Agrárne právo EÚ
ročník XIV.
vydanie 2/2025

EU Agrarian Law
volume XIV.
number 2/2025
10.2478/eual-2025-0007

DESIGNING PARTICIPATION: INSTITUTIONAL AND SOCIO-TECHNICAL DETERMINANTS OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN BRNO AND BRATISLAVA

TVORBA PARTICIPIPÁCIE: INŠTITUCIONÁLNE A SOCIÁLNO-TECHNICKÉ DETERMINANTY PARTICIPATÍVNEHO ROZPOČTU V BRNE A BRATISLAVE

Jitka MATĚJKOVÁ*

I Introduction

Participatory budgeting (PB) has diffused across European cities as a governance instrument intended to broaden civic voice, strengthen transparency[1], and improve allocative responsiveness. Yet performance varies markedly even among cities that share

1 Lindstedt, Naurin (2010)

Abstract (EN)

This study explains why Brno's municipal participatory budgeting (PB) has become durably institutionalised and scaled, whereas Bratislava's remains fragmented. National fiscal and programme-budgeting frameworks are treated as moderating conditions that enable or constrain local design choices, not as the primary object of analysis. Using a most-similar systems logic, we conduct a comparative multi-case analysis with embedded units – annual PB cycles, project types, core institutions/platforms, and, for Bratislava, boroughs. Evidence derives from publicly available municipal legal and budgetary documents and formally adopted PB rules and reports. The analysis integrates mechanisms from institutional theory (institutionalisation), actor – network theory (socio-technical robustness of identity, workflow, and data infrastructures), deliberative democracy (input/throughput/output legitimacy), and principal – agent perspectives (transparency and auditability). Findings show that Brno's stable funding envelope, dedicated participation unit, codified cycles, secure digital identity, and auditable end-to-end pipeline underpin predictable delivery despite clustered turnout. Bratislava's borough-led PB enables experimentation but creates coordination frictions, heterogeneous rules, and uneven links to programme budgeting. The study offers a portable, mechanism-based diagnostic for post-socialist municipal contexts.

Abstrakt (SK)

Táto štúdia vysvetľuje, prečo sa brnianske participatívne rozpočtovanie (PR) stalo trvalo inštitucionalizovaným a škálovaným, zatiaľ čo bratislavské zostáva fragmentované. Národné fiškálne a programové rozpočtové rámce sa považujú za moderačné podmienky, ktoré umožňujú alebo obmedzujú lokálne možnosti návrhu, nie za primárny objekt analýzy. Pomocou logiky najpodobnejších systémov sme vykonali porovnávaciu viacprípadovú analýzu s vloženými jednotkami – ročnými cyklami PR, typmi projektov, kľúčovými inštitúciami/platformami a v prípade Bratislavy aj mestskými časťami. Dôkazy pochádzajú z verejne dostupných mestských právnych a rozpočtových dokumentov a formálne prijatých pravidiel a správ o PR. Analýza integruje mechanizmy z inštitucionálnej teórie (inštitucionalizácia), teórie aktér-sieť (sociotechnická robustnosť identity, pracovného postupu a dátových infraštruktúr), deliberatívnej demokracie (legitimita vstupov/priepustnosti/výstupov) a perspektív príkazcu – agenta (transparentnosť a auditovateľnosť). Zistenia ukazujú, že stabilný finančný balík Brna, špecializovaná participátorská jednotka, kodifikované cykly, bezpečná digitálna identita a auditovateľný komplexný proces podporujú predvídateľné výsledky napriek zoskupenej účasti. Bratislavské programové rozpočtovanie vedené mestskými časťami umožňuje experimentovanie, ale vytvára koordinačné trenice, heterogénne pravidlá a nerovnomerné prepojenie s programovým rozpočtovaním. Štúdia ponúka prenosnú, na mechanizmoch založenú diagnostiku pre postsocialistické komunálne kontexty.

Keywords (EN)

participatory budgeting, institutional design, socio-technical infrastructure, municipal governance, post-socialist cities

Kľúčové slová (SK)

participatívne rozpočtovanie, inštitucionálny dizajn, sociotechnická infraštruktúra, mestská správa, postsocialistické mestá

* Mendel University in Brno, Czech Republic

similar macro-legal and economic environments. This article examines two such cases – Brno (Czech Republic) and Bratislava (Slovak Republic) – to explain how institutional and socio-technical design choices condition the effectiveness and legitimacy of municipal PB.

Our comparative strategy follows a most-similar systems design. Brno and Bratislava are large Central European capitals with a shared post-socialist administrative legacy and convergent alignment with EU public-finance norms, yielding a highly comparable macro context. At the same time, their PB architectures diverge in analytically salient ways. Brno operates a centralised, city-wide PB embedded in the municipal budget cycle, supported by a stable annual funding envelope, codified recurring rules, and a dedicated participation unit. Bratislava's PB is polycentric and borough-led, marked by heterogeneous rules, uneven funding, and variable administrative capacity across seventeen self-governing districts. Holding the broader context relatively constant while varying institutional configuration allows us to probe the mechanisms through which design choices translate into participation, delivery, and accountability.

The study is explicitly PB-centric: the unit of analysis is the municipal PB system. National fiscal frameworks – including medium-term budgeting and programme budgeting – are treated as moderating conditions that enable or constrain local design, rather than as the primary explanandum. Evidence consists exclusively of publicly available municipal legal and budgetary documents, formally adopted PB rules, and official implementation reports. This doctrinal and institutional-comparative strategy foregrounds how specific rules, roles, and socio-technical arrangements (identity management, submission and screening workflows, vote-aggregation rules, and data/reporting infrastructures) organise participation, structure project pipelines, and render decisions auditable.

Two research questions guide the analysis: RQ1. How do institutional embedding (rules, roles, organisational anchoring) and socio-technical robustness (identity verification, workflow standardisation, data transparency) shape participation, project delivery, and perceived legitimacy in Brno's and Bratislava's PB systems? RQ2. In what ways do national fiscal frameworks – medium-term and programme budgeting – moderate these relationships, and under what conditions do they strengthen or weaken the integration of PB into municipal budgeting?

The article advances three generalisable lessons for metropolitan PB design. First, in polycentric settings, effectiveness depends on a city-level backbone – shared identity verification, unified proposal and screening workflows, and a common reporting/data standard – that preserves local autonomy while minimising coordination losses. Second, to sustain delivery and evaluability, PB outputs should be mapped onto programme budgets and medium-term frameworks, enabling multi-year financing for complex projects and explicit linkage to strategic objectives and performance indicators. Third, equity safeguards – targeted outreach, transparent rejection rationales, and calibrated coverage rules – are most effective when embedded ex ante within PB rules and cycle management rather than pursued as ex post corrections.

