<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<rss version="2.0">
    <channel>
        <title>Białostockie Studia Prawnicze Feed</title>
        <link>https://sciendo.com/journal/BSP</link>
        <description>Sciendo RSS Feed for Białostockie Studia Prawnicze</description>
        <lastBuildDate>Sat, 04 Apr 2026 11:11:01 GMT</lastBuildDate>
        <docs>https://validator.w3.org/feed/docs/rss2.html</docs>
        <generator>https://github.com/jpmonette/feed</generator>
        
        <copyright>All rights reserved 2026, University of Białystok</copyright>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Digital Coercion? The Financial Market and the Right to Digital Opt-Out between Fiction and Reality]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.08</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.08</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article examines the challenges that digitalisation poses for the regulation of contemporary financial markets and the implications for individual freedom. The financial sector demonstrates how ‘digital coercion’ can threaten the right not to use technology, raising questions about the balance between protecting citizens’ rights and enabling participation in a digitalised economy. The focus is on how technological development, especially artificial intelligence (AI), affects everyday interactions with financial systems and whether individuals still have a genuine choice to remain outside digital frameworks. The analysis relies primarily on the dogmatic-legal method, complemented by axiological reflection and critical legal perspectives, to reveal tensions between existing regulations, constitutional values and human rights. Digital coercion occurs when opting out of technology is no longer practically possible, particularly in finance where alternatives diminish as digital tools dominate. While it may be theoretically possible to avoid financial technology, doing so risks exclusion from essential functions such as accessing credit or managing finances. EU regulations like the AI Act, MiCA and DORA reinforce this process, promoting and effectively enforcing digitalisation while limiting the right to digital opt-out. Although these frameworks aim to safeguard privacy and freedom, in practice technologies and algorithms increasingly shape financial markets, often in opaque ways. In line with Lawrence Lessig’s notion that ‘code is law’, algorithms become de facto lawmakers, establishing norms that constrain free consumer choice. Consequently, the right not to use technology becomes largely illusory when access to fundamental services depends on technological infrastructure.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Unseen Influence: Computational Propaganda, Free Elections, and the Reluctance to Seek Judicial Remedies in Poland. Evidence from AI-Assisted Case Law Analysis]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.14</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.14</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The Polish electoral system adheres to the principle of free and fair elections. This principle has a defined content, and its backbone remains access to truthful information and the free shaping of opinions about a candidate or an issue put to a referendum. However, the enormous increase in computational power and the associated development of artificial intelligence have caused electoral competition to become highly aggressive; it no longer avoids false information, messages appealing to negative emotions, or calls for violence. Very Large Online Platforms’ predictable abdication of their role as moderators of public debate leads to the question: How can or should public authorities protect integrity and freedom of participation from abuse in the era of digital constitutionalism? Should we rely on a litigation system where the initiative comes solely from the participant in the electoral process, or should we also include the regulatory power of the electoral administration? What picture of electoral campaigns is provided by Polish jurisprudence concerning electoral disputes?
