| (1) | it is ordinarily necessary that p just in case it is metaphysically necessary that if R then p |
| (2) | it is necessary that p in context c just in case Rc and it is metaphysically necessary that if Rc then p, for c a suitable context and Rc the relevant conditions determined by that context. |
| (2a) | [Intermediate Scope] it is necessary that p in context c just in case the relevant conditions R determined by c are such that R and it is metaphysically necessary that if R then p; or |
| (2b) | [Wide Scope] the (actual) relevant conditions R determined by c are such that it is necessary that p in context c just in case it is metaphysically necessary that if R then p. |
| (3) | it is necessary that p in context c just in case the relevant conditions R determined by c are such that R and necessarilyc if R then p |
| (3a) | Suppose φ is the OMS ‘it is necessary that p’ and c is a suitable context for φ. Use ‘relevant’ for the standard of relevance determined by c and ‘necessarily’ for the special modality determined by c. Then the proposition expressed by φ in the context c is the proposition that there are relevant conditions R for which R and necessarily if R then p. |
| (3b) | Suppose φ is the OMS ‘it is necessary that p’ and c is a suitable context for φ. Let R0 be the relevant conditions determined by c and ‘necessarily’ the special modality determined by c. Then the proposition expressed by φ in the context c is, if true, partially grounded in the proposition that necessarily if R0 then p. |