join the military of fellow member states (<https://archive.unescwa.org/gulf-cooperation-council>)

³ Kuwait Population. World Population Review. Retrieved November 13, 2019 from: <http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/kuwait-population/>

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Paul Dresch, "Foreign Matter: the Place of Strangers in Gulf Society" in *Globalization and the Gulf*. Edited by John W. Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed Al Mutawa. London: Routledge, 2006.

⁶ Ibid.

- ⁷ Benny Wilbrink, *New Perspectives on Identity Processes in Hobsbawm and Tilly: Intellectual Foundation, Identity Formation and Construction, and Implications for European Identity*, 2014, <http://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordId=4452233&fileId=4452234>.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Michael D. Berzonsky, "A Social-Cognitive Perspective on Identity Construction" in *Handbook of identity theory and research*. Edited by Seth J. Schwartz, Koen Luyckx, and Vivian L. Vignoles. New York: Springer, 2011, doi:10.1007/978-1-4419-7988-9.
- ¹¹ Ibid.
- ¹² Wilbrink, 16.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Berzonsky.
- ¹⁵ Ibid.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Ibid, 55.
- ¹⁸ Billig, "Remembering Banal Nationalism", 53.
- ¹⁹ Cris E. Toffolo, "Overview and Critique of the Present Research into the Politics of Cultural Pluralism" in *Emancipating cultural pluralism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003, 3, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aus-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3408361>.
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- ²² Michael S. Drake, "Theorizing Power" in *Political sociology for a globalizing world*. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010.
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- ²⁴ William Watts Miller, "Essay 1 – Power Struggles" in *A durkheimian quest: Solidarity and the sacred*. New York: Berghahn Books, 2012, 183, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aus-ebooks/detail.action?docID=1040775>.
- ²⁵ Andrew O'Shea, "Crisis and Unity in Moral Space: Identity and the Good" in *Selfhood and sacrifice : Rene Girard and Charles Taylor on the crisis of modernity*. London: Continuum International Pub. Group, 2010, 206, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aus-ebooks/detail.action?docID=533851>.
- ²⁶ Drake.
- ²⁷ Miller.
- ²⁸ Ibid, 123.
- ²⁹ Ibid, 122.
- ³⁰ Virginia Q. Tilley, "The Ethnic State The Structural Generation of Ethnic Conflict by the International System" in *Emancipating cultural pluralism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aus-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3408361>.
- ³¹ Ibid.
- ³² Drake.
- ³³ Richard Joseph Golsan, "Myth" in *Rene girard and myth : An introduction*. London: Routledge, 2002b, 84, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com>.

- ³⁴ Richard Joseph Golsan, "Sacrificial Violence and Scapegoat" in *Rene girard and myth : An introduction*. London: Routledge, 2002a, <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com>.
- ³⁵ Paolo Diego Bubbio, "Intellectual Expulsion" in *Intellectual sacrifice and other mimetic paradoxes*. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2018, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.14321/j.ctt1ws7x0t>.
- ³⁶ Drake.
- ³⁷ Bubbio, 13.
- ³⁸ O'Shea, 137.
- ³⁹ Toffolo.
- ⁴⁰ Golsan, "Myth," 84.
- ⁴¹ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities : Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (rev. ed.), London: International Monetary Fund, 1991.
- ⁴² Ibid.
- ⁴³ Eric Hobsbawm, "Language, Culture, and National Identity," *Social research* 63, no. 4 (Winter, 1996): 1065-1079. http://www.jimelwood.net/students/grips/lan_culture/hobsbawm_1996_language_culture_and_national_identity.pdf.
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- ⁴⁵ Tilley.
- ⁴⁶ Drake.
- ⁴⁷ Ibid, 114.
- ⁴⁸ Toffolo, 11.
- ⁴⁹ Billig, "Remembering Banal Nationalism", 55.
- ⁵⁰ Bubbio, 12.
- ⁵¹ Ibid, 17.
- ⁵² Golsan, "Sacrificial Violence and Scapegoat".
- ⁵³ Ibid, 31.
- ⁵⁴ Rene Girard, "Sacrifice" in *Violence and the Sacred*. Translated by Patrick Gregory. The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1977a.
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- ⁵⁶ Rene Girard, "The Crimes of Gods" in *The Scapegoat*. Translated by Yvone Freccero. The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 1989b.
- ⁵⁷ Ibid, 43 & Golsan, "Sacrificial Violence and Scapegoat."
- ⁵⁸ Girard, "The Crimes of Gods."
- ⁵⁹ Girard, "Sacrifice."
- ⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ⁶¹ Ibid & Girard, "The Crimes of God," 32.
- ⁶² Rene Girard, "Oedipus and the Surrogate Victim" in *Violence and the Sacred*. Translated by Patrick Gregory. The John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore and London, 1977b.
- ⁶³ Girard, "Sacrifice."
- ⁶⁴ Ibid, 14.
- ⁶⁵ Girard, "Guillame de Machaut and the Jews," 4.
- ⁶⁶ Girard, "The Crimes of the Gods," 86.
- ⁶⁷ Bubbio, 17.
- ⁶⁸ Ibid, 18.

