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            <title><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence and Authority. Unpacking China’s Tech Policy through Sage-King Governance]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2026-0004</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[As China rises to become a high‐tech society and actively adopts strategic policies to embrace the Artificial Intelligence (AI) era, this paper argues that China’s bold practices in AI conform to the historical logic of state‐led technological development. China’s science and technology (S&amp;T) policy framework has undergone three strategic paradigm shifts: military-industrial consolidation (1949–1978), market-oriented modernization (1978–2012), and comprehensive securitization (2012– present), with AI emerging as a pivotal frontier reflecting the transition from developmental statism to techno-security statecraft. This study employs the Sage-King Governance Paradigm and progressive Reductionist Framework to analyze China’s S&amp;T policy evolution, demonstrating: (1) how China’s civilizational worldview and Sage-King tradition shape public perceptions of technological progress and legitimize strong state leadership; (2) this political-psychological culture underpins both the legitimacy and velocity of China’s AI-driven modernization; and (3) technology mediates the transition from present (A) to ideal future (A’), with the Great Union (datong) functioning as both founding myth and governance ideal. Ultimately, China’s AI trajectory is driven less by global dominance than inward-looking self-actualization. This paper advances international studies on technology politics by revealing how political-psychological logics and civilizational imaginaries-rather than material power-drive divergent national AI trajectories and shape endogenous visions of technology and statecraft.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Economic Diplomacy of Small States: Beyond Economic Firepower in the Case of Luxembourg]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2026-0003</link>
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            <pubDate>Tue, 17 Mar 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Small states are particularly challenged within the prevailing multipolar and multifocal world order. To avoid being overpowered economically and politically in this rapidly changing context, small states increasingly seek shelter in multilateral frameworks and/or clusters around regional unions. Additionally, at a national level, they increase international cooperation, where economic diplomacy plays a key role. Focusing on Luxembourg, the European Union’s wealthiest member state, this paper adopts a structural realist perspective to understand why the country pursues economic diplomacy. Applying the realist approach and extending the economic diplomacy Okano-Heijmans framework, this paper contributes to the conceptualization of economic diplomacy and posits that Luxembourg’s economic diplomacy serves not only economic welfare but also political objectives for strengthening the country’s positioning and soft power.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Strategic Export Controls and the G7 Coordination Challenge]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2026-0002</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 25 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The “technology war” between the U.S. and China has prompted a proliferation of export control regimes across advanced economies. In particular, the Group of 7 (G7) nations have strengthened controls on sensitive tech exports to prevent adversaries from acquiring capabilities that could threaten security. However, coordinating these controls across the G7 remains a major hurdle. Each country faces unique economic interests and legal constraints that complicate efforts to form a cohesive front. This paper examines how U.S., European, and Japanese export control policies have tightened from 2022 through late 2025, and why aligning these measures within the G7 is so challenging. The central thesis is that while national security imperatives have led to stronger unilateral controls, multilateral coordination is lagging, undermining the effectiveness of these measures. An effectively coordinated “Tech Control Alliance” could establish common lists, shared license data, and joint diplomatic stances to persuade other nations to join controls. The task is to move from reactive, ad-hoc coordination to a standing unified framework that anticipates technological advances and updates controls in real-time.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[US leadership in trade statecraft: diminishing returns and a diminished role]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2026-0001</link>
