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        <title>Ethics &amp; Bioethics Feed</title>
        <link>https://sciendo.com/journal/EBCE</link>
        <description>Sciendo RSS Feed for Ethics &amp; Bioethics</description>
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            <title>Ethics &amp; Bioethics Feed</title>
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        <copyright>All rights reserved 2026, University of Prešov</copyright>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Are animals – and persons – morally “replaceable”?]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0020</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0020</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article critically examines Peter Singer’s arguments for two conclusions: first, that non-self-conscious animals are “replaceable” in the sense that the killing of one can be morally offset by the creation of another; and, second, that persons are not replaceable in this sense. Much of the support that Singer provides for the second of these claims is found in his defense of “the debit view of preferences,” which he advanced in response to an earlier critic of his preference utilitarianism. The author argues that the debit view is untenable for several reasons. The author argues further that Singer’s appeal to Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem in support of the replaceability of non-self-conscious individuals is also mistaken. In spite of these problems, however, the author contends that there is a genuine insight in Singer’s “replaceability thesis,” and develops and defends different arguments for both the claim that some animals – and, indeed, some human beings – are replaceable and the claim that persons are not.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Editorial]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0021</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0021</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Moral status, suffering, and compassion: Towards reconciling human moral priority with animal welfare]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0011</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0011</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This paper critically examines the principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) in the discourse of animal ethics. I claim that within a consequentialist moral order, an entity's moral status comes from working backward from consequences, not solely on intrinsic capacities. Hence, I propose that to judge moral status, one must take into account not only (a) an entity's intrinsic capacity for sentience but also (b) how reliably that entity will reduce suffering overall. Given these two criteria, I explore whether human beings deserve a higher moral status than nonhuman animals. While there is evidence that homo sapiens have evolved a unique instinctual urge to reduce suffering called ‘compassion,’ humans are not always compassionate. For this reason, I conclude that as a species, human beings do deserve a much higher moral status than other animals; however, the moral status of any individual human being falls upon a much wider spectrum above and below other animals. This framework has the advantage of justifying common moral intuitions about human moral superiority while still obligating humans to exercise compassion. I conclude by discussing the implications of this on the moral status of non-paradigm humans, and its possible import for AI ethics and alignment.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Infanticide in bioethics: Singer’s argument and cross-framework debates]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0017</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0017</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The aim of this article is to analyze Peter Singer’s utilitarian approach to infanticide and compare it with alternative moral frameworks through systematic philosophical analysis. Singer argues that cognitive capacities, such as self-awareness and the ability to form preferences, rather than species membership, should determine moral consideration. This perspective leads him to conclude that newborns do not possess full moral personhood and may be subject to different ethical calculations. This includes his controversial “replaceability argument” regarding severely disabled infants. The analysis also considers supporting views from philosophers like Michael Tooley and Jeff McMahan, as well as opposition from deontological and natural law theorists, who maintain that human dignity is inherent and not dependent on specific capacities. The debate has practical implications, as evidenced by the Groningen Protocol in the Netherlands, and extends to broader societal concerns such as eugenics, disability rights, and healthcare resource allocation. Recent advances in neonatal care and prenatal testing have complicated these discussions by improving outcomes and altering decision-making contexts. While Singer’s framework appears philosophically coherent, it remains morally troubling. Conversely, alternative approaches have yet to resolve the fundamental disagreements surrounding human moral worth.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Foreword to the Special Issue of Ethics &amp; Bioethics (in Central Europe)]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0023</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0023</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Rethinking Singer: Toward a valid argument for helping the global poor]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0012</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0012</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

For more than 50 years, Peter Singer has argued that we are required to donate to aid agencies. While many commentators have rejected one or more of his premises, no one appears to have challenged the argument's validity, and it is often assumed to be valid even by critics. This article demonstrates that Singer's common-sense morality arguments for donating to aid agencies are invalid. It then reconstructs a valid version of the argument consistent with Singer's broader work, but shows that this version carries significant costs. The paper concludes that although we have a moral obligation to help those less fortunate, this does not entail an obligation to donate to aid agencies, nor does failing to do so necessarily constitute wrongdoing, provided the obligation to help is otherwise fulfilled.