



Amadeusz Citlak and Pamela Koziol
Institute of Psychology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Poland

The linguistic expression of power in political addresses of Polish prime ministers from 1945 to 2019 (quantitative analysis)

The current study presents a quantitative analysis of the political addresses of 29 Polish prime ministers in the light of the theory of the desire for power. The timeframe covers 74 years, between 1945 and 2019, including two important periods in Polish history: Soviet domination (1945-1989) and the time since the fall of communism and the return of an independent Poland (1989-2019). An analysis of the vocabulary grid adopted in our preliminary and main study allowed the identification of different views of social relations and the social world. The concept of power provided a consistent explanation of the captured quantitative differences in the addresses: first, differences in language from the communist era and independent Poland after 1989; second, differences in language from the periods of breakthroughs in the country's history (martial law, overthrow of communism, accession to NATO and the EU); third, in the addresses of the prime ministers representing different parties and political ideologies (Civic Platform and Law and Justice).

Key words: striving for the sense of power, dominance, social and political power, Kazimierz Twardowski School, Władysław Witwicki, quantitative discourse analysis

Address for correspondence: Amadeusz Citlak

Institute of Psychology, Polish Academy of Sciences, Jaracza 1, 00-378, Warsaw, Poland

E-mail: acitlak@wp.pl

This is an open access article licensed under the CC BY NC ND 4.0 License.

Introduction

Psychological analysis of the language of politics is usually conducted at one of two levels: individual or social. In the former, linguistic data provides insights into the personality, traits, or motivations of politicians (Semenova & Winter, 2020; Winter, 2005), while in the latter, the data is treated as information about the nature of the beliefs and worldview of a broader social group, particularly that which is represented by a given political party¹ (Laver et al., 2003; Suedfeld, 2010). If the performance of politicians is formalized and expressed according to the prevailing discursive norms, these may determine the style of speech and its content to a greater extent than is determined by personal beliefs (Baker & Vessey, 2018; Hube & Rambour, 2010). While accurately distinguishing the individual versus the social layer of political discourse is a rather complex task, it forces the researcher to formulate conclusions in a more balanced and careful manner.

The address is one of the more structured and politically rooted canons of linguistic expression. As the prime minister's keynote address, it presents their vision of the state and is part of a broader political perspective, especially of the party they represent. Here, we present a quantitative analysis of the addresses of 29 Polish prime ministers which they delivered over a period of 74 years, between 1945 and 2019 (Marszałek-Kawa & Siemiatkowski, 2020; Siewierska-Chmaj, 2005). The timeframe covers two important periods of Polish history: Soviet domination (1945–1989) and the independent Poland (1989–2019). The year 1989 divides the addresses into two groups of political discourse: representing the communist (authoritarian) power and representing democratic power, while the political diversity between 1989 and 2019 makes it possible to analyze the address of prime ministers from different parties. Since the aim of the analysis was to characterize addresses in the light of the notion of power, this analysis is theoretically framed by the psychological tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School of Kazimierz Twardowski (Brożek et al., 2017; Woleński, 2019), and more specifically, by Władysław Witwicki's theory of striving for a sense of power (Witwicki, 1900, 1907, 1927), which was used earlier in the study of written discourse and closely resembles Alfred Adler's theory of power (Adler, 1912, 1920).

The aim of the article is, firstly, to analyze the concept of power in the historically changing Polish political discourse on the example of an expose. We assumed that power may be an essential psychological variable explaining significant political changes in the history of Poland from the end of the second world war to the present day. Secondly, the study aims to answer the question about the validity of one of the most original theories of the Twardowski school, the theory of cratism. The variable of power was conceptualized based on this theory. We believe that it provides valuable conceptual instruments that can be helpful in the analysis of political discourse. Third, we wanted to answer whether the quantita-

1 "Acknowledgement of the supraindividual in the study of (...) language is of considerable importance. Above all, it allows theorists to move 'out of the head' by considering the functions of multi-party events, group dynamics, and changing populations" (Rączaszek-Leonardi & Cowley, 2012, p. 8).

IN POLITICAL ADDRESSES OF POLISH PRIME MINISTERS

tive methodology, previously used in the study of religious discourse based on the theory of cratism, can also be used in political discourse.

Theoretical Background

The concept of power, as one of the most important concepts in modern psychology, has been the subject of many studies and various definitions (Köllner & Schultheiss, 2014; Sokolowski et al., 2000; Winter, 2018). In its simplest sense, it denotes a type of social relationship in which one party can significantly influence or control the decisions of another. Power can be understood as institutional political power and social or ideological power (Haslam et al., 2011; Turner, 2005; Raven, 1993). It can also refer to physical actors in social relationships who exert personal influence over others (Raven, 1990, 1992) or it can mean specific forms of pressure and coercion creating a certain arrangement of relationships between people (Kipnis, 1990; Lynch, 2011). Power can be a situational or personality-based variable (McClelland, 1973), manifesting itself not only in forms of overt dominance but, for example, in forms of altruism or prosocial attitudes that are not formally associated with high social status or the overt pursuit of power (Frieze & Boneva, 2001).

The Polish theory of striving for a sense of power adopted in the current study originates from the psychological-philosophical Lvov-Warsaw School, in which the analytical tradition with descriptive psychology played a dominant role (Citlak, 2022; Plotka, 2019, 2023). There were two reasons for the choice of this theory. First, it is a theory that describes social relations in the context of striving for a sense of power and is also a theory from social psychology (Citlak, 2024; Rzepa, 1991). Second, this theory strongly emphasizes the thesis that in situations of threats or challenges, the cratic attitude (orientation), focused on regaining power, intensifies, and these are the circumstances we dealt with in the case of the analyzed exposés. Third, it has already been used to analyze the concept of power-domination in historical religious discourse research (Citlak, 2020, 2021). The results proved to be consistent in that the research has been extended to historical political discourse, in which the concept of political-social power also plays an important role. This second reason is especially relevant, as it is difficult to find a tool in contemporary psychology that enables the linguistic identification of such textual features that are indicative of the perception of social reality in terms of power, strength, and domination. It is perhaps possible to explicitly state that despite a few exceptions (Semenova & Winter, 2020; Winter, 2018), the linguistic representation of this variable remains underestimated in psychological research. Currently available (validated) tools of this type are used to measure other variables, such as the linguistic category model of Fiedler and Semin (Semin, 2008; Sutton & Douglas, 2008), a discourse dogmatism quotient (Ertel, 1978, 1986), Pennebaker's LIWC (Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010), and thematically diverse analyses of features, categories, actions, and personal pronouns (Graf et al., 2013; Kacewicz et al., 2014; Smet & Velde, 2020; Steffens & Haslam, 2013).

The author of the theory of striving for a sense of power is Władysław Witwicki, a student of Kazimierz Twardowski (the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School and a former student of Franz Brentano). The theory of striving for power has been the subject of extensive debate in Polish psychology, and has also recently become available in the English literature (Citlak, 2016; 2024), so only the main theses will be highlighted here. The theory was developed over a period of almost thirty years from Witwicki's 1900 doctoral dissertation on ambition to its most developed form presented in the textbook *Psychology* in 1927. In 1907, Witwicki used the word *cratism* (from the Greek "*kratos*," meaning "force," "power," "strong," or "to take possession of," "to rule"), which would later serve as the name of the theory. According to the main thesis, the striving for a sense of power (*cratic motivation*) is a biologically innate, universal motivational mechanism of every human being, with a direct impact on their entire life (behavior, emotions, and relationships with the environment). The desire for power is also based on ambition, the "positive force" and noble feeling "pushing man upwards" (Rzepa, 1991, p. 70. 73). Witwicki describes striving for power as the desire to be above, independent or social influence and significance. However, the way in which the striving for power is realized is subject to historical and cultural variation. For example, physical strength as a key tool for achieving power and dominance in tribal settings, has given way to new social or professional competencies, especially in the culture of democracy and the developed state². A sense of power can arise from power and dominance over others or oneself (one's own weaknesses or limitations) as well as from control and power over nonpersonal factors such as fate or the concurrence of events. Witwicki distinguished four *cratic* tendencies: raising oneself, raising others, belittling oneself, and belittling others. The theoretical assumptions allowed Witwicki to analyze interpersonal relationships and the emotions that dominate them, which, he argued, mainly depend on a subjectively perceived social position and a sense of power. The experience of power (*cratic experience*) has also become one of the central categories in the analysis of aesthetic and religious experience³. Ultimately, it is about a psychological state resulting not so much from actually possessed but rather from a subjectively perceived power over oneself or others – a sense of "being above" with a tendency to perceive the world in terms of asymmetrical social relations as well as power and domination. Here, we understand *cratism* as the *cratic orientation* – a unique way of perceiving the social world regarding power, strength, and domination.

2 "If a man did not live in societies, but in a wild state among the forests and the steppes, surrounded by wild equals (...) ambition would lead this primitive man to gain respect and fear of his greatness; thus ensuring his freedom to live his own life on the corpses and on the necks of those weaker than himself (...) Today, people live in organized communities (...), people change both physically and spiritually. Today, in society, when a man has begun to value the traits that make him a decent component of human society (...) in this way, this instinct, originally personal, is taken on as a social instinct. This is how a man living in society can rise up to fulfil his social role: working in some direction for all" (Witwicki, 1900, p. 47–48; see also Boehm, 1999).

3 The subject experiences a sense of power, for example, by establishing a relationship with a higher power in acts of worship or sacrificial rituals (analogous to the work of Rudolf Otto or the psychologists of religion of the time [Wulff, 2001]).

IN POLITICAL ADDRESSES OF POLISH PRIME MINISTERS

The theory offers an original understanding of power that includes the pursuit of power and the perception of the world in terms of domination and strength. An essential element of such a cognitive image of the world is the preference for social asymmetry, the presence of stronger and weaker people, and the importance of ambition as a driving force⁴. We did not find these elements combined in other theories about power.

