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STEREOTYPICAL METAPHOR: A MISSING PIECE IN CONCEPTUAL METAPHOR THEORY

Abstract. The paper argues for a new kind of metaphors referred to as *stereotypical metaphors*. They are assumed to be stereotype-based metaphors, in that they arise from stereotypical thoughts speakers within a speech community attach to concepts. They are shown to be instrumental in motivating metaphorical extension of a variety of lexical items. Two case studies are conducted to adduce evidence in support of their descriptive adequacy.

Keywords: motivation, culture-specific stereotype, stereotypical metaphor, metaphorical extension, polysemy.

1. Introduction

The paper seeks to emphasize the key role metaphor plays in motivating semantic extension of words. Cognitive semantics considers motivation a crucial aspect of embodied cognition. It serves the main function of making sense of the semantic extension that involves bodily grounded mechanisms, especially image schemas and metaphors. On the whole, image schemas are motivated in the sense that they arise from our sensorimotor experiences (Brugman and Lakoff, 2006; Dodge and Lakoff, 2005; Gibbs and Colston, 1995; Johnson, 1987, 1991, 2017; Lakoff, 1990, 1993; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; see also Hampe and Grady, 2005 for an overview). Likewise, many metaphors are motivated, being grounded in embodied correlations (Grady, 1997; Lakoff, 1993, 2016; Lakoff and Johnson, 1999).

How image schemas and metaphors motivate semantic extension of lexical items is well documented in cognitive linguistics. A number of scholars (Langacker, 1991, 2008; Sweetser, 1990; Talmy, 2000) showed in this way that the extension of modal verbs in English from the deontic to epistemic sense is motivated by our experiential understanding of FORCE schema.

According to Sweetser (1990: 30), by way of illustration, *must* is used in (1) and (2) in the deontic and epistemic sense, respectively.

(1)   You must be home at ten, or I will tell mother.

(2)   John must be home; I see his coat.

Both senses are grounded in sociophysical force. However, they notably differ as regards their modality: in (1), *must* expresses a social obligation, whereas in (2), a logical probability. These forces are mapped onto each other via a metaphor Sweetser (1990: 30) calls MIND AS BODY METAPHOR. The latter is, all in all, a generic-level metaphor that accounts for correlations between "our external experience and our internal emotional and cognitive states". It provides as such motivation for metaphorical extension of various words, mostly those that denote "bodily sensations, such as sight, touch and taste" (Kövecses, 2010: 256).

Rather than applying Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) to additional data to lend further evidence for its adequacy, the paper aims to draw attention to a particular metaphorical extension, especially concerned with culture-specific stereotypes. To get a better idea of the details, I introduce, and argue for, a special kind of metaphor referred to as *stereotypical metaphor*. This metaphor is claimed to arise from stereotypical thoughts concepts can be attached within a speech community. Two case studies are carried out, with particular stress on the extent to which metaphorical extension of a variety of lexical items is closely dependent on, and motivated by, underlying stereotypes. The first study pertains to animal-related words, and aims, more specifically, to describe the stereotype-based metaphors that motivate their entrenched 'anthropomorphized' senses. The second bears on the proverb *Jelly in a vise* (Lakoff and Turner, 1989), and attempts to account for its multiple context-dependent readings. The main goal is twofold; firstly, to support the assumption that its readings mostly depend on stereotype-based metaphors that induce different extensions of the words *jelly* and *vise*, and secondly, to indicate that each reading is shaped by a blended metaphor (see Lemghari, 2021a), emerging from the conceptual integration of two stereotypical metaphors.

2. Stereotypical metaphor: a broad outline

The notion of stereotypical metaphor helps create some clarity into the way some metaphorical senses arise by extension from the central meanings of their respective categories. It is proposed here as an addition to CMT.

Stereotypical metaphor refers to a kind of metaphor that fundamentally calls upon Stereotype Theory (Anscombre, 2001, 2012, 2016, 2020), the main claim of which is that semantic structures of lexical items are made up of various culture-specific stereotypes, in addition to their lexical meanings. Within this framework, the notion of stereotype, borrowed from Putnam (1975), is used in line with Fradin (1984)'s construct of *stereotypical statement.* Stereotypes are considered open-ended sets of stereotypical statements that are conventionally associated with concepts within a speech community.

According to Anscombre (2020: 20), words are understood on the basis of the stereotypical statements they activate in relevant contexts. The word *monkey*, for example, is conventionally associated with the stereotypical statement *"monkeys like bananas"*. This is indeed the reason why its semantic behaviour proves different with the adjectives *normal* and *curious*, as shown in the following.

(3)   My monkey is normal (*curious): it likes bananas.

(4)   My monkey is curious (*normal): it does not like bananas.

In a word, the use of *normal* and *curious* in (3) and (4) is either well-formed or ill-formed, depending on whether they are consistent or inconsistent with the stereotypical statement *monkey* activates.

There is reason to believe, given the long-held assumption that human conceptual system is fundamentally metaphorical, that many of everyday conceptualizations involve stereotypical metaphors, the prominent feature of which is that they arise from stereotypical thoughts speakers attach to concepts. It must be noted, nevertheless, that metaphoricity characterizes the stereotype as a whole, not necessarily each of its individual stereotypical thoughts. The main claim, in this sense, is that a stereotype is metaphorical when the body of its constituent stereotypical thoughts evoke a cognitive domain, far different from that activated by the source concept. Under this view, stereotypical metaphors turn out to play, in the same fashion as standard conceptual metaphors, a key role in semantic extension of words. To better understand such a role, I will consider the semantic structure of the word *butcher*, which has been extensively discussed in the recent cognitive literature.

According to Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, *butcher* denotes a literal sense in (5) and two distinct metaphorical senses in (6) and (7).

(5)   A person who slaughters animals or dresses their flesh.

(6)   One that kills ruthlessly or brutally.

(7)   One that bungles or botches.

For the purpose of simplicity, I propose to condense the senses (6) and (7), respectively, into *pitiless killer* and *task bungler*. There is then a need to understand, first, why they are considered metaphorical and, second, what prompts their emergence and motivates their semantic relationship with the central/literal meaning (5). In a word, their metaphoricity shows up in the difference between their respective domains of pitilessness and sloppiness and the domain of butchery, evoked by the central meaning (5). Indicating, in addition, that they are related to one another amounts indeed to accounting, on the one hand, for the metaphors that motivate their derivation from the central meaning of their common category and, on the other hand, for their minimal variation links (see for the notion of minimal variation Norvig and Lakoff, 1987). The question that arises then is whether it is standard conceptual metaphors or stereotypical metaphors that provide motivation for them.