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A critique of Peter Singer’s utilitarian perspective on abortion: An African (Igbo) jurisprudence approach]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0016</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0016</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This paper critiques Peter Singer’s utilitarian defense of abortion, which hinges on the fetus’s lack of preference capacity, through the lens of African (Igbo) jurisprudence and ethics. Singer’s argument, grounded in self-autonomy and individual freedom, is examined for its cross-cultural applicability and ethical robustness. Engaging with this objective, the study employs philosophical analysis and critical hermeneutics. The study finds Singer’s position deficient in universal applicability, particularly lacking resonance with Igbo (African) legal and ethical traditions. Furthermore, his framework is deemed inadequate for informing inclusive public health policies. This work broadens bioethical discourse by incorporating African legal and ethical perspectives, emphasizing the necessity of cultural integration and social harmony in ethical decision-making. Additionally, it contributes to environmental ethics, supporting Singer’s climate change insights while advocating for a more integrative discourse connecting abortion ethics and environmental concerns. The paper underscores the importance of culturally sensitive bioethics for contextually relevant public health policies.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Debt, interest, and effective altruism: Critically evaluating Singer’s utilitarian ethics in the context of contemporary economics]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0014</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0014</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This paper critically evaluates Peter Singer’s effective altruism (EA) from the perspective of economic justice. It argues that the focus on individual charitable actions may overlook the structural causes of global poverty, particularly the systemic role of interest-bearing debt. While Singer’s utilitarian framework prioritizes measurable and cost-effective interventions to alleviate suffering, this paper contends that such an approach, when overly concentrated on quantifiable outcomes, may hinder long-term justice and reform. Drawing on historical, ethical, and contemporary economic insights, the paper highlights how modern debt structures perpetuate inequality and moral harm. It proposes that effective altruism must expand its focus to include advocacy for systemic change, such as debt relief, financial regulation, and institutional reform, in order to maintain ethical adequacy and genuinely address global suffering.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The objectivity of ethics and the unity of practical reason]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0019</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0019</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article revisits the evolutionary debunking arguments advanced by Katarzyna Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer. It evaluates their implications for the objectivity of ethics and the unity of practical reason. Building on Sidgwickian rational intuitionism, the paper contrasts the stability of utilitarian reasons with the vulnerability of egoistic justification once evolutionary and metaphysical assumptions about personal identity are examined. It further incorporates revised views on free will, moral epistemology, and peer disagreement, arguing for a more sceptical and collaborative philosophical method. The conclusion advocates prioritizing ethical epistemology and moral psychology over continued disputes between major normative theories.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Beyond efficiency: Reconciling Singer’s effective altruism with care ethics]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0013</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0013</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article reviews Peter Singer’s concept of Effective Altruism (EA) through the lens of care ethics and proposes a preliminary idea for their integration. Singer advocates for maximizing good through efficiency-driven moral practices, such as pursuing high-income careers to increase charitable donations or supporting interventions like farm animal welfare that promise significant measurable impact. However, from the perspective of care ethics (CE), this approach overlooks the importance of personal relationships and emotional bonds. Additionally, its outcome-oriented reasoning may lead to neglecting the most vulnerable groups, potentially sacrificing individual rights in favor of maximizing overall well-being. To ensure that EA evolves and remains relevant, especially in humanitarian work, integrating it with CE presents a promising path forward. By balancing EA’s focus on maximizing impact with CE’s emphasis on relational responsibility, contextual awareness, and emotional engagement, we can develop a more holistic ethical framework for humanitarian action. This integrated approach could also foster a more robust and equitable vision of global development and social justice, one that values both effective outcomes and the dignity and agency of those affected.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Algorithmic care: Peter Singer’s ethics and the challenge of AI in the end-of-life medicine]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0018</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0018</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article applies Peter Singer’s ethical framework to evaluate the impact of predictive AI systems in end-of-life care. Singer’s work is particularly fitting for this analysis because it focuses on the normative variables that AI technologies influence: the moral significance of suffering, the formation of reflective preferences, and the assignment of responsibility for foreseeable outcomes. His perspective on personhood, emphasis on autonomy as rational self-determination, and principle of equal consideration of interests provide a solid foundation for assessing how algorithmic models affect clinical timing, deliberation, and risk allocation. By examining two predictive tools used in end-of-life care, the article demonstrates how Singer’s framework clarifies the ways in which AI can enhance procedural rationality in end-of-life decisions. Additionally, it identifies the risks that AI poses to autonomy, responsibility diffusion, and the reproduction of structural inequalities. Ultimately, Singer’s framework offers a conceptual means to differentiate algorithmic interventions that support ethical decision-making from those that undermine the non-negotiable ethical conditions he advocates.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Sentencing algorithms and equal consideration of interests]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0015</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0015</guid>