⁶⁹ Sulayman Khalaf, “The Evolution of the Gulf City type, oil, and globalization” in *Globalization and the Gulf*. Edited by John W. Fox, Nada Mourtada-Sabbah, and Mohammed Al Mutawa. London: Routledge, 2006, 489.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 511.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Dresch.

⁷³ Khalaf, “The Evolution of the Gulf City type, oil, and globalization”, 495.

⁷⁴ Abdulhadi Khalaf, “The Politics of Migration” in *Transit states: labour, migration and citizenship in the Gulf*. Edited by Omar Al Shehabi, Adam Hanieh, and Abdulhadi Khalaf. London: Pluto Press, 2015, 39.

⁷⁵ The *kafala* or sponsorship system is prevalent across Arab countries, including the GCC as well as Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and Iraq. “Kafala” comes from the root word “k-f-l”, which could mean: to support, to provide bail, and to sponsor or be the legal guardian of (Longva, 1997 as cited in Hernandez, 2021). Due to the demographically characteristic large populations of migrant workers in the GCC especially, the *kafala* system is essential to “manage” labor through sponsors or kafeels who could either be national individuals or companies (either owned fully by nationals or majority shares owned by nationals). The kafeel provides the makfool or the sponsored with the capacity to exist and work within the borders of a kafeel’s country legally through a residency permit (i.e. iqama) bearing their name. In other words, a non-national cannot exist legally without being registered under a national’s name or a company of theirs as a makfool. In this way, the kafeel must sanction a makfool’s movement in and out of the country, any job changes, health decisions, and even a makfool’s social life. This means that kafeels may also trade in the iqama permit of a makfool in their care for a second party’s makfool’s iqama permit, or effectively sell their makfool’s iqama permit for a sum of money.

⁷⁶ Omar Hesham Al Shehabi, “Policing labour in empire: the modern origins of the Kafala sponsorship system in the Gulf Arab States”. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 48, no. 2 (February 2019):291-310. DOI: 10.1080/13530194.2019.1580183.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid. & Khalaf, “The Politics of Migration”.

⁷⁹ Al Shehabi, “Policing labour in empire: the modern origins of the Kafala sponsorship system in the Gulf Arab States”.

⁸⁰ Khalaf, “The Evolution of the Gulf City type, oil, and globalization” & Khalaf, The Politics of Migration”, 51.

⁸¹ Al Shehabi, “Policing labour in empire: the modern origins of the Kafala sponsorship system in the Gulf Arab States”.

⁸² Ibid. & Mohammed Dito, “Kafala: Foundations of Migrant Exclusion in GCC Labor Markets” in *Transit states: labour, migration and citizenship in the Gulf*. Edited by Omar Al Shehabi, Adam Hanieh, and Abdulhadi Khalaf. London: Pluto Press, 2015.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ibid. & Al Shehabi.

⁸⁵ Khalaf, “The Politics of Migration,” 49.

⁸⁶ Dito, 81.

⁸⁷ Ibid, 88 & Omar Hesham Al Shehabi, “Histories of Migration to the Gulf” in *Transit states : labour, migration and citizenship in the Gulf*. Edited by Omar Al Shehabi, Adam Hanieh, and Abdulhadi Khalaf. London: Pluto Press, 2015.

⁸⁸ Dito.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Sara Mills, "Discourse Analysis and Critical Discourse Analysis" in *Discourse*. London: Routledge, 2004b.

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⁹² Justin Scholsberg, "Heard But Not Seen". In *Media ownership and agenda control: The hidden limits of the information age*. New York, NY: Routledge, 2017.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Tilley, 30.

⁹⁵ This paper was initially written as my senior project at the American University of Sharjah under the guidance of Dr. Yuting Wang during the Fall 2019 semester, hence the chosen time period to focus on.

⁹⁶ Louise Phillips and Marianne Jørgensen, "Laclau and Mouffe's Discourse Theory" in *Discourse analysis as theory and method*. London: Sage Publications, 2002a, 34.