By integrating insights from institutional theory, actor–network approaches, deliberative democracy, and principal-agent perspectives, the study contributes theoretically by specifying mechanisms – institutionalisation, socio-technical assemblages, deliberative quality, and transparency – through which PB design affects outcomes. Empirically, it offers a structured, mechanism-oriented comparison grounded in official municipal sources, clarifying when and how participation can be expected to influence fiscal and implementation performance.

II Literature Review and Theoretical Framework

2.1 Dialogic Accounting and PB as Deliberative Accounting

Participatory budgeting (PB) operates as a dialogic accounting device: it reconfigures how public accounts are produced, justified, and contested[2]. Dialogic practices – reason-giving, explicit trade-off articulation, and public justification – can broaden accountability, yet they may also induce a reflexivity trap, whereby institutional work becomes performative and self-referential rather than transformative. Comparative experiences show both trajectories: PB can enable counter-hegemonic voices while also drifting toward elite capture or procedural routinisation if deliberative safeguards are weak[3]. Illustrative studies include analyses of PB through a dialogic lens in post-Soviet municipal contexts and examinations of PB elitisation under constrained civic fields[4],[5].

2 Alt, Lassen (2006).
3 De Vries, Špaček (2023).
4 Aleksandrov, Bourmistrov, Grossi (2018).
5 Kuruppu, Maksymchuk, Adhikari (2023).

2.2 New Institutionalism and Actor-Centred Approaches in PMM

Actor-centred new institutionalism clarifies how socio-technical "rails" – digital identity modules, submission and screening platforms, vote-aggregation tools – become rules-in-use that structure behaviour, stabilise expectations, and institutionalise PB routines. This perspective complements actor–network theory (ANT): ANT foregrounds heterogeneous assemblages and translations; actor-centred institutionalism specifies how strategic behaviour interacts with evolving templates of public-sector performance measurement and management (PMM). Recent PMM agendas argue for integrating institutional work, technology, and performance logics to explain durability and drift in governance instruments[6].

2.3 New Public (Financial) Management, Performance Budgeting, and Medium-Term Frameworks

The Czech and Slovak budget architectures are best read through the evolution of New Public (Financial) Management, where programme budgeting and medium-term fiscal frameworks (MTBF/MTFS) embed performance logics into routine budgeting. In such settings, PB's durability hinges on the fit between participatory outputs and programme structures, as well as on the availability of multi-year envelopes for complex projects. Syntheses in the public financial management literature highlight that instruments aligned with programme goals and indicators are more likely to be insulated from annual volatility and to yield auditable, outcome-oriented trajectories[7].

2.4 Participation's Effects on Fiscal Outcomes and PB Sustainability

The quality of participation and the design of PB – its institutional anchoring, transparency regime, and equity safeguards – condition both fiscal outcomes (discipline, allocative responsiveness) and the intertemporal sustainability of PB. Large-N and comparative studies link participatory mechanisms to shifts in fiscal performance via information, monitoring, and compliance channels[8]. Country-specific evidence identifies organisational and financial determinants of PB continuity under stress tests such as COVID-19[9],[10],[11]. Research on local institutions and equity[12] further suggests that distributive fairness depends less on ex-post rebalancing than on ex-ante safeguards embedded in rules and outreach.

2.5 Theoretical Framework

This study integrates four strands – (i) institutional theory, (ii) ANT as a socio-technical approach to decision-making, (iii) deliberative democratic theory, and (iv) principal–agent perspectives on transparency – to capture formal rules, networked interactions of human and non-human actants (platforms, voting tools, legal norms), the quality of deliberation, and accountability relations among citizens, elected representatives, and the administration.

2.5.1 Institutional Theory: Formal Rules, Embedding, Isomorphism

Stability and performance depend on institutional embedding within the municipal budget cycle[13] (legislation[14], budgetary rules, procedural standards, organisational anchoring). We trace coercive (legal/binding rules), normative (professional standards), and mimetic (emulation) pressures. Proposition P1: A higher degree of institutional embedding – dedicated participation units, clearly defined phases, repeated cycles, and predictable allocations – correlates with greater stability and a larger volume of implemented projects.

2.5.2 ANT and Socio-Technical Assemblages of Decision-Making

PB processes are networks of heterogeneous actors and actants: political representatives, civil servants, citizens, NGOs, and digital/legal/budgetary artefacts (identity systems, platforms, bylaws, MTBF/MTFS). Attention centres on translations, enrolment, and obligatory passage points (feasibility screens, thresholds, voting rules, implementation protocols). Proposition P2: More robust socio-technical networks – reliable identity verification, a transparent proposal – validation – voting – implementation pipeline, and open data/public APIs – raise participation and strengthen perceived legitimacy.

6 Leca, Laguecir (2023).
7 Grossi, Guthrie, Mattei (2025).
8 Park, Butler, Petrovsky (2023).
9 Kukučková, Bakoš, Samsonová, 2025.
10 Benzoni Baláž et al. (2023).
11 Svidroňová, Klimovský (2021).
12 Wei (2025).
13 Klimovský, Grynchuk (2017).
14 Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic (2017).

2.5.3 Deliberative Democracy: Input, Throughput, and Output Legitimacy

PB quality is not reducible to vote counts; it hinges on inclusiveness, informed participation, reason-giving, fair conflict mediation, and the traceability of argumentation. We distinguish input (openness/equal access), throughput (process fairness, justification), and output legitimacy (utility and impact of projects). Proposition P3: Higher deliberative quality – clear criteria, constructive feedback on rejections, and community facilitation – yields a more equitable spatial and social distribution of benefits.

2.5.4 Principal-Agent and Transparency: Reducing Information Asymmetry

Relations between citizens (principals) and officeholders (agents) are marked by information asymmetry. Active transparency – machine-readable budgets, open project datasets, timelines, costs, and ex-post reporting – reduces monitoring costs and deters opportunism. Proposition P4: Higher transparency and auditability shorten implementation delays and mitigate PB politicisation risks.

2.5.5 Linking PB to Programme-Based and Medium-Term Budgeting

The coupling of PB with programme budgets and MTBF/MTFS is theoretically consequential for allocative coherence and delivery. Proposition P5: Stronger integration of PB into programme budgeting and MTBF/MTFS increases alignment with strategic objectives (e.g., spatial development, climate, mobility) and enhances the sustainability of outputs.

III Methods

This section follows a data – procedures – analyses – quality architecture. The unit of analysis is the municipal participatory budgeting (PB) system in Brno and Bratislava. Embedded sub-units comprise:

a) annual PB cycles,
b) project typologies,
c) core institutions and digital platforms, and – only for Bratislava,
d) borough-level PB arenas.

