The Status of Souls as Hupokeimena in Aristotle
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/met.149 | Journal eISSN: 2515-8279
Language: English
Submitted on: Mar 13, 2024
Accepted on: Aug 1, 2024
Published on: Oct 24, 2024
Published by: Ubiquity Press
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
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© 2024 Christopher Hauser, published by Ubiquity Press
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