Psychological literature has a rich tradition of similar theories to the above. The most prominent theory is Adler's theory and the concept of *Machtstreben* (Markinówna, 1935). Similarly, analogies can also be found between striving to humiliate oneself/others and the authoritarian personality of Adorno (1950), or the sadistic-masochistic personality of Fromm (1973). The classification of social relations and the accompanying emotions resemble Leary's model of interpersonal relations, based on the dimensions of dominance versus submission and friendship versus hostility (Leary, 1957). The interactional theory of emotions by Kemper (Kemper, 1978, 1991), which analyses the specificity of interpersonal relationships according to power relations and position in the social hierarchy, is also closely related.

The orientation in the social world of an individual motivated by striving for a sense of power also seems to comply with the social dominance theory of Sidanius and Prato (1999), in which the key category is the perception of the social environment in terms of asymmetry, inequality, and power disparity. The perception of the social world by people with power is part of the comprehensive theory of Keltner et al. (2003). According to them, "elevated power is associated with positive affect, attention to rewards, automatic information processing, and disinhibited behavior", while "reduced power is associated with negative affect, attention to threat, punishment, others' interests (...) controlled information processing, and inhibited social behavior" (p. 265). Although this theory has also been the subject of critical discussion (e.g., Lin & Schmid, 2022; Moscovitz, 2004), it highlights several important problems in light of our study. People with high power experience pride, enthusiasm, desire, positive mood, and positive affect much more often, while people with lower power more often experience emotions of fear and threat. We find a similar distribution of emotions in Witwicki's work (depending on who has power and who is subordinate). Keltner et al. (2003) draw attention to the correlation between the possession of power and the tendency to perceive the world in a simplified way, using ready-made heuristics and false attributions. Although power generally improves cognitive functioning and flexibility (Yin & Smith, 2020), high-power individuals prefer automatic, not controlled, cognition in social spaces (Cho & Keltner, 2020). They perceive people, groups, and social activities more stereotypically, even with a tendency

⁴ We can question to what extent the presented research will confirm Witwicki's theory. However, it must be remembered that "an attempt to verify selected hypotheses of this theory is an attempt to modify it (...) Witwicki never translated certain psychological concepts into empirical language. In other words, a verification attempt would also be a modification attempt" (Citlak, 2020, p. 126). We believe that our study provides valuable empirical data for further research.

to discriminate outgroup members (Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 2000). To sum up, "people feeling powerful (...) are more attentive to social rewards; construct others in terms of how they satisfy their own goals and needs; and recognize their social environment in more automatic, simple ways. They also act in a more disinhibited and at times counternormative fashion." (Keltner et al., 2003, p. 279). Additionally, in Witwicki's theory, the relationship between power and cognitive functioning only concerns the individual's general orientation in the environment and the assessment of whether others attribute specific attributes necessary for the sense of power to them.

Operationalization and Preliminary Research

The analysis presented here falls within the field of historical discourse analysis or text corpora research, which has been fairly popular for some time, especially as new possibilities for quantitative data analysis have emerged in recent years (Baker, 2006; Budge & Pennings, 2006; Choi et al., 2019; Kilgarriff, 2001). Similar studies of speeches or other documents have been conducted in the past (Baker & Vessey, 2018; Bręński & Obrębska, 2017; Hube & Rambour, 2010; Pilecki & Hammack, 2014; Smet & Velde, 2020; Semenova & Winter, 2020; Smith, 2008; Winter, 1992, 2005, 2018) but without such explicit reference to the concept of power as a central category. The assumption that the address will be linked to the notion of power seems rather obvious: a statement is, after all, a linguistic expression by persons of exceptional prestige and position in the hierarchy of power, and is addressed to members of parliament (also those in power), presenting a program for the creation of a new socio-political reality. The identification of such a variable can be qualitative or quantitative (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). The current study was quantitative because it provides unambiguous numerical data that minimizes the problem of subjectivity in the interpretation phase and lends itself to statistical evaluation (Baker, 2006; McNamara, 2011; Reisigl & Wodak, 2009).

The linguistic identification of this variable has already been achieved in previous studies and its numerical value was expressed in the form of a quotient as the proportion of cratic vocabulary (referring to the concept of power-strength-dominance) to the other words comprising the studied text corpora, as in other quantitative discourse studies (Cichocka et al., 2016; Graf et al., 2013; Kacewicz et al., 2014; Smet & Velde, 2020). Unlike the most commonly used quotients involving, for example, personal pronouns, categories (nouns) or traits (adjectives), the quotient proposed here concerns a certain spectrum of linguistic features which are considered to reflect a broader cognitive perspective. According to Witwicki's theory, we assumed that the author of an utterance adopting this perspective sees and describes reality within the light of power, force, domination, and asymmetry of social relations. The vision of the world thus includes the stronger, the weaker, the rulers and the ruled, those at the top, and those at the bottom. The saturation of discourse with cratic terminology can, of course,

result from various causes –personality preferences, the influence of ideology, or reactions to a specific situation (e.g., group conflicts). A conceptually similar construct is the linguistic quotient of dogmatic thinking, developed back in the 1980s by German psychologists (Barufol & Guntern 1980; Ertel, 1972, 1985, 1986; Vorderer & Groeben, 1987). It covers several categories of linguistic expressions, which were established on the basis of Rokeach's theory of the dogmatic mind. Increasing values of the quotient were then obtained, for example, in Adolf Hitler's public speeches during the power struggle of 1933–1939, and also in Immanuel Kant's during the writing of the Critique of Pure Reason (Ertel, 1986). In the case of both dogmatism and power-craticism, it is not a question of analyzing the frequency of a few selected words but of analyzing the frequency of a broader set of vocabulary that may be indicative of a certain way of perceiving the world. The numerical value of the quotients is expressed by the ratio of diagnostic words to opposing words in the text under study.

The procedure adopted in the current study was as follows:

- preliminary preparation of a terminological grid relating to the concept of craticism (power)⁵;
- analysis and evaluation of vocabulary frequency in different types of public discourse (parliamentary discourse, philosophical discourse, media, addresses);
- reanalysis of vocabulary, correction, and preparation of the final list of cratic words (removing words with very low or no frequency, dividing the cratic vocabulary into five subcategories, which are components of the cratic orientation: position, action, power, categories, ambition);
- actual analysis of the addresses (calculated automatically, with corrections made by the authors of the article⁶).

The first attempts to identify the notion of power in the light of the Polish theory were conducted in 2012–2016 as part of the scientific project *The Lvov-Warsaw School and selected problems of psychology, philosophy and semiotics, and also in the project Władysław Witwicki's theory of craticism - psychological research on social relations (2018–2019)*⁷. The aim of the first was to attempt to use the theory in the analysis of canonical religious discourses and the different visions of the social world contained in them. On the basis of Witwicki's psychological work, first,

5 Two psychologists, scientifically involved in the psychology of the Lvov-Warsaw School and familiar with the works of Witwicki, prepared the cratic vocabulary. The criterion for selecting linguistic indicators of power was the assumption that the selected words must reflect the perception of the world in terms of power-dominance-asymmetry in accordance with the concept of cratic orientation. The list of words - then identified in the examined text - was established in consultations and not through the consensus of decisions of, for example, several judges.

6 In some cases, a word appearing in the text could not be counted because of a completely different meaning in the context of a given utterance (e.g., the cratic word "ulegać" (to submit) in the text sometimes appeared as "nie ulegać wątpliwości" (to raise no doubts)).

7 The Program of the Minister of Science and Higher Education, entitled "National Program for the Development of the Humanities", in years 2012-2016 (11H 11005180), and 2018/02/X/HS6/00278.

the Polish cratic vocabulary, that is, relating to the concepts of power, strength, and domination, was identified. The second project focused on text corpora in ancient Greek which further confirmed the results acquired earlier (significantly different cratic vocabulary frequencies for corpora produced before and during group conflicts, Citlak, 2021, 2020). The power-cratism vocabulary grid adopted at the time identified different visions of the social world.

The Polish cratic vocabulary, defined by psychologists at the time, was also used in the current address study, but required additional modification. This was because in previous research, the terminological grid for power-cratism concerned historical religious discourse, in this case, to refer to historical political discourse and, above all, to contemporary language. Thus, prior to the main study, a preliminary analysis of the Polish vocabulary for power-cratism present in contemporary nonreligious discourses was conducted. As a result of the preliminary analysis, the words that played no role in these discourses, that is, words which appeared very rarely or not at all (although they had previously appeared in historical religious discourse), were discarded. The original vocabulary list of words was reduced to approximately 120 words⁸. The entire corpus was divided into five groups: strength (strong, powerful, commanding, weak, inept, etc.), position (high, above, first, last, low, below), actions (rule, reign, command, humiliate), categories (power, strength, victory, respect), and ambition (dignity, pride, honor, shame). It is worth adding that ambition is, in the light of the cratism theory, one of the elements that distinguish the concept of power (usually not associated with it in the psychological literature).

Since the main feature of the procedure is the identification of the perception of the world as perceived in the adopted conceptual and linguistic grid and not the analysis of the description of a selected social subject (individual or group), the question of the subject to which the relevant words refer to was of secondary importance. The study was concerned not so much the manner in which the social subjects were described but the manner in which the world was seen and captured mainly at the structural level of discourse, being largely independent of overtly proclaimed beliefs. Thus, the procedure adopted was exactly the one used, for example, in LIWC, in the analysis of dogmatic discourse, in the identification of key words, in the analysis of preferences for the use of categories or moral judgments, in identifying the frequency of selected personal pronouns and, in general, in studies using automated, computerized word-frequency analysis (Budge & Penning, 2006; Choi et al., 2019; Ertel, 1986; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). In each of these cases, the frequencies of appropriately selected linguistic expressions, behind which lies a certain perception of the world, are fundamental. In this case, the selection of vocabulary was a multi-stage task, verified in different types of discourse and preliminary research. However, the version of the tool should be considered as a further important step on the path of its verification and not as its final form

⁸ We mean a base list, which in practice is more extensive (e.g., admiration-to admire-admired; and also inflection; see the Appendix).