My suggestion would be that standard conceptual metaphor, because of its high level of generality, has little chance to explain the semantic difference between the senses (6) and (7). Actually, each sense arises from a distinct metaphor that follows from a particular set of stereotypical thoughts, revolving around a particular frame in the domain of butchery.

The sense (6) refers to the act of killing animals for food. In and of itself, this act is awful, and thus gives rise to a number of recurrent stereotypical thoughts such as the following:

(8)   Butchers kill/slaughter animals.

(9)   Butchers have no mercy/no compassion for animals.

(10) Butchers are not repulsed or disgusted by blood being shed.

These thoughts foreground the social stereotype of pitilessness, which originates in butchers' job of killing and slaughtering animals. Of note, *pitilessness* is not an intrinsic property of the central meaning of *butcher*, otherwise butchery as a profession would be viewed in tones of negativity. It makes sense, on this view, to claim that the stereotype of pitilessness lies behind the extension of the literal sense of *butcher* to the metaphorical sense *pitiless killer*. Such an extension hinges thus on the stereotype-based metaphor PITILESS KILLERS ARE BUTCHERS.

The sense (7) exploits a metaphor that stems from a different stereotype, equally tied to *butcher*. This stereotype is based on a background scene in which butchers cut carcasses and prepare meat for sale. Such a scene is not horrible in itself, given our knowledge that butchers in this situation work on dead rather than live animals. Our attention is drawn especially to the way butchers dismember carcasses with butchery-specific tools. This ac-

tivity produces in the long run a pattern of stereotypical thoughts by means of which we reason about butchers. Among these are:

(11) Butchers rip carcasses to bits.

(12) Butchers tear carcasses limb to limb.

(13) Butchers cleave carcasses into pieces.

That these statements are not mere verbal descriptions of observed actions finds evidence in the expressions *"rip to bits"*, *"tear limb to limb"* and *"cleave into pieces"*, whose individual meanings suggest some carelessness in the way butchers work. Their common characteristic, therefore, is that they conjure up the domain of sloppiness, and hence the reason that *butcher* extends to the metaphorical sense *task bungler*. In other words, they provide the basis for thinking metaphorically of people achieving tasks in a sloppy fashion as butchers. On this premise, the metaphor that captures their commonality can be put in the following form: TASK BUNGLERS ARE BUTCHERS.

Lakoff (1993) argues that source domains are identified by means of two processes, namely "polysemy generalization" and "generalizations about lexical items". The first process is concerned with cross-category pairings, in that it abstracts central meanings of source domains from a variety of related lexical items. For instance, the domain *journey* that serves as a source domain for a number of targets (life, love, career, etc.) is singled out on the basis of the commonality of a family of related expressions, such as *"dead-end street"*, *"crossroads"*, *"spinning one's wheels"*, and the like. The second focuses on individual lexical items, and establishes their central meanings by generalizing over their respective related senses. Lakoff (1993: 225) considered, by way of illustration, the word *crossroads* and concluded that its "central meaning is in the domain of space, but it can be used in a metaphorical sense to speak of any extended activity, of one's life, of a love relationship, or of a career". In sum, both processes focus, in identifying source domains, on the central meanings either of related lexical categories or of related senses of polysemes.

These processes, and in particular "generalizations about lexical items", seem to disregard the crucial part extended senses play in the process of interpreting expressions. For instance, in metaphorical expressions where the word *butcher* serves to evoke the source domain, it can be hard to determine which one of its senses provides conceptual material for the target. Such expressions are most likely to prove ambiguous. A case in point is the well-studied expression *"That surgeon is a butcher"* (see Coulson, 2001; Glucksberg and Keysar, 1990; Grady, Oakley and Coulson, 1999;

Kövecses, 2011; Lakoff, 2008; Lemghari, 2021a). Kövecses (2011: 19) underscored its ambiguity, pointing out that speakers may interpret it in two ways, depending on whether they make use of the sense (6) or (7). In the first case, the expression would mean that a surgeon has "killed one or several patients as a result of an unsuccessful operation", and in the second, that a surgeon is sloppy, carless, and thus incompetent. Kövecses considered the latter interpretation as "the one that most scholars assume", thereby taking the sense (7) to be the salient meaning of *butcher* (see for the notion of salient meaning Giora, 1997, 2002; Giora and Fein, 1999).

Ambiguity of metaphorical expressions is a logic consequence of the basic assumption that "[M]appings are at the superordinate level" (Lakoff, 1993: 212). This assumption may be challenged by source words whose semantic structures are characterized by the co-occurrence of more than one metaphorical sense. In particular, speakers using such words in the free flow of discourse in rather specific senses would probably activate no general metaphors that have reference to the central meanings of the corresponding categories, which raises doubts about whether meanings of the metaphorical expressions at hand are shaped via general or less general metaphors. In all likelihood, since in contexts of communication speakers have to be relevant to optimize mutual understanding, one expects them, in order to prevent confusion and subsequent ambiguities, to use words in the senses intended. Therefore, the most immediate expected metaphors would be those that structure the senses involved. To take up the word *surgeon* again as an example, speakers, employing it either in the sense *pitiless killer* or *task bungler* would not be assumed to activate arbitrarily any metaphors at the base of the cognitive domain of butchery, but rather the specific metaphors that shape those senses. That is to say, the stereotypical metaphors PITILESS KILLERS ARE BUTCHERS and TASK BUNGLERS ARE BUTCHERS would not be assumed to instantiate the domain of butchery as a whole, and hence the reason that they are considered less general in nature, being related to particular aspects or substructures of that domain. On this view, there is every likelihood that sentences (14–16) below are better accounted for in terms of the stereotypical metaphor PITILESS KILLERS ARE BUTCHERS than the standard conceptual metaphor A PERSON WHO PERFORMS ACTIONS WITH CERTAIN CHARACTERISTICS IS A MEMBER OF A PROFESSION KNOWN FOR THOSE CHARACTERISTICS (Lakoff, 2008).

(14) Their people will have an opportunity for democracy and freedom instead of being under the regime of this murderous butcher and his family.

(15) No one can deny that Macbeth is a ruthless butcher and bloody fiend.

(16) He is the godfather of the settlement movement, a butcher and the master of a brutal and relentless occupation.