3.1 Data

The evidentiary base integrates three families of publicly available materials: Legal and methodological texts: national budgetary acts and municipal by-laws; formally adopted methodological guidance and internal rulebooks governing PB cycles. Municipal records: approved budgets and final accounts[15]; medium-term fiscal frameworks (MTBF/MTFS) and programme budgets; officially published PB calendars, proposal/shortlist registers, winning-project lists, and implementation reports, including any official dashboards or statistical summaries released by the cities. Peer-reviewed scholarship and high-quality professional/intergovernmental evaluations are used strictly for contextualisation and construct clarification.

To ensure verifiability and relevance, the following ex ante inclusion criteria were applied:

a) persistence (DOI for scholarly sources; persistent URL or official archival path for public documents);
b) authoritative provenance (municipal/ministerial/IGO origin or peer-reviewed outlet);
c) construct relevance (institutional embedding, socio-technical arrangements, deliberative safeguards, transparency/auditability, integration with MTBF/MTFS, PB performance);
d) temporal fit (2011–2025).

Items without stable access, non-official commentary lacking attributable authorship, duplicates, or sources that could not be independently corroborated were excluded. For all included items, bibliographic metadata, retrieval dates, and document types were logged to support traceability.

3.2 Procedures

3.2.1 Document Collection and Harmonisation

Documents were retrieved from official municipal portals, legislative repositories, and journal platforms. Non-searchable files were converted to text (OCR where necessary). Czech/Slovak materials were checked by a bilingual researcher; key passages were translated into English to maintain terminological consistency across the analysis. Version control was maintained where documents had been amended across PB cycles.

3.2.2 Doctrinal and Institutional-Comparative Approach

Analysis proceeded in two coordinated steps:

1. Doctrinal reading of legal and budgetary instruments to identify the formal locus of PB within the municipal budget cycle (funding envelope, cycle codification, budget inscription, and links to programme structures).
2. Institutional-comparative mapping of Brno and Bratislava against pre-stated analytical categories derived from the theoretical propositions

15 Capital City of Bratislava (n. d.).

P1–P5 (institutional embedding; socio-technical arrangements; deliberative safeguards; transparency/auditability; linkage to MTBF/MTFS). This mapping relies on direct statements in official rules, reports, and budget documents; it does not employ interview evidence or curated coding datasets.

3.3 Analyses

3.3.1 Structured Qualitative Comparison

A structured, mechanism-oriented comparison contrasts Brno and Bratislava (and, where applicable, Bratislava's boroughs) along the P1–P5 categories. Following a socio-technical perspective, process maps are derived from official documents to identify obligatory passage points in the PB pipeline (identity/registration, feasibility screening, vote aggregation, budget inscription, procurement, reporting) and to highlight potential bottlenecks or coordination frictions.

3.3.2 Descriptive Indicators (from Official Publications)

Where municipalities publish aggregate figures, we report descriptive indicators by city-year (and borough-year where available): PB funding envelope; counts of submitted/accepted proposals; number of voters; participation rate as defined by the municipality; median project cost bands; indicative time-to-delivery (budget inscription → completion/closure); and the share of on-time completions. Equity is assessed descriptively via participation coverage (share of districts/boroughs with ≥1 finalist or winner per cycle) and the presence of ex-ante safeguards recorded in official rulebooks and cycle reports (e.g., targeted outreach, district-balancing/minimum-coverage rules, youth or micro-grant tracks). No parametric inference is attempted, given the small-N design and reliance on aggregate, officially reported statistics.

3.3.3 Programme Mapping and Transparency Review

For each city, we assess whether funded PB projects are explicitly mapped to programme budgets and medium-term frameworks (programme codes; multi-year appropriations; performance indicators) and review transparency features evidenced in official sources (machine-readability of data; availability at draft stages; project-level status/cost/timeline reporting; presence of APIs/bulk downloads; update periodicity). Findings are summarised narratively and, where useful, in compact tables compiled directly from official publications.

3.4 Quality Assurance: Validity, Reliability, Coherence, and Transparency

Construct validity is supported by triangulating across legal/by-law texts, budget documents, formally adopted PB rules, official reports, and peer-reviewed scholarship used for conceptual anchoring. Reliability is pursued through consistent application of predefined analytical categories (P1–P5), bilingual verification of source passages, and cross-checking statements across multiple official documents from the same cycle. Internal coherence is maintained by separating descriptive reporting of official provisions and outcomes from mechanism-based interpretation tied explicitly to P1–P5. Transparency is ensured by full citation of sources and logging of retrieval dates and versions; no non-public materials or human-subject data are used.

3.5 Ethics, Data Protection, and Scope Note

The study did not involve human participants and processed only publicly available documents. No personal data was collected or analysed.

All results reflect what is attested in official municipal and legal documents for the period 2011–2025. Any illustrative, time-bound observations are discussed in the Limitations section to delineate scope and avoid causal overreach.

IV Results

This section reports empirically grounded findings organised thematically to align with propositions P1–P5 and the data–procedures–analyses architecture set out in the Methods. We examine:

A/ the institutionalisation of PB and associated organisational capacity;

B/ the socio-technical pipeline and transparency posture;

C/ participation, distribution, and delivery performance.

Throughout, "participatory budgeting" (PB) denotes formally organised municipal cycles in which residents propose and vote on projects financed from a pre-allocated envelope. All descriptors derive from publicly available municipal/legal documents and officially released PB materials.

Table 1 PB Anchoring Index (qualitative ratings)

Indicator	Brno (city)	Bratislava (city)	Notes on Bratislava heterogeneity
A1 Dedicated participation unit	yes	no	present in some boroughs (e.g., Nové Mesto)
A2 Stable annual PB envelope (ex ante)	yes	partial	recurring in some; irregular/low in others
A3 Codified PB cycle/timelines (by-law/rules)	yes	partial	borough rulebooks; no city-wide codex
A4 Binding inscription into the budget	yes	partial	varies by borough; weak city consolidation
A5 Programme mapping to MTBF/MTFS (multi-year)	partial	partial	selective, non-standardised

Source: author's elaboration
Scoring: yes – 1; partial – 0.5; no – 0; index – mean of A1–A5

4.1 Theme A – Institutionalisation of PB and Organisational Capacity (P1, P5)

A.1 Brno: Deep Anchoring and Predictable Administration

Brno operates a centralised, city-wide PB embedded in the municipal budget since 2017, with a stable CZK 35 million envelope announced ex ante and a codified, recurring cycle published on the city's PB portal.[16] Voting is tied to the city's digital identity system (Brno iD) – full-account holders authenticate to cast votes – thereby standardising participation and lowering administrative transaction costs.[17] Winning projects are formally inscribed into the budget by resolution (Zařazení projektů do rozpočtu), and the dedicated Dáme na vás Fund provides an institutional vehicle for regular annual transfers authorised by the City Assembly, reinforcing year-on-year continuity.[18]