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            <pubDate>Sun, 22 Feb 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This article puts current developments in US trade policy in an historical context. It identifies three broad types of trade statecraft the US has pursued since 1945: alliance politics, promoting an international trade order that serves the national interest and unilateralism. It argues that US trade statecraft has exhibited all three types. What has changed has been the relative importance of each in any given period. The article illustrates this in three broad time periods: 1945 to the early 1970s, when US trade statecraft pursued ‘alliance politics’; the early 1970s to the mid 2010s when US statecraft was shaped by two-level trade diplomacy aimed at promoting a trading order that served US interests; and finally, 2016 to the present day and the turn to unilateralism. Unilateralism, always latent in US decision making, has now come to the fore because key policy makers see diminishing political and commercial returns from promoting an international trade order. This trend is likely to result in a diminished US role in world trade.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Central Asia’s Strategic Autonomy in the New Heartland: Introduction to the Special Issue]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0013</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Economic relations between Europe and China – “de-risking” or renewed partnership?]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0014</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 19 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Since establishing their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2003, China and the EU have developed their relations in an incongruous manner. While trade and investment have flourished, political relations have recently deteriorated. Since at least 2023, European politicians have tried to "de-risk" from China. However, businesses have not followed this trend. This makes sense, as the sheer size of the Chinese economy makes finding another country or group of countries to compensate for such "de-risking" difficult. Many Europeans believe that China’s influence will continue to grow in the coming years and that it could surpass the U.S. within a decade. At the same time, however, China’s influence on international relations is often viewed negatively. After the April 2025 Trump tariff shock and the July 2025 EU-U.S. "agreement" on tariffs, it would be wise for Europe to improve relations with China. However, both parties would have to adapt some of their policies. The EU should move away from emulating the U.S.'s treatment of China as a secular rival. In turn, China should adhere to its long-standing foreign policy principles of not interfering in the internal affairs of other states and upholding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, including with respect to Russia.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Debt Diplomacy and Trust: Lessons from the European Recovery Plan]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0010</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This study examines the European Recovery Plan (ERP) through the lens of debt diplomacy, arguing that its success was rooted in a departure from ad hoc, transactional debt relief towards a structured, trust-based approach. The ERP, a $13 billion financing program spanning 1948–1951, is often viewed as a Cold War containment strategy or a neoliberal economic intervention by the United States. However, this paper situates it within a broader historical framework of debt diplomacy, analyzing it as a large-scale effort to stabilize transatlantic financial relations and prevent a post-war balance of payments crisis. We reassess the ERP as a model for international financial assistance, emphasizing the roles of encapsulated trust, intellectual generalism, shared responsibility, and transnational polylateralism. Through a historical review of pre-ERP aid (1945–1947), the study highlights how earlier, fragmented debt-relief efforts failed to address systemic financial instability in Europe. It further explores the unique conditions that enabled the ERP’s success, including high trust relations between the U.S. and Europe, geopolitical imperatives of Cold War containment, and deep economic interdependence. By revisiting the Marshall Plan through the lens of debt diplomacy, this paper not only offers new perspectives on the ERP, but also contributes to debates on debt diplomacy and efforts to achieve global debt sustainability.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Regionalization Processes in Central Asia and Southeast Asia: Similarities, Differences, Challenges and Central Asia’s Integration Perspectives in the Light of the ASEAN’s Experience]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0007</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper addresses the issue of the Central Asian regionalization and regional integration in the light of the experience of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)1. The purpose of this study is two-fold. On the one hand, it intends, via an approach under the prism of the ASEAN’s strategy of regionalization and regional integration, to provide an analytical framework for understanding current integration processes in Central Asia (understood as the five post-Soviet Republics, or “C5”). Indeed, despite their differences, the C5 and ASEAN integration process shares key common features. On the other hand, it aims at providing guidance on how to further proceed in Central Asia, precisely because both integration processes share similarities, although this does not imply that the ASEAN mode of integration can apply as such to the C5. Accordingly, this study makes also extensive policy recommendations whose criterion is the realistic development and consolidation in the long run of Central Asia’s regional autonomy and geopolitical empowerment in the light of the ASEAN experience.