Actually, this metaphor turns out on closer analysis to be so general that it comes to fit any category that is characterized by a bundle of characteristics. As such, it does not directly motivate the more specific senses *pitiless killer* and *task bungler*. Conversely, stereotypical metaphor not only helps account for incontestable metaphorical expressions like *"That surgeon is a butcher"*, but also for such problematic sentences as the following.

(17) My surgeon is a Russian.

(18) My butcher is a Russian.

(19) My lawyer is a Russian.

Lakoff (2008: 33) considers these sentences nonmetaphorical in nature. He recognizes the word *Russian* is associated with a stereotype, made up of such statements as *"Russians are sentimental/emotional/almost uncontrollable"*. Nevertheless, he maintains they are rather literal, and thus far different from the metaphorical sentence *"That butcher is a surgeon"*. In view of the model of metaphoric stereotypicality, there seems to be no plausible reason why these sentences could not be accounted metaphorical, provided that the stereotype involved has attained a high degree of psychological entrenchment, which is not seemingly the case of that evoked by Lakoff. Let us now highlight another stereotype that is highly characteristic of Russians at large, that is, *"Russians are barbarous/brutal/uncivilized"*, etc. This stereotype is well entrenched, in such a way that it is encoded by a well-known proverb, attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte (following Manser, 2002), namely *"Scratch a Russian and you find a Tartar"* (see Lemghari, 2021b for a metaphor-based analysis of this proverb). With this stereotype in mind, I believe, all sentences (17–19) may prove metaphoric.

3. Evidence for stereotypical metaphor

At this stage some evidence should be provided in support of the claim of stereotypical metaphor. Of note, within CMT evidence for claims has preferably to meet the standards of psychological plausibility. I can however offer no form of verification here, for this study is more of a theoretical than an empirical contribution. I shall thus limit myself to emphasizing two

facts that nevertheless enhance the adequacy of stereotypical metaphor. The first one pertains to the main thesis of metaphor unidirectionnality, and the second, to the phenomenon of what I would call *intrinsic contradiction of concepts*, that is, the likelihood of some concepts to be intrinsically contradictory, in particular along the positive/negative dimension.

3.1. Metaphor reversibility

One basic claim of CMT is that in most cases source and target domains are not reversible. For instance, if we have the LOVE IS A JOURNEY metaphor, in which the target *love* is comprehended in terms of the source *journey*, we do not have the reverse, that is, the JOURNEY IS LOVE metaphor. Of course, the former is corroborated at least linguistically by a number of metaphorical expressions such as *"We cannot turn back now"*; *"We have hit a dead-end street"*; *"Love is a two-way street"*. In contrast, there are no such linguistic realizations for the latter.

The main stance of scholars on metaphor unidirectionality is highly sensible to metaphor meaningfulness. It can thus be reducible to this credo: a metaphor is not reversible when its reversibility does not make sense. Such a stance is indeed a corollary of the standard definition of metaphor. In theory at least, if metaphor is understanding a concept in terms of another, the source concept is assumed to be rather concrete. This definition faces a serious difficulty: only concrete concepts would function as source domains were concreteness a definitional characteristic of metaphor. But there seems to be no good reason why abstract concepts would not fulfill this function. A close look at the literature reveals that various abstract concepts are structured via rather abstract source concepts. A case in point is the metaphor LOVE IS INSANITY. We may contest the abstractedness of the concept *insanity*, arguing that insanity as a mental illness is recognized by several tangible signs or behaviours, which stresses its concreteness. I find this objection plausible, but I should consider the target *love* not less concrete than the source *insanity* for the same reason, that is, with respect to stereotypical behaviour of lovers. For this reason, I would take *familiarity* rather than *concreteness* to be the most definitional characteristic of source domains. Any familiar concept, be it concrete or abstract, can then serve as a source domain. The notion of familiarity entails indeed that our encyclopedic knowledge of concepts comprises various social stereotypes. On this view, a metaphor of the form A is B can meaningfully be reversible if its source and target concepts are associated each with well entrenched stereotypes. For the sake of illustration, I will expand on the expression *"That surgeon is a butcher"*, for it has been shown to

be quite reversible (Glucksberg and Keysar, 1993; Kövecses, 2010). I aim more particularly to account for the stereotype that makes the concept *surgeon* behave as a source domain in the reversed metaphor *"That surgeon is a butcher"*.

To begin with, Glucksberg and Keysar (1993) put it clear that source and target domains of metaphors are not reversible. The reason is that metaphors serve, within their model of class-inclusion statement, to create new categories that include both prototypical instances and targets as members. Their reasoning rests on the idea that an inclusive category, logically, stands no chance to function as the target of an included source domain. Therefore, the expression *"My job is a jail"* is meaningful, but not the expression *"My jail is a job"*, where the source and target are reversed. In the former expression, the source *jail* behaves as a prototypical instance of, and a name for, the inclusive category created. In the latter, however, the source *job* fails to evoke a superordinate category with the superordinate *jail* as a member of the category designated by *job*.

Notwithstanding, Glucksberg and Keysar pointed out that some metaphors can be reversed. This is the case of *"That butcher is a surgeon"*, as shows the expression *"That butcher is a surgeon"*. Nevertheless, they argued that "the only reason that such metaphors can be reversed is that the new vehicle happens to exemplify a category to which it can lend its name and in which the topic can be a member" (p. 415).

Of special interest here is the use of the verb *happen*. It implies that Glucksberg and Keysar consider metaphor reversibility a mere exception to the rule. Even so, such an exception needs further investigation to create some clarity about the mechanisms that allow it, which will offer some interesting insights into the functioning of metaphor at large. I would claim in this connection that stereotypical metaphor is a key construct in tackling the issue of metaphor reversibility.

We must ask at the outset: what does make a concept behave as a prototypical instance of the new superordinate category it creates and names? The bundle of features it is associated with does. This claim is evidenced, according to Glucksberg and his associates (1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2006), by the fact that the new superordinate category can include its prototypical instance as a member, as in this statement *"My jail is a (real) jail"*. To account for the meaningfulness of this expression Glucksberg (2008) appeals to the construct of "dual reference", which entails that a term, say *jail*, is employed to refer literally to a particular instance of a category, and metaphorically to the new superordinate category that takes the name of the particular instance. For Glucksberg (2008: 72), this notion helps better

comprehend why tautological statements like *"Boys will be boys"*; *"Cambodia has become Vietnam's Vietnam"* are interpreted the way they do, that is, as informative statements. We are led to conclude that in a class-inclusion statement the use of a word at both the basic and superordinate levels results in a difference not only in meaning but also in nature. My suggestion is that its basic-level meaning is descriptive and literal in nature, whereas its superordinate-level meaning is rather stereotypical and metaphorical. I take furthermore its metaphoricity to arise from its underlying stereotype.