(through subsequent applications, the tool may require additional modifications).

The preliminary analysis conducted on Polish discourses also intended to answer the question of whether the adopted cratic terminology actually differentiates between the discourse types. In addition to the address, these included: (a) selected transcripts of parliamentary debates, (b) news on the situation in Ukraine attacked by Russia, as posted on the Polish information website www.onet.pl, and (c) selected scientific articles on philosophy, published in the Polish journal *Filozofia Nauki*. These discourses were expected to be characterized by different frequencies: philosophical discourse (unrelated to the concept of power, i.e., lowest frequencies), parliamentary discourse about the people in high positions in the government (higher frequencies), address (higher values than the parliamentary debate), and media discourse about the situation in Ukraine (discusses the problem of war, violence, i.e., highest values). The frequencies were first counted manually, word by word in the text, and then, to validate the results, using the *clarin.pl* program which automatically identifies all occurrences of previously indicated words in the text corpus⁹.

The following preliminary results were obtained for the four discourses: philosophical discourse = 0.021, parliamentary discourse = 0.027, media discourse (news on Ukraine) = 0.031, and addresses = 0.042. This shows that the adopted terminological grid for the power-craticism variable achieved different values in the different types of discourse and, importantly, all values differed significantly from one another (χ^2 was always above 5.22, $df = 1$, $p < .01$). Somewhat surprising was the fact that the result for addresses was higher than the result for news on the situation in Ukraine. This was opposite to what was expected. Ultimately, it confirms the preconceived assumptions about the nature of the addresses as a statement with an evidently cratic perspective of their authors. The description of the situation in Ukraine, despite the war-related subject, does not necessarily indicate such a dominance of this perspective.

Prior to the main study, the factor analysis of the terminology of power-craticism and the correlation analysis between the five groups (categories of words) was also conducted for all 29 addresses inclusively. The first of these identified two factors: (a) the power-craticism factor (to be able to, to rule, to dominate, to be in front of, to help, to liberate, ambition, disgrace, shame) and (b) the tension-conflict factor (enemy, opponent, to win, invincible, to defeat, to win, against). Both factors provided a slightly broader view of the specificity of the terminology adopted, namely, the fact that it is confrontational in nature in addition to power and dominance. It can be assumed that a high saturation of this vocabulary will characterize utterances in which notions of conflict, dispute, or confrontation play an important role. Moreover, this is consistent with the assumptions of craticism theory. However, the correlation analysis demonstrated a strong correlation between the distinguished vocabulary sub-categories:

⁹ The results obtained using *clarin.pl* slightly differed from the manual results (the former were higher than the latter), but the general picture of the obtained results is similar.

Table 1. *Correlation Coefficient for the Five Sub-Categories of Cratic Vocabulary in the 1945-2019 Addresses ($p < .01$)*

	Position	Power	Action	Categories
Power	.93	-	-	-
Action	.61	.69	-	-
Categories	.68	.74	.92 ¹⁰	-
Ambition	.79	.85	.53	.66

Study 1: Orientation for Power in the Communist (1945–1989) and Democratic (1989–2019) Periods

One of the basic claims of Witwicki's theory of striving for power is that any attempt to limit a person's life force will result in an increased striving to regain it. This happens in moments of threat such as conflict, persecution, or criticism. The reaction to a threat or deprivation of one's sense of power may not only be increased hostility or aggression but also increased self-aggression (e.g., self-criticism) in order to increase mental mobilization and regain self-control and the motivation to change. Such results were also obtained in previous analyses of religious discourse in which the source of striving to regain power was, for example, group conflict (Citlak, 2020, 2021). It seems that similar correlations can be expected in political discourse.

The Polish prime ministers' addresses come from the long period from the end of the second world war in 1945 to 2019. They are primarily divided by 1989, when communist rule in Poland collapsed and democratic rule began. The impact of communism in Poland after 1945 – although weaker than, for example, Ukraine, Romania, or Belarus – was profound. Until 1989, a unified political system, one ruling party, and the centralization of power and censorship prevailed. The qualitative analysis of the addresses from that period conducted by Siewierska-Chmaj (2005) and Bralczyk (2003) reveals that the negative keywords organizing the linguistic-mental field included imperialism, capitalism, colonialism, Cold War, revisionism, crisis, speculation, and the positive included peace, cooperation, security, friendship, socialism, unity, and democracy. In the post-1989 addresses, the negative vocabulary included unemployment, inflation, crisis, communism, corruption, and poverty, while the positive words included security, Europe, cooperation, freedom, common good, democracy, dialogue, truth, and responsibility. The political awareness of prime ministers and their political parties before 1989 was clearly entangled in the tension between the East and the West, socialism and capitalism. Moreover, the political independence of prime ministers or parties was basically nonexistent. They remained under the control of socialist ideology, which strongly exposed the aforementioned group tensions and divisions. The division between one's own and outsiders ("rotten West," "relic

10 The correlation is high because categories and action very often refer to a common concept and have a similar linguistic form, for example, "walczyć" (to fight) – "walka" (fight/struggle), "zwyciężyć" (to win) – "zwycięstwo" (victory/win).


IN POLITICAL ADDRESSES OF POLISH PRIME MINISTERS

of the bourgeoisie," etc.), the sense of a real political threat to be defended against, and the sense of rivalry were a permanent feature of social awareness. It seems likely that pre-1989 addresses would be more saturated with the terminology of power-cratism, exposing the social dichotomy and the importance of force, power, and domination. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was as follows:

H1: The addresses from the period 1945–1989 will have a higher power-orientation quotient than the addresses from the period 1991–2019.


Results

Figure 1. *Orientation for Power in the 1945–1989 Addresses*¹¹



Note. 1 = E. Osóbka-Morawski, 1945-1947; 2 = J. Cyrankiewicz, 1947-52 and 1954-70; 3 = B. Bierut, 1952; 4 = P. Jaroszewicz, 1970-1980; 5 = E. Babiuch, 1980; 6 = J. Pińkowski, 1980-1981; 7 = W. Jaruzelski, 1981-1985; 8 = Z. Messner, 1985-1988; 9 = M. Rakowski, 1988-1989; 10 = J. Kiszcak, 1989; 11 = T. Mazowiecki, 1989-1991).

Figure 2. *Orientation for Power in the 1991–2019 Addresses*



Note. 1 = J. Bielecki, 1991; 2 = J. Olszewski, 1991-1992; 3 = W. Pawlak, 1992; 4 = H. Suchocka, 1992-1993; 5. W = Pawlak, 1993-1995; 6 = J. Oleksy, 1995-1996; 7 = W. Cimoszewicz, 1996-1997; 8 = J. Buzek, 1997-2001; 9 = L. Miller, 2001-2004; 10 = M. Belka, 2004-2005; 11 = K. Marcinkiewicz, 2005-2006; 12 = J. Kaczyński, 2006-2007; 13 = D. Tusk, 2007-2011; 14 = D. Tusk, 2011-2014; 15 = E. Kopacz, 2014-2015; 16 = B. Szydło, 2015-2017; 17 = M. Morawiecki, 2017-2019; 18 = M. Morawiecki, 2019).

¹¹ All quotient values are multiplied by 10 to make the results more readable. This is purely a technical procedure (the calculations were made on the original results).

Interpretation

After averaging the results, the values obtained were 0.47 for the 1945–1989 period and 0.44 for the 1991–2019 period, and there was a significant, albeit small, difference between them ($\chi^2 = 4.19$, $df = 1$, $p < .05$). This result confirmed the hypothesis that the perception of socio-political reality during the communist period, in contrast to the loudly proclaimed slogans of that period about the equality of all people, was more exposed to the notion of power, domination, and social asymmetry than in the period after 1989 in independent Poland. This result is consistent with the facts: communist rule represented a totalitarian order in which there was neither room for criticism from the opposition nor political equality. The language of the communist addresses constructed, promoted, and stabilized precisely this vision of the world, with a greater tendency towards inequality and social division. The linguistic differences of the two periods thus break through the prevailing discursive rules of the address itself, which, although governed by its own rules, acquires different characteristics depending on the dominant political ideology. The frequency analysis provides access to structural characteristics of the text (and, at the same time, insight into the author's perspective) that may be invisible in the layer of overtly proclaimed views and captures more general linguistic tendencies over which the author has less control. The result seems to prove that the world of equality, fraternity, and ideals preached by the communist authorities was not consistent with the orientation towards power, domination, and socio-political inequalities expressed in the quantitative layer (Köllner & Schultheiss, 2014). This appears all the more understandable as the communist ideology was characterized by a sense of constant rivalry with the enemy either outside (the West) or inside (with foreign agents) which fostered a sense of confrontation and tension, and as mentioned, these are the elements typical of the terminology of the orientation for power.

The interpretation of the results demands a degree of caution, as the variation of individual addresses in the two periods is evident. Ultimately, in the communist period, there was no upward trend in successive years (see Figure 1), which seems to reflect a relatively uniform vision of the state policy and the monoparty system. The most outstanding address in this respect is Bolesław Bierut, who achieved the highest quotient (0.63). Although his address was fairly short (and therefore quantitative analysis does not provide clear conclusions), it is worth noting that Bierut, particularly loyal to Stalin, belonged to the KGB, in which power and violence played an important role. It is therefore possible that this is why the result is so high. The quotient is also relatively high in the addresses of Jaruzelski (the imposition of martial law in December 1981) and Mazowiecki (the overthrow of the communist regime). However, an upward trend in the value of the quotient is visible in the period after 1989 in the newly independent Poland (see Figure 2). This increase is most likely due to the growing dynamics of political life, with political parties no longer guaranteed to continue the governance of their predecessors, but

IN POLITICAL ADDRESSES OF POLISH PRIME MINISTERS

having to compete with each other and fight to win in subsequent elections.

