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            <title><![CDATA[Norwegian party leaders’ communication on social media platforms during Covid-19 lockdowns: A longitudinal comparison of Facebook and Instagram content]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0018</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 10 Oct 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Social media platforms became key channels for political leaders’ crisis communication during the Covid-19 pandemic. In this article, I examine how Norwegian party leaders used Facebook and Instagram across three national lockdowns in Norway. A dataset of 2,397 posts from national party leaders was coded using a four-part framework for analysing government communication on social media platforms, capturing information provision, input-seeking, politics, and symbolic presentation. Post-level linear probability models estimate how the probability of each communication type varied by platform and lockdown period, controlling for government or opposition status and Covid-19 relatedness. Facebook accounts for a larger share of posts and carries a broader crisis-communication repertoire, particularly for political and input-seeking communication. The use of Instagram for crisis communication became more selective over time, with several communication types declining during the third lockdown. Contrary to participatory expectations, input-seeking decreased as the crisis persisted. Opposition leaders relied more on information provision across platforms, consistent with visibility and accountability work during prolonged crisis governance.]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Feelings among friends and foes in populist communication: The Finns Party leadership’s emotional appeals on social media during the 2023 Finnish parliamentary election]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0017</link>
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            <pubDate>Sun, 27 Sep 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This study examines the use of emotional appeals in the social media communication by members of the populist radical right Finns Party leadership during the 2023 Finnish parliamentary election campaign. While previous research has highlighted the importance of emotions in populist communication, less empirical attention has been devoted to how populist radical right actors employ both negative and positive emotional appeals, how these appeals are directed toward different targets, and how their use varies across social media platforms. To address these gaps, we conducted a quantitative content analysis of 524 social media posts published on X (Twitter), TikTok, Facebook, and Instagram by six members of the Finns Party leadership. The findings show that negative emotional appeals are more prevalent and are primarily directed toward “elites” and “dangerous outgroups”, reinforcing a negative collective identity construction of antagonistic “others”. In contrast, positive emotional appeals are also used extensively and are primarily directed toward “the people” and populist actors as their representatives, reinforcing a positive collective identity construction of “us”. Finally, the analysis reveals variation across platforms, highlighting the need for further research on the relationship between social media platforms and emotional appeals.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Book review: Well-Being and Creative Careers: What Makes You Happy Can Also Make You Sick]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0016</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 30 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Book review: Narrative Theory in Journalistic Practice: Understanding Emerging Digital Genres]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0015</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Transparency of datafied journalism: Finnish news users’ response profiles to an interventionist audience study]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0014</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 22 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The rise of opaque algorithmic systems presents new challenges for journalism, particularly regarding transparency. This includes not only openness about journalistic processes but also about how technologies, like front-page personalisation and audience metrics, shape news production and consumption. Yet, news users’ views on these systems remain underexplored. In this study, I investigate how active Finnish news users respond to features of datafied journalism, especially the use of user data. Using a qualitative longitudinal interventionist approach, I engaged 21 participants in quizzes, group interviews, and chat discussions. After 1.5 years, 18 were re-interviewed to reflect on their earlier participation. Inductive analysis revealed varied reactions to the initial information, differing transparency assessments, and changes in engagement with datafied journalism. Three user response profiles emerged: opt-outs, compliants, and vigilants. These profiles offer insight into how understanding datafied journalism influences users’ perceptions and news consumption.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[The spread of manosphere ideology to a Norwegian audience through ironic spectatorship: A qualitative analysis of influencer engagement with Andrew Tate]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0010</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In this article, I analyse the processes through which extremist discourses are mainstreamed via social media influencers, with a particular focus on the Norwegian context. Drawing on insights from feminist scholarship, extremism research, and media and communications theory, I investigate how young male influencers reproduce, adapt, and negotiate ideas and symbols associated with Andrew Tate and the manosphere. The study concentrates on–2023, when Tate’s visibility surged internationally and became a prominent topic in Norwegian mainstream media. Through qualitative analysis of ten YouTube and Instagram posts produced by Oscar Westerlin, Norway’s most prominent male influencer, both explicit references and more subtle incorporations of manosphere-related ideas are identified. A key argument in the article is that Westerlin acts as an “ironic spectator”, a figure who strategically brings extremist content into the mainstream to attract attention in today’s digital media landscape. Situated within the Norwegian society where gender equality is highly valued, the article contributes to an understanding of how influencer culture can facilitate the normalisation of extremist ideologies in a specific context.