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        <title>Kairos. Journal of Philosophy &amp; Science Feed</title>
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            <title><![CDATA[Is testability falsifiability?]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0012</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Special Issue Truth and Falsity: Introduction]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0008</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[A parrésia em Foucault - tecimentos]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0014</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[A Pós-Verdade, Para Além do Verdadeiro e do Falso]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0010</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[On how statistics is used and abused to find truth in Science]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0013</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
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            <title><![CDATA[Dispensing with Truthfulness: truth and liberty in Rorty’s thought]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0011</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Rorty saw the course of philosophy in the twentieth century as an effort to part from two major philosophical trends, namely historicism and naturalism, only to inevitably return at the end of a tortuous path to these very same tendencies. If we can concede without major objections (although perhaps with many objections of detail) Rorty’s diagnosis of the trends in contemporary continental and analytical philosophy, which seem to reveal the exhaustion of modern philosophy, based as it has been on epistemology, we must, on the other hand, examine carefully the three main questions that this diagnosis leaves open: (1) How does Rorty reconcile continental idealist subjectivism with materialistic behaviorism? (2) Is it really inevitable that philosophy (and philosophers) blinded by Geist are unable to question prevalent beliefs? (3) Finally, is the acceptance of a liberalism that is not able to give reasons for itself the most effective and pragmatic liberalism? In answering these questions, it may not be possible to avoid a non-dogmatic, but pragmatic, metaphysics: a vocabulary of vocabularies that allows Rorty (and us) to speak of the problems of justice in Plato and Rawls, of the soul in Aristotle and Descartes, of the dystopias in Moro and Orwell. On pragmatic terms, perhaps a modest version of a metaphysic’s “vocabulary” turns out to be as legitimate and practical as any other vocabulary.]]></description>
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            <title><![CDATA[Lying, computers and self-awareness]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0009</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 11 Oct 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[From the initial analysis of John Morris in 1976 about if computers can lie, I have presented my own treatment of the problem using what can be called a computational lying procedure. One that uses two Turing Machines. From there, I have argued that such a procedure cannot be implemented in a Turing Machine alone. A fundamental difficulty arises, concerning the computational representation of the self-knowledge a machine should have about the fact that it is lying. Contrary to Morris’ claim, I have thus suggested that computers – as far as they are Turing Machines – cannot lie. Consequently, I have claimed that moral agency attribution to a robot or any other automated AI system, cannot be made, strictly grounded on imitating behaviors. Self-awareness as an ontological grounding for moral attribution must be evoked. This can pose a recognition problem from our part, should the sentient system be the only agent capable of acknowledging its own sentience.]]></description>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Fernando R. Contreras, El Arte en la Cibercultura - Introducción a una Estética Comunicacional, Madrid: Editorial Biblioteca Nueva, 2018]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0002</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 28 May 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[Jean-Yves Mercury, Chemins Avec et Autour de Merleau-Ponty (Paris, L’Harmattan, 2019)]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0001</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 28 May 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[Equações Como Ícones (Seguidos Das Suas Peircianas “Verdades Insuspeitadas”)]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0007</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 28 May 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Franck Jedrzejewski, Hétérotopies musicales: Modèles mathématiques de la musique (Paris, Hermann, 2019)]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0003</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 28 May 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Perspetivar a Integridade Depois do Fim da Natureza]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0006</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 28 May 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The expression “end of nature” has been coined by American environ-mentalist Bill McKibben is his 1989 famous book, The End of Nature. Since then, the philosophical implications of such an obituary have been explored, mainly on an ethical perspective over the environment. The conceptual end of nature is one of those implications, in the context of a post-naturalistic environmental philosophy. Our purpose is to build upon the ambiguities of “nature” and reframe some readings of the concept of “integrity” as a guiding principle in the relation between human beings and the environment.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Hacking into Cybertherapy: Considering a Gesture-enhanced Therapy with Avatars (g+TA)]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2020-0004</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 28 May 2021 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper will philosophically extend Julian Leff’s Avatar therapy paradigm (AT) for voice-like hallucinations that was initially proposed for treatment-resistant Schizophrenia patients into the realm of gesture-enhanced embodied cognition and Virtual Reality (VR), entitled g+TA (gesture-enhanced Avatar Therapy). I propose an philosophy of technology approach of embodied rhetorics of triadic kinetic “actions” in the sense of Charles Sanders Peirce that transforms the voice hallucination incorporated by an avatar- and that can confront acousmatic voice-like hallucinations with a method of gesture synchronization and dyssynchronization and gestural refusal of interaction that the player with the Avatar can resist in full embodiment. This paper therefore introduces a gesture-enhanced, extended version of Cybertherapy with Avatars that tackle multimodal bodily experience of voice-like hallucinations beyond mere visual or auditory stimulation. This is put forward theoretically in a 4E-cognition approach that expands Avatar Therapy with gestures into VR.