However, the differences obtained between the communist and democratic periods can be considered somewhat questionable due to the division of addresses we adopted in the current study. In the first group, we included Mazowiecki's addresses, which were delivered on 24 August and 12 September 1989. This was after the Round Table talks (6 February–4 April 1989), which marked the collapse of communism and a new period in the history of Poland. Mazowiecki and his political environment represented a vision of the state that was contrary to the previous government and closer to the ideas of democracy, and he was an opposition activist. On the other hand, it is necessary to consider that 1989, although officially recognized as the year of the fall of communism in Poland, was highly complex, and the country was still under strong influence of the communist authorities. The 4 April 1989 elections were only partially free (65% of the members of the Sejm were elected from the communist party, and only 35% from outside the party). The first entirely free elections to the Sejm and Senate took place on 27 October 1991, and the constitutional changes crucial for a democratic state entered into force on 31 December 1989¹². In short, including Mazowiecki's addresses in the two groups remains problematic. However, they fall within a period when Poland was not yet a fully democratic state (old Constitution, lack of entirely free elections). Excluding his addresses (which are long and have a high cratism quotient = 0.53) from the first group made differences between the communist and democratic periods decrease and become statistically insignificant, $\chi^2 = 2.81$, $df = 1$, $p < .10$.

The analysis of the frequency in the individual subcategories of words (strength, position, actions, categories, and ambition) is omitted here because, despite the different overall results for a given address, the differences between the subcategories were generally not statistically significant. There are, however, a few exceptions, which will be mentioned in the following section

Study 2: Orientation for Power at the Turning Points in Polish Post-War History

The history of post-war Poland is filled with twists and turns and events fraught with social and political consequences. Some of these deserve special attention as they were connected with a threat, crisis, or political decisions that introduced a completely new order in the state. In particular, there are four episodes of historic and critical importance. First was the imposition of martial law in December 1981 by General Wojciech Jaruzelski, which still arouses strong emotions and political disputes today. Second was the overthrow of communist rule in 1989, the Round Table talks, and the introduction of free elections under Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Third was the admission of Poland into NATO under Jerzy Buzek in 1999, and fourth was the accession of Poland to the European Union under Leszek Miller in 2004. Although these are different

¹² Mazowiecki's address (12 September 1989) was delivered at the 7th session of the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic.


types of events, from the perspective of striving for a sense of power, they are very similar in nature. In each case, Poland faced either a threat and conflict (economic crisis, martial law, the West, communists) or a new, difficult challenge (NATO requirements, European Union standards). The ruling elite faced challenges requiring the full mobilization of forces and resources. On the basis of the adopted theory, this should intensify the need for the strength and dominance necessary to overcome adversity or threat, while the cognitive perspective should move towards an intensified focus on one's own group and its enemies, that is, in a more confrontational direction. For these reasons, it is possible to expect some changes not only in the addresses of Jaruzelski, Mazowiecki, Buzek, and Miller in relation to other addresses but also in the addresses delivered in the 1980s, as it was then that the economic crisis and socio-political unrest in Poland grew steadily, ultimately leading to the collapse of communist rule in 1989. Therefore, the following two hypotheses were adopted:

H2: The addresses delivered during breakthrough/critical periods in the Polish history (Jaruzelski, Mazowiecki, Buzek, and Miller) will have a higher power-orientation quotient than other addresses.

H3: T. Mazowiecki's 1989–1991 address (from the period of the overthrow of the communist authority and the establishment of a new order in the state) will have a higher power-orientation quotient than the 1985–1989 address (i.e., preceding the overthrow of the communist regime: Messner, Rakowski, Kiszczak).

Results

Figure 3. *Orientation for Power in Addresses of Noncritical (0.45) and Critical (0.51) Periods in the Polish History, as well as Before (0.46) and During (0.53) the Overthrow of the Communist Regime.*



Interpretation

Figure 3 shows on the left the power orientation values for the addresses of the prime ministers from Poland's breakthrough periods (Jaruzelski, Mazowiecki, Buzek, and Miller = 0.51) and the addresses of the other prime ministers from 1945–2019 (0.45). The right side shows the power orientation values for the ad-

IN POLITICAL ADDRESSES OF POLISH PRIME MINISTERS

dresses of the prime ministers from the years 1985–1989 (Messner, Rakowski, and Kiszczak) before the overthrow of the communist regime (0.46) and the address of T. Mazowiecki, when the political resistance reached its climax and led to the overthrow of communism with the help of Solidarity and Lech Wałęsa (0.53). These results confirm H2: there was a significant difference between the addresses from the critical (0.51) and noncritical (0.45) periods, $\chi^2 = 8.04$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$, the language of the addresses in the critical periods being more saturated with the terminology of power, authority, and domination. This also suggests that there are not only different descriptions of socio-political reality but also different perceptions of it. Such reality is seen more in terms of power, domination, strength and social asymmetry. Meanwhile, the results for the addresses from the years 1985–1989 (0.46) and Mazowiecki's address (0.53) showed that the differences in the proportions are not statistically significant, $\chi^2 = 1.95$, $df = 1$, $p < .05$, despite the fact that they showed a higher frequency of cratic terminology in the period of the overthrow of communist regime. Although this does not provide grounds for confirming H3, it does indicate some linguistic changes in the period before and during the change of the political system in Poland, which is close to expectations.

In both cases, there was an increase in the quotient, and for all the prime ministers of the breakthrough periods, very high values were obtained: Jaruzelski = 0.51, Mazowiecki = 0.53, Buzek = 0.50, and Miller = 0.49. In other words, the cratic variable (the orientation for power) reached increased values in the moments of threat or challenge, when it was necessary to mobilize resources (psychological, social, and economic) in order to overcome adversity, regardless of political orientation. The breakthrough periods required the prime ministers and their political base to focus on their own competence, capabilities, and belief in their ability to succeed, whether it was the communist Jaruzelski (who tried to control the crisis in the country through the use of military force) or the anti-communist Mazowiecki, Buzek, or Miller (overthrowing communism, leading the country into NATO or the EU). The orientation for power thus seems to relate to a more basic characteristic of human psychological functioning in a similar manner to the research on the linguistic expression of dogmatism (both Hitler and Kant revealed high levels of dogmatic thinking). This result is significant because it provides a better understanding of the fact that conflict situations can not only be a source of a change in a cognitive perspective but also a kind of dichotomization or even negativization of social relations (ingroup-outgroup divisions, stereotyping, ingroup favoritism). Socio-political challenges can also trigger similar changes, which as such are not necessarily negative. Challenges (here related to EU and NATO accession), by the fact of strong mobilization¹³, appeared to induce very similar mechanisms: the vision of the world becomes dichotomized, asymmetrical and, in a sense, even takes on the characteristics of an authoritarian world in which power-authority-domination play a prominent role.

13 See also "a transgressive decision study into the Polish economic reform of 1989–1991, commonly known as the Balcerowicz Program". The cratism theory of power partly inspired the transgression theory used by Józef Koziński (Koziński, 1995).

Study 3: Orientation for Power and Political Parties


The differentiation in the performance of political parties has already been partly shown by the data in Study 1, in which the monoparty period was generally characterized by a higher power-orientation quotient compared to parties from the period after 1989 in independent Poland. However, the set of addresses enables more detailed comparisons between parties and their leaders, specifically, the comparison of the two most conflicted and active political camps in Poland, that is, the Civic Platform party and the Law and Justice party. The former, for many years led by Donald Tusk, the latter, led by Jarosław Kaczyński, have for a long time been in constant competition for power in Poland. Donald Tusk's party is assessed as centrist, while Jarosław Kaczyński's party is assessed as an extreme conservative party in regard to tradition and morals and extreme left in the field of economy. Donald Tusk (President of the European Council 2014–2019) is seen as the opposite of Jarosław Kaczyński, whose speeches have often been in opposition to European Union programs or recommendations. Taking into account the theoretical assumptions of the orientation for power, it seems that the Law and Justice party, due to its rather confrontational attitude towards the socio-political reality in Poland and Europe, as well as due to its more right-wing political ideology, is closer to the notion of force-power-dominance. Therefore, the following hypotheses were adopted:

H4: The address of the Law and Justice party leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, will have a higher power orientation than that of the Civic Platform leader, Donald Tusk.

H5: The addresses delivered by representatives of the Law and Justice party will have a higher level of power orientation than those of representatives of the Civic Platform party.

Results

Figure 4. *Orientation for Power in the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice Prime Ministers' Addresses.*



Interpretation

The addresses of political leaders, Tusk and Kaczyński, noticeably differed in terms of the intensity of power orientation (0.43; 0.53) and this difference was statistically significant, $\chi^2 = 8.65$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$. There was also a significant difference between the addresses of the prime ministers from the Civic Platform party (E. Kopacz, D. Tusk = 0.43) and the Law and Justice party (B. Szydło, M. Morawiecki, J. Kaczyński = 0.49; $\chi^2 = 8.26$, $df = 1$, $p < .01$). This confirms both hypotheses, implying that the addresses of the prime ministers representing Law and Justice were more strongly saturated with cratic terminology and reflected to a greater extent such a vision of the socio-political world with a greater dominance of the notion of force and power and also the asymmetry of social relations. It is worth mentioning that the global result for the Law and Justice prime ministers is slightly underestimated here by Morawiecki's first address from 2017 (0.40). His second address had a result that was very high (0.53).