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The future of regionalism and the strategies adopted by states in Central Asia following the Ukraine war]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0011</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The conflict between Russia and Ukraine in February 2022 has created uncertainty regarding the balance of power, particularly in Central Asia, where Russia wields significant influence. Russia’s military confrontation in Ukraine and its strategic concentration on disrupting equations in its favor have led to changes in its national and foreign policy, giving rise to new questions. This research aims to address the following inquiries: will the conflict in Ukraine diminish Russia’s sway and involvement in regional institutions in Central Asia? Will China’s position become more prominent if the function of regional organizations, in which Russia has played a significant part, decreases? Will the Central Asian countries align themselves with the Western bloc or other regional powers like Turkey?This research has utilized secondary data analysis and applied the theories of regionalism and soft power to examine the sources of power and influence of China and Russia in regional organizations and mechanisms in Central Asia, both before and after the Ukrainian war. Assessing the potential difficulties and advantages that this war has brought for China and Russia’s influence in this area, provide potential outcomes for the future condition of regionalism in Central Asia and the significant actors involved. According to the research findings, Russia’s allocation of military resources in the Ukraine war and its efforts to advance its goals have created uncertainty regarding the future of the country’s power resources in Central Asia, particularly in the security field. The premise that another power or powers will likely fill the potential power vacuum left by Russia in Central Asia has been reinforced in the context of this war. As Russia’s attention towards Central Asia diminishes, China has a favorable chance to enhance its political and economic Nevertheless, the decline of Russia’s influence and power resources in Central Asia has created a significant chance for the governments in this area to enhance their engagements with other significant regional nations like Turkey and India, as well as trans-regional states such as the European Union.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[“C5+1” as a Dovetailing Mechanism for Central Asia’s Regional Integration: Insights from Uzbekistan]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0012</link>
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            <pubDate>Wed, 24 Sep 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This article examines the evolving geopolitical landscape of Central Asia and evaluates the “C5+1” multilateral format as a mechanism for regional cooperation, strategic balancing, and integration. With Uzbekistan playing a pivotal role in shaping regional diplomacy, the study explores how the “C5+1” framework serves as a “dovetailing mechanism” – aligning regional interests with external engagements while maintaining strategic autonomy. By analyzing historical trends, policy shifts, and emerging regional dynamics, the paper assesses the effectiveness of this diplomatic platform in balancing the influence of major external actors, including the United States, European Union, China, Russia, India, and other regional stakeholders.Uzbekistan’s proactive and pragmatic diplomacy, particularly under the “Uzbekistan-2030” Strategy, has strengthened intra-regional cooperation through bilateral treaties, consultative meetings, and economic partnerships. The country has led efforts to institutionalize multilateral collaboration, enhance economic integration, and mitigate long-standing regional disputes. However, while the “C5+1” format has expanded from ministerial to summit-level engagements, challenges remain in its long-term sustainability. The paper critically examines potential risks, such as external powers steering the agenda, the lack of formal institutionalization, and internal competition among Central Asian States (CAS).By providing a comparative analysis of different “C5+1” models, this study offers insights into how Central Asia can leverage this framework to foster sustainable economic growth, regional security, and geopolitical stability. The findings contribute to ongoing discussions on multi-vector diplomacy and propose strategies to ensure that C5+1 remains a genuinely inclusive and effective mechanism for long-term regional integration.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Expanding Beyond Conventional Connections: Central Asian Nations Establish New Partneships]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0006</link>
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            <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[The article delves into the rationale behind Central Asian countries’ extensive engagement with these emerging powers, offering valuable insights into the evolving geopolitical landscape of the region. Through a structured exploration, the paper outlines the strategies in place for the Western, Russian, and Chinese vectors, subsequently focusing on the emergence and dynamics of the fourth vector. By scrutinizing the motivations and mechanisms driving Central Asia’s interactions with these newfound partners, the article sheds light on the complexities and opportunities inherent in these evolving relationships. The conclusion synthesizes key arguments and proposes avenues for future research to further elucidate the evolving geopolitical dynamics in Central Asia.