In the cognitive literature, comments on the expression *"That surgeon is a butcher"* and its reversed version *"That butcher is a surgeon"* assume that their meanings are different along the negative/positive dimension. The meaning of the former is negative because of the property *incompetence*, linked to the source *butcher*, whereas that of the latter is positive as a result of the property *skillfulness*, attributed to the source *surgeon*. *Skillfulness* is indeed a stereotypical rather than a descriptive feature of *surgeon*. It emerges from the way we conceive of the profession of surgery, not necessarily from individual surgeons. We view it as one of the noblest professions, say vocations, since it is concerned with the business of contributing to the betterment of humankind. As it stands, we think it requires crucially dexterity and skillfulness. But in practice, surgery does not often live up to our expectations. Therefore, that surgeons can be metaphorically conceptualized as butchers is the proof that many of them are not as skillful as we wish they were.

Similarly, insofar as skillfulness is a stereotypical property, one expects that different metaphorical stereotypes may be associated with surgeons, especially in a cross-linguistic perspective. In Moroccan culture, for instance, the Arabic equivalent expression for *"That butcher is a surgeon"* is *"Had tabib jazar"* (lit. *That doctor is a butcher*), which is a rather negative expression, and is mostly used in business deals to describe any target as being rapacious. It must be noted, incidentally, that Moroccans use the more general term *doctor* to refer to any medical specialist. Thus, central to the negative meaning of the Arabic expression is an underlying stereotype that epitomizes the way Moroccans conceive of particular attitudes of doctors towards patients. Moroccans judge these attitudes as rather apathetic. The reason for that is not difficult to fathom; we just need to understand how Moroccan patients experience illness. Because of their aches and pains, patients expect compassion and sympathy even from doctors. Curiously, they hope doctors charge them very low fees. But since fees for medical services are somehow unnegotiable, patients come to conceptualize doctors as rather

insensible to their sufferings. They come thus to think of them as rather rapacious, based on a set of stereotypical thoughts, arising from what they experience as a lack of compassion, such as the following:

(20) Doctors are indifferent to patients' sufferings.

(21) Doctors are compassionless/affectless

(22) Doctors are hard-hearted/hard-boiled

These related thoughts are individual statements of a pattern of thinking which is both stereotypical and metaphorical in character. Stereotypical, because it is a culture-specific conceptualization, not an intrinsic property of the meaning of *doctor*, and hence the notable difference between the Moroccan and English expressions along the negative/positive assessment. Metaphorical, because the property it adds to the semantic structure of *doctor* activates another domain, clearly different from that evoked by its central meaning: *rapacity* is not conventionally asserted about doctors, but rather about greedy people. On this assumption, it stands to assume that the conceptual material carried over to the target in the Arabic expression is motivated via the stereotypical metaphor RAPACIOUS PEOPLE ARE DOCTORS.

3.2. Opposing views for the same concept

I aim to report here, briefly, some results of previous studies to adduce further evidence for stereotypical metaphor (see Lemghari and Lemghari, 2024; Lemghari, 2024). The main focus in these studies has been on the phenomenon of proverbial contradiction, which has long been discussed in the paremiological literature (Furnham 1987; Honeck, 1997; Teigen; 1986; Yankah; 1984[1994]). The following proverbs give an idea, however limited, of the phenomenon.

(23) a. Too many cooks spoil the broth.
b. Many hands make light work.

(24) a. Absence makes the heart grow fonder.
b. Out of sight, out of mind.

(25) a. Admiration is the daughter of ignorance.
b. Prejudice is the daughter of ignorance.

Proverbial contradiction is such a serious issue that it is closely related to two main characteristics of the semiotic status of proverb, that is, *wisdom* and *truthfulness*. Given that proverbs are repositories of condensed folk-wisdom (Mieder, 2004) and that wisdom "should at least contain a kernel of truth" (Teigen, 1986: 4), a question arises: how can it be the case that

some proverbs contradict? I believe it is important to raise this issue within the framework of CMT, for the bearing metaphors are thought to have on our thinking and behaving (Lakoff, 1993), and on the way people interpret proverbs (Gibbs and Beitel, 1995).

Scholars within the broad paradigm of psychological research are divided on the relevance of proverb's study (see Furnham, 1987). Those who emphasized its significance, however, sought to conciliate its paradox of being both true and contradictory. Based on the results of experimental work, Teigen (1986: 47) showed that participants accepted pairs of contradictory proverbs as generally true, because "most statements can be interpreted in more than one way".

I am especially interested in what motivates contradiction in proverbs. From the standpoint of CMT, it is no surprise that the same domain can be contradictorily assessed, being structured via opposite conceptual metaphors (see Lemghari, 2019). As Gibbs (2018: 355) puts it: "Our complex understanding of many abstract domains, such as money, often demands that we create different, sometimes contradictory, metaphors in order to capture some of the rich, complex knowledge of these domains".

Many recent studies have shown that money is conceptualized in terms of various metaphors (Gibbs, 2018; Kövecses, 2018; O'Connor, 2009; Oleneva, 2023, among others). A special emphasis has been put on the MONEY IS A FORCE metaphor. Not surprisingly, money is conceived as "a cause that can bring about all kinds of events, actions, states, and so on" (Gibbs, 2018: 368). However, none of them has indicated the way conceptual metaphor explains contradiction in money proverbs like the following.

(26) A heavy purse makes a light heart.

(27) Much coin, much care.

I would suggest that contradiction in pairs of proverbs, evoking the same domains, is a matter of the paradoxical views people hold on them. Therefore, proverbs (26) and (27) can be said to conjure up the same abstract domain of money, but they essentially differ as regards the opposing views they provide about it. One way to argue for this claim is to look at their respective illocutionary forces or exhortations (Lakoff and Turner, 1989): proverb (26) serves to exhort us to be eager for money, whereas proverb (27) reminds us of the anxiety plenty of money brings about. In a word, both views emerge from paradoxical conceptualizations of money, which I take to be motivated via two contradictory metaphors, namely MONEY IS HAPPINESS and MONEY IS TROUBLE, respectively. I believe

furthermore that these metaphors are stereotypical in character, and assume that they originate in two stereotypes commonly attached to money; each grows out of a set of stereotypical thoughts, grounded in our everyday experience of it.