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Legal Entity Identifier and Legacy Systems: Harmonisation, Interoperability, and Balance in Digital Governance]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.12</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.12</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article examines the Legal Entity Identifier (LEI) as a cornerstone of contemporary digitalised governance. Originally introduced in response to the 2008 financial crisis to address systemic opacity in financial markets, the LEI has since evolved into a global public-good infrastructure that enables interoperability, transparency, and accountability across jurisdictions and sectors. This study investigates the extent to which the LEI can be effectively implemented in Poland and the European Union, and what legal, institutional, and economic barriers constrain its universal adoption. The research employs a multi-method design, combining doctrinal and comparative analysis with empirical evidence from European supervisory projects (the EIOPA, ESMA, ECB, and EBA) and a Polish case study conducted under an NCN project on tax administration. Findings confirm that the LEI strengthens systemic risk monitoring, audit quality, and SME participation in global trade, but also reveal persistent barriers, including renewal costs, administrative burdens, and fragmented domestic identifiers. The analysis identifies four pillars of reform – universality, interoperability, continuity, and public co-financing – necessary to embed the LEI within governance systems. Comparative lessons from the United States and Japan demonstrate that statutory identifiers can extend beyond finance and support innovation while oversight is maintained. The article concludes that only by recognising the LEI as a structural component of digitalised governance can its transformative potential for transparent, resilient, and inclusive public administration be fully realised.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Limited Use and Non-Use of Digital Tools and Technologies in the Activities of Political Parties in Poland]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.07</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.07</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article examines selected causes and manifestations of a limited use or outright non-use of digital technologies and tools by political parties in Poland. The analysis focuses on key areas of party activity within the digital ecosystem, particularly internal dimensions such as membership, party financing, internal e-voting, and decision-making processes. The research design combines a review of the existing literature, critical analysis of primary sources (including party websites and statutes), and original data derived from an expert survey.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Right to Privacy and the Obligation to Transfer and Authenticate Personal Data through the Internet: Conflicting Issues]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.10</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.10</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

Contemporary legal and commercial solutions practised by various types of businesses are associated with a definition of precisely specified obligations imposed on the actors of the indicated activities (natural persons, legal persons and other legal entities). This also includes an obligation to perform specific actions only (or in parallel) electronically, including the implementation and application of top-down (authoritative) authentication processes, defined by legislation and by commercial entities. In practice, there is a lot of controversy concerning both the necessity of such solutions and the definition of the nature and scope of protection of the rights of individuals who are obliged to transfer certain information in this way. This is not only about minimizing the possible liability of the specific actor who obtains this type of data (the administrative body, institution or entity, e.g. an entrepreneur) for its loss and/or improper use, but in general about justifying the necessity of this type of obligation. Analysis of these issues will be presented as part of a substantive study considered in the light of limits for protecting the right to privacy.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Legal and Ethical Issues Related to the Use of Artificial Intelligence in the Field of Justice]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.11</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.11</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) has created many opportunities in various areas of human life, such as facilitating healthcare and education, improving production processes and creating labour efficiencies, or enabling human connections through social media, to name a few. Even though AI technology can be of excellent service to humanity, it also risks embedding biases which result in discrimination and inequality, as well as violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which, not surprisingly, raise numerous legal and ethical concerns. Given these issues, this paper endeavours to provide some insights into the application of artificial intelligence in the judiciary and to answer some questions which might be posed in this context: Are AI algorithms capable of simulating judicial decision-making? Can legal and ethical standards characteristic of the judicial function be maintained when AI tools are employed in the field of justice? The main highlights of the paper refer to the shaping of the legal framework in the AI area, compliance with ethical guidelines and recommendations, and risks and biases created and embedded by AI algorithms, as well as the issue of transparency towards both parties and the public, and in the area of AI algorithmic reasoning and methods. The paper concludes with some examples of national case law from courts’ decisions on AI from five EU Member States, which provide specific case background for the issue in question.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Prawo dostępu do Internetu, prawo do niekorzystania z Internetu i prawo do bycia offline a prawo do prywatności – czy multiplikacja praw człowieka jest remedium na ich efektywność?]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.03</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.03</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The research objective of this study is to address the need for scientific interest in categories that are somewhat overshadowed by analyses dedicated to internet access, namely the categories of not using the internet and being offline, and their possible conceptualisation within the framework of the next human rights, in order to then refer to the longer history of human rights and the established status of the right to privacy. The leading research perspective is that of human rights, which has allowed important questions to be asked in the context of the intensifying phenomenon of the multiplication of rights. In this context, is moving towards a standardisation of the right to access the internet, the right not to use the internet and the right to be offline justified and, as such, is it confirmed in the axiologically conditioned protective function of law? Does the multiplication of rights not undermine the effectiveness of their protection mechanisms and obliterate the values underlying them and the scope of their protection? Should the well-established right to privacy shape the content of the right to access the internet, or on the contrary the right not to use the internet or the right to be offline, even if one wants to recognise them as having a postulatory character de lege lata?
