References
- 1Barnes, E. 2005. ‘Vagueness in sparseness: a study in property ontology’. Analysis, 65(4): 315–21. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8284.2005.00572.x
- 2Barnes, E. 2013. ‘Metaphysically Indeterminate Existence’. Philosophical Studies, 166(3): 495–510. DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-9979-3
- 3Barnes, E and Williams, JRG. 2011.
‘A Theory of Metaphysical Indeterminacy’ . In: Bennett, K and Zimmerman, DW (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 103–148. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199603039.003.0003 - 4Bird, A. 2007a. Nature’s Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 5Bird, A. 2007b. ‘The Regress of Pure Powers?’ The Philosophical Quarterly, 57(229): 513–34. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.507.x
- 6Dummett, M. 1975. ‘Wang’s Paradox’. Synthese, 30: 301–24. DOI: 10.1007/BF00485048
- 7Edgington, D. 1992. ‘Validity, Uncertainty and Vagueness’. Analysis, 52: 193–204. DOI: 10.1093/analys/52.4.193
- 8Edgington, D. 2000. ‘Indeterminacy de re’. Philosophical Topics, 28: 27–44. DOI: 10.5840/philtopics20002818
- 9Ellis, B. 2001. Scientific Essentialism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 10Evans, G. 1978. ‘Can there be vague objects?’ Analysis, 38: 208. DOI: 10.1093/analys/38.4.208
- 11Fine, K. 1975. ‘Vagueness, Truth and Logic’. Synthese, 30: 265–300. DOI: 10.1007/BF00485047
- 12Heil, J. 2003. From an Ontological Point of View. New York: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/0199259747.001.0001
- 13Kamp, H. 1975.
‘Two Theories about Adjectives’ . In: Keenan, EL (ed.), Formal Semantics of Natural Languages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 123–55. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511897696.011 - 14Kroll, N. 2023.
‘Determinable Dispositions’ . In: Austin, CJ, Marmodoro, A and Roselli, A (eds.), Powers, Parts and Wholes. Essays on the Mereology of Powers. New York and London: Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9781003298830-7 - 15Lewis, D. 1986. On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. pp. 96–108.
- 16Lowe, EJ. 2005.
‘Identity, Vagueness and Modality’ . In: Bermúdez, JL (ed.), Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Garreth Evans. Oxford: Clarendon. pp. 290–310. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.003.0010 - 17Manley, D and Wasserman, R. 2007. ‘A Gradable Approach to Dispositions’. The Philosophical Quarterly, 57(226): 68–75. DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.469.x
- 18Manley, D and Wasserman, R. 2008. ‘On Linking Dispositions and Conditionals’. Mind, 117(465): 59–84. DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzn003
- 19Marmodoro, A. 2016. ‘Dispositional modality vis-à-vis conditional necessity’. Philosophical Investigations, 39(3): 205–214. DOI: 10.1111/phin.12125
- 20Marmodoro, A. 2020.
‘Review of Williams, N E 2019 The Powers Metaphysic’ . New York: Oxford University Press. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. Available at:https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/the-powers-metaphysic/ [Last accessed 22 August 2024]. - 21Marmodoro, A. 2021.
‘Causal Powers in Aristotle and His Predecessors’ . In: Jorati, J (ed.), Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 10–27. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190925512.003.0002 - 22Martin, CB. 2008. The Mind in Nature. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 23McKitrick, J. 2018. Dispositional Pluralism. New York: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198717805.001.0001
- 24Merricks, T. 2017. ‘Locating Vagueness’. The Journal of Philosophy, 114: 221–50. DOI: 10.5840/jphil2017114518
- 25Molnar, G. 2003. Powers. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 26Mumford, S. 2004. Laws in Nature. New York: Routledge. DOI: 10.4324/9780203458426
- 27Mumford, S and Anjun, RL. 2011.
‘Getting Causes from Powers’ . New York: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695614.001.0001 - 28Parsons, T. 2000. Indeterminate Identity: Metaphysics and Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250449.001.0001
- 29Russell, B. 1923. ‘Vagueness’. Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 84–92. DOI: 10.1080/00048402308540623
- 30Salmon, N. 1981. Reference and essence. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 31Sider, T. 2001. Four-dimensionalism. Oxford: Clarendon Press. DOI: 10.1093/019924443X.001.0001
- 32Sorensen, RA. 1988. Blindspots. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- 33Sorensen, RA. 2001. Vagueness and Contradiction. Oxford: Clarendon Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199241309.001.0001
- 34Tye, M. 1990. ‘Vague objects’. Mind, 99: 535–557. DOI: 10.1093/mind/XCIX.396.535
- 35Tye, M. 1994. ‘Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness’. In: Tomberlin, EJ (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 8: Logic and Language. pp. 189–206. DOI: 10.2307/2214170
- 36Tye, M. 1996. ‘Fuzzy realism and the problem of the many’. Philosophical Studies, 81: 215–225. DOI: 10.1007/BF00372783
- 37Tye, M. 2000. ‘Vagueness and Reality’. Philosophical Topics, 28: 195–209. DOI: 10.5840/philtopics200028124
- 38Unger, P. 1980. ‘The Problem of the Many’. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 411–467. DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-4975.1980.tb00416.x
- 39van Inwagen, P. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- 40Vetter, B. 2015. Potentiality: From Dispositions to Modality. New York: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198714316.001.0001
- 41Wasserman, R. 2017. ‘Vagueness and the Laws of Metaphysics’. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 95(1): 66–89. DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12269
- 42Williams, NE. 2019. The Powers Metaphysic. New York: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198833574.001.0001
- 43Williamson, T. 1994. Vagueness. London: Routledge.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5334/met.143 | Journal eISSN: 2515-8279
Language: English
Submitted on: Dec 27, 2023
Accepted on: Oct 22, 2024
Published on: Nov 27, 2024
Published by: Ubiquity Press
In partnership with: Paradigm Publishing Services
Publication frequency: 1 issue per year
© 2024 Elisa Paganini, published by Ubiquity Press
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.