The assumption that stereotypical metaphor best accounts for proverbial contradiction can furthermore be evidenced by the semiotic status of proverbs itself. Proverbs could contradict without losing their semiotic status as true statements only because of the stereotypicality of their truthfulness. When they come to contradict, it is in no way their truths that are intrinsically contradictory, but instead the stereotypes underlying the domains evoked. Stereotypical metaphors have thus to be distinguished from standard conceptual metaphors; even though both kinds can often be at work in the same proverbs, they neither fulfill the same function nor operate at the same level of meaning interpretation.

4. Two case studies

The raison d'être of the following case studies is to indicate how stereotypical metaphors motivate semantic extension of words at large. The first study deals with metaphorical extension of animal-related words, and seeks more particularly to shed light on various culture-specific stereotypes at the base of their context-independent senses. The second, in contrast, aims to raise the issue of whether stereotypical metaphors are likely to provide grounding for metaphorical context-based senses. The proverb *"Jelly in a vise"*, thanks to its contextual polysemy (Lakoff and Turner, 1989), affords a fascinating case for getting this issue sorted out. There seems to be a good reason that its multiple readings involve an intricate interplay between a set of underlying stereotype-based metaphors; each motivates a context-dependent extension of either *jelly* or *vise*.

4.1. Metaphorically-motivated extension of animal-related words

Most animal-related words denote by extension various metaphorical senses, especially with reference to human beings. An important issue arises as to whether their motivation is provided by standard conceptual metaphors or stereotypical metaphors.

To begin with, Lakoff and Turner (1989) proposed GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, especially to indicate how different forms of being are mapped onto one another on the Great Chain of Being. However, being a general metaphor, it does not show how animal-related words are attributed hu-

man properties, nor does it explain how metaphorical senses encoding such properties arise from their central meanings.

In the same vein, Kövecses (2010) suggested the HUMAN IS ANIMAL metaphor to account for mappings of lower forms of animals onto higher forms of humans. But the fact that this metaphor is general in character led Kövecses to posit the less general metaphor HUMAN BEHAVIOR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOR to explain how animal-related properties are carried over to humans. Still, given that human behaviour is prone to negative and positive assessment, he came to put forward a more specific metaphor, namely OBJECTIONABLE (PLEASANT) HUMAN BEHAVIOR IS ANIMAL BEHAVIOR. Again, this metaphor can be elaborated by more specific metaphors, such as DIFFICULT-TO-HANDLE THINGS ARE DOGS and SEXUALLY ATTRACTIVE WOMEN ARE KITTENS. Such low-level metaphors (see Lemghari, 2022) structure metaphorical expressions that highlight specific aspects of source concepts. Overall, these metaphors appear to be arranged in an elaborative hierarchy where they rank from the more generic to the more specific (see Kövecses, 2017, 2020 for the multi-level view of conceptual metaphor).

I would hypothesize that metaphorically-motivated extensions of animal-related words are constrained to a large extent by social stereotypes animals are attached within given speech communities. Consider for the sake of illustration the following:

(28) He is an animal when he is drunk.

(29) He was a beast to her throughout their life.

(30) He was an absolute pig to his family.

(31) He was a lion in the war field.

The point emphasized here is that we metaphorically understand the words *animal*, *beast*, *pig*, and *lion* in terms of underlying stereotypical metaphors, grounded in our experiential thinking about the animals involved rather than in terms of the generic-level metaphor HUMAN IS ANIMAL.

The source word *animal*, as well as *beast* in (29) is a superordinate-level word. One expects it to immediately evoke the HUMAN IS ANIMAL metaphor. However, a close look reveals that *animal* denotes in particular the metaphorical sense *unpleasant person*. Of note, this sense represents the commonality inherent in the metaphorical senses of various animal-related words, indeed all those that connote the same negative sense. It makes some sense, on this premise, to contend that the extended sense *animal* hinges on a rather lower-level metaphor, namely UNPLEASANT PERSONS ARE ANIMALS. This metaphor is stereotypical in character, if only because it follows

from a social stereotype that portrays most of animals as violent, wild and frightening.

Unlike *animal*, the words *pig* and *lion* in (30) and (31) are basic-level words. In view of their specific metaphorical senses, there is little chance that the general metaphor HUMAN IS ANIMAL is at work here, at least in a straight way. The domain of pig is complex, being made up of a number of frames. The latter provide, indeed, the basis for extending the word *pig* to several metaphorical senses, each arising from a stereotypical conceptualization about natural habits and behaviour of the animal. It is no surprise thus that *pig* is commonly used to talk about someone being dirty, gluttonous, or repulsive. In (30), *pig* acquires, more specifically, the sense *unpleasant*. It stands to reason that this sense is shaped by a stereotype, originating in our folk knowledge about the temperament of pigs. Some of its individual statements are:

(32) Pigs are aggressive.

(33) Pigs are stubborn.

(34) Pigs (especially boars) have an irascible temper.

These thoughts form a coherent stereotype, in that they activate together the domain of unpleasantness. On this view, there is every likelihood that the metaphorical meaning *unpleasant person* arises by extension from the central meaning of the word *pig* via the stereotypical metaphor UNPLEASANT PERSONS ARE PIGS.

Although stereotypes are culture-specific, some of them may display cross-linguistic similarities. As an illustration, the stereotype in (32–34) shows up in different languages; for example, in the English expression *"Pig-headed"*, the French idioms *"Tête de cochon"* (lit. *Head of pig*); *"Caractère de cochon"* (lit. *Character of pig*); *"Écumer comme un verrat"* (lit. *To foam with anger like a boar*), and the Chinese expression *"Zhū tóu"* (lit. *Head of pig*; see Chen, 2020: 8).

The word *lion* in (31) is used in the metaphorical sense *brave*. But since *bravery* is not an objective property of lions but rather a conceptualized attribute, there is every reason that it stems from a social stereotype in terms of which we conceive of them as courageous. Some of its recurrent thoughts are:

(35) The lion is the king of the jungle/of beasts.

(36) Lions never back down from fights.

(37) Lions have no natural predators.