The result for the addresses of the prime ministers associated with the Law and Justice party—Kaczyński in 2007 (0.53), Szydło in 2015 (0.53), and Morawiecki in 2017 (0.40) and 2019 (0.53)—is interesting when compared to the other addresses delivered after 1989 (see Figure 2). Excluding Morawiecki's first addresses in 2017 (0.40), these are the highest results after the regaining of political independence in 1989, and also among the highest in the history of postwar Poland. The result was higher only for Bierut in 1952 (0.63), and also for Mazowiecki during the period of the overthrow of the communist regime in 1989–1991 (0.53). Such high values of orientation for power may result from at least two factors: a radical, right-wing political worldview, the spectrum of which also includes a confrontational element, and a sense of an extraordinary political mission for the country. The addresses of the politicians of this party have been filled with slogans of "rising from one's knees," "rejecting the pedagogy of shame," "the greatness of the Polish nation," that is, the use of metaphors that further foster a sense of uniqueness, pride, strength and motivation for change (Bougher, 2012), as often used by politicians in general (cf. the famous slogan of R. Reagan and D. Trump, Make America Great Again, see Carver & Pikalo, 2008; Lakoff, 1991). Metaphors are an effective tool for public influence and power building. In the discourse of representatives of the Law and Justice party, they are primarily used to create a political vision, indicate values, and identify enemies. With such a high result obtained by all three prime ministers of the party, it is most likely dependent on the political perspective adopted and not on the individual characteristics of the politicians. Such a dependence also seems to be confirmed by the example of M. Morawiecki, as in his first address from 2017, he obtained an exceptionally low level of orientation for power (0.40) – it is important to add that he joined Law and Justice late in 2016 – and it was only in the second address of 2019 that he achieved a result that matched the other Law and Justice prime ministers (0.53). It is very possible that this was an effect of the influence of the party ideology that became visible only after a longer membership.

Also noteworthy are the differences in the frequency of the power-cratism vocabulary subcategories between the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice politicians. While clear differences between the vocabulary subcategories were not previously noticeable in the compared groups of the addresses, they were in this case. The addresses of the Law and Justice politicians, especially Kaczyński's, are the most saturated in the area of the power category, not only in comparison to the Civic Platform politicians but also compared to the other 28 addresses (the frequency was about 50% higher). It is one of the more significant categories that draw into focus this politician's linguistic and ideological sphere, and plays a far greater role than in the case of the other prime ministers. The differences in the subcategories over time can also be noticed in the addresses of politicians from each party compared to the addresses from 1945–2006: the addresses of both parties are more saturated in the subcategory of ambition, but the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice politicians showed no differentiation between one another. The increase in the frequencies of this subcategory seems to indicate that the political activity and rivalry of the Civic Platform and Law and Justice representatives have a stronger reference to the concept of dignity and honor than it had in the previous years (1945–2006). However, these concepts may have slightly different connotations, resulting from the different status of the individual (I) and the group (we) in the two parties. Given the right-wing (and sometimes populist) nature of the Law and Justice party's politics, the importance and distinctiveness of the own group (we) should be higher than in the case of the Civic Platform party. If this is in fact the case, a correlation could be expected between a high level of power orientation and the importance of the ingroup, not only in the addresses of the Law and Justice prime ministers but also in the addresses from the communist period (1945–1989), during which the importance of the ingroup was exceptionally high. To examine this assumption, an additional hypothesis was adopted:

H6: An increase in power orientation will correlate positively with an increase in the sense of ingroup distinctiveness and also (in the case of the addresses of the prime ministers from the Law and Justice party and from the period 1945–1989) with a greater focus on the past.

The sense of ingroup distinctiveness was measured by two quotients: (a) the ingroup focus quotient, expressing the ratio of the frequency of personal pronouns, that is, first person plural (we) to the second and third person plural (you, they), and (b) impersonal references quotient, expressing the ratio of personal pronouns of the third person singular (he, she, it) to the first and second person singular (I, you). The focus on the past was measured by the past-focus quotient, that is, by the ratio of past tense verb forms to future tense verbs occurring in the address.

In this fashion, the variable of ingroup focus was identified by personal pronouns. The manipulation of the frequency of personal pronouns plays a very important role in social perception and is constantly used by politicians in the creation of power relations or social relationships. This has been shown in the analyses of

IN POLITICAL ADDRESSES OF POLISH PRIME MINISTERS

politicians' interviews, their speeches in the media, and the analyses of written discourse (e.g., M. Thatcher, soldiers with higher social status, political leaders during election periods; Duszak, 2002; Gustafsson et al., 2014; Kaciewicz et al., 2014; Steffens & Haslam, 2013; Wilson, 1990). An increase in the ingroup focus quotient indicates an increased focus on the ingroup, while a decrease indicates the opposite tendency and an increased attention to the outgroup. By contrast, the impersonal references quotient was adopted from the discourse research conducted by German psychologists (Ertel, 1985, 1986) and signifies the tendency of the author of an utterance to focus on third parties, the "stranger" who appears more frequently in the narrative perspective but does not establish a relationship-dialogue with them. The assumption is that the two quotients should complement each other. In the case of the past-focus quotient (verb forms), the matter is slightly more complex. Indeed, an increased focus on the past can be a manifestation of an appeal to group resources that are a source of identity, stability, and strength for the group (e.g., values, ideas, tradition, Jakubowska, 2018), but it can also result from a critique of a flawed past that requires change. This latter aspect, present, for example, in revolutionaries, is, however, subordinated to the foregrounding of a vision of a new future that legitimizes the new leader. Consequently, an increased focus on the past can be expected to manifest itself more under conditions of threat (Pyszczyński et al., 2015; Solomon et al., 1991; Stollberg et al., 2017), when it is important to preserve the current status quo (or in groups with a greater sense of uniqueness or distinctiveness). An increase in the value of this quotient was therefore expected in the addresses of prime ministers originating from the Law and Justice party and the People's Republic of Poland (1945–1989).

Results

Table 2. *Summary of Values for Orientation for Power and Other Quotients in Pairs*

	1945- 1989	1989- 2019	Noncritical	Critical	Before 1989	1989-1991 Mazowiecki	Tusk	Kaczyński	Civic Platform	Law and Justice
Power orientation quotient	0.47	0.44	0.45	0.51	0.46	0.53	0.43	0.53	0.44	0.49
Ingroup focus quotient ¹⁴	4.28* ¹⁵	3.68	2.46*	3.15	0.84	2.06	3.83	6.60	3.28	5.43
Impersonal references quotient	7.65	4.34	4.74	7.27	2.12	7.54	2.64*	3.28	2.66	4.89
Past-focus quotient	1.29	0.69	0.86	0.72	0.69*	0.74	0.75	1.04	0.67	1.04

14 Because in Polish, personal pronoun functioning as a participant is often absent and the category of grammatical person denotes a verb ending, we also used another quotient as the ratio of the frequency of verbs in the first plural to the second and third plural. We obtained slightly different results: 0.84 (1945-1989) versus 1.07 (1989-2019); 0.99 (noncritical) versus 1.02 (critical); 0.33 (before 1989) versus 0.88 (1989-1991); 1.04 (Tusk) versus 1.0 (Kaczyński); 1.01 (Civic Platform) versus 1.21 (Law and Justice). These results are less conclusive.

15 * = difference between quotient values in a given pair of comparisons that was not statistically significant (ingroup focus between 1945-1989 and 1989-2019, noncritical versus critical, etc.).

Interpretation

The correlation between orientation for power and ingroup focus was $r = 0.28$ ($p < .01$). Moreover, the ingroup focus quotient showed increased values in each pair of comparisons for which power orientation increased (although there was a statistically significant difference only between Mazowiecki's address and the pre-1989 address and between the Law and Justice and the Civic Platform prime ministers). The difference between the values for Mazowiecki's address (power orientation = 0.53; ingroup focus = 2.06) and the values for Kaczyński's and the Law and Justice party's addresses may seem surprising (power orientation = 0.53 and 0.49; ingroup focus = 6.60¹⁶ and 5.43) because Mazowiecki's address, with its high power orientation, had a relatively low ingroup focus. However, it should be remembered that this was the address of the Law and Justice prime ministers that had, at the same time, a high saturation of the subcategories of power and ambition, which was not seen in Mazowiecki's address (and in the other addresses). Perhaps this is one of the reasons behind the high ingroup focus of the Law and Justice prime ministers.

The above result is also consistent with the values of the impersonal references quotient. First, the correlation between it and the orientation for power was positive and high, 0.51 ($p < .01$), and second, the increase in the values of the impersonal references quotient is evident wherever there was an increase in the ingroup focus quotient, that is, in all compared pairs of the addresses. The differences between the values of the impersonal references quotient were also statistically significant (except for the Tusk-Kaczynski pair = 2.64 versus 3.28). Thus, the positive correlations – as well as the partly increased values of the quotients – suggest that there is a correlation between the orientation for power and an increased focus on the ingroup and a stronger sense of the presence of "strangers" (albeit not the same in every pair of comparisons). Also consistent with our prediction are the results of the past-focus quotient, the correlation of which with the orientation for power was 0.27 ($p < .01$): it had significantly higher values in the addresses of the prime ministers from the Law and Justice party (1.04) than from the Civic Platform party (0.67) and in the addresses from the communist regime period 1945–1989 (1.29) than in independent Poland (0.69). By contrast, an increase was not observed in the critical periods (a decrease in the value of the quotient) or under Mazowiecki (a nonsignificant difference between 0.69 and 0.74), which is consistent with our understanding of the role of politicians in times of transition or reform.