A.2 Bratislava: Polycentric Architecture and Heterogeneous Capacity

Bratislava's PB is decentralised across 17 self-governing boroughs with no city-wide PB rulebook or backbone services; the capital operates a multi-year programme budget but does not consolidate PB rules or reporting at city level[19],[20],[21]. Several boroughs maintain codified PB schemes[22]. Nové Mesto publishes formal Rules of Participatory Budgeting and recurrent calls (with per-project caps, e.g., €5,000), while Lamač[23] regulates PB by Directive No. 3/2019 and keeps an online archive of yearly PB rounds. Other boroughs prioritise general grant frameworks (dotácie) rather than dedicated PB by-laws[24], reinforcing rule heterogeneity (e.g., Petržalka VZN on grants).[25]

Funding scales and administrative capacity thus vary widely: borough budgets differ by orders of magnitude (illustratively, Petržalka's approved budget exceeds € 70–86 million in recent years), while PB envelopes at the borough level range from micro-grant tracks (low thousands per project) to six-figure annual allocations in PB-active boroughs (e.g., Nové Mesto's programme line "Participatívny rozpočet")[26]. The absence of shared identity, unified workflow, or consolidated reporting at the city tier produces coordination losses and limits cross-borough learning even where individual boroughs run mature cycles.[27]

A.3 Comparative Synthesis

Table 1 summarises five observable indicators of "anchoring." Brno satisfies four fully and one partially (programme mapping). Bratislava does not meet these consistently at the city level, though selected boroughs approximate Brno's design. The pattern supports P1 (institutionalisation → stability/delivery) and informs P5 (value of programme mapping for multi-year coherence).

4.2 Theme B – Socio-technical Pipeline and Transparency (P2, P4)

B.1 Process "Rails" and Obligatory Passage Points

Brno's pipeline incorporates secure digital identity (Brno iD)[28], standardised submission and feasibility screening, multi-vote aggregation rules, budget inscription, and implementation tracking. These socio-technical rails lower participation and administrative

16 Brno Daily (2024).
17 Statutory City of Brno (n. d.)
18 Ibid.
19 Bardovič, Gašparík (2020).
20 Bardovič, Gašparík (2021).
21 Benzoni Baláž, Gašparík Et Al. (2023).
22 Forkovičová (2013).
23 Bratislava – Lamač Borough (2019).
24 Džinić, Svidroňová (2016).
25 Mestská Časť Bratislava – Petržalka (2023).
26 Bratislava – Dúbravka Borough (2016).
27 Bratislava – Nové Mesto Borough (n. d.).
28 Brno Daily (2024).

Table 2 Transparency & API audit (qualitative posture)

Dimension (public-facing)	Brno (city)	Bratislava (city)	Example borough (Bratislava – Lamač)
T1 Machine-readable budget data (CSV/JSON)	yes	partial	partial
T2 Draft-stage publication (rules, shortlists, costings)	partial	partial/no	partial
T3 Project status time-stamps (end-to-end)	yes/partial	partial	partial
T4 Cost updates & variance reporting	partial	partial	partial
T5 Public API/bulk download (PB projects, votes, milestones)	partial	no/partial	no/partial
T6 Update periodicity (≥monthly during implementation)	partial	partial/no	partial/no
T7 Archival completeness (≥5 historical cycles)	yes	partial	yes

Source: author's elaboration
Scoring: yes – fully met; partial – partially met; no – not met
Note: Archival completeness (T7) is scored Yes when at least five historical PB cycles are publicly accessible through a single, stable interface/repository; it is scored Partial when records are fragmented across sub-city entities (e.g., boroughs) or otherwise incomplete

transaction costs and enable auditability (P2, P4). In Bratislava[29], mixed online/paper modalities and borough-specific rule sets raise integration costs and complicate city-level monitoring and learning.

Proposal → ID/eligibility → Feasibility screening → Public display/Q&A → Voting/aggregation → Budget inscription → Implementation → Ex-post reporting (costs, milestones)

Figure 1 Process schematic (derived from official cycle documents)
Source: derived from official cycle documents; authors compilation

B.2 Transparency Posture and Data Openness

Czech municipalities typically expose disaggregated, machine-readable budget data via public portals; draft-stage artefacts (shortlists, costings) and performance indicators remain uneven. In Slovakia[30], programme budgeting and national consolidation provide strong ex-post visibility, but borough-level PB disclosure is variable and often lacks a unified data schema/API. Table 2 summarises the observed posture.

4.3 Theme C – Participation, Distribution, and Delivery (P3, P4, P5)

C.1 Participation Levels and Composition

Official municipal materials for Brno report high absolute participation (on the order of tens of thousands of voters in recent cycles), typically corresponding to single-digit percentage shares of the eligible population. Participation remains socially and spatially skewed – with clustering by districts. In Bratislava, borough-level participation rates are generally below 5%, with marked variance across boroughs. Both systems thus face an equity challenge: without calibrated outreach, facilitation, and ex-ante safeguards (e.g., district-balancing or minimum-coverage rules), participation asymmetries persist (P3). In line with the Methods, equity is profiled descriptively via participation coverage and the documented presence of safeguards in official rulebooks and reports.

C.2 Delivery Timelines and Throughput

Brno's PB accommodates multi-year delivery for larger projects (often up to ~3 years), while Bratislava's small-scale neighbourhood projects frequently complete within 1–2 years, though timelines are heterogeneous and monitoring is uneven across boroughs. In both cities, publicly auditable pipelines – timestamps, cost updates, and milestone tracking – are central to managing implementation risk and sustaining trust (P4). Table 3 collates indicative descriptors compiled from official sources.

Borough-scale PB in Bratislava often targets small neighbourhood projects with shorter delivery horizons (frequently 1–2 years)[31], but monitoring depth and publication formats vary by borough. Nové Mesto provides PB documentation (calls/results) and integrates PB as a budget programme line, whereas Lamač[32],[33] couples a formal PB directive with

29 Capital City of Bratislava (2023).
30 Capital City of Bratislava (2024).
31 Garaj, Bardovič (2021).
32 Bratislava – Lamač Borough (2019).
33 Bratislava – Lamač Borough (n. d).