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Central Asia in the Geopolitical Crossfire: Strategic Alignments Amidst the Russo-Ukrainian Conflict]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0002</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 24 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This study explores the evolving cooperation perspectives of Central Asian states against the backdrop of an ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine. This protracted conflict has triggered regional and global geopolitical shifts, prompting reassessment of the roles and strategies of the various global and regional actors. Focusing on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, this research employs the argumentative framework of Political Discourse Analysis to examine the prospects for cooperative actions drawing insights from five Central Asian leaders’ 2022 speech in Cholpan-Ata. Guided by the shelter-seeking foreign policy strategy, the findings reveal Central Asian leaders’ commitment to pursuing a cohesive regional strategy as an immediate necessity to address shared challenges, including security, economic and infrastructural development and water resource management to promote enhanced cooperation within the region. The study advocates for taking proactive, tangible, and assertive policy measures to realize the proposed actions, emphasizing the importance of a unified approach in navigating the complex geopolitical dynamics.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The East Asia Concept of the German Federal Foreign Office (2002) and the Federal Government’s Strategy on China (2023) – Similarities and Differences]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2024-0003</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 24 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[In July 2023, the German federal government published its “Strategy on China”. This had been mandated by the 2021 coalition agreement, but happened quite a bit later than originally intended. While the Strategy is the first ever comprehensive document to set out the federal government’s China policy, it can – and should – be compared to the federal foreign office’s East Asia Concept of 2002 that also established basic tenets of German China policy. Remarkably, the principles enunciated in both documents are the same or very similar: The references to basic values such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights have not changed, Tibet and Xinjiang are mentioned prominently. Then, as now, there is an appeal to Beijing to assume responsibility for world peace and global affairs. There is also no change regarding the need for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and for German across-the-board cooperation with EU partners on China. Major differences exist, however, on economic issues. Two decades ago, China was the largest recipient of German development aid; now it is, depending on the yardstick used, the world’s second-largest or largest economy. In 2002, German companies in China were seen as an asset in the endeavor to bring Western values to China; in 2023, they are regarded as a risk possibly causing an overdependence on China. The Strategy is based on the assumption that China has changed – meaning: for the worse – and that as a result Germany needs to change its approach to China. One of the Strategy’s central features is the concept of “de-risking” the German economy from China. This has, however, failed so far: Since the Strategy’s adoption, German companies have invested more in China than ever before. The jury is still out on whether the Strategy will over the coming years be a blueprint for Germany’s China policy. Basing oneself on the fate of the Concept, that is rather not to be expected. It would, however, be erroneous to presume that Beijing’s policies can only move in one direction. That would disregard the experience that the policies of the Communist Party have over the past decades been prone to considerable swings – the most recent example being the sudden demise of the zero-COVID policy. It is therefore not excluded that relations between Germany and China could become closer again in future.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Rising Multiplex World Order and Regional Order in Central Asia: a case study of the Emerging Role of the EU and its implications for Kazakhstan’s Multivector foreign policy]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0003</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 24 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This study seeks to examine the role of multivectorism in the ever-changing international landscape and how, despite the detractors that believe multivectorism will eventually deteriorate into balancing and bandwagoning, the new multiplex world has strengthened it. A case study of Kazakhstani foreign policy will unpack this phenomenon by exploring the development of Kazakhstan’s multivector policies, including an analysis of the dynamics of multivectorism amidst international tensions and the reshuffling of alliances, shedding light on how these events influence a state’s strategic calculus and their interactions within the broader multiplex world. Recent geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions have significantly impacted the relationship between the EU and Kazakhstan. The EU’s interest in Kazakhstan has increased due to disruptions in the energy supply from Russia, leading to increased engagement in the region to secure its interests. This emphasis on connectivity has created new opportunities for dialogue and cooperation beyond energy. Kazakhstan’s strategic importance in balancing relations with Russia has made it a focal point for the EU in the region. The paper will demonstrate how the EU’s new interactions reshape the complex political contestation and show how the multiplexity and interdependencies of today’s foreign policies are more nuanced than a simple alignment strategy.