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[Populist communication and extremist narratives as strategic messaging: A comparative analysis of Nordic political parties on Facebook]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0013</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This study extends the communicative approach to populism – widely used in research on populist communication – to the analysis of extremist narratives, enabling a differentiated examination of populism and extremism as two related but distinct phenomena that are often conflated in academic and public discourse. We distinguish analytically between populist communication (people-centrism, anti-elitism, out-group exclusion) and right-wing extremist narratives that reject liberal-democratic EU values, and we investigate how the use of populist communication and extremist narratives varied across countries and parties and to what extent their prevalence overlapped. Our manual coding comprises 2,700 Facebook posts by political parties and politicians in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden during the 2024 European Parliament election campaign. Findings show that populist communication was present across the political spectrum, with notably higher levels in Sweden, while extremist narratives were rare and largely confined to right-wing fringe actors. These results challenge the notion of a uniform “Nordic pattern” and suggest a contagion effect in Sweden, where radical-right rhetoric appears to influence mainstream discourse. By operationalising both strategies within a shared analytical framework, this study provides a promising way of measuring and comparing populist and extremist messaging in digital campaign environments in a nuanced way.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Telegram as a multifaceted platform for antagonistic political passion: The Finnish alternative groups under the scope]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0012</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In this article, we examine Finnish alternative actors using Telegram within the right-wing and anti-systemic frameworks. We draw on Chantal Mouffe’s concept of political passion to argue that it offers a useful lens for explaining the underlying dynamics among these actors. Using Finnish Telegram groups as an approximated example, we conducted a network analysis to map the landscape, identifying four distinct clusters of actors. We also qualitatively analysed how different modes of political engagement manifest among these antagonistic groups through their selection of topics and rhetoric. Our results reveal how alternative voices can rapidly shift from general critique to extreme viewpoints, driven by far-right ideology and amplified through anti-democratic Russian propaganda.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The alternative influence network (AIN) of far-right YouTubers in Sweden: Connectivity and hybridisation of online extremism during the Covid-19 pandemic]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0008</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This study maps the composition and tactics of the alternative influence network (AIN) of far-right actors in Sweden on YouTube in a two-year period of the Covid-19 pandemic (2020–2022). To understand how YouTube enables a cohesive network of far-right ideas and actors, we ask: How does the extra-parliamentarian far-right in Sweden connect across influencers, groups and organisations, and alternative news media on the platform? Second, how do far-right actors in this network combine activist tactics and influencer techniques, and how does this fusion drive the hybridisation of online extremism in social media? We draw on a mixed-methods approach combining social network analysis and a qualitative case study of the media practices of key actors, focusing on how they merge activism with engagement-driven influencer tactics and profit-oriented content production. The study shows that far-right actors strategically engage hyperlinking, guest appearances, and personal endorsements to establish a network of mutual support and collaboration. Through these connective practices, they fuse commercial (self-)branding strategies, marketing, and monetisation schemes with political propaganda techniques. In contextualising our findings, we focus on how these developments reflect new forms of professionalisation and hybridisation of contemporary forms of online extremism at this critical juncture of political instability and democratic backsliding across the world.]]></description>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Antisemitism on mainstream social media after Hamas terror attack: A case study of online discourse and its impact on Jewish youth in Sweden]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0009</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Social media have created new opportunities for Jewish community-building and education but are also used to disseminate antisemitic content. Individuals and political actors from various ideological backgrounds exploit these platforms, while algorithms amplify such hate speech. The Hamas terrorist attack in Israel on 7 October 2023 intensified this issue, leading to a surge in Israel-related antisemitism online. With this case study, we examine antisemitic discourse on the social media accounts of a Swedish Jewish youth organisation and its impact on the youths’ engagement with these platforms following the attack and ensuing conflict. We draw on data from interviews, a focus group, and posts (n = 115) and comments (n = 2,964) from X and Instagram. The findings reveal how rising antisemitism, particularly the “Israelisation of antisemitism”, affected young Jews, prompting self-censorship and withdrawal from unsafe online spaces. This study provides insights into the evolving nature of antisemitism in the digital age. It highlights the need for societal and technological responses to address the challenges posed by online hate speech.