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Constitutionalization of the Internet and the Right to Non-Use]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.02</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.02</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The author discusses the phenomenon of non-use, defined as a conscious refusal to use the internet, and its constitutional justification. She defends the thesis according to which an individual’s decision not to use the internet, and thus electronic communication, may have a constitutional background. It is also discussed that the traditionally understood principle of freedom of form should not be subject to an exception that makes the effectiveness of administrative proceedings dependent on their performance electronically, especially through an ICT system. This constitutionally guaranteed right cannot be hindered by a lack of or deficiency in the necessary statutory regulations. The introduction of a procedural regulation about the right not to use the internet within the laws on administrative and tax proceedings is postulated.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Jawność postępowania gospodarczego a elektronizacja procesu cywilnego]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.15</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.15</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The principle of openness is a guiding principle of the organisation of justice; the right to an open hearing of a case, inter alia a civil case, is a human right, although not an absolute one. Therefore the digitisation of the civil process should not affect this right. All forms of digitisation are in practice really concerned with the technical and not the substantive aspects of the proceedings. Technical innovations aimed at improving the civil process should be introduced primarily in commercial cases; in the digital age, this does not infringe on the right to a court. Before attempting to apply artificial intelligence to the adjudication of court cases (if that is really possible), it would be advisable first to completely digitise the civil process, especially commercial proceedings.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Right Not to Use the Internet and Protection against the Digital Divide: Some Preliminary Remarks]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.01</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.01</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article discusses the concept of the so-called ‘right not to use the internet’ in the context of the digital divide. Multiple measures, undertaken at national and supranational levels with the purpose of ensuring the digital transition, have led to the expansion of the online sphere. At the same time, and despite the continuing commitments of public authorities to strengthen digital accessibility, the number of people deprived of full access and the capacity to use new information and communication technologies remains relatively high, even within developed countries. Furthermore, the current digital revolution undermines freedom of choice regarding internet use, imposing a de facto obligation to be constantly online. The authors argue that the concept of the right not to use the internet may serve as a compelling argument when making policies to counteract any digital inequalities and to preserve the fundamental freedom of choice, including the freedom to be offline.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Right to (Not) Make an Electronic Will: The Case of Nevada]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.13</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.13</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

In 2001, the US state of Nevada became the first in the world to issue regulations directly introducing electronic wills into the legal system. This article provides a brief historical overview of this regulation, as well as the practice of preparing them (or rather the lack thereof) for many years after their introduction. In July 2019, the Uniform Law Commission (Electronic Wills Committee) completed work on the framework for the Uniform Electronic Wills Act, which can be easily adopted by all states. This Act covers the basic regulations necessary for preparing electronic wills, omitting the more controversial and extensive ones found in the Nevada Revised Statutes and leaving states free to choose some of the proposed solutions. The approval of the Uniform Electronic Wills Act and the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic and the associated isolation undoubtedly contributed to the increased interest of state legislatures in electronic wills, as well as the acceleration of work on related legislation. The possibility of witnesses participating in the preparation of a will without being personally present but rather using remote attestation using audiovisual communication turned out to be particularly attractive. The list of states explicitly regulating the form of electronic wills has begun to grow, and at the same time, mentions of the first electronic wills being prepared have begun to appear.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Human Rights and Digital Choice: Rethinking the Right (Not) to Use the Internet]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.04</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.04</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