Table 3 Delivery and throughput – comparative descriptors

Metric (definition in Methods)	Brno (city)	Bratislava (aggregate)
Envelope & scale	CZK 35m annually; city-wide	€3k–€1m per borough; decentralised
Voters/participation	tens of thousands; single digit %	typically, <5% per borough
Delivery horizon	up to ~3 years for larger projects	often 1–2 years for small projects
Monitoring posture	end-to-end pipeline; partial open data	variable; weak city-level consolidation

Source: author's elaboration

a public archive of annual PB projects; other boroughs disclose spending predominantly through general budget/closing accounts or grant VZN without PB-specific pipelines[34],[35][36]. At the city level, Bratislava's programme budget and regular budget reports provide strong ex-post visibility, but PB-specific city-wide tracking is not unified, reinforcing the study's finding of polycentric robustness with heterogeneous capacity.[37]

4.4 Cross-case Synthesis

The comparative evidence highlights three central dimensions through which design choices shape the performance of participatory budgeting (PB) in Brno and Bratislava.

First, institutionalisation (P1) emerges as a decisive factor. Brno's "anchoring triad" – a predictable funding envelope, a dedicated participation unit, and codified cycle rules – constitutes a credible commitment bundle that is reinforced by the binding inscription of PB results into the municipal budget. This institutional embedding enables stable and predictable delivery even under conditions of modest and spatially clustered turnout. By contrast, Bratislava's polycentric, borough-led model permits a greater degree of local experimentation but lacks a city-level backbone to ensure procedural coherence. The absence of such metropolitan "rails" generates coordination frictions, reproduces uneven administrative capacities across districts, and ultimately fragments accountability.

Second, socio-technical robustness (P2, P4) differentiates the two systems. Brno's deployment of a single sign-on identity, standardised submission and screening workflow, and auditable data infrastructure functions as a set of obligatory passage points. These reduce transaction costs for both participants and administrators and allow the system to scale while retaining accountability. Bratislava, by contrast, relies on mixed modalities – paper-based and digital submissions, borough-specific rules, and disparate vetting practices – that raise integration costs and obstruct city-wide monitoring. The result is higher administrative overhead and weaker capacity to generate consolidated, auditable outcomes at the metropolitan level.

Third, questions of equity and multi-year coherence (P3, P5) remain pressing in both contexts. Participation is socially and spatially skewed in Brno and Bratislava alike, suggesting the need for ex-ante safeguards such as district-balancing rules, targeted outreach, and low-barrier micro-grant tracks. Slovakia's programme-budgeting architecture, in principle, provides an institutional advantage by facilitating programme mapping of PB outputs into medium-term frameworks. Yet Bratislava's decentralised PB has not consistently leveraged this potential. Brno, in turn, binds results annually into the budget with credible force, but it has not yet fully experimented with multi-year PB tracks. Introducing such staged mechanisms for complex investments would strengthen alignment with strategic objectives and enhance the coherence of PB with broader municipal planning.

These findings are restricted to what can be substantiated in official municipal and legal documents covering the period 2011–2025. All time-bound observations and gaps in available evidence are explicitly addressed in the Limitations section, which delineates the scope of causal claims and the generalizability of results.

V Discussion

This section interprets the comparative results through four complementary lenses: institutional theory, actor–network theory (ANT), deliberative democracy, and principal–agent perspectives, to explicate how design choices shape the performance and legitimacy of participatory budgeting (PB) in post-socialist municipal contexts[38]. It concludes with policy implications, scope conditions and alternative explanations, and avenues for further research.

34 Bratislava – Nové Mesto Borough, 2016.
35 Bratislava – Nové Mesto Borough (n. d).
36 Bratislava – Nové Mesto Borough (n. d).
37 Capital City of Bratislava, (n. d).
38 Park, Butler, Petrovsky (2023).

5.1 P1 – Institutionalisation and Stability

The Brno case corroborates the proposition that deeper institutional embedding enhances procedural stability and delivery capacity: the combination of a city-wide envelope fixed ex ante, a dedicated participation unit, codified and recurring cycle rules, and the binding inscription of results into the municipal budget functions as a credible-commitment bundle that lowers political and administrative uncertainty, preserves organisational memory, and reduces learning costs across cycles. By contrast, Bratislava's borough-led architecture produces heterogeneity in rules, funding, and administrative capacity; while this pluralism sustains local experimentation, it fragments accountability and elevates coordination costs at the metropolitan scale. The contrast illustrates the complementarity of coercive, normative, and mimetic pressures in sustaining institutionalised participatory budgeting and resonates with New Public (Financial) Management perspectives, which underscore that budgeting innovations achieve durability only when firmly anchored in stable rules, clearly defined roles, and recurrent resources. From a design perspective, decentralisation is not inherently inferior, yet a federated model of participatory budgeting requires at minimum a common rulebook and shared backbone services in order to mitigate coordination frictions, promote interoperability, and reconcile local autonomy with system-wide accountability.

5.2 P2 – Socio-technical Robustness and Scale (ANT)

Findings and mechanisms highlight how Actor–Network Theory (ANT) draws attention to non-human actants – digital identity systems, submission portals, feasibility screens, vote-aggregation modules, and data schemas – which function as obligatory passage points that stabilise participation and reduce transaction costs. In Brno, the combination of secure online verification, a standardised workflow, and an end-to-end audit trail underpins the city's capacity to process higher volumes of proposals while maintaining predictable timelines. By contrast, Bratislava's reliance on mixed online and paper modalities and borough-specific rule sets increases integration costs, complicates data harmonisation, and impedes the transfer of learning across boroughs. The theoretical contribution of this contrast lies in extending dialogic-accounting insights by demonstrating how technical artefacts and legal norms jointly generate administrative capacity in municipal participatory budgeting, while also clarifying how actor-centred institutionalism links these artefacts to institutional stability. From a design perspective, the evidence suggests the need to establish a city-level PB backbone – including single sign-on or identity verification, a unified workflow with clearly demarcated gates, and a shared reporting and data standard (with APIs) – to support scaling while preserving auditability.

5.3 P3 – Deliberative Quality, Distribution, and Equity

Findings and mechanisms indicate that deliberative democracy distinguishes between input, throughput, and output legitimacy. In Brno, the incorporation of multi-vote design and dedicated tracks such as youth pipelines expands opportunities for expression and fosters civic learning, yet participation overall remains modest and spatially concentrated. In Bratislava[39], decentralised borough-level cycles deliver tangible neighbourhood improvements, but their reliance on uneven administrative capacity and civic organisation risks creating disparities in access. Equity therefore, emerges as a design problem rather than a mere measurement issue: without ex-ante safeguards – such as district-balancing or minimum-coverage rules, targeted incubation for under-represented groups, and transparent rationales for project rejection – participatory budgeting risks reproducing, rather than correcting, participation asymmetries. From a design perspective, equity safeguards should be embedded upstream and accompanied by transparent monitoring through simple, actionable indicators: participation coverage (the proportion of districts or boroughs represented by at least one finalist and one winning project per cycle), safeguard adoption timelines (clarifying the existence, scope, and duration of rules), and targeted-outreach outputs (such as events, facilitation hours, or youth and micro-grant tracks). These coverage-and-safeguard metrics provide a pragmatic means of supporting managerial learning and reinforcing public accountability in the current data environment, thereby reducing over-reliance on ex-post distributional indices.