When mapped onto humans, the word *lion* extends to the metaphorical sense *brave person.* Such an extension is taken to be motivated via the metaphor BRAVE PERSONS ARE LIONS. Evidence for its stereotypicality can be sought by looking at other languages. Not surprisingly, being culture-specific, stereotypes are likely to vary cross-linguistically. In Chinese culture, for instance, the stereotype of bravery is not attached to lions but rather to the bear and leopard (see Chen, 2020: 10).

Another source of evidence for stereotypical metaphors comes from various allegorical narratives, most specifically, fables. From the earliest known collection of fables linked to Aesop in the 14th century BCE to the medieval collection *Roman de Renart* to the famous work of Jean de La Fontaine in the 17th century, the fable has crucially contributed to increasing polysemy of animal-related words. Fables anthropomorphize animals, making them speak, feel and act like human beings. But given that fables are fictitious stories, the characteristics animals are attributed are most likely to be, so to speak, narrative-specific properties. In general, to the extent that fables portray many lower forms of being (*animals*, *insects*, *plants*, etc.) in such a way as to meet the allegories intended, they come to construct many stereotypes that induce the semantic extension of various lexical items.

Polysemy of a number of animal-related words lends support to this claim. For instance, in French many metaphorical senses grew out of the stereotypes La Fontaine's fables elaborate on various forms of being. As an illustration, the fable *La cigale et la fourmi* (lit. *The cicada and the ant*) constructs and/or reinforces – in case the fable can be traced back to Aesop – two contrasting stereotypes relative to these forms. The stereotype at the base of the semantic characterization of the cicada includes such stereotypical thoughts as the following:

(38) The cicada is bone idle/not willing to work.

(39) The cicada lives hand to mouth.

(40) The cicada is incautious and shortsighted.

The reason for grouping these thoughts together lies in the common domain they activate, namely the domain of improvidence. The latter provides thus evidence for the semantic extension of *cicada* to the metaphorical sense *improvident person.* This sense is assumed to be motivated via the stereotypical metaphor IMPROVIDENT PERSONS ARE CICADAE.

The second stereotype revolves around the ant. It stands indeed in marked contrast to that associated with the cicada. Correspondingly, some of its stereotypical thoughts are the following:

(41) Ants are very active.

(42) Ants are industrious.

(43) Ants are prudent and far-sighted.

These thoughts give rise to the metaphorical sense *hardworking person*. The stereotypical metaphor that embodies their commonality and motivates furthermore the semantic extension of *ant* is HARDWORKING PERSONS ARE ANTS.

In sum, if we take metaphorical senses of animal-related words to be basically motivated by the standard conceptual metaphors HUMAN IS ANIMAL, we would have some difficulty understanding why some of their metaphorical senses sound negative, whereas others positive. I would suggest therefore that this metaphor proves rather neutral in regard to the negative/positive assessment for one main reason. The source domain of animal is so general in meaning that it turns out to be harder to determine whether it refers to the central meaning of the category denoted by the word *animal* – in which case the metaphor would be no different from GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR – or to the negative stereotype that portrays all animals as brutal, violent, etc. One important reason why standard conceptual metaphor and stereotypical should be separated is that they differ, in many cases as those discussed here, with respect to their function and the level of their meaning specification. Thus, in metaphorical sentences like those given above, it makes sense to claim that both kinds of metaphors are involved. But while the HUMAN IS ANIMAL metaphor, in projecting lower forms onto higher forms operates, and shapes meaning, at a high level of conceptual organization, stereotypical metaphors such as UNPLEASANT PERSONS ARE PIGS; BRAVE PERSONS ARE LIONS, etc., occur, and pin down meaning, at a rather less general level, being indeed constrained by the specific senses that really provide conceptual materials for targets. There is then a sense in which stereotypical metaphor could be said to imply standard metaphor, but it is not necessarily reducible to it.

Rather surprising is the fact that the semantic structure of some animal-related words can be characterized by both a positive and negative metaphorical meaning. This is the case of the word *dog*, as illustrated by the following examples.

(44) a. Dogs are loyal animals.
    b. Dog is man's best friend.

(45) a. He is a dirty dog.
    b. Son of a bitch!

As we can see, the word *dog* connotes a positive sense of loyalty in (44a-b) and a negative sense of vileness in (45a-b), as well as in many other derogatory expressions, commonly used as insults. On this assumption, the positive sense is assumed to be motivated by the LOYAL PEOPLE ARE DOGS metaphor, whereas the negative sense by the VILE PEOPLE ARE DOGS metaphor.

Of note, in stating that these metaphors are stereotypical in character I do not claim that the expressions at hand do not evoke the standard conceptual HUMAN IS ANIMAL. The latter is indeed what allows us to understand the concept associated with *dog* as designating a different domain, that of human. However, I still believe that what makes us grasp the word *dog* in the sense of both human loyalty and vileness is not the general metaphor HUMAN IS ANIMAL, but rather the stereotype-based metaphors LOYAL PEOPLE ARE DOGS and VILE PEOPLE ARE DOGS. Actually, the general metaphor HUMAN IS ANIMAL turns out on closer analysis to be identified on the basis of various linguistic data, in which humans are referred to in terms of allegory as animals. At this high level of conceptual organization, there is no doubt that such mappings are at the superordinate level. But once we seek, given an appropriate discourse context, to profile specific senses rather than the general sense *animal*, we no longer need to activate that superordinate-level metaphor, but instead the stereotypical metaphors that are directly activated in the free flow of discourse.

In conclusion, activation of stereotypical metaphors instead of such a general metaphor as HUMAN IS ANIMAL is due to the fact that the senses highlighted in the right contexts of communication do not directly relate to animals themselves, but more particularly to their behaviours. The latter might exist outside of us in some objective forms. But we have no way to make sense of them but through our experiential conceptualizations. To be meaningful, any animal behaviour should be categorized as a semantic structure, which we instantiate whenever we come to use the expression(s) that encode(s) it. Such a structure is indeed what is called here *stereotype*. A stereotype is metaphoric in character, if only because the sense it adds to a word is instantiated in a domain, different from that designated by its central meaning. Furthermore, a stereotype that is well established in being recognized and attached as such to a word is assumed to arise from a pattern of stereotypical thinking rather than from a temporary intellectual experience, say, a short-lived thought. This pattern is referred to as stereotypical statements. The latter can be construed either by conventional or nonconventional expressions.