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Epistemology of Research on Radiation and Matter: a Structural View]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0016</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The modern understanding of radiation got its start in 1895 with X-rays discovered by Wilhelm Röntgen, followed in 1896 by Henri Becquerel’s discovery of radioactivity. The development of the study of radiation opened a vast field of research concerning various disciplines: chemistry, physics, biology, geology, sociology, ethics, etc. Additionally, new branches of knowledge were created, such as atomic and nuclear physics that enabled an in-depth knowledge of the matter. Moreover, during the historical evolution of this body of knowledge a wide variety of new technologies was emerging. This article seeks to analyze the characteristics of experimental research in radioactivity and microphysics, in particular the relationship experience-theory. It will also be emphasized that for more than two decades, since the discovery of radioactivity, experiments took place without the theory being able to follow experimental dynamics. Some aspects identified as structural features of scientific research in the area of radiation and matter will be addressed through historical examples. The inventiveness of experiments in parallel with the emergence of quantum mechanics, the formation of teams and their relationship with technology developed from the experiments, as well as the evolution of microphysics in the sense of “Big Science” will be the main structural characteristics here focused. The case study of research in radioactivity in Portugal that assumes a certain importance and has structural characteristics similar to those of Europe will be presented.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[From Effect to Cause: Deductive Reasoning]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0011</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[According to the traditional view, the following incompatibility holds true: in reasoning, either there is warrant (certainty) or there is novelty. If there is warrant, there is not novelty: that would be the case of deductive reasoning. If there is novelty, there is not warrant: that would be the case of inductive reasoning. Causal reasoning would belong to the second group because there is novelty and, therefore, there is not warrant in it. I argue that this is false: reasoning may have novelty and, nevertheless, be a deductive one. That is precisely what happens in (some) causal reasoning. And I will develop the following line of argumentation: one thing is to warrant that some state of affairs exists and other thing is to warrant that warrant. So we may have correct deductive reasoning without having certainty of that correction, like in some cases of causal reasoning.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Should Special Science Laws Be Written into the Semantics of Counterfactuals?]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0010</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Adam Elga has presented an anti-thermodynamic process as a counterexample to Lewis’s default semantics for counterfactuals. The outstanding reaction of Jonathan Schaffer and Boris Kment is revisionary. It sacrifices Lewis’s aim of defining causation in terms of counterfactual dependence. Lewis himself suggested an alternative: «counter-entropic funnybusiness» should make for dissimilarity. But how is this alternative to be spelled out? I discuss a recent proposal: include special science laws, among them the laws of thermodynamics. Although the proposal fails, it serves to uncover the limits of Elga’s example.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Gothic Uncanny: Selected Mind-Images in Literature and Film]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0014</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Ontological Concept of Disease and the Clinical Empiricism of Thomas Sydenham]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0013</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The clinical empiricism of Thomas Sydenham (1624–1689) and his definition of especie morbosae represented a substantial turn in the medicine of his time. This turn supposed the shift towards an ontological conception of diseases, from a qualitative to quantitative interpretation. Sydenham’s clinical proposal had a great influence on empiricism philosophical thinking, particularly in John Locke and his delimitation of knowledge. The dialogue between medicine and philosophy, set out by Sydenham-Locke, reactivates the problem of the clinical and theoretical foundations of medical thought, as well as the limits of scientific knowledge. Similar to problem exposed in the Hippocratic treatise On ancient medicine, seventeenth-century medicine seeks its epistemological foundations and the solution to its difficulties in clinical experience, probability and analogy. The aim of this work is to show the Sydenham’s contribution to one of the great controversies between medicine and philosophy.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Awareness Logic: an Epistemological Defence Correlations between Awareness Logic and Epistemology]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0009</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[with this paper, we intend to clarify some of the central notions that are commonly used in contemporary developments of Epistemic Logic, which lack a proper theoretical foundation. We want to follow the steps of some prominent epistemologists and epistemic logicians, who advocate for a correlation between their respective fields of study. We will proceed with a first small step that will consist in adapting one contemporary version of Epistemic Internalism to the framework of Awareness Logic, such that the key concepts in this logic can be sustained by an epistemological view, which, in turn, can work as a theoretical foundation for Awareness Logic.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Role of Intuition and Formal Thinking in Kant, Riemann, Husserl, Poincare, Weyl, and in Current Mathematics and Physics]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/kjps-2019-0007</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Mar 2020 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[According to Kant, the axioms of intuition, i.e. space and time, must provide an organization of the sensory experience. However, this first orderliness of empirical sensations seems to depend on a kind of faculty pertaining to subjectivity, rather than to the encounter of these same intuitions with the real properties of phenomena. Starting from an analysis of some very significant developments in mathematical and theoretical physics in the last decades, in which intuition played an important role, we argue that nevertheless intuition comes into play in a fundamentally different way to that which Kant had foreseen: in the form of a formal or “categorical” yet not sensible intuition. We show further that the statement that our space is mathematically three-dimensional and locally Euclidean by no means follows from a supposed a priori nature of the sensible or subjective space as Kant claimed. In fact, the three-dimensional space can bear many different geometrical and topological structures, as particularly the mathematical results of Milnor, Smale, Thurston and Donaldson demonstrated. On the other hand, it has been stressed that even the phenomenological or perceptual space, and especially the visual system, carries a very rich geometrical organization whose structure is essentially non-Euclidean. Finally, we argue that in order to grasp the meaning of abstract geometric objects, as n-dimensional spaces, connections on a manifold, fiber spaces, module spaces, knotted spaces and so forth, where sensible intuition is essentially lacking and where therefore another type of mathematical idealization intervenes, we need to develop a new form of intuition.]]></description>
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