5.4 P4 – Transparency, Accountability, and Implementation Risk

Findings and mechanisms show that, from a principal–agent perspective, active transparency – manifested in machine-readable budgets, accessible project dashboards, and timely ex-post reporting – serves to reduce monitoring costs and deter strategic behaviour. In the Czech context, the availability of public budget portals strengthens ex-post accountability; however, the uneven disclosure of draft-stage documents and

[39] Balážová, Klimovský, Svidroňová, Nemec (2022).

the limited use of performance indicators constrain citizens' capacity to influence allocations before they become binding. Within participatory budgeting specifically, the presence of publicly auditable pipelines – including time-stamped status updates, cost reporting, and delivery milestones – emerges as crucial for sustaining trust, particularly in contexts of modest participation and heightened reputational risk arising from potential allegations of manipulation. The theoretical contribution of this finding lies in demonstrating that the quality of participation and the strength of fiscal outcomes are linked through transparency mechanisms, which tighten accountability and enhance allocative coherence. In design terms, this suggests the need to mandate end-to-end public ledgers for participatory budgeting projects and to align internal monitoring practices with externally visible indicators such as on-time completion rates and variance from approved budgets, thereby reinforcing both credibility and public trust.

5.5 P5 – Integration with Medium-Term Frameworks

Findings and mechanisms indicate that while Slovakia's programme budgeting framework and rolling medium-term horizon provide an institutional basis for strategic continuity, Bratislava's decentralised participatory budgeting architecture has thus far only unevenly capitalised on this potential. In Brno, PB outcomes are integrated into the annual budget with binding effect, yet the system only partially exploits the advantages of multi-year staging for complex or capital-intensive projects. Evidence from both cities underscores the value of systematically mapping PB projects to medium-term objectives – using explicit programme codes, multi-year funding envelopes, and clearly defined performance targets – to strengthen coherence with strategic priorities, reduce the risk of implementation slippage, and enhance the evaluability of outcomes in ex-post assessment. From a design perspective, the introduction of a dedicated multi-year PB track for large-scale investments, formally linked to programme budgets and embedded within medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBF/MTFS), would represent a significant step toward aligning participatory budgeting with broader strategic and fiscal planning.

5.6 Policy Implications

Three design lessons emerge directly from the comparative analysis. First, participatory budgeting must be institutionally anchored: a predictable funding envelope, dedicated staff capacity, and codified cycles are mutually reinforcing rather than substitutable elements, and their combined effect should culminate in the binding inscription of results into the municipal budget. Second, the socio-technical "rails" should be standardised: shared digital infrastructure – comprising identity verification, unified workflows, and interoperable data standards – enables both centralised and federated models to achieve scale while safeguarding auditability. Third, equity must be embedded ex ante rather than pursued as an exposé correction: targeted outreach, facilitation, minimum geographic coverage rules, and transparent rejection rationales should be formally codified within PB regulations. In practical terms, this implies that Bratislava should establish a city-level backbone for participatory budgeting (including identity management, workflow integration, and a unified reporting dashboard) while allowing boroughs to retain thematic autonomy, whereas Brno should pilot multi-year PB tracks aligned with programme budgeting to accommodate staged, capital-intensive investments.

5.7 Original Contribution

The study advances a portable, mechanism-based diagnostic that moves beyond descriptive inventories. By specifying how institutionalisation, socio-technical robustness, deliberative safeguards, and transparency jointly condition outcomes, it clarifies where bottlenecks arise and how reforms can be sequenced (anchor rules and roles → standardise rails → broaden voice → bind to strategy).

5.8 Alternative Explanations and Scope Conditions

Leadership effects, fiscal space, and exogenous shocks (e.g., pandemic-related strain) may also influence PB performance. Generalisability is strongest for medium-to-large Central European cities operating under EU-aligned budgetary rules. Extension to small municipalities or to administrative traditions with different intergovernmental fiscal arrangements warrants caution.

5.9 Limitations and Future Research

Evidence relies solely on official documentary sources, constraining causal claims about trust, learning, and distributional effects. Future work should combine mixed-method field designs, quasi-experimental probes around rule changes (e.g., threshold alterations), and distributional diagnostics (geospatial equity metrics; beneficiary profiling). A standardised impact framework linking PB projects to programme indicators across multiple cycles would enable cumulative learning within and across jurisdictions.

VI Conclusion

This comparative analysis demonstrates that the effectiveness and legitimacy of participatory budgeting (PB) in post-socialist cities depend less on the mere existence of legal mandates than on the depth of institutional embedding and the robustness of socio-technical infrastructures that carry proposals through the stages of screening, voting, budget inscription, and implementation. The juxtaposition of Brno's centralised, city-wide model with Bratislava's decentralised, borough-led architecture illustrates how design choices directly shape participation, implementation reliability, and accountability, even under broadly similar macro-legal conditions.

6.1 Design Takeaways for European Metropolitan Governments

1/ Institutionalisation triad (envelope–unit–codification). Participatory budgeting proves to be a durable governance instrument when three elements operate in tandem: a predictable annual funding envelope, a dedicated participation unit with clearly defined responsibilities, and codified, recurring cycle rules that culminate in the binding inscription of results into the municipal budget. These elements are complements rather than substitutes, and their partial adoption significantly weakens institutional resilience.

2/ City-level PB backbone for polycentric settings. In multi-borough or district-based cities, a shared backbone – encompassing single sign-on identity verification, a unified submission-to-screening workflow with clearly delineated gates, and a common reporting and data standard (including APIs) – is essential to transform local experimentation into metropolitan-scale auditability and coordination, while preserving thematic autonomy at the sub-city level.

3/ Equity by design, not ex post correction. Equity must be embedded upstream in the rules of the process. This requires codified safeguards such as district-balancing or minimum-coverage provisions, dedicated resources for targeted outreach, and the maintenance of low-barrier participation tracks (for example, youth pipelines or micro-grants). Monitoring equity should rely on transparent, actionable indicators – participation coverage in each cycle and the public reporting of safeguard adoption timelines – to ensure visible accountability over time.