⁹⁷ Louise Phillips and Marianne Jørgensen, "Critical Discourse Analysis" in *Discourse analysis as theory and method*. London: Sage Publications, 2002b, p.67.

⁹⁸ Bina Hernandez, "Racialised institutional humiliation through the Kafala", *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47, no. 19 (February 2021): 4344-4361. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2021.1876555>.

⁹⁹ Phillips and Jørgensen, "Critical Discourse Analysis".

¹⁰⁰ Refers to a hall or room to receive friends or guests. Essentially and traditionally a place to socially gather and discuss current events, the *diwaniya* is instrumental to influencing political decisions and perceptions, marriages, and even careers. More open yet themed *diwanis* including women and non-nationals have quite recently begun operating in Kuwait such as the Cross-Cultural Diwaniya (CCD).

¹⁰¹ Aziz Ahmad, "4 thieves specializing in stealing from wafideen arrested", *Al Rai*, August 4 2014. <https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Details?id=991fd858-d635-4c99-b350-e9fcb017bf10>.

¹⁰² Mansour Al Shimmari, "Drunk violates a wafid and beats her, fleeing the scene". *Al Rai*, February 24 2012. <https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Details?id=5c5e7aa3-c5a2-406f-8e37-476e9af72b73>.

¹⁰³ Mansour Al Shimmari, "3 reckless youth restrain and rob a wafid of all his belongings". *Al Rai*, 14 November 2011. <https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Details?id=4f5e986f-117c-4e21-913f-5a5bf03492ad>.

¹⁰⁴ Abdulaziz Al Yahyouth, "Modifying his car, a delinquent tricks wafideen into extortion – I'm a Fed". *Al Rai*, June 28 2011. <https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Details?id=a034e9c6-ace2-48a1-a77c-08907de0b9f0>.

¹⁰⁵ David Machin and Andrew Mayr, "Representing People: Language and Identity" in *How to do critical discourse analysis: A multimodal introduction*. Los Angeles: Sage, 2012, 79.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 85.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Mohammad Nasser Al Atwan, . "A conversation with my friend the wafid". *Al Rai*, May 20 2015.: <https://www.alraimedia.com/article/578948>.

¹⁰⁹ Hazim Al Saleh and Turki Al Moqamis, "Wafid residential cities: housing or concentration camps?". *Al Rai*, June 30 2010. <https://www.alraimedia.com/article/193233>.

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<https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Details?id=e5a37f1c-b259-4913-b770-c76fd639bf29>
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- ¹¹⁵ Hassan Abdullah Abbas,. “Wafideen crowding out Kuwaiti nationals”. *Al Rai*. 12 November, 2015.<https://alraimedia.com/Home/Details?id=2e76c552-8eee-436d-afda-119af63145ae>.
- ¹¹⁶ AlRai, “Al Mudhaf: wafideen’ employment while thousands of Kuwaiti youth are unemployed reflects a governmental coma”. *Al Rai*. 24 July, 2013.
<https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Details?id=5d087c4f-50fa-4ab4-8b93-d38cd51eb10b>.
- ¹¹⁷ AlRai, “Directors to Al Hajraf: Retirement is “nationwide execution”, allows wafideen to manage the country”. *Al Rai*. 20 May, 2013.
<https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Details?id=6ce85ef3-3505-48fb-a3d7-c68c5dc10e60>.
- ¹¹⁸ Al Rai. “Al Saadun: Nationality to whom had done honorable deeds for Kuwait”. *Al Rai*. 6 October, 2010.<https://www.alraimedia.com/Home/Details?id=7e9f2157-1103-4c80-b001-fd766b234da9>.
- ¹¹⁹ Mohammad Anwar, “Al Kandari: deporting wafideen for seaside barbequing is hooliganism”. *Al Rai*. 1 January, 2015. <https://www.alraimedia.com/article/543079> 6.
- ¹²⁰ Merwin Crawford Young. “Afterword: Interrogating the Emancipation of Cultural Pluralism” in *Emancipating cultural pluralism*. Edited by Cris E. Toffolo. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003, 243. <https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aus-ebooks/detail.action?docID=3408361>.
- ¹²¹ Ibid.
- ¹²² Ibid, 245.
- ¹²³ Ibid, 243.
- ¹²⁴ Ibid, 255.
- ¹²⁵ Dito.
- ¹²⁶ Young.
- ¹²⁷ Girard, “The Crimes of the Gods,” 32.