The results suggest that orientation for power correlates positively with a sense of group distinctiveness, which has a profound effect on the organization of the

16 In another study, Kaczyński's address also achieved a very high level of collectivity, measured by the frequency of sentences containing forms in the first person plural. Such terms as "Europe," "modernity," and "reforms" – in comparison to Tusk's 2007 address – also had a less extensive range (Planeta, 2008). Szymon Bręński i Monika Obrębska (2017) showed that Kaczyński's address, compared to Tusk's 2007 address, was characterized by greater use of words expressing certainty.

IN POLITICAL ADDRESSES OF POLISH PRIME MINISTERS

linguistic and psychological space of the authors of the address. This also implies a number of predictions about the psychological characteristics of politicians with increased results of this variable in the form of the intensification of mechanisms regulating intergroup relations, such as rivalry, readiness for prejudice, stereotyping, and ingroup favoritism versus outgroup discrimination. This leaves considerable potential for additional analyses involving a broader base of written documents than just addresses, as the latter, by their very nature, do not provide sufficient data to fully verify hypotheses on intergroup relations.

Conclusions

Political language can be a rich source of information about psychological processes and mechanisms, but their identification may not be an easy task, requiring the adoption not only of a coherent theory but also of appropriate tools. In the current study, we carried out a quantitative analysis according to a suitably adapted Polish theory of striving for power. The variable of orientation for power provided a consistent description and explanation of most of the captured quantitative differences in the addresses from more than 70 years. First, we captured the differences in the language of the addresses from the communist era and independent Poland after 1989, second, the differences in the language of the addresses from the periods of breakthroughs in the country's history (martial law, overthrow of communism, accession to NATO and the EU), and third, in the addresses of the prime ministers representing different parties and political ideologies (Civic Platform and Law and Justice). In each of these cases, a different vision of socio-political relations was present, which seems to primarily reflect the declared political ideology in response to the circumstances. The results are interpreted as identifying an important dimension of social cognition, that is, the linguistic representation of the world in terms of strength-power-dominance with a concomitant preference for asymmetrical social relations. The theory then refers to a layer of the psychological functioning of politicians responsible for the linguistic representation of the world they constructed. One of the fundamental theses of the Polish theory is that the pursuit of power intensifies in conditions of threat or challenge, as a natural reaction. This is what we expected in our hypotheses.

An essential component of power in Polish theory is the concept of ambition. In the psychological literature, ambition is included as an additional, correlating variable, not a component. We emphasize this fact because it does not allow us to interpret the results in a one-sided way. The increased level of cratism may be related not only to negative changes in social life (power corrupts, DeCelles et al., 2012; Rind & Kipnis, 1999) but also to positive changes (as claimed by Keltner et al., 2003). Conceptualizing the variable of cratic orientation is a challenging task, and the proposal presented here is one of the possible ones that must be treated as an interpretation of Witwicki's theory. We do not treat the distinction of five subcategories, including ambition, as final but rather as a proposal for the

operationalization of a theoretical variable. All the more so because in most of the analyzed addresses, the subcategories did not differ significantly. Perhaps the number of words or subcategories should be reduced or increased, some could be placed in another subcategory, or the cratic words should be ranked according to severity. They play (despite high/low frequencies) a diverse role in diagnosing cratic orientation. This would improve the research methodology and allow for obtaining more reliable results. Above all, however, more extensive analyses of written language should be carried out, considering different types of discourse. However, the adopted research procedure (previously used in religious discourse) provides valuable results in the psychological assessment of political discourse. We believe it is an important step in discourse research using Polish theory, although it requires additional additions and modifications.

The preliminary study showed that the variable of orientation for power also differentiated between other types of discourse (philosophical, media, and parliamentary), manifested itself with different intensities, and thus cannot be attributed only to individuals with authoritarian or antidemocratic tendencies. High values can be obtained not only in both authoritarian ideology (e.g., in the language of communist politics) or in right-wing ideology (e.g., Law and Justice) but also under conditions of conflict and political reform (the government of T. Mazowiecki in 1989) and in challenging situations (the accession to NATO and the EU). The language of the address is clearly changing, becoming saturated with terminology that reflects specific changes in the perception of the socio-political reality. In other words, this is a variable that has a more universal meaning than just related to conflicts or tendencies bordering on the social norm. This is exactly the case with the linguistic expression of the dogmatic style, which (as previously mentioned) intensified in the speeches of Hitler, and the writer of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. However, Study 3 has shown that the intensification of orientation for power may be associated with certain threats, such as the dichotomization of the social world and a greater preference for intergroup bias. It is very possible that other negative phenomena are also present along with these, including an increased tendency towards prejudice, the radicalization of social judgements, and dehumanization. However, the assessment of such correlations would require separate studies taking into account other sources. All the more so because the increased level of cratic orientation correlated positively with distance emotions such as fear, hatred, anger, and hostility in religious discourse (although it depended on the more or less authoritarian type of community, Citlak, 2020, 2021). Similar or more complex correlations could be captured in a less formalized political discourse than an expose, where politicians have more opportunities for emotional expression. Again, the negativization of the social world does not seem to be a natural consequence of the increased sense of power. The results for addresses may suggest the presence of other mediating variables, such as ambition or the importance of the ingroup.

The results ultimately prompt a look at the dynamics of socio-political life in a somewhat broader perspective. The observed changes in political language and

worldview associated with the negativization of the image of human relations, social inequalities, the rise of power, and radicalism need not be exclusively associated with the undesirable, that is, with conflict, political extremism, or authoritarianism. These changes can also become part of a process of positive political change and reform, which, although intended to lead to improve social relations, in the course of mobilizing resources and struggling for reform, represent a potential source of serious psychological risk.

Quantitative analysis of political language can provide original data that is largely independent of the overtly proclaimed political views of their authors (Köllner & Schultheiss, 2014). Although at the semantic, overt layer, politicians may perform some manipulation in the content of an address in order to achieve the desired image-building effect, a deliberate manipulation at the quantitative level is extremely difficult. This method provides an opportunity to penetrate the quantitative structure of the text and discover in it a more reliable characterization of political beliefs that are hidden beyond the officially proclaimed slogans. This was presented by the differences between the communist-era addresses and those of independent Poland. The former, despite slogans about equality and fraternity, clearly demonstrated a greater preference for socio-political inequality and a picture of the world in which one of the most important categories organizing social space is power and authority. This is a unique, sometimes underappreciated, advantage of quantitative research, which would be best combined with qualitative discourse analysis. Political actors create more or less credible worlds. Most importantly, they do not express all their intentions directly. Combining both methods increases the chances of assessing the coherence of political beliefs expressed in the semantic and structural layers. In light of our research, high scores of cratic orientation generally do not favor perceiving the world in terms of equality but domination and asymmetry. It is no coincidence that prime ministers representing the Law and Justice party achieved a high power score. Its politics was filled with ideas of equality, justice, care for people experiencing poverty, and media freedom. At the same time, party representatives created exceptional political, legal, and media structures favorable to its policies and supporting its power¹⁷. The reconstruction of the legal and political order is also one of the biggest problems of the new government after the elections on 15 October 2023. People with a high need for power probably construct the political and social reality to enable them to continue to exercise power, even after formally losing it. However, verification of such conclusions would require separate research.

To sum up, the linguistic expression of power based on Witwicki's theory allows us to identify significant changes in the Polish political language. These changes most likely reflect the broader cognitive perspective of the prime ministers, which is related to their political ideology, perception of the ingroup, and current challenges or threats. Although the proposal of identifying the language

17 After losing power in the elections on 15 October 2023, they also made unprecedented attempts to maintain influence or control (e.g., occupying the headquarters of Telewizja Polska, TVP).

of power through a quantitative analysis of the cratic vocabulary still needs to be developed and refined, it seems to be a promising direction of research that can provide essential data on linguistic communication in those areas of social space where the concept of power plays an important role.

Conflict of Interest Disclosure

The Author reports there are no competing interests to declare.

Funding

The Author reports no sources of funding for the current study.

Research Ethics Statement

Institutional ethical approval was not necessary as no primary data was collected or analyzed.

Data Availability Statement

The data will be shared upon reasonable request to the corresponding author.

Authorship Details

Amadeusz Citlak: research concept and design, collection and/or assembly of data, data analysis and interpretation, writing the article, critical revision of the article, final approval of the article. Pamela Kozioł: collection and/or assembly of data, data analysis and interpretation, critical revision of the article.