As digitalization permeates nearly all areas of life, access to the internet has become essential for the exercise of numerous human rights, including freedom of expression, access to information, and participation in public life. However, the growing expectation to engage digitally may undermine individual autonomy, especially when access to fundamental services or legal entitlements depends on being online. This article examines the underexplored concept of the right not to use the internet as a human rights issue. It argues that digital non-use – whether by choice, necessity, or circumstance – must be recognized as an aspect of informational self-determination rooted in the principles of dignity and autonomy. While access to the internet facilitates other rights, the freedom to disconnect is equally essential to prevent new forms of exclusion, coercion, and surveillance. Drawing on evolving interpretations of existing rights – particularly the rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and non-discrimination – the paper proposes that digital autonomy requires protecting both positive and negative dimensions: the right to use the internet and the right not to use it. It hypothesizes that formally recognizing a ‘right to digital non-use’ as a separate human right faces significant challenges in highly digitalized societies, while the existing European human rights framework is sufficiently robust to protect this right. The analysis supports both hypotheses.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Czas pracy a prawo do bycia offline – analiza w świetle koncepcji „non-use of technology” w prawie polskim i unijnym]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.05</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.05</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The development of technology undoubtedly affects the way work is performed. New digital tools significantly influence the performance of work, on the one hand introducing flexibility and new opportunities, but also leading to the blurring of boundaries between the professional and private spheres. The increasingly widespread use of digital tools – including communication and monitoring applications – creates new challenges in the area of employee privacy protection and the realization of the right to rest. In this context, growing emphasis is placed on the concept of non-use of technology, which denotes the right to refrain from using technology in the name of autonomy and well-being, as well as on the right to disconnect, understood as the employee’s entitlement to be unavailable outside working hours. Both concepts complement each other and may constitute an element of employee rights protection. The aim of this study is to present the essence of the right to disconnect and its connection with working time and the right to rest, as well as to indicate the extent to which EU and Polish regulations provide protection against the culture of permanent availability. The analysis encompasses legal acts, case law, and scholarly literature, which allows for an assessment of whether the right to disconnect should be regarded as an instrument supplementing traditional labour law provisions in the context of advancing digitalization.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[(Nie)dopuszczalność stosowania neurotechnologii w miejscu pracy]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.06</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.06</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

Neurotechnology, together with the rapid development of artificial intelligence, opens up a world of almost infinite possibilities. It is also finding applications in the work environment. Despite the undoubtedly positive effects of the use of neural tools in the workplace (the possibility of improving work efficiency, enhancing the health and safety system, or risk management), they bring obvious threats to the dignity, privacy, psychological privacy, and other personal assets of the worker. There is no doubt that technological progress will redefine human life, may significantly affect social relations as we have known them so far, and will give rise to unprecedented consequences for human rights. It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the existing legal regulations are a sufficient response to these challenges, or whether it is nevertheless necessary to amend the regulations or enact a new law.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[The Development and Implementation of the Right to Disconnect in Different Jurisdictions]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.09</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.04.09</guid>
            <pubDate>Fri, 28 Nov 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article examines the development and implementation of the right to disconnect in selected jurisdictions, with particular attention to its legal foundations and its implications for employee well -being, productivity, and work–life balance. The central hypothesis is that explicit statutory regulation, supported by organizational practice, provides stronger protections for workers than reliance on general working-time provisions alone. The study applies doctrinal, comparative, historical, and socio-legal methods, and incorporates insights from a small-scale survey of remote workers. The analysis shows that while France and Italy have introduced comprehensive legislative frameworks, other countries, such as Romania and Japan, continue to rely primarily on working-time limits, and Canada is moving towards a mixed federal–provincial model. The article concludes that sustainable implementation of the right to disconnect requires not only statutory safeguards but also collective bargaining, cultural change, and sector-specific adaptations.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Nadzór AML nad kryptoaktywami od 30.12.2024 r. – zmiany w Dyrektywie 2015/849 wprowadzone rozporządzeniem 2023/1113]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.08</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.08</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The aim of this article is to take a closer look at the most important changes to EU AML supervision of cryptoassets introduced to EU Directive 2015/849 by EU Regulation 2023/1113. Th e analysis leads to the thesis that as of 30 December 2024, this supervisory landscape has been significantly remodelled. There have been changes to the subject of supervision, the scope of supervised activity, entity modifications and licensing requirements. These changes are aimed at tightening AML supervision over cryptoassets. The considerations made also allow us to state that the EU legislation perceives the MiCA regulation as a legal act of a systemic nature for a new class of assets, i.e. cryptoassets.