4/ Programme mapping and multi-year financing. PB's strategic contribution is maximised when funded projects are systematically mapped onto programme budgets and medium-term frameworks, complete with explicit programme codes, multi-year envelopes for staged investments, and measurable performance targets. Such alignment reduces the risk of implementation slippage and enhances the evaluability of PB outcomes in ex-post assessment.

6.2 Transferability and Scope Conditions

These design lessons are transferable beyond Czechia and Slovakia to medium- and large-sized European metropolitan areas operating under EU-consistent public finance norms. Their effective adoption presupposes three enabling conditions:

a) legal authority to bind PB outcomes into budget appropriations;
b) digital identity and data infrastructures sufficient to support auditable pipelines;
c) fiscal capacity to sustain multi-year commitments. By contrast, generalisation to small municipalities, jurisdictions lacking medium-term fiscal frameworks, or contexts without interoperable digital infrastructures requires caution. In such cases, simplified variants – such as low-technology backbone solutions or micro-grant tracks – may offer a more feasible pathway.

6.3 Contribution

Conceptually, this study integrates insights from institutional theory, actor–network theory, deliberative democracy, and principal–agent perspectives into a mechanism-based diagnostic of PB design. Empirically, it demonstrates how organisational anchoring, technical interoperability, deliberative safeguards, and programme integration interact to shape participation, delivery, and accountability. In doing so, it advances the debate beyond descriptive accounts, offering instead an explanation of techno-institutional complementarities that condition the durability and effectiveness of participatory budgeting in post-socialist municipal contexts.

References

1. ALEKSANDROV, E. – BOURMISTROV, A. – GROSSI, G. 2018. Participatory budgeting as a form of dialogic accounting in Russia: actors' institutional work and reflexivity trap [online]. In Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, vol. 31, 2018, no. 4, pp. 1098–1123. https://doi.org/10.1108/AAAJ-02-2016-2435
2. ALEKSANDROV, E. – MAURO, S. G. 2023. Searching for dialogue in public sector budgeting research: the case study of the JPBAFM [online]. In Journal of Public

Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, vol. 35, 2023, no. 2, pp. 141–171. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-12-2021-0175

3. ALT, J. E. – LASSEN, D. D. 2006. Transparency, political polarization, and political budget cycles [online]. In American Journal of Political Science, vol. 50, 2006, no. 3, pp. 530–550. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x
4. BALÁŽOVÁ, M. – KLIMOVSKÝ, D. – SVIDROŇOVÁ, M. M. – NEMEC, J. 2022. Determinants of combining budgetary innovations at the local level: Experience from Slovakia [online]. In Public Sector Economics, vol. 46, 2022, no. 3, pp. 355–383. https://doi.org/10.3326/pse.46.3.2
5. BARDOVIČ, J. – GAŠPARÍK, J. 2020. Participatory budgeting – The case of the Slovak Republic [online]. In Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Sectio K – Politologia, vol. 27, 2020, no. 2, pp. 59–73. https://doi.org/10.17951/k.2020.27.2.59-73
6. BARDOVIČ, J. – GAŠPARÍK, J. 2021. Enablers of participatory budgeting in Slovakia during the COVID-19 pandemic [online]. In Scientific Papers of the University of Pardubice. Available from: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/351101966
7. BENZONI BALÁŽ, M. – GAŠPARÍK, J. et al. 2023. Who participates in participatory budgeting? [online]. NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, vol. 16, 2023, no. 2, pp. 30–54. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0012
8. BRATISLAVA – DÚBRAVKA BOROUGH. 2016. Dúbravka News 01/2016 [online]. Bratislava: Bratislava – Dúbravka Borough. Available from: https://www.dubravka.sk/files/documents/organizacie/dubravske_noviny/2016/01-2016.pdf
9. BRATISLAVA – DÚBRAVKA BOROUGH. 2021. Mayor's programme – March 2021 (work diary) [online]. Bratislava: Bratislava – Dúbravka Borough. Available from: https://www.dubravka.sk/files/documents/samosprava/starosta/starosta_program_2021.pdf
10. BRATISLAVA – LAMAČ BOROUGH. (2019). Directive No. 3/2019 on the rules of the participatory budget of the Borough Bratislava – Lamač [online]. Bratislava: Bratislava – Lamač Borough, 15 July 2019. Available from: https://www.lamac.sk/files/documents/zverejnovanie/3_2019_pravidla_participativneho_rozpoctu%20(2).pdf
11. BRATISLAVA – LAMAČ BOROUGH (n. d.). Directives – borough legislation [online]. Bratislava: Bratislava–Lamač Borough. Available from: https://www.lamac.sk/samosprava/zverejnovanie/legislativa/smernice
12. BRATISLAVA – NOVÉ MESTO BOROUGH. 2016. Participatory Budget Bratislava – Nové Mesto [online]. Bratislava: Bratislava – Nové Mesto Borough, 17 May 2016. Available from: https://banm.zastupitelstvo.eu/data/att/12453.pdf
13. BRATISLAVA – NOVÉ MESTO BOROUGH (n. d.). Basic information on the participatory budget [online]. Bratislava: Bratislava – Nové Mesto Borough. Available from: https://pr.banm.sk/liferay/web/participativny-strom/new-page/-/asset_publisher/U1fl/content/zakladne-informacie-o-participativnom-rozpocte/282511
14. BRATISLAVA – NOVÉ MESTO BOROUGH (n. d.). Documents – Participatory budget (archive and forms) [online]. Bratislava: Bratislava – Nové Mesto Borough. Available from: https://pr.banm.sk/liferay/dokumenty
15. BRATISLAVA – NOVÉ MESTO BOROUGH (n. d.). Draft budget for 2022, 2023, 2024 – expenditures [online]. Bratislava: Bratislava – Nové Mesto Borough. Available from: https://banm.zastupitelstvo.eu/data/att/42355.pdf
16. BRNO DAILY. 2024. Dame Na Vas: Seven Projects Selected in City of Brno's Participatory Budgeting Scheme for 2024 [online]. Brno: Brno Daily, 4 December 2024. Available from: https://brnodaily.cz/2024/12/04/brno/dame-na-vas-seven-projects-selected-in-city-of-brnos-participatory-budgeting-scheme-for-2024/
17. BRNO DAILY. 2024. Final Round of City of Brno's Participatory Budgeting Scheme for 2024 Will Include 74 Projects [online]. Brno: Brno Daily, 10 October 2024. Available from: https://www.brnodaily.com/2024/10/10/brno/final-round-of-city-of-brnos-participatory-budgeting-scheme-for-2024-will-include-74-projects/
18. CAPITAL CITY OF BRATISLAVA. 2023. Draft budget of the Capital City of Bratislava for 2024–2026 [online]. Bratislava: Capital City of Bratislava, December 2023. Available from: https://cdn-api.bratislava.sk/strapi-homepage/upload/Navrh_rozpoctu_HM_SR_Bratislavy_na_roky_2024_2026_1d6cf71642.pdf
19. CAPITAL CITY OF BRATISLAVA. 2024. Budget amendment of the Capital City of Bratislava 01/2024 [online]. Bratislava: Capital City of Bratislava, 29 February 2024. Available from: https://cdn-api.bratislava.sk/strapi-homepage/upload/Zmena_rozpoctu_hlavneho_mesta_SR_Bratislavy_01_2024_c3c4ad61d7.pdf
20. CAPITAL CITY OF BRATISLAVA (n. d.). Budget and financial management [online]. Bratislava: Capital City of Bratislava. Available from: https://bratislava.sk/mesto-bratislava/transparentne-mesto/rozpocet-a-hospodarenie
21. CAPITAL CITY OF BRATISLAVA (n. d.). Final account [online]. Bratislava: Capital City of Bratislava. Available from: https://bratislava.sk/mesto-bratislava/transparentne-mesto/rozpocet-a-hospodarenie/zaverecny-ucet
22. CITY OF BRNO. 2025. City Assembly, 2025. Engagement of the "Dáme na vás" Fund in participatory budgeting projects, voting results – proposal for budgetary adjustment. Material 18/18 [online]. Brno: City of Brno,