            <pubDate>Wed, 31 Dec 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This paper examines whether sentencing algorithms – machine-learning-based tools for assessing the likelihood that a convicted individual will commit further offenses if released on parole – are consistent with Peter Singer's preference utilitarianism and the principle of equal consideration of interests. It begins by explaining the functioning and ethical challenges of such algorithms, especially the challenge of individualized sentencing. The paper then explores how these algorithms align with Singer's preference utilitarianism, particularly his principle of equal consideration of interests. Analyzing the key elements of this principle – maximizing and equally weighing interests, impartiality, and rejection of irrelevant group memberships – reveals how critics might use it to oppose the implementation of sentencing algorithms. A contextually more sensitive reading of Singer's views suggests that the same principle, in fact, supports the use of these algorithms. The paper concludes that sentencing algorithms are not only consistent with Singer's position but are, in many respects, reinforced by it.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Ľudovít Štúr’s book Slavdom and the world of the future: A new perspective]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0010</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0010</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The author examines Ľudovít Štúr’s controversial book Slavdom and the world of the future (1867) from a new perspective. He formulates two hypotheses regarding the intentions that led Štúr to write this work. According to the first hypothesis, Štúr’s book was about a pragmatic political calculation on how to secure the future of the Slavs, including the Slovaks, in the new political order of Europe after the revolutions of 1848–1849, namely under Russian domination. Within the second hypothesis, the author examines to what extent Štúr’s book can be read as a dystopia of the future of the Slavs under Russian domination. In conclusion, the author states that the second hypothesis seems more likely in the contemporary geopolitical context (Crimean War) in which Štúr’s book was written.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The mind of plants: Toward a vegetal philosophy in Hans Jonas]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0001</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0001</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article intends to analyze the main theses of Hans Jonas’ ontological approach to plant life in his phenomenology of life. To do so, we will start with the hypothesis that plant life must be thought of as a carrier of mind (inwardness) and that this guarantees plants’ ethical status. From there, we will analyze the two approaches Jonas developed, which, according to him, demonstrate the ontological superiority of plants in relation to animals and simultaneously their greater vulnerability: material immediacy (represented by their nutritive activity) and spatial proximity (linked to the problem of movement). From these two aspects derives the indistinction between acting and the objective of acting (which makes metabolism a process intrinsic to the vegetable being itself). We will conclude by suggesting that such a position brings Jonas closer to the post-humanists, insofar as he questions humanist anthropocentrism, opening the way for the recognition of plants not only as moral subjects but as legal entities.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[A qualitative evaluation on the informed consent of women undergoing cesarean section]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0004</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0004</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The concept of informed consent means that the patient voluntarily accepts medical intervention with his/her free will after being fully and adequately informed about the medical interventions to be performed. In the context of our thesis, which was completed at Ankara University, Institute of Social Sciences, Department of Women’s Studies, Integrated PhD program, the main purpose of the study was to examine whether the informed consent of the woman was obtained within the framework of cesarean section practices, whether and how much the informed consent was obtained properly from a bioethical perspective. The issue was approached from the perspective of women. A qualitative study was conducted with the participation of 10 women who had undergone a cesarean section. The interviewees’ reasons for preferring cesarean section, their relevant thoughts, the decision-making process, and their value discourses on informed consent in cesarean section were obtained through in-depth interviews using a prepared questionnaire. The questionnaire used in our study is a questionnaire with open-ended questions for semi-structured interviews that allow for the collection of deeper and contextualized information. The data obtained were evaluated by thematic analysis method. The value discourses that came to the fore in the interviews were categorized into context, main theme, and sub-themes. According to the findings of the study, it was observed that individual, social/environmental and physician factors played a role in the preference for cesarean section, and fear of vaginal delivery and pain was an important factor. In the context of opinions, it was found that the number of interviewees who evaluated cesarean delivery negatively was high. It was determined that there was no material shortage in obtaining information about cesarean delivery, but the fear of vaginal delivery hindered the desire to have that information. Regarding the decision on the mode of delivery, the interviewees agreed that this should be a joint decision of the physician and the woman. The method and scope of informed consent were examined, and it was found that informed consent was not duly applied ethically and that the scope of the information provided to women did not include all the elements that should be included in informed consent. As a result, it has been observed that the condition of information, which is a sine qua non to give consent autonomously, is not sufficiently provided.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Limits to respect for autonomy principle when caring for people with dementia: Rethinking respect for people with dementia]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0007</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0007</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