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Model i środki bezpośredniej ochrony praw podmiotowych nabywców i posiadaczy kryptoaktywów w prawie polskim]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.06</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.06</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The legal basis for investigations into the model and means of direct protection of the subjective rights of buyers and holders of cryptoassets in Polish law is the provisions of the MiCA Regulation and the provisions of the Polish Act on Cryptoassets, assuming that the draft law will be adopted in the form known on 31 December 2024. Summarizing the normative solutions already in force and planned in Polish law which are devoted to the means of direct protection for the subjective rights of purchasers and holders of cryptographic assets is a source of limited optimism. In the current legal situation, the model of protecting the subjective rights of buyers and holders of cryptographic assets is not effective, and the means of direct protection of these subjective rights are not sufficient or fully effective.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Ad ministracja publiczna rynku finansowego wobec innowacji. Centrum innowacji (innovation hub), piaskownica regulacyjna (regulatory sanbox) i inne specjalne instytucje regulacyjne innowacji]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.13</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.13</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The digitalization of products and services on the financial market creates new challenges for public authorities administering this area. The Polish Financial Supervision Authority (PFSA) has been legally obliged to take care of the security of the market and at the same time support the innovation of it. Currently, innovation is strongly related to digitalization. This means that the PFSA has had to find legal and organizational solutions to fulfil these obligations. This article presents an argument indicating the contradiction between security and innovation. It then discusses solutions that allow the maximization of both security and innovation in the financial market. These solutions were developed in the administrations of highly developed financial markets and have already been transferred or can be transferred to the practice of the PFSA. On the basis of the British solutions, the article gives the examples of and discusses the most important solutions, collectively referred to as special regulatory institutions for innovation, i.e. innovation hubs, regulatory and digital sandboxes and innovation pathways.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Problem adekwatności rozwiązań prawnych przyjętych przez polskiego ustawodawcę dla zgromadzeń online wspólników spółek kapitałowych – ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem regulacji dotyczących prostej spółki akcyjnej]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.03</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.03</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

The aim of this article is to discuss the use of digital technologies to conduct online shareholder meetings in limited liability companies, joint-stock companies, and simple joint-stock companies under Polish law. The authors rely on a dogmatic analysis of amendments in this area introduced in the Polish Commercial Companies Code before and after the COVID-19 pandemic, supported by a comparative method with German and Austrian law. It is argued that the regulation of simple joint-stock companies is not compatible with the regulation of limited liability companies and joint-stock companies, and therefore three de lege ferenda postulates have been formulated: (1) online shareholder meetings in a simple joint-stock company should be foreseen by default as ex lege, not as up-to-date ex contractu, which will constitute a unification with the ex lege model already existing in limited liability companies and joint-stock companies, (2) the prerequisite of secrecy in voting should also be maintained in a simple joint-stock company, (3) more generally, due to the rapid changes in technology and the development of artificial intelligence systems, the regulation of online shareholder meetings in all types of companies should be regularly revised at certain time intervals, and these revisions should be programmed by law.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Can a National Financial Supervisor Support the Development of the Fintech Sector? Innovation Hubs as a Tool for Supporting Innovation: The Examples of Poland, Estonia, and Italy]]></title>
            <link>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.14</link>
            <guid>https://sciendo.com/article/10.15290/bsp.2025.30.03.14</guid>
            <pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2025 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[

This article aims to examine one of the primary tools utilized by national financial supervisors to support innovative projects in the fintech sector. The analysis focuses primarily on the Innovation Hub established by the Polish Financial Supervision Authority (KNF), with additional insights provided from similar initiatives in two other European countries, Estonia (Finantsinspektsioon) and Italy (Bank of Italy). The article is further enriched by examples from other European Economic Area supervisors. The study seeks to address the question of whether national financial supervisors can effectively support innovative projects through instruments such as innovation hubs.
]]></description>
            <category>ARTICLE</category>
        </item>
    </channel>
</rss>