4.2. Words with multiple metaphorical senses. The case of *Jelly in a vise*

Lakoff and Turner (1989) hold that *"Jelly in a vise"* is associated with four readings, each being a matter of how *jelly* and *vise* are conceived both in isolation and in causal combination with respect to "a background of assumptions and values" (p. 187).

The first and second readings are based on a background schema in which the persons referred to as jelly and vise are viewed as being confronted in competitive and/or antagonistic situations. The first reading emphasizes the need to avoid confrontation; therefore, the person-as-jelly wins as a result of her wiliness. In contrast, the second suggests confrontation as a virtue; hence, the person-as-vise is assessed as positive, if only because of the efficiency she shows in the confrontational situation.

The third and fourth readings are based on a background schema in which the person-as-jelly and the person-as-vise are engaged in social interaction. The third reading refers to a particular social context, especially characterized by the need to preserve social stability. Therefore, the person-as-jelly is cast in tones of negativity because of her lack of determination. Rather efficient in such critical social circumstances is the person-as-vise. The fourth reading pertains to a social situation in which the person-as-jelly needs to be treated with much care. Here the person-as-vise is described as a flat-footed person who ends making mess of the social problem encountered.

Lakoff and Turner's main goal is to demonstrate that GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, in mapping the lower forms *jelly* and *vise* onto the higher level of humans, allows us to make various interpretations of the proverb. They take for granted, therefore, that the source words *jelly* and *vise* are contextually polysemous, in that they exhibit in each situation of communication specific metaphorical senses, the causal combination of which generates a distinct reading.

Still a problem arises: how can a single metaphor motivate, and thus give rise to, four different readings? This problem – one of the thorniest challenges faced by the model of Great Chain Metaphor – can best be sorted out in terms of the notion of stereotypical metaphor.

4.2.1. Identifying the underlying stereotypical metaphors of the proverb

To account for the multiple readings of *"Jelly in a vise"*, we need first to identify the stereotypical conceptualizations at the root of the various metaphorical mappings of *jelly* and *vise*. Indeed, GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR

maps *jelly* and *vise* not only onto *persons*, but especially onto behavioural patterns of persons. Given our experiential knowledge of the physical characteristics of these forms, there is every reason that GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR maps them onto the higher forms of *flexible person* and *rigid person*, respectively. In view of the four readings, I would suggest that both *flexible person* and *rigid person* give rise by extension to four metaphorical senses. In light of the different situations depicted in Lakoff and Turner (1989), *flexible person* extends to the senses *astute person*, *slippery person*, *spineless person* and *delicate person*, whereas *rigid person*, to the senses *unbending person*, *rigorous person*, *upright person* and *rough person*. Furthermore, each sense is assumed to be motivated by a stereotypical metaphor, which captures the commonality inherent in a set of stereotypical thoughts, originating in recurrent patterns of behaviour characteristic of flexible and rigid persons.

It is noteworthy that the metaphorical senses the forms *jelly* and *vise* exhibit in the four readings are not well entrenched, and therefore well established in the mental lexicon, but rather context-dependent in character. That is to say, they do not emerge by extension from the source words *jelly* and *vise*, but instead from the targets onto which they map in terms of GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, that is, *flexible person* and *rigid person.* As a corollary, the underlying stereotypical metaphors and the instantiating thoughts at their base are not attached to the lower forms *jelly* and *vise* themselves, but to the higher forms *flexible person* and *rigid person.* As such, they serve to categorize, and thus to make sense of, a group of individuals on the basis of recurrent patterns of behaviour.

On the whole, each of the four readings is framed by two stereotypical metaphors. The first one involves the mapping of *flexible person* and *rigid person* onto *astute person* and *unbending person*, respectively. Granted our social knowledge of people, it stands to reason that the stereotypical statements in (46) and (47) are some of the thought patterns we hold about flexible and rigid persons.

(46) a. Flexible persons do not stick doggedly to their positions.
  b. Flexible persons adapt themselves to constraining circumstances.
  c. Flexible persons are skilled at gaining advantages in constraining situations.

(47) a. Rigid persons show dogged determination in imposing their views/ positions.
  b. Rigid persons are stubborn about their goals.
  c. Rigid persons are not open to opposite opinions.

These statements form two distinct stereotypes, each being underpinned via a stereotypical metaphor. The stereotype in (46) gives rise to the AS- TUTE PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS metaphor and that in (47), to the UN- BENDING PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS metaphor. Two reasons support their metaphoricity and stereotypicality. First, the mappings of *flexible person* onto *astute person* and *rigid person* onto *unbending person* bring into play distinct domains. Second, they are neither arbitrary nor a matter of whim, for they are grounded in a set of stereotypical beliefs people attach to flexible and rigid persons.

In the second reading, *flexible person* and *rigid person* are negatively and positively evaluated, respectively. As a consequence, they serve as source domains for rather contrasting targets: *flexible person* maps onto *slippery person*, whereas *rigid person* onto *rigorous person*. Again these projections are prompted by the stereotypes that shape our thinking about flexible and rigid persons. Each stereotype is structured by a metaphor, arising from a set of recurrent thoughts. The stereotype in (48) is structured via the metaphor SLIPPERY PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS, while the stereotype in (49), via the metaphor RIGOROUS PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS.

(48) a. Flexible persons are not firmly convinced about their beliefs.
   b. Flexible persons are not prompt to react to opposite decisions.
   c. Flexible person acts at variance with principles and positions.

(49) a. Rigid persons are stubborn about methodical approaches.
   b. Rigid persons pay scrupulous attention to details.
   c. Rigid persons are punctilious about rules.

The two last readings, according to Lakoff and Turner (1989), arise against a background of social interaction. The latter is crucial to distin- guishing them from the previous ones. Indeed, they would be redundant were they to be grounded in the same background schema.

In the third reading, *flexible person* and *rigid person* map onto *spine- less person* and *upright person*, respectively. The sense *spineless person* has a negative connotation as a result of the underlying stereotype in (50), which serves to typify malleability of flexible persons. This sense is thus assumed to be structured by the stereotypical metaphor SPINELESS PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS.

(50) a. Flexible persons take no clear positions on serious issues.
   b. Flexible persons avoid taking action or opposing people.
   c. Flexible persons are characterless.

In contrast, the sense *upright person* has a positive connotation. This comes as a consequence of the stereotype in (51), which casts rigid persons as acting in the right way. Hence the reason that this sense is motivated by the UPRIGHT PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS metaphor.