References

- Adler, A. (1912). *Über den nervösen Charakter: Grundzuge einer vergleichenden individual-Psychologie und Psychotherapie*. Verlag von J.F. Bergmann.
- Adler, A. (1920). *Praxis und Theorie der Individualpsychologie*. Verlag von J.F. Bergmann.
- Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., & Sanford, N. (1950). *The authoritarian personality*. Harper.
- Altemeyer, B. (2006). *The authoritarians*. University of Manitoba Press.
- Baker, P. (2006). *Using corpora in discourse analysis*. Continuum.
- Baker, P., & Vessey, R. (2018). A corpus-driven comparison of English and French Islamist extremist texts. *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics*, 23(3), 255–278. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmj.4.5674.51-a>
- Barry, B. (2003). Wywieranie wpływu w organizacjach z perspektywy oczeki-

IN POLITICAL ADDRESSES OF POLISH PRIME MINISTERS

- wań społecznych [Influence in organizations from a social expectancy perspective]. In: A. Lee-Chai, J. Bargh (Eds.), *Władza. Pokusy i zagrożenia* [The use and abuse of power] (pp. 34–58). GWP.
- Barrufol, E., & Guntern, A. (1980). Zur Validität des Dogmatismus - Textauswertungsverfahrens von Ertel. *Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie* 11, 225–232.
- Biber, D. (2012). Corpus-based and corpus-driven analyses of language variation and use. In: B. Heine & H. Narrog (Eds.), *The Oxford handbook of linguistic analysis*. (pp. 193–224). Oxford University Press.
- Bobryk, J. (2014). The relevance of concepts in traditional Polish psychology. *Z Historie Psychologie*. LVIII(3), 302–310.
- Boehm, C. (1999). *Hierarchy in the forest: The evolution of egalitarian behavior*. Harvard University Press.
- Bougher, L. (2012). The case of metaphor in political reasoning and cognition. *Political Psychology*, 33(1), 145–163. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00865.x>
- Bralczyk, J. (2003). *O języku polskiej polityki lat osiemdziesiątych i dziewięćdziesiątych* [On the Language of Polish Politics in the 1980s-1990s]. Trio.
- Bręński, Sz., & Obrębska, M. (2017). Język, płeć i władza. Analiza leksykalna przemówień programowych polskich premierów [Language, sex and power. Lexical analysis of Polish prime ministers' keynote speeches]. *Socjolingwistyka*, 31, 117–132. <http://dx.doi.org/10.17651/SOCJOLING.31.7>
- Brożek, A., Stadler, F., & Woleński, J. (Eds.) (2017). *The significance of the Lvov-Warsaw school in the European culture*. Springer.
- Budge, I., & Pennings, P. (2006). Do they work? Validating computerised word frequency estimates against policy series. *Electoral Studies*, 26(1), 121–129. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2006.04.002>
- Carver, T., & Pikalo, J. (2008). *Political language and metaphor: Interpreting and changing the world*. Routledge.
- Choi, S., Liu, J., Csértő, I., Vincze, O., Fülöp, E., & Pólya, T. (2019). Automated analysis of narrative: Narrcat and the identification of infrahumanization bias within text. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*. 39/2. 237–259. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0261927x19893833>
- Cho, M., & Keltner, D. (2020). Power, approach, and inhibition: Empirical advances of a theory. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 33, 196–200. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.08.013>
- Cichocka, A., Bilewicz, M., Jost, J., Marrouch, N., & Witkowska, M. (2016). On the grammar of politics – or why conservatives prefer nouns. *Political Psychology*. 37(6), 799–815. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12327>
- Citlak, A. (2016a). The Lvov-Warsaw school – the forgotten tradition of historical psychology. *History of Psychology*, 19(2), 105–124. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/hop0000029>
- Citlak, A. (2019). The problem of mind and mental acts in the perspective of psychology in the Lvov-Warsaw school. *Philosophical Psychology*, 32(7),

- 1049–1077. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2019.1647410>
- Citlak, A. (2020). Group conflicts in light of the cratism theory (psycholinguistic analysis). *Annals of Psychology*, 23(2), 107–131. <http://dx.doi.org/10.18290/rpsych20232-1>
- Citlak, A. (2021). The psychology of the pursuit for a sense of power and structural patterns of biblical social relations. *Journal of Religion and Health*, 60(6), 3993–4013. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10943-021-01241-6>
- Citlak, A. (2023). Brentano's psychology and Kazimierz Twardowski School: implications for the empirical study of psychological phenomena today. *Psychological Research*, 87, 1665–1681. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00426-022-01744-1>
- Citlak, A. (2024 in press). The first European strength-power motivation theory (Władysław Witwicki's theory and the Lvov-Warsaw School). *History of Psychology*.
- DeCelles, K. A., DeRue, D. S., Margolis, J. D., & Ceranic, T. L. (2012). Does power corrupt or enable? When and why power facilitates self-interested behavior. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 97(3), 681–689. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026811>
- Duckitt, J., Bizumic, B., Krauss, S., Heled, E. (2010). A tripartite approach to right-wing authoritarianism: The authoritarian-conservatism-traditionalism model. *Journal of Political Psychology*, 35, 685–716. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00781.x>
- Duszak, A. (Ed.) (2002). *Us and others: Social identities across language. Discourse and cultures*. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
- Ertel, S. (1972). Erkenntnis und Dogmatismus. *Psychologische Rundschau*, 13, 241–269.
- Ertel, S. (1985). Content analysis: An alternative approach to open and closed mind. *The High School Journal*, 68(4), 229–240.
- Ertel, S. (1986). Language. Thought and culture: Toward a mergence of diverging problem fields. In: I. Kurcz, G.W. Shuga, J.H. Danks (Eds.). *Knowledge and language* (pp. 139–163). North Holland
- Fiske, S. T. (1993). Controlling other people: The impact of power on stereotyping. *American Psychologist*, 48, 621–628. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066x.48.6.621>
- Frieze, I., & Bonev, a B. (2003). Motywacja do sprawowania władzy a motywacja do pomagania innym [Power motivation and motivation to help others]. In: A. Lee-Chai, & J. Bargh (Eds.). *Władza. Pokusy i zagrożenia* [The use and abuse of power]. (pp. 97–114). GWP.
- Fromm, E. (1973). *The anatomy of human destructiveness*. Holt, Rineheart and Winston.
- Goodwin, S. A., Gubin, A., Fiske, S., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2000). Power can bias impression processes: Stereotyping subordinates by default and by design. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 3, 227–256. <http://dx.doi.org/10>

.1177/1368430200003003001

- Góralewska-Słońska, A. (2012). Istota pojęcia władza – kontekst źródeł. wymiarów. skuteczności i patologii – ujęcie teoretyczne [the concept of power - context of sources, dimensions; Efficacy and pathology of power and the theoretical approach]. *Problemy Profesjologii*, 1, 91–105.
- Graf, S., Bilewicz, M., Finell, E., & Geschke, D. (2013). Nouns cut slices: Effects of linguistic forms on intergroup bias. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 32(1), 62–83. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X12463209>
- Greenaway, K. H., & Cruwys, T. (2019). The source model of group threat: Responding to internal and external threats. *American Psychologist*, 74(2), 218–231. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/amp0000321>
- Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Lyon, D. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience on reaction to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58, 308–318 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.2.308>
- Gustafsson, S., Lindholm, T., & Sikström, S. (2014). Selection bias in choice of words: Evaluations of "I" and "we" differ between contexts. But "they" are always worse. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 33(1), 49–67. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X13495856>
- Haslam, S.A., Reicher, S.D., & Platow, M.J. (2011). *The new psychology of leadership: Identity, influence and power*. Psychology Press.
- Hube N., & Rambou, r M. (2010). French political parties in campaign (1989–2004): A configurational analysis of political discourses on Europe. *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*, 11(2), 146–166. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15705851003760909>
- Jakubowska, U. (2018). *O naturze preferencji politycznych* [On the nature of political preferences]. PWN, IP PAN.
- Kacewicz, E., Pennebaker, J. W., Davis, M., Jeon, M., & Graesser, A. C. (2014). Pronoun use reflects standings in social hierarchies. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 33(2), 125–143. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0261927x13502654>
- Keltner, D., Gruenfeld, D. H., & Anderson, C. (2003). Power, approach, and inhibition. *Psychological Review*, 110(2), 265–284. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.110.2.265>
- Kemper, Th. (1978). *A social interactional theory of emotions*. Willey.
- Kemper, T. (1991). Predicting emotions from social relations. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 54, 330–342. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2786845>
- Kilgarriff, D. (2001). Comparing corpora. *International Journal of Corpus Linguistics*, 6(1), 97–133. <https://doi.org/10.1075/ijcl.6.1.05kil>
- Kipnis, D. (1990). *Technology and power*. Springer.
- Kozielecki, J. (1996). The polish economic reform: Transgressive decision making. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, 16(2), 175–204. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-9055\(96\)00003-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-9055(96)00003-0)

- org/10.1016/0167-4870(94)00033-7
- Köllner, M. G., & Schultheiss, O. C. (2014). Meta-analytic evidence of low convergence between implicit and explicit measures of the needs for achievement, affiliation, and power. *Frontiers in Psychology*, 5, 826. <http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00826>
- Lakoff, G. (1991). Metaphor and war: The metaphor system used to justify war in the Gulf. *Journal of Urban and Cultural Studies*, 2(1), 59–72. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/cogsem.2012.4.2.5>
- Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry J. (2003). Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data. *American Political Science Review*, 97(2), 311–332. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003055403000698>
- Leary, T. (1957). *Interpersonal diagnosis of personality*. Ronald.
- Lieberman, E., Jean-Baptiste, M., Jackson, J., Tang, T., & Nowak, M. (2007). Quantifying the evolutionary dynamics of language. *Nature*, 449(7), 13–16. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nature06137>
- Lin, E., & Schmid, P. C. (2022). Does power increase attention to rewards? Examining the brain and behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 101, 1–18. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2022.104332>
- Lynch, R. A. (2011) Foucault's theory of power. In: D. Taylor (Ed.) *Michel Foucault: Key concepts* (pp. 13–26). Acumen Publishing.
- Markinówna, E. (1935). Psychologia dążenia do mocy. Zestawienie poglądów Witwickiego i Adlera [the psychology of the pursuit for power. The summary of Witwicki's and Adler's theories]. *Kwartalnik Psychologiczny*, 7, 329–340.
- Marszałek-Kawa, J., & Siemiatkowski, P. (2020). *Expose Prezesów Rady Ministrów 1989-2019* [Addresses of prime ministers in 1989-2019]. Adam Marszałek.
- McClelland, D. (1973). The two faces of power. In: D. McClelland, R. Steele (Eds.). *Human motivation* (pp. 300–316). General Learning Press.
- McNamara, D.S. (2011). Computational methods to extract meaning from text and advance theories of human cognition. *Topics in Cognitive Science*, 3, 3–17. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-8765.2010.01117.x>
- Mooijman, M., Kouchaki, M., Beall, E., & Graham, J. (2020). Power decreases the moral condemnation of disgust-inducing transgressions. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, 161, 79–92. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2020.04.005>
- Moscovitz, D. (2004). Does elevated power lead to approach and reduced power to inhibition? Comment on Keltner, Gruenfeld, and Anderson (2003). *Psychological Review*, 111(3), 808–811. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.111.3.808>
- Pilecki, A., & Hammack, P. (2014). "Victims" versus "righteous victims": The rhetorical construction of social categories in historical dialogue among Israeli and Palestinian youth. *Political Psychology*, 35(6), 813–830. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12063>