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“Young Finn, you have already awakened, so arise!” Mobilising keyboard warriors to combatants through Finnish active club Telegram channels]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0011</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Recruitment into right-wing extremism (RWE) through combat sports groups is a growing phenomenon in Europe and beyond. In Finland, Active Club Finland, Veren Laki, and Club 8 follow the international White Nationalism 3.0 strategy, seeking to mainstream extremist values through subcultural activities. Using their public Telegram channels, they circulate hyper-masculine, white-supremacist, and (neo)Nazi-inspired content aimed at drawing young men into regional RWE combat sports networks. In this study, I employ critical discourse analysis and ritual theory to examine 245 recruitment-oriented Telegram posts (2020–2024) and one related podcast episode. I explore how RWE symbols and subcultural activities function as rituals that construct collective identity and foster emotional solidarity, facilitating the transition from online discursive spaces to offline activism. The findings indicate that recruitment relies more on emotions and rituals than on arguments. Narratives of societal decline and historical struggle are employed to evoke negative emotions, which are transformed into a desire for action through promises of brotherhood and honour. Posts are saturated with RWE symbols and coded gestures that signal in-group belonging. Combat sports training serves as a central embodied ritual of discipline and collective duty, while public performances, such as street activism and Black Bloc–style demonstrations, build internal cohesion and project strength externally. Together, these practices turn ideology into emotionally charged experiences, normalising extremist ideals and moving recruits from the liminal space of online curiosity to offline activism, illustrating how the Finnish RWE milieu applies the broader strategy of White Nationalism 3.0.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A changing digital landscape of extremism in the Nordic countries: Introduction to the special issue]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0007</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Social media has changed the nature of extremism in the twenty-first century. This special issue of Nordicom Review focuses on online extremism in the Nordic countries and considers how online extremism and the associated practices, aesthetics, and communities are woven into Nordic cultures. Featuring a collection of empirical studies and theoretical reflections, the issue contributes to the fields of social media research and contemporary trends in extremism, including mainstreaming processes, hybrid threats, conspiracy theories, and a range of social media practices and phenomena, which enable shifts toward the extremes of the Nordic publics. The special issue includes six contributions, each tackling a case study anchored in national contexts and pinpointing a significant challenge in the field of extremism and social media research.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The political economy of networked media: The revenue and concentration of communication markets in the Nordics]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0006</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 24 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In this article, we consider revenue and concentration developments of Nordic media and communication sectors within the wider framework of the network Internet ecology, the aim of which is to understand and contextualise what media concentration is in today’s digital platform economy. By comparing revenue data from the telecom, content media, Internet, and backbone service sectors in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden between 2018–2022, our analysis shows that telecom is the most profitable sector, particularly wireless (mobile). Traditional content media displayed revenue recessions during Covid-19, however most sectors were recovering by 2022, and many show growth. While content media are moderately to highly concentrated across the region, telecom and core Internet services – particularly search – display the highest concentration levels overall. Finland has the most concentrated media and communications ecology, while Denmark is the least concentrated. High revenue coupled with high concentration thus indicates that small markets may benefit from concentration to attain economies of scale to enable funding of quality services in competition with global providers. The Nordic context furthermore suggests that such concentration levels are only sustainable with appropriate regulations. Our research thus shows that concentration in communication markets should be understood within context-dependent market dynamics, contributing to the political economy of communication.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Book review: Controversial Encounters in the Age of Algorithms: How Digital Technologies Are Stifling Public Debate and What to Do About It]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0005</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 11 Apr 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Shifting semantics: A longitudinal study of keywords in climate change reporting]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0004</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[News reporting is a key source of public information on climate change. Over the past three decades, public communication about climate change has intensified, contributing to ongoing public negotiation over the meanings of climate change. This systematic longitudinal study uses computational methods to explore the semantic shifts in climate reporting. We examine three common terms – greenhouse effect, global warming, and climate change – as a means to trace the development of climate news. Our findings indicate that each keyword is associated with distinct semantics, and media coverage of climate change varies according to the prevailing term. While the greenhouse effect dominated early climate reporting, the term global warming was used as a transitional term before climate change became the predominant term. These variations have significant epistemological, political, and methodological implications. They demonstrate how media reporting on climate science is constantly evolving; indicate how public discussions of climate change are informed by climate news; and highlight the importance of aligning sampling methods with the changing semantic landscape of public climate communication.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Sustainable journalism redux: What are the “cornerstone” media frames of a sustainable future?]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0003</link>