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Chinese global governance as a diffusion process]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0001</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 24 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper offers a conceptual framework to interpret the diffusion of Chinese global governance. Global governance is identified as a crucial aspect of China’s economic statecraft, especially as a means to develop and maintain international trade and investment. The adoption of Chinese global governance norms and rules is conceptualized as a diffusion process in which global governance is the innovation. Diffusion is a spatial-temporal process. Adoption over time is conceptualized as an adoption-curve of early-, mid-, and late adopters. Space is conceptualized as core, semi-periphery, and periphery regions of the capitalist world-economy. The forms of global governance are identified as either the politics of inter-state cooperation or the politics of domestic development. The policy focus of these two types of politics rests on an understanding of hegemony that requires dominance in the fields of manufacturing, trade, and investment. In addition to these economic spheres, global governance must address emerging crises, such as global climate change or war. Combining scales of global governance, the geography of core, semi-periphery, and periphery, and the policy focus of global governance rules and norms produces a 2*3*4 cube of 24 cells. Countries may be situated within one of these cells to understand their alacrity or hesitation in adopting Chinese global governance practices. The conceptual framework is illustrated through three vignettes describing China’s relations with Ghana and Zambia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and Hungary.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Trans-Regional Integration and Connectivity in Central Asia: Strategies of Russia, China and European Union]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0005</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 24 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Trans-regional integration and connectivity has been considered mostly in the sense of cross border transport and logistics corridors for regional and inter-regional trade in the context of this particular research work. Central Asia, after the breakup of former Soviet Union, reappeared in the ebb and flow of international exchanges as the global and regional powers are intensely engaged in developing regional and trans-regional transport corridors across the region.Russia, China and European Union (EU) have developed and operating their own plans of integration and connectivity. Russia’s approaches to trans-regional integration in Eurasia’s heartland demonstrate the characteristics of both ‘open regionalism’ under Greater Eurasian Partnership and ‘close regionalism’ under the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) framework. China’s plans of regional and trans-regional integration in Eurasia’s heartland under the BRI are based on the concept of open regionalism despite having geographical contiguity. EU’s approach towards regional and trans-regional integration in Central Asia is also based on the principles of open regionalism where Middle Corridor has become a necessity. Multilateralism under the regional organizations is also at work for enhanced cross border hard and soft connectivity. Hence a number of trans-continental Eurasian trade and transport corridors across Central Asia are being developed giving impetus to regional cooperation in Central Asia. The paper attempts to answer three main questions; how regionalism and trans-regional integration has been evolving in Central Asian context? How Russia, China and European Union (EU) have been developing their plans of trans-regional connectivity in altered regional configuration?, and how the trans-regional connectivity plans impacting Central Asia as a region? The approach in this study is explanatory and exploratory and methodology adopted is qualitative in nature mainly descriptive and analytical.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Central Asia as the Grand Chessboard: the EU, China, Russia’s Regional Strategies and the C5’s Responses]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2025-0004</link>
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            <pubDate>Sat, 24 May 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Central Asia is an integral part of the concurrent geopolitical marathon in the 21st century. This region has been of great imperative concern for all the rising and incumbent hegemons of the international arena. The dissolution of the Soviet Union has garnered the multidimensional speculations to the Central Asian countries and gave a new stream of struggle for geopolitical clout among the influential actors (Russia, China, and European Union) in the geopolitical canvas. The current political atmosphere immaculately exemplifies the amplified power dynamics in the new global order. The contest for Central Asia act as an immediate chessboard in which the rooks and bishops along with their overlapping interests are trying hard to get the king’s worth. Nevertheless, the self-proclaimed pawns of this grand chessboard (Central Asian States) are unaware of their own potential of being a checkmate in this conundrum. The approach towards the Central Asia by Russia, China, and