- Planeta, P. (2009). Słowa sztandarowe w exposé polskich premierów w latach 1989-2007 [key words in addresses of Polish prime ministers in 1989-2007]. *Zeszyty Prasoznawcze*, 7(1-2), 7-34.
- Płotka, W. (2019). From psychology to phenomenology (and back again): A controversy over the method in the school of Twardowski. *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences*, 19, 141-167. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09620-x>
- Płotka, W. (2023). The origins and development of Leopold Blaustein's descriptive psychology: An essay in the heritage of the Lvov-Warsaw School. *History of Psychology*, 26, 372-390. <https://doi.org/10.1037/hop0000241>
- Pyszczyński, T., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (2015). Thirty years of terror management theory. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 52, 1-70. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2015.03.001>
- Rączaszek-Leonardi, J., & Cowley, S. J. (2012), the evolution of language as controlled collectivity. *Interaction Studies*, 13(1), 1-16. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1075/is.13.1.01rac>
- Raven, B. H. (1990). Political application of the psychology of interpersonal influence and social power. *Political Psychology*, 11, 493-520. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3791662>
- Raven, B. H. (1992). A power/interaction model of interpersonal influence: French and Raven thirsty years later. *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality*, 7, 217-244.
- Raven, B. H. (1993). The bases of power: Origins and recent developments. *Journal of Social Issues*, 49, 277-251. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1993.tb01191.x>
- Raven, B. H., Schwarzwald, J., & Kozlowsky, M. (1998). Conceptualizing and measuring a power/interaction model of interpersonal influence. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 28, 307-332. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.1998.tb01708.x>
- Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2009). The discourse-historical approach. In R. Wodak, & M. Meyer (Eds.). *Methods of critical discourse analysis* (pp. 87-121). Sage.
- Rind, B., & Kipnis, D. (1999). Changes in self-perceptions as a result of successfully persuading others. *Journal of Social Issues*, 55, 141-156. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00109>
- Rodríguez-Bailón, R., & Willis, G. B. (2012). Power: Its social psychology. *International Journal of Social Psychology*, 27(3), 287-292. <https://doi.org/10.1174/021347412802845595>
- Rzepa, T. (1991). *Psychologia Władysława Witwickiego* [Psychology of Władysław Witwicki]. Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM.
- Rzepa, T., & Stachowski, R. (1993). Roots of the methodology of Polish psychology. *Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities*, 28, 233-250.
- Semenova, E., & Winter, D.G. (2020). A motivational analysis of russian pre-

- sidents. 1994–2018. *Political Psychology*, 41(4), 813–834. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/pops.12652>
- Semin, G. R. (2008). Language puzzles: A prospective retrospective on the linguistic category model. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 27(2), 197–209. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X07313664>
- Sidanius, J., & Prato, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. Cambridge University Press.
- Siewierska-Chmaj, A. (2005). *Język polskiej polityki. Politologiczno-semantyczna analiza expose premierów Polski w latach 1919-2004* [Language of Polish Politics. Political and semantic analysis of the expose of Polish Prime Ministers in 1919-2004]. WSiZ.
- Smet, I., & Velde, F. (2020). A corpus-based quantitative analysis of twelve centuries of preterite and past participle morphology in Dutch. *Language Variation and Change*, 32, 241–265. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0954394520000101>
- Smith, Ch. (1996). Content analysis. In: A. Manstead. & A. Hewstone (Eds.) *The Blackwell encyclopedia of social psychology*. Blackwell Publishers Ltd.
- Smith, A. (2008). The implicit motives of terrorist groups: how the needs for affiliation and power translate into death and destruction. *Political Psychology*, 29(1), 55–75. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00612.x>
- Sokolowski, K., Schmalt, H.-D., Langens, T. A., & Puca, R. M. (2000). Assessing achievement, affiliation, and power motives all at once: the Multi-Motive Grid (MMG). *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 74, 126–145. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa740109>
- Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). A terror management theory of social behavior: The psychological functions of self-esteem and cultural worldviews. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 24, 93–159. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0065-2601\(08\)60328-7](http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0065-2601(08)60328-7)
- Steffens, N., & Haslam, S. (2013). Power through ‘Us’: /leaders’ use of we-referencing language predicts election victory. *PLoS One*, 8(10). <http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0077952>
- Stollberg, J., Fritsche, I., & Jonas, E. (2017). The groupy shift: Conformity to liberal in-group norms as a group-based response to threatened personal control. *Social Cognition*, 35(4), 374–394 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.2017.35.4.374>
- Suedfeld, P. (2010). The cognitive processing of politics and politicians: archival studies of conceptual and integrative complexity. *Journal of Personality*, 78(6), 1669–1702. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00666.x>
- Sutton, R. M., & Douglas, K. M. (2008). Celebrating two decades of linguistic bias research: An introduction. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 27(2), 105–109. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X07313642>
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In: Austin. S. Worchel (Eds.) *Psychology of intergroup relation* (pp. 33–47). Brooks/Cole.

- Tausczik, Y. R., & Pennebaker, J. W. (2010). The psychological meaning of words: LIWC and computerized text analysis methods. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, 29(1), 24–54. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0261927x09351676>
- Turner, J.C. (2005). Explaining the nature of power: A three-process theory. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 35(1), 1–22. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.244>
- Twardowski, K. (1912/1979). Actions and products. In: J. Pelc (Ed.). *Semiotics in Poland 1984-1969*. Open WorldCat.
- Vorderer, P., & Groeben, N. (Hrsg.). (1987). *Textanalyse als Kognitionskritik? Möglichkeiten und Grenzen ideologiekritischer Inhaltsanalyse* (Empirische Literaturwissenschaft. 10). Narr.
- Wilson, J. (1990). *Politically speaking*. Basil Blackwell.
- Winter, D. G. (1992). Content analysis of archival data. personal documents. and everyday verbal productions. In C. P. Smith (Ed.). *Motivation and personality: Handbook of thematic content analysis* (pp. 110–125). Cambridge University Press.
- Winter, D. (2005). Things I've learned about personality from studying political leaders at a distance. *Journal of Personality*, 73(3), 557–584. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2005.00321.x>
- Winter, D. G. (2018). What does Trump really want? *Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy*, 18(1), 155–171 <https://doi.org/10.1111/asap.12154>
- Witwicki, W. (1900). Psychologiczna analiza ambicji [Psychological analysis of ambition] *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, 3, 26–49.
- Witwicki, W. (1907). Z psychologii stosunków osobistych [From the psychology of personal relationships]. *Przegląd Filozoficzny*, 10(4), 531–537.
- Witwicki, W. (1926/1962, 1927/1963). *Psychologia* [Psychology]. PWN.
- Wodak, R., & Meyer, M. (Eds.) (2001). *Methods of critical discourse analysis*. Sage.
- Woleński, J. (2019). *Lvov-Warsaw school*. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lvov-warsaw/#SignLvovWarsSchol>
- Wulff, D. (2001). *Psychology of religion. Classic and contemporary*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Yin, Y., & Smith, P. K. (2020). Power and cognitive functioning. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 33, 95–99. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2019.07.020>

Appendix

The basic list of cratic words

Position
wysoko, wysoki, nisko, niski, góra, na- w górze, górny, górować, dół, na- w dole, dolny, nad, ponad, nadrzędny, pod, podrzędny, poniżej, przód, przed, z przodu, tył, z tyłu, za, pierwszy, ostatni, początek, początkowy, koniec, końcowy
Power (attributes)
mocny, mocno, silny, silnie, słaby, słabo, mały, mało, duży, dużo, wielki, wielkie, potężny, potężnie, ogromny, ogromnie, władczy, władczo, uległy, uległe, wolny, zniewolony, nieudolny, zdolny (zdolny do zrobienia czegoś), potrafić, móc, wolno, być w stanie
Action
czcić, uczcić, wywyższać, podziwiać, chwalić, wzmacniać, umacniać, wspierać, opierać się na, pomagać, wspomagać, być posłusznym, kłaniać się, służyć, ulegać, władać, rządzić, panować, opanować, poddać, poddawać, kazać, nakazać, rozkazać, zmuszać, przymuszać, poniżać, gnębić, tępić, gardzić, wzgardzić, współczuć, lekceważyć, zlekceważyć, zniewalać, buntować się, sprzeciwiać się / czczony, podziwiany, pochwalony, umocniony, wsparty, pomocny, posłuszny, służalczy, władczy, rządzone, zarządzany, opanowany, poddany, nakazany, zmuszony, przymuszony, poniżony, z/po-gnębiony, wzgardzony, zlekceważony, zniewolony, zbuntowany, przeciwny
Categories
cześć, podziw, chwalenie, pochwała, wzmocnienie, umocnienie, wsparcie, oparcie, pomoc, pomaganie, posłuszeństwo, pokłon, ukłon, służba, służenie, uległość, uleganie, władza, rządzenie, panowanie, opanowanie, poddanie (się), nakaz, rozkaz, przymus, poniżenie, gnębienie, potępienie, pogarda, wzgarda, współczucie, lekceważenie, niewola, zniewolenie, bunt, sprzeciw, moc, siła, potęga, wielkość, wolność
Ambitions
ambicja, ambitny, honor, honorowy, wstyd, hańba, z/hańbić, godność, godny, niegodny-nie, aspiracje, duma, dumny, przegrać, wygrać, porażka, sukces, zaszczyt, szacunek,