28 January 2025. Available from: https://www.brno.cz/documents/20121/11581614/Materi%C3%A1l_18-18.pdf/89218baa-b7e3-e5f5-12ce-f7202e26789d
23. DE VRIES, M. S. – ŠPAČEK, D. 2023. Municipal participatory budgeting designs in the V4 countries [online]. In NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, vol. 16, 2023, no. 1. https://doi.org/10.2478/nispa-2023-0009
24. DŽINIĆ, J. – SVIDROŇOVÁ, M. M. 2016. Participatory budgeting: A comparative study of Croatia, Poland and Slovakia [online]. In NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy, vol. 9, 2016, no. 1, pp. 5–26. https://doi.org/10.1515/nispa-2016-0002
25. FORKOVIČOVÁ, A. 2013. Understanding participatory budgeting: Lessons learned from Bratislava [online]. Master's thesis. Budapest : Central European University, 2013. Available from: https://www.etd.ceu.edu/2013/forkovicova_anna.pdf
26. GARAJ, M. – BARDOVIČ, J. 2021. Participatory budgeting – The case of the Slovak Republic [online]. In Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, Sectio K: Politologia, vol. 28, 2021, no. 2, pp. 89–101. https://doi.org/10.17951/k.2021.28.2.89-101
27. KLIMOVSKÝ, D. – GRYNCHUK, N. 2017. Participatory budgeting. NISPAcee – Capacity Building Publication [online]. Bratislava : NISPAcee, 2017. Available from: https://www.nispa.org/files/publications/training/Participatory_budgetingENG.pdf
28. KUKUČKOVÁ, S. – BAKOŠ, E. – SAMSONOVÁ, G. 2025. Intensity and fragility of Czech participatory budgeting during the Covid-19 crisis [online]. In Public Money & Management, vol. 45, 2025, no. 4, pp. 360–368. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2024.2361357
29. KURUPPU, Ch. – MAKSYMCHUK, O. ADHIKARI, P. 2023. Exploring elitisation of participatory budgeting in a post-Soviet democracy: evidence from a Ukrainian municipality [online]. In Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, vol. 13, 2023, no. 3, pp. 648–665. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAEE-10-2018-0118
30. LECA, B. – LAGUECIR, A. 2023. Expanding public sector performance measurement and management research with actor-centred approaches in new institutionalism [online]. In Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, vol. 35, 2023, no. 5, pp. 608–620. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-12-2022-0180
31. LINDSTEDT, C. – NAURIN, D. 2010. Transparency is good for you: A game-theoretic analysis of transparency [online]. In International Political Science Review, vol. 31, 2010, no. 3, pp. 301–322. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110377602
32. MINISTRY OF FINANCE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC. 2017. Full text of Act No. 250/2000 Coll., on budgetary rules of territorial budgets (consolidated as of 21 February 2017) [online]. Prague : Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic, 2017. Available from: https://www.mfcr.cz/assets/attachments/Zak_2000-250_uplne-zneni-k-21-2-2017.pdf
33. PARK, J. – BUTLER, J. S. – PETROVSKY, N. 2023. Understanding public participation as a mechanism affecting government fiscal outcomes: Theory and evidence from participatory budgeting [online]. In Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, vol. 33, 2023, no. 2, pp. 375–389. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muac025
34. ROBERTO, F. – GROSSI, G. – GUTHRIE, J. – MATTEI, G. 2025. The development of New Public Financial Management scholarship: From global warning to emerging warnings [online]. In Journal of Public Budgeting, Accounting & Financial Management, vol. 37, 2025, no. 6, pp. 49–76. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPBAFM-01-2025-0021
35. STATUTORY CITY OF BRNO. 2024. Press Office, 2024. Give your votes to the best projects in the participatory budget "Dáme na vás": voting starts on Friday, 1 November [online]. Brno : Statutory City of Brno, 2024. Available from: https://cosedeje.brno.cz/w/dejte-sve-hlasy-nejlepsim-projektum-v-participativnim-rozpoctu-dame-na-vas-hlasovani-zacina-v-patek-1-listopadu
36. STATUTORY CITY OF BRNO (n. d.). Brno iD [online]. Brno : Statutory City of Brno. Available from: https://in.brno.cz/en/brno-id
37. STATUTORY CITY OF BRNO (n.d.). Department of Participation, n. d. Call for proposals [online]. Brno: Statutory City of Brno. Available from: https://paro.damenavas.cz/vyzva/
38. STATUTORY CITY OF BRNO (n.d.). Department of Participation, n. d. Dáme na vás – Participatory Budget [online]. Brno: Statutory City of Brno. Available from: https://paro.damenavas.cz/
39. STATUTORY CITY OF BRNO (n.d.). Department of Participation, Rules of the Participatory Budget of the Statutory City of Brno [online]. Brno: Statutory City of Brno.
40. WEI, W. 2025. Political accountability and social equity in public budgeting: Examining the role of local institutions [online]. Public Administration Review (advance online publication), 2025. https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.13905

Contact address/Kontaktná adresa

JUDr. Ing. Jitka Matějková
Mendel University in Brno
Faculty of Business and Economics
Department of Law and Social Sciences
jitka.matejkova@mendelu.cz