EU often differs from each other. However, interests and strategic vulnerabilities have put these giants in the same spectrum. Russia’s objective in this region is to maintain the neocolonial status with the tool of Eurasianism to consolidate its position in the region. China’s foremost ambition in the region is to preserve the Sino-Initiatives integrity (BRI) and to accommodate the regional connectivity with its global economic agendas in the region. Surprisingly, the primary ambition of all stakeholders overlaps with each other which elevates their geostrategic rivalry and possibly paves the way for Central Asian’s strategic autonomy. This research paper is going to conduct a comprehensive and qualitative analysis of this intricate marathon by using Heartland theory for identifying the specific and significant objectives of this unusual quest for Central Asia. Firstly, it will focus that, How the overlapping interests of the stakeholders can become the competing threshold along with analyzing the aftermath of Russia-Ukraine Crisis? Moreover, it will further extend its analytical view on How the Central Asian nations can maintain the more pragmatic, realistic, and inclusive approach towards every stakeholder in this great game without facing any geopolitical trials and tribulations?]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Eco-Alliance: Tackling Climate Change in the Caribbean with Chinese FDI]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2024-0002</link>
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            <pubDate>Sun, 08 Dec 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[This paper explores the transformative role of Chinese FDI in catalyzing the Caribbean’s transition to renewable energy amidst significant climate vulnerabilities. It investigates the economic impacts of climate-induced disasters in the region, underscoring the necessity for renewable energy solutions to ensure sustainable development. This study highlights the potential benefits for the Caribbean by examining successful Chinese FDI examples in the renewable sectors of Suriname, Brazil, and Argentina. The article is structured to first analyze the region’s climate risks and economic impacts, then examine Chinese FDI’s contributions to renewable energy development, and finally propose policy recommendations for leveraging these investments. Through this analysis, the paper aims to contribute to sustainable development strategies, advocating for targeted policies and international collaboration to build a resilient and sustainable Caribbean in the face of climate change.]]></description>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Decline and Fall of Globalization]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2024-0001</link>
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            <pubDate>Fri, 12 Jul 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[If globalization means openness to the free movement of goods, capital, and labor across international borders, then globalization is declining. The forces of protectionism are on the rise and barriers to trade and investment are proliferating. The fundamental cause is structural – the erosion of American hegemony as a result of a shift in the global distribution of power. At the end of the Cold War, the US was the world’s only great power. But the global diffusion of technological innovation has allowed the emergence of challengers. Now, the locus of world power has shifted to Asia. Attempting to preserve American primacy, the US is pursuing nationalist, mercantilist trade policies that undermine the liberal economic order established after WWII. Tariffs, export controls, and restrictions on FDI have replaced the free flow of goods and capital. Adam Smith and David Ricardo have been replaced by Alexander Hamilton and Niccolò Machiavelli. The US is enlisting its allies to reform the rules of the international economic order. It intends to transform the G7 into a steering committee of the free world. Such an action is likely to provoke an equal and opposite reaction, leading to a world of exclusive economic blocs. The resulting fragmentation will spell an end to the liberal multilateral order known as globalization.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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            <title><![CDATA[Why and How the People’s Republic of China Entered the World Bank in 1980 and Afterthoughts]]></title>
            <link>https://reference-global.com/article/10.2478/ecdip-2023-0007</link>
            <guid isPermaLink="false">/article/10.2478/ecdip-2023-0007</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 08 Jan 2024 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[China’s re-entry into the World Bank (WB) in 1980 was a joint endeavor by WB and Chinese reform-minded leaders. This article gives a chronicle of major events which paved the way for the People’s Republic of China to take over China’s seat in the WB. It describes in some detail the role played by Robert McNamara, Shahid Husain, Edwin Lim and Javed Burki on the WB’s side, and Deng Xiaoping, Gu Mu and the Bank of China on the Chinese side in engineering Beijing’s re-entry and in establishing a relationship with the WB based on mutual trust. It uncovers how the issue of Taiwan’s debt to the WB at the time, a potentially serious obstacle to the PRC’s WB membership, was successfully resolved. The article ends with reflections on China’s engagement with the Bretton Woods System.]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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