Dementia is an umbrella term used for a range of conditions affecting cognitive functions, such as memory, thinking, planning, understanding, and social and emotional skills. As cognitive functions decline, the abilities associated with self-determination are compromised and people with dementia become more dependent on others. As a result, family members and caregivers face the challenge of how to respect people with dementia. With demographic change and longer life expectancy, the number of people living with dementia is increasing every year. Germany, with the highest demographic change in Europe, is an aging society with an increasing number of people with dementia, putting it at the center of the debate on respect for people with dementia. The German Ethics Council, an influential moral authority in Germany, has addressed the issue of respect for people with dementia. The Council stated that the principle of respect for autonomy is effective in respecting people with moderate severe dementia who do not have a living will. Considering the lower uptake of living wills, this issue will continue to grow in importance. With this debate in mind, this paper considers what it means to respect a person with dementia. We argue that the principle of respect for autonomy is not sufficient to respect people with dementia, and that adhering to it would lead to a contradiction in the Council’s position. To avoid this, we suggest focusing on personality and non-autonomous decision to overcome the problems of the autonomy principle-based approach.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Data Ethics: Issues related to data biases and the application of traditional ethical theories on AI Ethics]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0002</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0002</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The purpose of this article is to present and evaluate some issues related to data ethics in the era of artificial intelligence (AI). First, a philosophical definition of AI is attempted following the classic portrayal of AI presented by John Searle. This sets the frame for understanding AI and its basic components, machine learning, and big data. A distinction of the basic, traditional ethical theories (deontological ethics, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics) follows to draw an ethical schema via which to assess the discussion of data ethics in this paper. Then, the basic biases that are relevant to data gathering and processing are thoroughly presented with some significant examples to enhance understanding of these issues. After explaining the biases related to data, an assessment of how these could be eliminated follows based on the simple ethical schema presented at the initial stages of the article. None of these ethical theories suffice to eliminate data biases. However, their importance lies in the fact that they can be used as ethical methodological tools to assess data bias and understand the ways in which it may hinder the presumed objectivity of AI.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[To the sources of self-fulfillment: Contemporary interpretations of the ideas of Hryhoriy Skovoroda]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0005</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0005</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The article examines the features of the modern methodological-philosophical reception of the legacy of the most famous Ukrainian philosopher, Hryhoriy Skovoroda (1722–1794), and its timeless heuristic influence on cultural sociality. The introduction outlines the general state of the development of academic Skovorodian studies. For the first time, the specifics of three research approaches in understanding the central issues of Skovoroda’s teachings – the sources of human self-realization – are analyzed in comparative juxtaposition. In the first paragraph, it is emphasized that the cultural approach views Skovoroda’s ideas through the lens of the dominant Neoplatonic Ukrainian tradition of philosophizing, known as the “philosophy of the heart”. In the second paragraph, it is argued that the ethno-psychological approach significantly helps to systematize Skovoroda’s ideas by considering their connection with the national Ukrainian mentality and the Slavic “worldview”. As an example, the practical ethics of Skovoroda and Masaryk are compared. The third paragraph, using a semiotic approach, interprets the teachings on self-realization in light of Skovoroda’s proposed theses on the antinomy of human cognition, the dual nature of man, and the concept of vocation. It is argued that, in each of the approaches discussed, Skovoroda’s conscious integration of his “life philosophy” and personal self-fulfillment into Ukrainian reality is emphasized, aiming to revive the inherent values of freedom, dignity, and justice in collective national identity and culture.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Kierkegaard’s early philosophy of history: A view for contemporary times]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0009</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0009</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This study seeks to show that the ethical considerations put forward by Søren Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, judge William, in Either/Or Part 2, stem from a novel and so far, completely ignored, philosophy of history. We start with a close contextualization of William’s immediate motivation, namely, to help a friend overcome the existential despair which is typical of any aesthetic outlook on life. In so doing, we show how William implicitly advances a distinct representation of history, which is both tragic and spiritually meaningful. Next, we address very briefly the originality of William’s meditations by contrasting them with Hegel’s idealist theory of history. We conclude with the enumeration of several distinguishing characteristics of William’s argument, which render it, not just philosophically and morally noteworthy, but also very relevant today.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Kierkegaard and modernity: Truth and decision]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0003</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ebce-2025-0003</guid>
            <pubDate>Tue, 03 Jun 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article is intended to be an interpretation to the question of truth in Kierkegaardian writings under the pseudonym of Johannes Climacus (mainly from Concluding Unscientific Postscript), and intended to present, in accordance with his insightful considerations of his time, the most essential points of what might be called a Kierkegaardian diatribe addressed to modernity. At the same time, his ideas are confronted with other thinkers in a dialectical way in order to contrast them and to delimit their meaning. The distinguished Dane suggests surreptitiously, but also directly, a vindication of what is human based on a search for Christian truth, decision-making, the passion to exist, intensive spirituality, and the convictions that give meaning to human existence. All this in the face of the characteristics of modernity, such as excessive rationality, reflection, scientific objectivity, abstract subjectivity and, in general, intellectual confusion with respect to the categories proper to the Christian religion
]]></description>
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