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            <pubDate>Thu, 12 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The concept of sustainable journalism can be used to analyse many different aspects of environment and society, while the downside is that it becomes too much of a floating signifier, in need of some terminological precision. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to theoretically elaborate sustainable journalism as a particular means of framing society, with a clear connection to sustainability literature. We argue that such frames could be operationalised based on a few core principles of sustainable development thinking, found in texts such as Brundtland’s report, Our Common Future: Report of the 1987 World Commission on Environment and Development, for the United Nations. Three prominent frames of sustainable journalism – namely the three-pillar, time reflexive, and cross-spatial frames – are empirically exemplified through their hybrid combination of generic and issue-specific aspects of sustainability. By means of framing theory, media theory, and journalism studies, our intention is to present them as tools for conducting empirical analyses of the ways media deploy a sustainability outlook in their reporting.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Do alternative media users distrust all mainstream news or only some? Assessing Danish left-wing and right-wing alternative media users’ trust in news at the outlet-specific level]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0002</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In this article, I investigate Danish alternative media users’ trust in mainstream news at the outlet-specific level. Drawing on an online survey representative of the adult Danish population (N = 1,518), the study distinguishes between users of left-wing and right-wing alternative media and reveals a remarkable difference: The former only have lower trust in (purportedly) right-leaning mainstream media whereas the latter have lower trust in mainstream media regardless of their ideological leanings, indicating more all-encompassing lower trust. While the users have relatively lower news trust than the rest of the population, their trust is still fairly high in absolute terms. I conclude with a discussion of potential explanations for the left/right difference and of the democratic implications of the findings in and beyond the Danish media context.]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[News media lobbying and the EU’s Digital Services Act: Strategies and experiences from the small non-EU state of Norway]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2026-0001</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 10 Jan 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The formation of the Digital Services Act (DSA) in the European Union (EU), aiming to regulate platform power, provided a unique policy window to secure media-specific interests vis-à-vis platforms. This study investigates how Norwegian news media actors utilised the policy window. Drawing on qualitative interviews with 20 elite informants in Norway and the EU, the analysis shows how the Norwegian actors strategised to protect editorial independence and autonomy by lobbying to exempt editorial content from platform moderation. Unable to build a broad coalition and facing substantial resistance from an alliance of platforms, fact-checkers, and civil society groups, the attempt failed. The study contributes with insight into how news actors from a small, non-EU member state lobbied to gain influence in a policy process at the EU level. It also illustrates how the blurring boundaries of journalism and the multifaceted European media landscape make supranational news media lobbying particularly demanding for small, outsider actors.]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[The Nordic media welfare state and the challenge of imagining livable futures: Keynote speech, NordMedia2025, Odense, Denmark, 13–15 August (revised and edited)]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2025-0023</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 16 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The scholarly debate about a Nordic media system received a major impetus with the publication of the The Media Welfare State: Nordic Media in the Digital Age by Trine Syvertsen, Gunn Enli, Ole J. Mjøs, and Hallvard Moe in 2014. Ten years later in 2024, discussions continued in The Future of the Nordic Media Model: A Digital Media Welfare State? edited by Peter Jakobsson, Johan Lindell, and Fredrik Stiernstedt. A key concern across these debates has been whether and to what extent the media systems in the Nordic countries actually do form a common “Nordic media system”, and whether this media system is somehow better than other media systems at equipping Nordic citizens with democratic prerequisites. My article outlines the key positions in these debates about the continued role and relevance of the Nordic media welfare state, mainly in the area of news provision, based in part on recent research that explores this issue from an audience perspective (Schrøder et al., 2020, 2024). In the article, I tentatively explore how Nordic news media are presenting climate challenges and thereby equipping us as Nordic citizens for imagining livable futures.]]></description>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Book review: The Data Welfare State]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/nor-2025-0021</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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