(51) a. Rigid persons behave in accordance with reason and logic.
b. Rigid persons' judgments are often impartial.
c. Rigid persons abide by principles.

The fourth reading involves the mappings of *flexible person* and *rigid person* onto *delicate person* and *rough person*; each involves a stereotypical metaphor which arises from a particular stereotype. Therefore, the extension of *flexible person* to *delicate person* is claimed to be motivated by the DELICATE PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS metaphor, deriving from the stereotype in (52), whereas the extension *rigid person* to *rough person*, by the ROUGH PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS metaphor, originating in the stereotype in (53).

(52) a. Flexible persons suffer from clumsy behaviour.
b. Flexible persons feel indignant and resentful at unfair treatments.
c. Flexible persons are susceptible to even less hurting attitudes.

(53) a. Rigid persons use much authority in handling social issues.
b. Rigid persons show no elegance towards delicate persons.
c. Rigid persons are boorish enough to make messy of delicate cases.

In conclusion, the multiple readings of the proverb emanate from various metaphorical extensions of *flexible person* and *rigid person*, the targets onto which the lower forms *jelly* and *vise* map in terms of GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR. The focus has been on their underlying stereotype-based metaphors. The challenge now is to show how these metaphors are integrated to provide the basis for the four different readings.

4.2.2. Blending the underlying stereotypical metaphors of the proverb

Linguistic expressions vary in metaphorical complexity. Two broad classes have been distinguished (see Lemghari, 2021a): (1) expressions with simple metaphorical potential, involving one single metaphor; and (2) expressions with complex metaphorical potential, including more than one metaphor. The latter case is best represented by the proverb *"Jelly in a vise"*.

I would claim that each reading of the proverb makes use of a complex cognitive operation wherein two stereotypical metaphors are blended, in such a way that they result in a new metaphor. The latter is assumed

to shape in a direct manner the reading concerned. On this view, the understanding process of the proverb turns out to utilize another model referred to as *Metaphoric Integration Theory* (see Lemghari, 2021a). Within this model, unlike Blending Theory (Fauconnier and Turner, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003), input spaces are taken to be populated by metaphors, and emergent structures, by blended metaphors. The difference between the four readings, then, hangs on the stereotypical metaphors that are singled out for blending.

As noticed above, the first two readings arise against an antagonistic background. The difference between them is hence a matter of how *flexible person* and *rigid person* are evaluated along the positive/negative dimension. In the first reading, they are, respectively, positively and negatively assessed. As a result, the stereotypical metaphors that are picked out for blending are ASTUTE PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS and UNBENDING PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS. Their conceptual integration, as shown in Figure 1, results in a new metaphor, EFFICIENT PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS, which is different from either metaphors in the inputs. This metaphor highlights flexible persons' efficiency in antagonistic situations. Thanks to such a positive assessment, the proverb can be used as an exhortation to show wiliness in coercive situations.


Figure 1. The EFFICIENT PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS metaphor

The second reading favours rigid persons over flexible persons, thereby depicting the former as positive and the latter as negative. Under this view,

the metaphors involved appear to be the negative metaphor SLIPPERY PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS and the positive metaphor RIGOROUS PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS. They serve thus as input spaces for a new blended metaphor, that is, EFFICIENT PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS, as sketched in Figure 2. In light of the positive view of rigid persons, the proverb suggests that rigorous measures be taken against evasive individuals in difficult social circumstances.


Figure 2. The EFFICIENT PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS metaphor

The last two readings, according to Lakoff and Turner (1989), are based on a background schema of social interaction. The third reading sets up a conceptual integration process that operates on the stereotypical metaphors SPINELESS PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS and UPRIGHT PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS. In particular social circumstances demanding much determination, flexible persons may be seen as weak-willed and rigid persons, as strong-willed. Hence the reason this reading provides a positive view of rigid persons. It must be noted, however, that this view does not result from the UPRIGHT PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS metaphor that obviously advantages rigid persons, but rather from the emergent metaphor PRACTICAL PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS as described in Figure 3. On this reading, the proverb can be used as an exhortation to show much firmness against weak-willed persons.

**Figure 3.** The PRACTICAL PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS metaphor

Figure 4. The TACTLESS PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS metaphor

Finally, the fourth reading makes use of the conceptual integration network, sketched in Figure 4. Here rigid persons are cast in tones of negativity. Blending operates here on the input metaphors DELICATE PERSONS ARE FLEXIBLE PERSONS and ROUGH PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS, and gives rise to a new blended metaphor, namely TACTLESS PERSONS ARE RIGID PERSONS. The target concept *tactless* is different from either of the target concepts in the input spaces. Granted this reading, the proverb serves as an exhortation to avoid awkwardness in dealing with vulnerable persons.

5. Conclusion

The paper outlined the model of stereotypical metaphor, and applied it to a number of lexical items to indicate the way their senses arise by extension from the central meanings of the categories they represent. Two case studies were conducted to provide evidence for the descriptive adequacy of the model.

The first one focused on animal-related words, and sought to figure out whether it is standard conceptual metaphor or stereotypical metaphor that provides motivation for their extended anthropomorphized senses. CMT takes for granted that metaphors like GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, HUMAN IS ANIMAL, PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS, etc. lie at the base of various extended senses of animal-related words. Notwithstanding, being general in character, they were shown to fail to account for their minimal differences, especially along the positive/negative contrast. This evidence suggested that such senses are rather motivated by, and dependent on, social stereotypes we hold about animals.

The metaphorical senses discussed in the first case study are familiar and well established in memory. Their underlying stereotypical metaphors can be viewed as highly conventional, in that they stem from well entrenched stereotypes. The second case study attempted consequently to underline the role of stereotypical metaphors in context-dependent senses. The model was applied in this connection to the proverb *"Jelly in a vise"*, which is described in the cognitive literature as having four context-based readings. Again, the focus was on their motivation. On the assumption that the lower forms *jelly* and *vise* map in terms of GREAT CHAIN METAPHOR, respectively, onto the higher forms *flexible person* and *rigid person*, the four readings were claimed to involve a complex interplay between various stereotype-based metaphors, all of which are grounded in our thought patterns about flexible and rigid persons. Still, the challenge was to work out how such

an interplay generates all these readings. My suggestion was that the latter emerge from different conceptual integrations, operating especially on stereotypical metaphors. Each conceptual integration produces a distinct blended metaphor that yields a context-specific reading, and determines to a large extent the kind of exhortation the proverb conveys on that reading.

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